EN
BANC
G.R. No. 163653 (COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. FILINVEST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
respondent)
G.R. No. 167689
(COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. FILINVEST DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondent)
Promulgated:
July
19, 2011
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CONCURRING
OPINION
I
concur that the property-for-shares exchange between Filinvest Development
Corporation (FDC) and Filinvest Alabang, Inc. (FAI), on one hand, and Filinvest
Land, Inc. (FLI), on the other, was tax-free under Section 34(C)(2) of the National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1993.
Section
34(C)(2) of the NIRC of 1993 provided:
Sec.
34. Determination
of amount of and recognition of gain or loss.
x
x x x
(c) Exchange of property.
x
x x x
(2) Exception.
No gain or loss shall be recognized if in pursuance of a plan of merger or
consolidation (a) a corporation which is a party to a merger or consolidation
exchanges property solely for stock in a corporation which is a party to the
merger or consolidation, (b) a shareholder exchanges stock in a corporation
which is a party to the merger or consolidation solely for the stock of another
corporation also a party to the merger or consolidation, or (c) a security
holder of a corporation which is a party to the merger or consolidation
exchanges his securities in such corporation solely for stock or securities in
another corporation, a party to the merger or consolidation. No
gain or loss shall be also be recognized if property is transferred to a
corporation by a person in exchange for stock in such a corporation of which as
a result of such exchange said person, alone or with others, not exceeding four
persons, gains control of said corporation.
Provided, That stocks issued
for services shall not be considered as issued in return for property. (Emphasis
ours.)
Control
was defined as ownership of stocks in a corporation possessing at least
fifty-one per cent of the total voting power of all classes of stock entitled
to vote.[1]
When FDC and FAI
transferred real property to FLI, they respectively acquired, in return, 61.03%
and 9.96% of the outstanding capital stock of FLI. Together, FDC and FAI held 70.99% of the
outstanding capital stock of FLI after the exchange, thus, gaining control of
FLI.
There is no
basis for the argument of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) that the
foregoing property-for-shares exchange was not tax-free because as a result of
the same, the shareholding of FDC in FLI actually decreased from 67.42% to
61.03%. Even with such decrease, the
shareholding of FDC in FLI after the exchange was still beyond 51%, hence, FDC
still had control of FLI within the meaning of Section 34(C)(2) of the NIRC of
1993. Control by FDC over FLI after the
exchange is even more evident when the shareholdings of FDC in FLI are combined
with that of FAI. It is also significant
to note that FDC owns 80% of FAI.
Section
34(C)(2) of the NIRC of 1993 is clear. Therefore,
no statutory construction or interpretation is needed. Neither can conditions
or limitations be introduced where none is provided for. Rewriting the law is a forbidden ground that
only Congress may tread upon. The Court
may not construe a statute that is free from doubt. Where the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for application. The Court has no choice but to see to it that
its mandate is obeyed.[2]
I likewise agree
that any increase in the value of the shareholdings of FDC in Filinvest Asia
Corporation (FAC) is not yet taxable income for it remains
unrealized until said shareholdings are sold or disposed of. Income in tax law is an amount of money
coming to a person within a specified time, whether as payment for services,
interest, or profit from investment. [3] It means cash or its equivalent. It is gain derived and severed from capital,
from labor, or from both combined.[4] Income should be reported at the time of the
actual gain. For income tax purposes,
income is an actual gain or an actual increase of wealth.[5] In this case, FDC will only enjoy actual gain
if it is able to sell its shareholdings in FAC at a price higher than the cost
of acquiring the same. In fact, as along
as FDC holds on to its shareholdings in FAC, FDC is at risk of suffering loss
should the value of its shareholdings in FAC decrease in the future.
Although
I am also in accord with the majority opinion that the CIR may not impute
interest income on the cash advances FDC extended to its affiliates, I have a
different basis for my vote.
Section
43 of the NIRC of 1993 grants the CIR specific authority over controlled
taxpayers, viz:
Sec. 43. Allocation
of income and deductions. In any case of two or more organizations,
trades or businesses (whether or not incorporated and whether or not organized
in the Philippines) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same
interests, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is authorized to distribute,
apportion or allocate gross income or deductions between or among such
organizations, trades or businesses, if he determines that such distribution,
apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes
or clearly to reflect the income of any such organizations, trades or
businesses.
The
majority opinion acknowledged that the situation sought to be addressed by
Section 43 of the NIRC of 1993 seemingly exists considering FDC and its
affiliates are controlled taxpayers; and FDC extended substantial sums of money
as cash advances to its affiliates as financial assistance for the operational
and capital expenditures of the latter.
The majority opinion further conceded that the power of the CIR to distribute,
apportion, or allocate gross income or deductions between or among controlled
taxpayers may be exercised whether or not fraud inheres in the transaction/s
under scrutiny; and for as long as the controlled taxpayers taxable income is
not reflective of that which it would have realized had it been dealing at
arms length with an uncontrolled taxpayer, the CIR can make the necessary
rectifications in order to prevent evasion of taxes.
Nonetheless,
the majority opinion held that the CIR cannot impute interest income on the
cash advances extended by FDC to its affiliates because: (1) there was no
evidence that the cash advances extended by FDC to its affiliates were sourced
from the loans obtained by FDC from commercial banks and for which FDC claimed
deductions of interest expense from its gross income; (2) there was no proof of
actual or probable receipt or realization by FDC of interest income from the
cash advances; and (3) there was no express stipulation in writing that
interest would be due on the cash advances as required under Article 1956 of
the Civil Code.
I
believe, however, that the CIR need not establish that the cash advances
extended by FDC to its affiliates were sourced from the loans obtained by FDC
from commercial banks. The source of the
cash advances is irrelevant. What the
CIR is seeking to tax herein is the interest income FDC should have earned from
the cash advances it extended to its affiliates; the theory being that FDC
would have imposed and collected said interest had it been dealing at arms
length with an uncontrolled company.
It
is just as unnecessary for the CIR to present proof of actual or probable receipt
by FDC of interest income from the cash advances it extended to its
affiliates. Section 43 of the NIRC of
1993 should be appreciated as an exception to the general rules on income
taxation as it addresses a very specific situation: controlled taxpayers
dealing with each other not at arms length.
To exercise his authority under said provision, it is already sufficient
for the CIR to establish that the income reported by the controlled taxpayer
from the transaction amongst themselves fall below the arms length standard; in
which case, the CIR may already impute such arms length income on the transaction,
and accordingly distribute, apportion, or allocate the same among the
controlled taxpayers who participated in said transaction. To require the CIR to still submit proof of
the actual or probable income received by the controlled taxpayers from the
transaction, and limit the income which the CIR may distribute, apportion, or
allocate to that which was thus proved, would not only severely limit the
authority of the CIR under Section 43 of the NIRC of 1993, but would also
render the arms length standard useless and superfluous.
Even
more alarming is the statement in the majority opinion that for the CIR to
exercise its authority to attribute interest income on the cash advances FDC
extended to its affiliates under Section 43 of the NIRC of 1993, there must be
an express stipulation in writing that such interest was due on the transaction
in accordance with Article 1956 of the Civil Code. Section 43 of the NIRC of 1993 prevails over
Article 1956 of the Civil Code. Lex specialis derogat generali. General legislation must give way to special
legislation on the same subject, and generally is so interpreted as to embrace
only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable. In other words, where two statutes are of
equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one specially designed
therefore should prevail.[6]
As
for loans and advances among controlled taxpayers, tax evasion may be committed
by (1) charging interest thereon but not at arms length rate; or (2) not
charging any interest at all. Expectedly,
in the latter case, there would be no express stipulation in writing that
interest is due on the loans or advances.
Are we saying that the CIR may impute arms length interest in the
former case, but is totally powerless to impute any interest in the latter
case? This will render the latter a
completely effective means of tax evasion.
Controlled taxpayers can just do away with any written stipulation of
interest on the loans or advances altogether, and even when such absence of
interest is contrary to the arms length standard, the CIR will be unable to
exercise its authority under Section 43 of the NIRC of 1993.
I
submit that the CIR cannot impute any interest income on the cash advances FDC
extended to its affiliates for the simple reason that Revenue Memorandum Order
(RMO) No. 63-99, which sets down the guidelines for the determination of
taxable income on inter-company loans or advances, applying what is now Section
50 of the NIRC of 1997, was issued only on July 19, 1999. Pertinent provisions of RMO No. 63-99 reads:
2. Coverage:
This paper applies to all forms of bona
fide indebtedness and includes:
2.1 Loans or advances of money or other
consideration (whether or not evidence by a written instrument);
2.2 Indebtedness arising in the ordinary
course of business out of sales, leases, or the rendition of services by or
between members of the group, or any other similar extension;
2.3 But does not apply to alleged
indebtedness which was in fact a contribution of capital or a distribution by a
corporation with respect to its shares.
x x x x
4. Determination
of Taxable Income on Inter-company Loans or Advances:
4.1 In
general. Where one member of a group
of controlled entities makes a loan or advances directly or indirectly, or
otherwise becomes a creditor of another member of such group, and charges no
interest, or charges interest at a rate which is not equal to an arms-length
rate as defined in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph, the Commissioner may make
appropriate allocations to reflect an arms length interest rate for the use of
such loan or advance.
4.1.1 If payments are made to parties under common
control according to a legally enforceable contract, the contract may still be
recognized as valid. However, for
purposes of determining the true taxable income of the parties involved, the
interest rate charged may be subjected to reallocation.
4.1.2 Section 50 does not apply only to taxable
entities. Reallocation may also apply to
tax-exempt organizations.
4.2 Arms
Length interest rate.
4.2.1 In
general. For purposes of this Order,
the arms length interest rate shall be the rate of interest which was charged
or would have been charged at the time the indebtedness arose in independent
transaction with or between unrelated parties under similar circumstances. All relevant factors will be considered,
including the amount and duration of the loan, the security involved, the
credit standing of the borrower, and the interest rate prevailing at the situs
of the lender or creditor for comparable loans.
4.2.2 For purposes of determining the arms length
rate in domestic transactions, the interest rate to be used is the Bank
Reference Rate (BRR) prescribed by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).
4.2.3. The fact that the interest rate actually
charged on a loan or advance is expressly indicated on a written instrument
does not preclude the application of Section 50 to such loan or advance.
5. Interest
Period
5.1 The interest period shall commence at the
date the indebtedness arises, except that with respect to indebtedness arising
in the ordinary course of business out of sales, leases, or supply of goods and
services which are generally considered as trade accounts receivables or
payables, the interest period shall not commence if the taxpayer is able to
establish that the normal trade practice in a given industry is to allow
balances, in the case of similar transactions with unrelated parties, to remain
outstanding for a longer period without charging interest.
5.2 For purposes of determining the period of
time for which a balance is outstanding, payments of credits shall be applied
against the earliest balance outstanding.
The taxpayer may, in accordance with an agreement, apply such payments
or credits in some other order in its books only after establishing that the
arrangement is customary for parties in that particular business.
FDC
extended the cash advances to its affiliates in 1996 and 1997, when there was
yet no clear regulation as to the tax treatment of loans and advances among
controlled taxpayers that would have accordingly guided the concerned taxpayers
and the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) officials. RMO No. 63-99 cannot be applied retroactively
to FDC and its affiliates as Section 246 of the NIRC of 1997 expressly
proscribes the same, to wit:
SEC. 246. Non-Retroactivity
of Rulings. Any revocation,
modification, or reversal of any of the rules and regulations promulgated in
accordance with the preceding Sections or any of the rulings or circulars
promulgated by the Commissioner shall not be given retroactive application if
the revocation, modification, or reversal will be prejudicial to the taxpayers,
except in the following cases:
(a)
where the taxpayer deliberately
misstates or omits material facts from his return or any document required of
him by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
(b)
where the facts subsequently gathered by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue are materially different from the facts on which
the ruling is based; or
(c)
where the taxpayer acted in bad faith.
Finally,
I join the majority opinion in classifying the instructional letters, journals,
and cash vouchers evidencing the advances FDC extended to its affiliates as
loan agreements, upon which documentary stamp taxes (DST) may be imposed. Regardless of whether or not the CIR may
impute interest on the cash advances, there is no dispute that said advances
were in the nature of loans, which were extended by FDC to its affiliates as
financial assistance for the latters operational and capital expenditures, and
which were repaid by the affiliates to FDC within the duration of one week to
three months.
For the
foregoing reasons, I join the majority in (1) dismissing for lack of merit the
Petition of the CIR in G.R. No. 163653 and affirming the Decision dated
December 16, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72992; and (2)
partially granting the Petition of the CIR in G.R. No. 167869 and affirming the
Decision dated January 26, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74510
with the modification that Assessment Notice Nos. SP-DST-96-00020-2000 and
SP-DST-97-00021-2000 for deficiency DST on the instructional letters, journals,
and cash vouchers, evidencing the cash advances FDC extended to its affiliates,
are declared valid.
TERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate
Justice
[1] Section 34, Definitions (c) of the
NIRC of 1993.
[2] Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. American Express International, Inc. (Philippine Branch),
500 Phil. 586, 608 (2005).
[3] Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil.
103, 120 (1999).
[4] Id.
[5] Baas, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 144, 159 (2000).
[6] Roque, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 188456, September
10, 2009, 599 SCRA 69, 196.