Republic of the
Supreme Court
|
DATU
KIRAM SAMPACO, substituted by HADJI SORAYA S. MACABANDO, Petitioner, - versus - HADJI SERAD
MINGCA LANTUD, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 163551 Present: CARPIO,*
J., VELASCO, JR., J.,
Chairperson, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: July 18, 2011 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
This
is a petition for review on certiorari
of the Court of Appeals Decision dated
The
facts, as stated by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
On September 14,
1984, respondent Hadji Serad Mingca Lantud, the plaintiff in the lower court, filed
an action to quiet title with damages[1] with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur, Branch 8, Marawi City (trial court), against
petitioner Datu Kiram Sampaco (deceased), the defendant in the lower court, who
has been substituted by his heirs, represented by Hadji Soraya Sampaco-Macabando.[2]
Respondent alleged in his Complaint[3] that he is the owner in fee
simple of a parcel of residential lot located at Marinaut, Marawi City, with an
area of 897 square meters covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
P-658. On August 25, 1984, petitioner Datu
Kiram Sampaco, through his daughter
Soraya Sampaco-Macabando with several armed men, forcibly and unlawfully
entered his property and destroyed the nursery buildings, cabbage seedlings and
other improvements therein worth P10,000.00. On P10,000.00
and attorneys fees.
In his Answer,[5] defendant Datu Kiram Sampaco,
petitioner herein, denied the material allegations of the Complaint. Petitioner
asserted that he and his predecessors-in-interest are the ones who had been in
open, public, continuous, and exclusive possession of the property in dispute. Petitioner alleged that OCT No. P-658 was
secured in violation of laws and through fraud, deception and misrepresentation,
considering that the subject parcel of land is a residential lot and the title issued is a free patent. Moreover, respondent and his
predecessors-in-interest had never taken actual possession or occupied the land
under litigation. On the contrary, petitioner has all the evidence of actual
possession and ownership of permanent improvements and other plants on the land
in dispute.
Petitioner filed a
counterclaim for actual and moral damages, and attorney's fees for the
unfounded complaint and prayed for its dismissal. He also sought the
cancellation of respondents OCT No. P-658 and the reconveyance of the subject parcel
of land.
During the trial,
respondent Hadji Lantud testified that he acquired the subject lot from his
grandmother, Intumo Pagsidan, a portion thereof from his grandmothers helper,
Totop Malacop, pursuant to a court decision after litigating with him.[6] Respondent had been residing on the lot for
more than 30 years, applied for a title thereto and was issued OCT No. P-658.[7] He paid the corresponding real estate taxes
for the land.[8]
He planted assorted trees and plants on the lot like bananas, jackfruits,
coconuts and others.[9] He testified that he was not aware of the
alleged litigation over the lot before Barangay Captain Hadji Hassan Abato,
although he was furnished a copy of the decision.[10]
On the other hand, petitioner
Datu Kiram Sampaco testified that the land under litigation is only a portion
of the 1,800 square meters of land that he inherited in 1952 from his father,
Datu Sampaco Gubat.[11] Since then, he had been in
adverse possession and ownership of the subject lot, cultivating and planting
trees and plants through his caretaker Hadji Mustapha Macawadib.[12] In 1962, he mortgaged the
land (1,800 square meters) with the Development
Bank of the
After trial on the
merits, the trial court rendered a Decision on
WHEREFORE, premises considered the court is of the
opinion and so holds that the preponderance of evidence is in favor of the
defendant and against the plaintiff. Judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1.
Dismissing plaintiffs complaint for lack of
merit;
2.
Declaring Original
Certificate of Title No. P-658 (Exh. A) null and void and of no legal effect;
3.
Declaring the
defendant the absolute or true owner and possessor of the land in dispute; and
4.
Ordering the plaintiff
to pay the defendant the sum of P10,000.00 for attorneys fees plus P500.00
per appearance.[16]
The trial court held that
the issuance of respondents title, OCT No. P-658, was tainted with fraud and
irregularities and the title is, therefore, spurious; hence, it is null and
void, and without any probative value. The finding of fraud was based on: (1) the
Certification issued by Datu Samra Andam, A/Adm. Assistant II, Natural
Resources District No. XII-3, Marawi City, stating that the data contained in
respondents title were verified and had no record in the said office; (2) the
said Certification was not refuted or rebutted by respondent; (3) while free patents are
normally issued for agricultural lands, respondents title is a free patent
title issued over a residential land as
the lot is described in the Complaint as a residential lot; and (4) Yusoph Lumampa, an employee of the local
Bureau of Lands, to whom respondent allegedly entrusted the paperwork of the
land titling, was not presented as a witness.
Moreover, the trial
court stated that respondent failed to establish with competent and credible
evidence that he was in prior possession of the subject property. No
corroborative witness was presented to further prove his prior possession.
On the other hand, the
trial court stated that petitioner offered documentary evidence, consisting of a
contract of real estate mortgage of the subject property, tax declarations, an
official tax receipt, and testimonial evidence to prove that he had been in
open, public, continuous, and lawful possession of the subject property in the
concept of owner.
Respondent appealed the decision of
the trial court to the Court of Appeals.
On
WHEREFORE:
1.
The
appeal is granted and the appealed judgment is hereby totally REVERSED.
2.
To
quiet his title, plaintiff-appelant Hadji Serad Mingca Lantud is confirmed the
owner of the parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-658;
3.
The
defendant-appellee is ordered to pay P50,000.00 as attorneys fees to
the plaintiff-appellant; and
4.
Costs
against the defendant-appellee.[17]
Petitioners motion
for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution[18] dated
The Court of Appeals
held that there is no controversy that respondent is a holder of a
The Court of Appeals
stated that the Torrens title has three attributes: (1) a Torrens title is the
best evidence of ownership over registered land and, unless annulled in an
appropriate proceeding, the title is conclusive on the issue of ownership; (2)
a Torrens title is incontrovertible and indefeasible upon the expiration of one
year from the date of the entry of the decree of registration;[20] and (3) a Torrens title is
not subject to collateral attack.[21]
The Court of Appeals held
that petitioners counterclaim filed on
The allegation of
fraud in securing OCT No. P-658 on the ground that the property in dispute is a
residential lot and not subject of a free patent was not given weight by the
appellate court as it was supported only by testimonial evidence that did not
show how (by metes and bounds) and why the property in dispute could not have
been the subject of a free patent. The appellate court stated that a mere
preponderance of evidence is not adequate to prove fraud;[24] it must be established by
clear and convincing evidence.
The Court of Appeals
also noted that petitioner claimed that the subject property is only part of
his larger property. Although petitioner introduced proof of payment of the
real estate taxes of the said property, as well as a previous mortgage of the
property, petitioner did not show that the disputed property is part of his larger
property. Hence, the appellate court stated that under such circumstances, it cannot rule that petitioner owned the
land under litigation, since petitioner failed to show that it is part of his
larger property.
The Court of Appeals did not award actual and
moral damages, because respondent failed to prove the amount of any actual damages
sustained, and the instances enumerated under Article 2219 of the Civil Code warranting
the award of moral damages were not present.
However, the Court of
Appeals awarded attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00, considering
that respondent was forced to incur expenses to protect his right through the
action to quiet title.
Petitioner filed this petition raising the
following issues:
I
THE COURT OF
APPEALS MISERABLY FAILED TO CONSIDER THE FACT THAT THE
II
THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE FACT THAT AS CERTIFIED TO BY THE BUREAU OF
LANDS ITSELF NO SUCH FREE PATENT OVER THE
III
THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE SUBJECT LOT
HAD LONG BEEN OWNED, POSSESSED AND CULTIVATED BY THE DEFENDANT (PETITIONER
HEREIN) OR HIS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL IN THE CONCEPT OF
AN OWNER.
IV
THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PETITIONERS COUNTERCLAIM FOR CANCELLATION OF
RESPONDENTS TITLE IS BARRED.
V
THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE COUNTERCLAIM IN THE INSTANT CASE IS A
COLLATERAL
VI
THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.[25]
The
main issue is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the
validity of OCT No. P-658 and confirming respondent as owner of the property in
dispute.
Petitioner
contends that the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the fact that the
The
contention is without merit.
The
In
this case, petitioner alleged in his Answer to respondents Complaint in the
trial court that respondents title, OCT No. P-658, was secured in violation of the law and through fraud,
deception and misrepresentation, because the subject parcel of land is a
residential lot, which cannot be subject of a free patent, since only
agricultural lands are subject of a free patent.
The trial court found that [t]he lot under
litigation as clearly described in the complaint is a residential lot and a
free patent title thereto cannot validly be issued. This finding was one of
the bases for the trial courts declaration that the issuance of OCT was
tainted with fraud and irregularities and is, therefore, spurious; thus, OCT
No. P-658 is null and void.
It should be pointed out that the
allegation in the Complaint that the land is residential was made only by
respondent, but the true classification of the disputed land as residential was
not shown to have been made by the President, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, pursuant to Section 9 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as The Public Land Act.[30]
Hence, the trial court erred in concluding that there was fraud in the issuance
of respondents free patent title on the ground that it covered residential land
based only on the Complaint which stated that the property was residential land
when it was not shown that it was the President who classified the disputed
property as residential, and OCT No. P-658 itself stated that the free patent
title covered agricultural land. It has been stated that at present, not
only agricultural lands, but also residential lands, have been made available
by recent legislation for acquisition by free patent by any natural born
Filipino citizen.[31] Nevertheless, the fact is that in this case,
the free patent title was granted over agricultural land as stated in OCT No.
P-658.
Moreover,
petitioner contends in his petition that the Certification[32]
dated
The
Court holds that the certification, by itself, is insufficient to prove the
alleged fraud. Fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of
patent and annulment of title, should never be presumed, but must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence, mere preponderance of evidence not being
adequate.[33] Fraud is a question of fact which must be
proved.[34]
The signatory of the certification, Datu Samra Andam, A/Adm. Assistant II,
Natural Resources District No. XII-3,
Thus,
the Court holds that the evidence on record is insufficient to prove that fraud
was committed in the issuance of respondents
On
the other hand, petitioner claims ownership of the subject lot, which is merely
a portion of a larger property (1,800 square meters) that
he allegedly inherited from his father in 1952, by virtue of open, public and
continuous possession of the land in the concept of owner making it petitioners
private property. Hence, petitioner
prays for reconveyance of the said property.
Article 434 of the Civil Code governs an action for reconveyance,
thus:
Art.
434. In an action to recover, the
property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his
title and not on the weakness of the defendants claim.
Under Article 434 of the
Civil Code, to successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a real
property, the person who claims a better right to it must prove two (2)
things: first, the identity of
the land claimed; and second, his
title thereto.[35]
In regard to the first requisite, in an accion
reinvindicatoria, the person who claims that he has a better right to the
property must first fix the identity of
the land he is claiming by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof.[36]
In
this case, petitioner claims that the property in dispute is part of his larger
property. However, petitioner failed to
identify his larger property by providing evidence of the metes and bounds
thereof, so that the same may be compared with the technical description
contained in the title of respondent, which would have shown whether the
disputed property really formed part of petitioners larger property. The appellate
court correctly held in its Resolution dated May 13, 2004 that petitioners
claim is solely supported by testimonial evidence, which did not conclusively
show the metes and bounds of petitioners larger property in relation to the metes
and bounds of the disputed property; thus, there is no sufficient evidence on
record to support petitioners claim that the disputed property is part of his
larger property.
In
regard to the second requisite of title to property, both petitioner and
respondent separately claim that they are entitled to ownership of the property
by virtue of open, public, continuous and exclusive possession of the same in
the concept of owner. Petitioner claims
that he inherited the subject property from his father in 1952, while respondent
claims that he acquired the property from his grandmother Intumo Pagsidan, a
portion thereof from his grandmothers helper Totop Malacop pursuant to a court
decision after litigating with him.[37] Respondent has OCT No. P-658 to prove his
title to the subject property, while petitioner merely claims that the property
is already his private land by virtue of his open, public, continuous possession of the same in the concept of
owner.
The
Court holds that petitioner failed to prove the requisites of reconveyance as
he failed to prove the identity of his larger property in relation to the
disputed property, and his claim of title by virtue of open, public and continuous
possession of the disputed property in the concept of owner is nebulous in the light
of a similar claim by respondent who holds a free patent title over the subject
property. As stated in Ybaez v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[38]
it is relatively easy to declare and claim that one owns and possesses public
agricultural land, but it is entirely a different matter to affirmatively
declare and to prove before a court of law that one actually possessed and
cultivated the entire area to the exclusion of other claimants who stand on
equal footing under the Public Land Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended) as any other pioneering claimants.
Further,
petitioner contends that the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that petitioners counterclaim is time-barred, since
the one-year prescriptive period does not apply when the person seeking annulment
of title or reconveyance is in possession of the lot, citing Heirs
of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano E. Santiago.[39] Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeals
erred in ruling that the counterclaim in this case is a collateral attack on
respondents title, citing Cimafranca v. Intermediate Appellate Court.[40]
Petitioner cites the case of Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of
Mariano E. Santiago,[41] which held that a counterclaim can be
considered a direct attack on the title.
The
Court notes that the case of Cimafranca v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[42]
cited by the Court of Appeals to
support its ruling that the prayer for the cancellation of respondents title through a counterclaim included in petitioners
Answer is a collateral attack on the said title, is inapplicable to this case. In Cimafranca, petitioners therein
filed a complaint for Partition and Damages, and respondents therein indirectly
attacked the validity of the title involved in their counterclaim. Hence, the
Court ruled that a
Here,
the case cited by petitioner, Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of
Mariano E. Santiago, declared that the one-year prescriptive period
does not apply when the party seeking annulment of title or reconveyance is in
possession of the lot, as well as distinguished a collateral attack under
Section 48 of PD No. 1529 from a direct attack, and held that a counterclaim
may be considered as a complaint or an independent action and can be considered
a direct attack on the title, thus:
The one-year prescriptive period, however, does not
apply when the person seeking annulment of title or reconveyance is in
possession of the lot.
This is because the action partakes of a suit to quiet title which is
imprescriptible. In David v. Malay, we held that a person in
actual possession of a piece of land under claim of ownership may wait until
his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to
vindicate his right, and his undisturbed possession gives him the continuing
right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the
nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his title.
x x x x
Section 48 of P.D. 1529, the
Property Registration Decree, provides that a certificate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack and cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding. An action is an attack on a title when the
object of the action is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment
or proceeding pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is
direct when the object of an action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or
enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or
collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the
judgment or proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.
x x x A counterclaim can be considered a direct
attack on the title. In Development Bank of the Philippines v.
Court Appeals, we ruled on the validity of a certificate of title despite
the fact that the nullity thereof was raised only as a counterclaim. It was held that a counterclaim is
considered a complaint, only this time, it is the original defendant who
becomes the plaintiff. It stands on the same footing and is to be tested
by the same rules as if it were an independent action. x x x[43]
The
above ruling of the court on the definition of collateral attack under Section
48 of P.D. No. 1529 was reiterated in Leyson v. Bontuyan,[44]
Heirs
of Enrique Diaz v. Virata,[45]
Arangote
v. Maglunob,[46]
and Catores
v. Afidchao.[47]
Based
on the foregoing, the Court holds that petitioners counterclaim for
cancellation of respondents title is not a collateral attack, but a direct
attack on the
Respondents
original certificate of title was issued on
In
fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in confirming that respondent is the
owner of the parcel of land covered by OCT No. P-658.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals decision dated
No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR. ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
Chairperson
JOSE CATRAL
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
*
Designated additional member
per Special Order No. 1042 dated
[1] Docketed as Civil Case No.
CI-11-84.
[2] Substitution per Order of the
trial court dated
[3] Records, p. 1.
[4] Exhibit 5, id. at 378.
[5] Records, p. 7.
[6] RTC Decision, rollo, pp. 58-59.
[7]
[8] RTC Decision, rollo, p. 59; Exhibits B, to D, records, pp. 375-377.
[9] RTC Decision, rollo, p. 59.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] RTC Decision, rollo, p. 60; records, pp. 445-447.
[15] RTC Decision, rollo, p. 60.
[16]
[17] Rollo, p. 46.
[18]
[19] Sec.
47. The original certificate in the
registration book, any copy thereof duly certified under the signature of the
clerk, or of the register of deeds of the province or city where the land is
situated, and the seal of the court, and also the owners duplicate
certificate, shall be received as evidence in all the courts of the Philippine
Islands and shall be conclusive as to all matters contained therein except as
far as otherwise provided in this Act.
[20] Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529,
Sec. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. The
decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence,
minority, or other disability of any person adversely, affected thereby, nor by
any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the
right of any person, including the government and the branches thereof,
deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or
confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of
First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of
registration not later than one year
from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration,
but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an
innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein,
whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever
the phrase innocent purchaser for value or an equivalent phrase occurs in
this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or
other encumbrancer for value. (Emphasis supplied.)
[21] PD No. 1529, Sec. 48. Certificate
not subject to collateral attack. A
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
[22] 231 Phil. 559 (1987).
[23] 255 Phil. 510 (1989).
[24] CA Decision, rollo, p. 45, citing Maestrado
v. Court of Appeals, 327 SCRA 678, 694 (2000).
[25] Rollo,
pp. 20-21.
[26] Carvajal
v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 582, 594 (1997).
[27] Heirs
of Leopoldo Vencilao, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 351 Phil. 815, 823 (1998).
[28] Ybaez
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68291, March 6, 1991, 194 SCRA
743, 749.
[29]
Republic
v. Mangotara, G.R. Nos. 170375, 170505 & 173355-56,
July 7, 2010, 624 SCRA 360, 489, citing Republic
v. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr., 441 Phil. 656, 674 (2002); Meneses v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
82220, 82251 & 83059, July 14, 1995,
246 SCRA 162.
[30] Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The
(a)
Agricultural;
(b)
Residential,
commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;
(c)
Educational,
charitable, or other similar purposes; and
(d)
Reservations
for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses.
The President,
upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources), shall from time to time make
the classifications provided for in this section, and may, at any time and in a
similar manner, transfer lands from one class to another.
[31] Antonio
H. Noblejas and Edilberto H. Noblejas, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds,
1986 edition, p. 389. See also Republic
Act No. 10023 (An Act Authorizing the
Issuance of Free Patents to Residential Lands), approved on
[32] Exhibit 15, records, p. 462.
[33] Republic
v. Mangotara, supra note 29, at
491, citing Saad-Agro Industries, Inc. v. Republic, 503 SCRA 522,
528-529 (2006).
[34] Quinsay
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 67935, March 18, 1991, 195 SCRA
268, 282.
[35] Hutchinson
v. Buscas, 498 Phil. 257, 262 (2005).
[36]
[37] RTC Decision, rollo, pp. 58-59.
[38] Supra
note 28.
[39] 452 Phil. 238 (2003).
[40] 231 Phil. 559 (1987).
[41] Supra note 39.
[42] Supra note 40.
[43] Heirs
of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano E. Santiago, supra note 39, at
252-253. (Emphasis supplied). See also Arangote
v. Maglunob, G.R. No. 178906, February 18, 2009, 579 SCRA 620; Leyson v. Bontuyan, G.R. No. 156357,
February 18, 2005, 452 SCRA 94.
[44] Leyson
v. Bontuyan, supra note 43.
[45] G.R. No. 162037,
[46] Supra
note 43.
[47] G.R. No. 151240,