SECOND DIVISION
|
GEORGE LEONARD S. UMALE, Petitioner, - versus - CANOGA PARK DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 167246
Present: CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
BRION, PERALTA,* PEREZ, and SERENO, JJ. Promulgated: July 20,
2011 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
Before us is a petition for review
on certiorari[1]
filed by George Leonard S. Umale (petitioner), challenging the August 20, 2004 Decision[2]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 78836 and its subsequent
February 23, 2005 Resolution[3]
that denied his motion for reconsideration. The CA reversed the Decision[4]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)-Branch
68,
On
On
The MTC-Branch 68 decided the
ejectment case in favor of the respondent. On appeal, the RTC-Branch 155,
During the pendency of the petition
for review, the respondent filed on
On
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff [referring to the respondent] and against the defendant and all persons claiming rights under him, as follows:
1. Defendant and all persons claiming rights under him are ordered to peacefully vacate the premises located at Lot 9, Block 5, San Miguel Avenue, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 488797 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City and to surrender the possession thereof to the plaintiff;
2. Defendant is ordered to pay unto plaintiff the following:
a.
Damages for the use of the property after the
expiration of the lease contract therefor in the amount of One Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00)
a month, beginning 16 January 2002 until he and all those claiming rights under
him have vacated and peacefully turned over the subject premises to the
plaintiff; and
b.
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as and for attorneys fees together with costs
of suit.
3. With respect to the commercial units built by [the] defendant on the subject land, he is hereby ordered to remove the same from the subject land and to restore the subject land in the same condition as it was received unto the plaintiff, at his exclusive account, failing which the same shall be removed by the plaintiff, with expenses therefor chargeable to the defendant.
On appeal, the RTC-Branch 68 reversed
and set aside the decision of the MTC-Branch 71, and dismissed Civil Case No.
9210 on the ground of litis pendentia.[16]
The petitioner, however, was still ordered to pay rent in the amount of
seventy-one thousand five hundred pesos (P71,500.00) per month beginning
Aggrieved
by the reversal, the respondent filed a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of
the Rules of Court with the CA. The respondent argued that there exists no litis
pendentia between Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 because the two cases
involved different grounds for ejectment, i.e.,
the first case was filed because of violations of the lease contract, while the
second case was filed due to the expiration of the lease contract. The
respondent emphasized that the second case was filed based on an event or a
cause not yet in existence at the time of the filing of the first case.[17]
The lease contract expired on
On
In presenting his case before this
Court, the petitioner insists that litis pendentia exists between the
two ejectment cases filed against him because of their identity with one
another and that any judgment on the first case will amount to res judicata
on the other. The petitioner argues that the respondent reiterated the ground
of violations of the lease contract, with the additional ground of the expiration
of the lease contract in the second ejectment case. Also, the petitioner
alleges that all of the elements of litis pendentia are present in this
case, thus, he prays for the reversal and setting aside of the assailed CA
decision and resolution, and for the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case
No. 9210 on the ground of litis pendentia and/or forum shopping.
We disagree with the petitioner
and find that there is no litis pendentia.
As a ground
for the dismissal of a civil action, litis pendentia refers to a
situation where two actions are pending between the same parties for the same
cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious.[19]
Litis
pendentia exists when the following requisites are present: identity
of the parties in the two actions; substantial identity in the causes of action
and in the reliefs sought by the parties; and the identity between the two
actions should be such that any judgment that may be rendered in one case,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in
the other.[20]
In the present case,
the parties bone of contention is whether Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210
involve the same cause of action. The petitioner argues that the causes of
action are similar, while the respondent argues otherwise. If an identity, or
substantial identity, of the causes of action in both cases exist, then the second
complaint for unlawful detainer may be dismissed on the ground of litis
pendentia.
We rule that Civil Case
Nos. 8084 and 9210 involve different causes of action.
Generally, a suit may
only be instituted for a single cause of action.[21] If two or more suits are
instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment on the merits in any one is ground for the dismissal of the others.[22]
Several tests exist to
ascertain whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action, such
as whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and
second causes of action[23] (also known as the same
evidence test),[24]
or whether the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the complaint
in the other.[25]
Also fundamental is the test of determining whether the cause of action in
the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint.[26]
Of the three tests cited, the third
one is especially applicable to the present case, i.e., whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the
time of the filing of the first complaint and to which we answer in the
negative. The facts clearly show that the filing of the first ejectment case
was grounded on the petitioners violation of stipulations in the lease
contract, while the filing of the second case was based on the expiration of
the lease contract. At the time the respondent filed the first ejectment
complaint on
In response to the petitioners
contention that the similarity of Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 rests on the reiteration
in the second case of the cause of action in the first case, we rule that the
restatement does not result in substantial identity between the two cases. Even
if the respondent alleged violations of
the lease contract as a ground for ejectment in the second complaint, the main
basis for ejecting the petitioner in the second case was the expiration of the
lease contract. If not for this subsequent development, the respondent could no
longer file a second complaint for unlawful
detainer because an ejectment complaint may only be filed
within one year after the accrual of the cause of action,[27]
which, in the second case, was the expiration of the lease contract.
Also, contrary to petitioners
assertion, there can be no conflict between the decisions rendered in Civil
Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 because the MTC-Branch 71 decided the latter case on
the sole issue of whether the lease contract between the parties had expired.
Although alleged by the respondent in its complaint, the MTC-Branch 71 did not
rule on the alleged violations of the lease contract committed by the
petitioner. We note that the damages awarded by the MTC-Branch 71 in Civil Case
No. 9210 were for those incurred after the expiration of the lease contract,[28]
not for those incurred prior thereto.
Similarly, we
do not find the respondent guilty of forum shopping
in filing Civil
Case No. 9210, the second civil case. To determine whether a
party violated the rule against
forum shopping, the test applied is
whether the elements
of litis pendentia
are present or
whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata
in another.[29]
Considering our pronouncement that not all the requisites of litis pendentia
are present in this case, the CA did not err in declaring that the
respondent committed no forum
shopping. Also, a
close reading of the Verification
and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping[30] (attached
to the second ejectment complaint) shows
that the respondent
did disclose that it had
filed a former complaint for unlawful detainer against the petitioner. Thus,
the respondent cannot be said to have committed a willful and deliberate forum
shopping.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate
Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate
Justice |
JOSE
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
*
Designated as Acting Member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 1006
dated
* Designated
as Acting Member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 1040 dated
[1] Rollo, pp. 24-60.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
Dated
[12] Rollo, pp. 222-227.
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Supra note 4.
[17] Rollo, p. 323.
[18]
[19] Proton Pilipinas Corporation v. Republic, G.R. No. 165027, October 16, 2006, 504 SCRA 528, 545; and Guaranteed Hotels, Inc. v. Baltao, 489 Phil. 702, 707 (2005).
[20] Dotmatrix Trading v. Legaspi, G.R.
No. 155622,
[21]
1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Section 3, Rule 2.
[22]
1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Section 4, Rule 2.
[23] Pealosa v. Tuason, 22
Phil. 303, 322 (1912); Pagsisihan v. Court of Appeals, 184 Phil. 469,
479 (1980); and Feliciano
v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil. 499, 506-507 (1998).
[24] See Agustin v.
[25] Victronics
Computers, Inc. v. RTC, Branch 63,
[26] Subic Telecommunications
Company, Inc. v.
[27] 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Section 1, Rule 70.
[28] Rollo, p. 352.
[29] Solid Homes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 337 Phil. 605, 615 (1997).
[30] Rollo, pp. 343-344.