SECOND DIVISION
|
EDWIN TABAO y PEREZ, Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE Respondent. |
G.R. No. 187246
Present: CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
BRION, PERALTA,**
and PEREZ, JJ. Promulgated: July 20,
2011 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
Edwin Tabao (petitioner) seeks reconsideration of our Resolution, dated June 8,
2009, denying his petition for review on certiorari for failure to show any
reversible error in the assailed
Court of Appeals (CA) decision to
warrant the exercise of this Courts discretionary
appellate jurisdiction, and for raising substantially factual issues.
The evidence for the prosecution reveals
the following facts:
At around 10:00 p.m. of January 21,
1993, the petitioner was driving his Toyota
Corolla car bearing plate number PCH-111 along Governor Forbes corner
The defense presented a different
version of the incident.
The petitioner narrated that at
around 10:00 p.m. of January 21, 1993, he was driving along Governor Forbes
corner
Mendez, for his
part, testified that at around 9:00 to 9:30 p.m. of January 21, 1993, he left his girlfriends house
in Blumentritt, Sta. Cruz,
The Office of the City Prosecutor
found probable cause and thereafter charged the petitioner and Mendez with
reckless imprudence resulting to homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 39, P478,434.12
as actual damages; (b) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and (c) P50,000.00
as moral damages.[16]
The petitioner filed an appeal before
the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR. No. 28401. The CA, in its decision[17]
dated July 27, 2007, agreed with the factual findings of the RTC, and affirmed
its decision with the modification that the petitioner be sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four years, nine months and 10 days
of prision correccional, as maximum.
The petitioner moved to reconsider
this decision, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution[18]
of March 17, 2009.
The petitioner
filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari alleging
that the courts a quo erred in
convicting him of the crime charged. As earlier stated, we denied this petition
for failure to show any reversible error in the assailed CA decision to warrant
the exercise of our discretionary appellate jurisdiction, and for raising
substantially factual issues.
The
petitioner now comes to us via the
present motion for reconsideration, raising the following arguments:
I.
THE
FINDINGS OF FACTS OF BOTH THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ARE
HIGHLY SPECULATIVE, MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN AND
UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE [ON RECORD;]
II.
[THE]
COURT OF APPEALS [ERRED IN UPHOLDING HIS] CONVICTION [ON THE BASIS OF THE]
INCREDIBLE AND UNRELIABLE TESTIMONY OF x x x VICTOR SORIANO[; and]
III. THE [SUPREME] COURT DISREGARDED [HIS CONSTITUTIONAL] PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE.[19]
In its Comment, the People of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, prays that the motion
be denied for being pro forma; the
petitioner merely advanced the same arguments which he raised in his
appellants brief and motion for reconsideration before the CA.
After due consideration, we resolve
to DENY the motion.
As a general rule,
findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are
binding and conclusive upon this Court; we will not normally disturb these
factual findings unless they are palpably
unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is based on
a misapprehension of facts.[20]
After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to overturn the lower
courts factual findings that found the petitioner guilty of the crime charged.
The
petitioner was positively identified by an eyewitness
The fact of Rochelle Lanetes death
was stipulated during pre-trial, as well as duly established during trial.[22]
What remain to be proven beyond reasonable doubt are the inexcusable lack in
precaution on the part of the petitioner and the direct link of his negligence
to the victims death.
An eyewitness account established
that the petitioners vehicle actually hit Rochelle Lanete. Eyewitness
identification is vital evidence, and, in most cases, decisive of the success
or failure of the prosecution.[23]
One of the prosecution witnesses, Victor Soriano, unfortunately for the
petitioners cause, saw the incident in its entirety; Victor thus provided direct evidence as eyewitness to the very
act of the commission of the crime.[24]
In his September 1, 1994 testimony, Victor positively identified the
petitioner as the person who drove the car that ramped on an island divider along
Governor Forbes corner
ATTY. ALICIA SERRANO:
Q: Mr.
Soriano, do you remember where were you on or about 10:00 oclock (sic) of
January 21, 1993?
VICTOR SORIANO:
A: Yes,
maam.
Q: Where
were you?
A: I
was at the corner of Governor Forbes and G. Tuazon.
Q: What
were you doing at the corner of Governor Forbes and G. Tuazon at that time?
A: My
sidecar was parked there because I was waiting for my wife, maam.
Q: And
when you were there at the corner of G. Tuazon and Governor Forbes at the said
time and place, was there any unusual incident that happened?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q:
And what was that unusual incident?
A:
I saw an accident involving a speeding
car which ramped over the island and bumped a woman who was crossing the
street.
Q: When you saw that the car ramped over the
island and hit and bumped a woman, what happened to the woman that was hit and
bumped by the car which you said ramped over the island?
A: The woman was thrown at the middle of the
road on her back, maam.
Q: When you saw this woman after being hit and
bumped by the car that ramped over the island and was thrown at the middle of
the road, what else happened?
x
x x x
A: The
woman was no longer moving at that time when I saw another car coming.
x
x x x
Q: What else happened when you saw the car
coming very fast?
A: The
woman sprawled at the middle of the road was ran over by the speeding car and
that car stopped while going up to the flyover.
x
x x x
Q: You said you saw a car that ramped over the
island and that the car that ramped over the island was the car that hit and
bumped the victim that was thrown at the middle of the street. Now, will you be
able to identify before this court the driver of that car that ramped over the
island and hit and bumped the victim?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: If that driver of the car that hit and
bumped the victim is inside the courtroom, would you be able to point to him
before this Honorable Court?
A: Yes, maam, he is here.
Q: Will
you kindly point before this courtroom who is that driver of the car that hit
and bumped the victim? Although, Your Honor, there was already a stipulation at
the start of the pre-trial admitting that the accused Tabao is the driver of
the car which ramped at the divider.
INTERPRETER:
Witness approaching a man seated inside the
courtroom and who stood up and identified as Edwin Tabao, the accused in this
case.[25] [emphases ours]
On
cross-examination, Victor further elaborated on what he saw of the incident:
ATTY. ESTEBAN NANCHO:
Q: Mr.
Soriano, you said that the first car ramped over the island and bumped a woman,
and as a result of that, the woman was thrown at the middle of
VICTOR SORIANO:
A: Yes,
sir, that is true.
Q: And
can you tell us how the woman was hit, was bumped by the car that ramped over
the island?
A: The
woman was crossing the street and when she saw the on-coming car, she tried to
avoid that but the car [which] ramped over the island bumped the woman.
Q: In
other words, the car first ramped over the island before it hit the woman?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: What
part of the car bumped the woman?
A: The
bumper of the car, the left side of the bumper.
Q: What
part of the body of the victim was hit by the car?
A: Her
left side of the body.
Q: Are
you saying that the victim was facing the car when the car bumped her.
A: Yes,
sir, she was facing the car. She was about
to avoid that car.
Q: How was the woman thrown at the middle of
A: She
was thrown backwards.
Q: And
what part of the body of the victim first hit the pavement?
A: The
back of her head.
x
x x x
Q: And
you said after the woman was thrown at the middle of the street[,] another
speeding car ran over the body of the woman?
A: Yes,
sir.
x
x x x
Q: Now,
from the time the body of the victim was thrown at the middle of the street,
how much time had lapsed when the second car ran over the body of the victim?
A: Not
more than one minute. When I saw the car, it was a little bit far then I saw
the car running very fast. It did not take more than a minute.
x
x x x
Q: Now,
did you point at any person gathered at the scene of the accident that it were (sic)
the 2 accused who were responsible for the accident?
A: I told Cielo about that and I told him
that whoever brought the victim to the hospital is the one who ran over the
victim.[26]
The
petitioner nonetheless claims that Victor is not a credible witness due to inconsistencies between his affidavit and
court testimony. He harps on the fact that Victor declared in his
affidavit that the petitioners car first hit Rochelle
before it ramped on an island divider; while he testified in court that the
petitioners vehicle ramped on the island divider before hitting the victim.
We find these arguments
unmeritorious.
Discrepancies and/or inconsistencies between a witness affidavit and testimony in open court do not impair credibility as affidavits are taken ex
parte and are often incomplete or inaccurate for lack or absence of searching
inquiries by the investigating officer.[27]
At any rate, Victor was able to sufficiently explain the discrepancies between
his affidavit and court statements. Victor reasoned out that the secretary who
typed his affidavit made a mistake; and explained that he signed the affidavit
despite the inaccuracies in paragraph 2 because the secretary told him, kasi ho magugulo ang naimakinilya na.[28]
Accordingly, when Victor informed his lawyer during the first day of the
hearing about the inaccuracy, the latter told him to state the truth regardless
of what was written in his affidavit.
The general rule that
contradictions and discrepancies between the testimony of a witness and his
statements in an affidavit do not necessarily discredit him is not without
exception, as when the omission in the affidavit refers to a very important
detail of the incident that one relating the incident as an eyewitness would
not be expected to fail to mention, or when the narration in the sworn
statement substantially contradicts the testimony in court.[29] In the present case, we see no substantial
contradiction in Victors affidavit and in his court statements as he declared
in both that he saw the petitioners car ramp on the island divider and bump
Rochelle. As to whether the car ramped on the center island before or after it
bumped the victim does not detract from the fundamental fact that Victor saw and identified the petitioner
as the driver of the car that ramped on the island divider and hit Rochelle.
As earlier discussed, Victor sufficiently explained this inconsistency during
the trial.
Victor, who stood only seven meters
from the incident, clearly and in a straightforward manner described how the
petitioners car had bumped the victim. We
thus see no reason to overturn the lower courts finding regarding Victors
credibility, more so since the petitioner did
not impute any ill motive that could have induced Victor to testify falsely.
The fundamental and settled rule is that the trial
court's assessment regarding the credibility of witnesses is
entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal,
especially when the assessment is affirmed by the CA.
The positive identification in this
case, coupled with the failure of the defense to impute any ill-motive on the
eyewitness, to our mind, works to dispel reasonable doubt on the fact that the petitioners
car had in fact hit Rochelle. The eyewitness account provides the necessary
link between the petitioners failure to exercise precaution in operating his
vehicle and Rochelle Lanetes death.
The
right of a person using public streets and highways for travel in relation to other motorists is mutual, coordinate
and reciprocal.[30]
He is bound to
anticipate the presence of other persons whose rights on the street or highway
are equal to his own.[31] Although he is not an insurer against injury
to persons or property, it is nevertheless his duty to operate his motor
vehicle with due and reasonable care and caution under the circumstances for
the safety of others as well as for his own.[32]
The
petitioner repeatedly admitted that as he drove his vehicle on his way home
from work on January 21, 1993, he did not notice the island divider at
the foot of the Nagtahan Flyover. As a result, his car ramped on the island so
that both its rear wheels became elevated from the road and he could no
longer maneuver the vehicle.[33]
The petitioner even testified that his car had to be towed.[34]
Later, during cross-examination, he
admitted that all four wheels of his car, not just the two rear wheels mentioned
in his earlier testimony, lost contact with the ground.[35]
The entire vehicle, therefore, ended
up on top of the island divider. He puts
the blame for the ramping and, essentially, his failure to notice the island on
the darkness of nighttime and the alleged newness of the island.[36]
To
our mind, the fact that the petitioners entire vehicle ended up ramped
on the island divider strongly indicates what actually happened in the
unfortunate incident. The vehicle could not have ended up in that
condition had the petitioner been driving at a reasonable speed. We are not
persuaded by the petitioners rather simplistic account that mere darkness,
coupled with the traffic islands alleged newness, caused his car to veer off
the traffic trajectory of
A motorist is expected to exercise
ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with all the
conditions encountered,[37] to enable him to keep the vehicle under control
and, whenever necessary, to put
the vehicle to a full stop to avoid injury to others using the highway.[38]
It has not escaped our notice that the intersection of
The fact that the petitioner was
driving near the Governor Forbes Street and G. Tuazon Street intersection gives
rise to the expectation that he would drive at a speed that anticipated or
would have anticipated that other persons are on the road, whether as pedestrians
or as motorists. The facts show, however, that the petitioner was driving his
car at an inappropriate speed for a vehicle crossing an intersection. Otherwise,
he should have been able to put his vehicle to a complete stop or, at the very
least, at a speed that would have prevented his car from climbing entirely on
top of the island divider. That the petitioners entire vehicle
landed on top of the traffic island body, chassis, four wheels and all sufficiently
indicates his speed at that time. The force that propels an entire car off the
street and on top of a traffic island could only have been inordinate speed, or
at least speed beyond that of a motorist coming from or going to an
intersection. In short, the ramping of
his vehicle demonstrably indicates to us that the petitioner failed to observe
the duty to maintain a reasonable speed.
We therefore believe Victors testimony that the petitioner was
speeding when he bumped the victim.[41]
We
are likewise not persuaded by the petitioners claim that darkness and the
traffic islands alleged newness justify his failure to notice the island. The petitioners admission that he did not
notice the traffic island is in itself an indication of his failure to observe
the vigilance demanded by the circumstances. Ultimately, it shows the criminal
recklessness for which he has been convicted. The record shows that pedestrians
were present in the vicinity at the time of the incident. The CA even pointed
out that the vicinity is near residential areas, while we pointed out its proximity to an
intersection. The darkness and these circumstances should have caused the
petitioner to be more alert and more vigilant, to say nothing of slowing his
car down. Newly constructed or not, the
island divider should have received the petitioners due attention. His bare allegation that the island lacked
markers or reflectorized marks is likewise not persuasive. As the trial court
correctly observed, many other vehicles passed the same road that night but
only the petitioner failed to notice the island divider.[42]
We thus find the trial court to be correct when it held that the petitioner failed
to exercise precaution in operating his vehicle on the night of the incident.
The location of the victims
injuries vis--vis
the position of the
petitioners vehicle
The petitioner insists that his car could not have bumped the victim because his car was coming from the right side (i.e., from Espaa), while the victim was hit on the left side of her body. He argues that if the victim was on her way to her house on Mabini Street coming from the corner of Governor Forbes Street and G. Tuazon Street (where she alighted), then the responsible vehicle could only have come from the left (i.e., from Nagtahan) as only those vehicles coming from this direction could hit the victim on the left side of her body. He further claims that his car had no dents or scratches.
The petitioners arguments are misleading.
Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., the attending physician, testified
that the victim suffered multiple injuries compatible and consistent with a
vehicular accident.[43]
He did not state that the injuries suffered by the victim were only on her left
side. In fact, a perusal of Dr. Altezas initial medical report shows that the
victim suffered injuries both on the
left and right sides of her body. In addition, Dr. Floresto Arizala, Jr.,
the National Bureau of Investigation medico-legal officer who conducted an
autopsy on Rochelles body, confirmed that the victim suffered injuries on
various parts of her lower right and left extremities as a result of the
initial or primary impact.
The petitioner relies heavily on Dr. Altezas statement allegedly declaring that the victims injuries on her lower left leg and left thigh were the primary impact injuries. However, this statement was not based on the actual incident but on Dr. Altezas presumptions. For clarity, we reproduce Dr. Altezas testimony:
ATTY. SERRANO:
Q: Now doctor, you said that these injuries you found x x x on the body of the victim are compatible and consistent with a vehicular accident. Would you tell this court how these injuries were sustained?
x x x x
Doctor,
what would be the possible situation
when you use compatible and consistent vehicular accident?
DR. ALTEZA:
A: If I would be allowed to make some
presumptions, if the patient was standing up at that time he was hit by a
vehicle, I would presume that the primary impact injuries, injuries hit first
by the vehicle are the injuries of the lower leg and the left thigh
considering that the height of the injuries are approximately the height of the
bumper as well as the hood of the car.
Q: There are
several kinds of vehicles, doctor?
A: Yes, Your
Honor, I was thinking of a car. Now, after being hit by [a] car, under normal
condition, the victim is normally thrown at the surface of the street.[44] [emphases ours]
From this
exchange, we find it clear that Dr. Alteza was merely making a hypothetical
statement that a person who is presumed to be standing when hit by a vehicle
would suffer primary impact injuries on his lower leg and left thigh. He never
declared that Rochelle suffered primary impact injuries on her lower left extremities. At any rate, it was not
improbable for the victim to have been
hit on the left side of her body as Victor testified that she (victim) tried to
avoid the petitioners car, and was in fact facing the car when she was hit.
We likewise do not believe the petitioners claim that his vehicle was not involved in the incident due to the absence of dents or scratches. As the petitioner himself admitted, his vehicle was not subjected to any investigation after the incident. Moreover, the pictures of the car, presented by the petitioner in court, were taken long after the incident and after a repair had already been done to the vehicle. There was therefore no way of verifying petitioners claim that his car did not have any dent or scratch after the incident. At any rate, the absence of a dent or a scratch on the petitioners car, assuming it to be true, does not conclusively prove his non-participation in the incident. The absence of any dent or scratch is influenced by several factors: the type of paint, the speed of the car, the points of impact, and the material used on the cars exteriors.
Weight of expert testimony
The petitioner likewise
claims that the CA violated Section 49, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court
when it disregarded the testimony of defense witness Police Senior Inspector
Danilo Cornelio who testified that the petitioners car could not have bumped
the victim because the latters body was not thrown in line with the car, but
on its side. The petitioner argues that P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio is highly
qualified in the field of traffic accident investigation, and as such, his
statements are backed-up by [the] principles of applied physics, engineering,
and mathematics.[45]
The
petitioners arguments fail to convince us.
Section 49, Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules of Court states that the opinion of a witness on a matter
requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training, which he is shown
to possess, may be received in
evidence. The use of the word may signifies that the use of opinion of an
expert witness is permissive and not mandatory on the part of the courts. Allowing the testimony does not mean, too,
that courts are bound by the testimony of the expert witness. The testimony of an expert witness must be construed
to have been presented not to sway the court in favor of any of the parties,
but to assist the court in the determination of the issue before it, and is for
the court to adopt or not to adopt depending on its appreciation of the
attendant facts and the applicable law. It
has been held of expert testimonies:
Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may place whatever weight they may choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability and character of the witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities for study and observation of the matters about which he testifies, and any other matters which deserve to illuminate his statements. The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view of all the facts and circumstances in the case and when common knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling effect. The problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of abuse of discretion.[46]
We emphasize that P/Sr.
Insp. Cornelio was not an eyewitness to the incident; his testimony was merely
based on the Traffic Accident Report prepared by SPO4 Edgar Reyes who himself
did not witness the incident. At any rate, nowhere in P/Sr. Insp. Cornelios
testimony did he conclusively state
that the petitioner could not have been involved in the incident. For clarity,
we reproduce the pertinent portions of P/Sr. Insp. Cornelios testimony:
ATTY. SERRANO:
Q: When
you said in line with the motor vehicle that bumped the victim, is it that when
a victim is bumped by the motor vehicle, the victim would be thrown in line
with the vehicle?
P/SR. INSP. CORNELIO:
A: Yes, Maam. Usually, that is the outcome of the incident.
Q: He cannot be thrown sideward?
A: Maybe if another vehicle would hit the pedestrian because
that also happened. When a pedestrian is hit by a vehicle and another vehicle
hit the pedestrian, it will be thrown somewhere else.
Q: Mr. Witness, you are testifying as far
as the vehicle of Tabao is concerned. You said that the line of vehicle that bumped the
victim would be in line. Are you telling us that it is not possible that when the
vehicle of Tabao hit the victim, the victim would be thrown sidewards?
A: Yes, Maam.
Q: What do you mean, yes, Maam?
A: He
can be thrown either in front of the vehicle that hit the victim or slightly
offset with the car of Tabao. It [may be] but not far from the side.
Q: But he would be thrown sidewise[,] not frontal?
A: Slightly
to the side but not considerable length of distance away from the car. It is
sidewards.
Q: In your Mathematics, do you consider that if a vehicle is
speeding fast, he could have thrown anything that is bumped by that vehicle far
away from the vehicle?
A: Yes, Maam, possible.
Q: So, that probability
is also possible aside from the probability that you said the victim is thrown
in line or in front. So, you are now saying it could be said that the victim
can be thrown sidewise?
A: It [may be] thrown sidewise. As I said [a while]
ago, it might be slightly offset with the vehicle that hit the pedestrian but
not too far from the side of the bumping vehicle.
Q: So, it could depend on the speed of the vehicle that bumped
the object bumped?
A: Yes, Maam.
Q: Whether it is forward
or sidewise, the distance of the object thrown would depend on the speed of the
vehicle that bumped?
A: Yes, Maam.
Q: So, if it is speeding, it could be thrown farther?
A: Yes, Maam.
Q: Sidewise or frontal?
A: It should be frontal.
Q: You said it could be
thrown sidewise do I take it correct[ly,] it can be thrown sidewise also?
A: Maybe. As I have said [a
while] ago, it [may be] slightly offset with the line of the vehicle.
x
x x x
Q: So, do we take it from you that your basis only of telling
the court that Tabao is not in [any way] responsible is the distance of the
victim from the car that bumped?
A: I am not saying categorically
that the car of Tabao is not responsible. But as I can see in the sketch
presented today in this Honorable Court, the position of the victim is too far
from the vehicle of Mr. Tabao. If I were the investigator in this particular
case, I should indicate the measurement of the victim from the car and this
sketch [does] not indicate the distance.
Q: Now, failure of the investigator to
indicate the distance, would that
show that it was not Tabao who bumped the victim?
A: I cannot say categorically that the car of Tabao indeed, hit
the victim. Because the distance is very significant in this sketch for proper
evaluation.
x
x x x
Q: So, it cannot be said
that when an object is bumped by a vehicle, it will be thrown forward. It will
all depend on which portion of the bumper hit by object bumped?
A: Yes, Maam.[47]
From
the foregoing, it is clear that P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio did not discount the possibility that the
victim could have been thrown on the side. He likewise admitted that the
location of an accident victim in relation to the vehicle would also depend on
the speed of the vehicle and the point of impact.
The defense of denial
The
petitioner denied that his car had bumped the victim, and insists that he just
saw the victims body sprawled on the road after his car had already ramped on
the island divider.
The petitioners defense of denial must crumble in light of
Victors positive and specific testimony. We reiterate that the petitioner,
aside from merely alleging the inconsistency between Victors affidavit and
court testimony, did not impute any ill motive on Victors part to falsely
testify against him. The petitioner, in fact, admitted that he and Victor did
not know each other prior to the incident. We have consistently held that positive
identification of the accused, when
categorical and consistent, and without any showing of ill-motive on the
part of the testifying eyewitness, should prevail over the denial of the
accused whose testimony is not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.[48]
A denial is negative evidence. To be believed, it must be buttressed by strong
evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, the denial is purely self-serving and has
no evidentiary value.[49]
We significantly note
that the petitioner claimed for the first time
in his present petition that he saw a rug-like thing[50]
being thrown out of a passing car as he was about to alight from his car after
turning off its engine; he later discovered that the thing thrown was a
persons body. He reiterated this claim in his motion for reconsideration
before this Court. This assertion was a clear rip-off from his co-accused
Mendez version who likewise claimed to have seen the same thing. To our mind, the modification of the petitioners
story was a belated attempt to cover up his failure to convincingly explain the
presence of the victims slumped body on the road near his car and a last-ditch
effort to exculpate himself. Nowhere in his affidavit or earlier court
testimonies, or even in his previous pleadings with the lower courts, did he
ever state that a passing car had thrown a rug-like thing[51]
on the street. The petitioners sudden change of story at this stage of the
proceedings casts doubt on the veracity of his claim.
In addition, we are baffled by the petitioners act of frequenting the hospital after the incident. Amanda Ycong, the victims aunt, testified that she saw the petitioner several times at the hospital when the victim was confined there; but would immediately leave whenever he saw members of the victims family. We find it highly unusual for a person who allegedly had no participation in the incident to be overly concerned with the victims well-being. What puzzles us even more is why the petitioner would evade members of the victims family whenever he was seen by them at the hospital.
All told, we see no
reason to overturn the lower courts findings of fact and conclusions of law
finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to DENY the motion with FINALITY, no substantial argument
having been adduced to warrant the reconsideration sought. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate
Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate
Justice |
JOSE
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
* Designated as Acting Member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 1006 dated June 10, 2011.
** Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno per Special Order No. 1040 dated July 6, 2011.
[1] TSN,
[2]
[3] TSN,
[4]
[5] Records, p. 6.
[6] TSN,
[7]
[8]
[9] TSN,
[10]
[11] TSN,
[12] TSN,
[13] The inculpatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about January 21, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused LEONARDO MENDEZ Y MENDEZ, being then the driver and person in charge of a Toyota Corona Sedan with plate [sic] No. PES-764, and accused EDWIN TABAO Y PEREZ, being then the driver and person in charge of a Toyota Corolla with plate [sic] No. PHC-111, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and operate the same along Governor Forbes intersection of G. Tuazon Streets, Sampaloc, in said City, in a careless, reckless, negligent and imprudent manner, by then and there making the said vehicle run at a speed greater than was reasonable and proper, without taking the necessary precaution to avoid accident to person considering the condition of traffic at said place at the time, causing as a consequence of such carelessness, negligence, recklessness, imprudence and lack of precaution, the said vehicle so driven, managed and operate [sic] by them in the manner above setforth, said vehicle driven by accused EDWIN TABAO Y PEREZ hit and bumped one ROCHELLE LANETE Y MATAAC, a pedestrian, causing her to be thrown on the pavement, and thereafter was ran [sic] over by the vehicle driven by accused LEONARDO MENDEZ Y MENDEZ, and as a result of the said impact, said ROCHELLE LANETE Y MATAAC sustained physical injuries which were the cause of her death thereafter.
Contrary to law. [Records, p. 1.]
[14] Penned by Judge Reynaldo G. Ros; rollo, pp. 61-92.
[15] Records, p. 735.
[16] The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the guilt of both accused, LEONARDO MENDEZ Y MENDEZ and EDWIN TABAO Y PEREZ, beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged in the Information which is for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of arresto mayor as minimum, to TWO (2) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS of prison correctional as maximum.
Both
accused are ordered to jointly and solidarity [sic] pay the heirs of the
victim Rochelle Lanete Y Mataac the amount of P478,434.12 as actual
damages; P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
[
[17] Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, and concurred in by Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Marlene Gonzales-Sison; rollo, pp. 41-60.
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] Caminos, Jr. v. People, G.R. No.
147437, May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA 348, 357, citing The Revised Penal Code,
Reyes, Luis b., 15th ed. (2001), pp. 994-995.
[22] Order dated August 5, 1993; records, p. 51. The Certificate of Death of Rochelle Lanete was presented during trial as Exhibit P; records, p. 216.
[23] People v. Meneses, 351 Phil. 331, 334 (1998), citing People v. Teehankee, Jr., 319 Phil. 128, 179 (1995).
[24] People v. Gallarde, 382 Phil. 718, 736 (2000).
[25] TSN,
[26]
[27] See People v. Villadares, 406 Phil. 530, 540 (2001).
[28] TSN, September 1, 1994, p. 47.
[29] See People v. Narvaez, 425 Phil. 381, 402-403 (2002); and People v. Castillo, 330 Phil. 205, 212 (1996).
[30] Caminos, Jr. v. People, supra note 21, at 350, citing Richards v. Begenstos, 21 N.W.2d 23, Hodges v. Smith, 298 S.W. 1023, and Lawson v. Fordyce, 12 N.W.2d 301.
[31]
[32] Id., citing Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Lyon, 107 F.2d 157, Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. McKee, 121 F.2d 583, Burdick v. Powell Bros. Truck Lines, 124 F.2d 694, Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Lane, 116 F.2d 264, Shipley v. Komer, 154 F.2d 861, and Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Owen, 101 S.W.2d 354.
[33] TSN,
[34] TSN,
[35] TSN, July 18, 2002, pp. 26-27.
[36] The pertinent portion from the
[Direct Examination of Witness Edwin Tabao. Emphasis ours.]
x x x x
Q. After you
dropped off your friend to the
A. I was heading for home and that I did not notice an island.
Q. This island is located at the foot of the Nagtahan flyover at the corner of Forbes and G. Tuazon?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So, what happened on your way home to this particular location?
A. My car was ramped on the island, sir.
Q. Why did
you not notice the island divider on that location, Mr. Witness?
A. Because it was already nighttime and it was dark so I did not notice the island and mukhang parang bago.
[37] Caminos, Jr. v. People, supra note 21, at 361, citing Foster v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 670 So.2d 471.
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41] TSN, September 1, 1994, p. 13.
[42] Records, p. 736.
[43] TSN, July 11, 1994, p. 12.
[44] TSN, July 11, 1994, pp. 15-16.
[45] Rollo, p. 204.
[46] See People v. Basite, 459 Phil. 197, 206-207 (2003), citing People v. Baid, G.R. No. 129667, July 31, 2000, 336 SCRA 656, 675.
[47] TSN,
[48] See Tapdasan, Jr. v. People, 440 Phil. 864, 877 (2002).
[49] Tan v. Pacuribot, A.M. Nos. RTJ-06-1982-1983, December 14, 2007, 540 SCRA 246, 300.
[50] Rollo, p. 7.
[51] Ibid.