Republic of the
Supreme Court
VICTORIANO SY,
Complainant,
-
versus - Judge OSCAR E. DINOPOL, Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal
City, Respondent. |
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2189 (Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-2837-RTJ) Present:
CORONA, C.J., CARPIO, CARPIO
MORALES, velasco, JR., NACHURA, leonardo-de castro, brion, peralta, BERSAMIN, DEL
CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA,
JR., PEREZ, MENDOZA, and SERENO, JJ. Promulgated: January 18, 2011 |
|
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
|
||
D E C I S I O N
|
||
|
|
||
PER CURIAM:
|
||
|
|
||
We resolve in this Decision
the Verified Complaint, dated March 11, 2008,[1]
filed by Victoriano Sy against Judge Oscar E. Dinopol of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 24, Koronadal
City, South Cotabato, for Conduct Unbecoming a Member of the Judiciary and for
Gross Ignorance of the Law, in relation to Civil Case No. 1403-24, entitled Sps.
Victoriano Sy and Loreta Sy v. Metrobank, for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage, and Misc. Case No. 1440-24,
entitled Metrobank v. Sps. Victoriano Sy, et al., for Issuance of a
Writ of Possession.
The Antecedents
Facts
The
facts are set out in the memorandum/report, dated May 25, 2009,[2]
of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), and are summarized
below.
The
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) was the mortgagee in
good faith and for value of twenty-three (23) parcels of land all located in
Koronadal City. The mortgagors were Marvella Plaza Hotel, Sprinter Lumber, Hardware
and Auto Parts, Inc. and/or Sps. Victoriano Sy and Loreta Cabaies-Sy and/or
Sps. Vicente and Antonia Mandanas.
Metrobank
foreclosed the mortgage for violation of the terms and conditions of the
mortgage agreement. At the public
auction on
Thereafter,
Sps. Victoriano and Loreta Sy, and Sprinter Lumber, Hardware and Auto Parts,
Inc. filed with the RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City, presided over by Judge Dinopol,
a complaint against Metrobank for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Real Estate Mortgage, Extrajudicial Foreclosure Proceedings and Certificate of
Sale, with Damages and Attorney’s Fees and with prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction, docketed as
Civil Case No. 1403-24.
On April 16, 2004, Judge Dinopol inhibited himself
from further acting on the case[3]
on the ground that he received a call, on April 12, 2004, from a ranking
officer of the Philippine Judicial Academy, interceding in behalf of the
defendant bank and an earlier call (July 2003) from a ranking personnel of the
OCA, appealing in behalf of the plaintiffs.
He claimed he wanted to avoid being charged with partiality either way
he acted on the case.
On September
15, 2005, Metrobank filed with the RTC, South Cotabato, a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Possession over the parcels of land subject of the
foreclosed mortgage against Marvella Plaza Hotel, Sprinter Lumber, Hardware and
Auto Parts, Inc., and/or Sps. Victoriano and Loreta Sy, and/or Sps. Vicente and
Antonia Mandanas, docketed as Misc. Case No. 1440-24,[4]
and assigned to the RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City, presided by Judge Dinopol.
On July 13,
2006, Judge Dinopol issued an Order granting the petition,[5]
and issued the writ of possession on July 21, 2006.[6]
Meanwhile, or
on May 22, 2006, Sprinter Lumber, Hardware and Auto Parts, Inc. filed with the
RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, a petition, entitled In the Matter of: Petition
for the Declaration of State of Suspension of Payments with Approval of
Proposed Rehabilitation Plan, docketed as Corp. Case No. 1585-06.[7]
On June 26,
2006, the RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, issued an Order[8]
staying the enforcement of all claims against the debtor, its guarantors and
sureties not solidarily liable with the debtor.
The same court subsequently approved the rehabilitation plan.
In the
meantime, Sheriff Conrado B. Dapulang, Jr. proceeded to implement the writ of
possession issued by Judge Dinopol, but it was returned unsatisfied in view of
the stay order issued by the RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, in Corp. Case No.
1585-06.[9]
Consequently,
the respondents in Misc. Case No. 1440-24 filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings
due to the issuance of the stay order and the approval of the rehabilitation
plan by the
Shortly
thereafter, Sy filed the present administrative complaint[11]charging
Judge Dinopol of gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a member of
the judiciary.
Gross Ignorance of the Law
Sy alleged in his complaint that while Civil
Case No. 1403-24 (in which he and his wife sought the declaration of nullity of
the foreclosure proceedings against Metrobank) was pending before Judge
Dinopol’s sala, the judge inhibited himself from acting on the case. This notwithstanding, and to Sy’s surprise,
Judge Dinopol still handled Misc. Case No. 1440-24, a petition for the issuance
of a writ of possession filed by Metrobank, a matter closely intertwined with
Civil Case No. 1403-24. Judge Dinopol
then issued an order granting Metrobank the right to possess the foreclosed
properties.[12]
Sy further
alleged that despite the issuance by the RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, of a stay
order[13]
and the approval of the rehabilitation plan, as well as the pendency of
Metrobank’s petition before the Court of Appeals (CA) Twenty-Third Division in Cagayan De Oro City (CA G.R. SP No.
01824) assailing the validity of the stay order, Judge Dinopol ordered that the
writ of possession be implemented.[14]
Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge
Sy claimed in
relation with his charge that while Civil Case No. 1403-24 was pending in Judge
Dinopol’s sala, the judge asked him for
commodity loans in the form of construction materials to be used in the construction
of the judge’s house. The transaction
was evidenced by delivery receipt no. 15178 (March 8, 2005),[15]
and charge invoices no. 9817 (P16,000.00,[16]
no. 9826 (March 9, 2005) for P850.00,[17]
and no. 9838 (March 10, 2005) for P780.00.[18]
Sy further
claimed that aside from the commodity loans, Judge Dinopol obtained cash loans from him on various occasions
between December 2, 2005 to July 14, 2006, in the total amount of P121,000.00, and Judge Dinopol borrowed
from him his Suzuki Multi-cab and returned it after the judge was suspended in
September 2007. Sy presented
disbursement vouchers, official receipts and an acknowledgement to prove his
claim.[19]
Judge Dinopol’s
Comment
In a 1st
indorsement dated March 18, 2008,[20]
the OCA required Judge Dinopol to comment on the complaint, which he did on
April 21, 2008.[21]
Judge Dinopol
denied Sy’s accusations. He stressed
that he inhibited himself from Civil Case No. 1403-24 on April 16, 2004 and had
not acted on the case since then; nobody intervened and pleaded in behalf of
Metrobank after Misc. Case No. 1440-24 was filed. He was not aware nor had he
been given notice that Metrobank filed a petition before the CA (CA G.R. SP No.
01824), nor did he receive any order from the appellate tribunal enjoining him
to desist from performing or acting on the incidents pending in Misc. Case No.
1440-24.
Judge Dinopol
denied that he committed any breach of procedural rules that could be
characterized as gross ignorance of the basic rules of civil procedures. He maintained that Sy did not allege any
specific actuations of deceit, malice or intent to cause injury to Sy, and that
he had acted fairly and objectively. He
added that he observed the requirements of the Code of Professional
Responsibility as a lawyer, relative to his handling of Misc. Case No. 1440-24.
With respect
to the alleged accommodations he received from Sy at the time his house was
under construction, Judge Dinopol claimed that when he obtained the commodity
loans from Sy in March 2005, he had already inhibited himself from handling
Civil Case No. 1403-24; he did so on April 16, 2004. He explained that Misc.
Case No. 1440-24 was filed only on September 15, 2005, and was assigned to his
sala on September 22, 2005. He denied
that he received from Sy cash loans in the amount of P121,000.00. He also denied borrowing Sy’s Suzuki
Multi-cab and claimed that it was Rogelio Villanueva who borrowed it.
Judge Dinopol
countered that it was Sy who acted with sinister design and employed deceit and
cunning to frustrate the administration of justice in the cases he handled.
In a
Resolution dated
The Court’s Ruling
The
OCA evaluation is well-founded. Judge
Dinopol cannot be disciplined for ignorance of the law and of procedure in his
handling of Civil Case No. 1403-24 (for Annulment and/or Declaration of
Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage)
filed by Sps. Victoriano and Loreta Sy against Metrobank, as he
inhibited himself from the case, nor in his handling of Misc. Case No. 1440-24
(Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession) filed by Metrobank against
Sps. Victoriano Sy, et al., because of the essential nature of the proceeding
itself.
In issuing
the writ of possession and in directing its re-implementation when it was
returned unsatisfied the first time it was enforced, Judge Dinopol acted in
accordance with the rules and jurisprudence on the matter.
As the Court
held in Santiago v. Merchants Rural Bank of Talavera, Inc.,[23]
the proceeding in a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is ex-parte and summary in nature. It is brought for the benefit of one party
only and may be granted even without notice to the mortgagor, in this case,
complainant Sy. Moreover, the duty of
the court to grant a writ of possession is a ministerial function. The court does not exercise its official
discretion or judgment.[24] Judge Dinopol, before whom the petition for
the issuance of a writ of possession was filed, had no discretion on whether to
issue the writ of possession or not. It
cannot be said, therefore, that Judge Dinopol exposed himself or exhibited bias
in favor of Metrobank when he issued the writ of possession.
Further,
regardless of whether there is a pending suit for the annulment of the mortgage
or the foreclosure itself, the purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession,
without prejudice of course to the eventual outcome of the annulment case. Once the writ of possession is issued, the
trial court has no alternative but to enforce the writ without delay.[25]
From another
perspective, a stay order only affects claims filed against the assets and
properties belonging to a debtor. Properties that have already been foreclosed,
and those whose titles have already passed on to the winning bidder are no
longer considered properties of the debtor.[26]
In such case, it is a ministerial duty on the part of the trial court to grant
a possessory writ over the foreclosed
properties.[27]
Clearly,
Judge Dinopol was well within his authority and committed no impropriety in
directing the re-implementation of the writ of execution in Misc. Case No.
1440-24.
On the other
hand, we cannot say the same thing with regard to Sy’s charge of conduct
unbecoming against Judge Dinopol.
The latter’s denial of having committed the acts complained of flies in
the face of indications in the records and documentary evidence that he
obtained commodity loans from Sy in the form of building materials for the
construction of his house in Koronadal City.
There was also Sy’s claim of cash loans to Judge Dinopol on various
occasions, between December 2, 2005 and July 14, 2006, amounting to P121,000.00, as well as the loan of
Sy’s Suzuki Multi-cab to the Judge.
The commodity
loans were evidenced by receipts[28]
indicating delivery of construction materials to Judge Dinopol’s
residence. The cash loans appear to have
been covered by disbursement vouchers,[29]
and the borrowed multicab is the subject of an “acknowledgement”[30]
from Judge Dinopol’s driver Rogelio Villanueva.
There is
substantial evidence showing that Judge Dinopol obtained the commodity loans
from Sy. The judge himself admitted that
he wrote Sy, on March 4, 2005, regarding the purchase of materials for his
house which was then under construction, although he claimed that it was his wife
who transacted with Sy and it was Sy himself who offered to deliver the
materials to his residence.[31]
Judge Dinopol pleaded innocence regarding the commodity loans or even the cash
loans saying that the transaction with Sy regarding the construction materials
occurred when there was no case pending in his sala where Sy was a party.
The above
disclaimer notwithstanding, we find Judge Dinopol to have committed a serious
impropriety in his or his family’s financial or business dealings with Sy.
Canon 3 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct in relation to a judge’s impartiality
provides, inter alia, as follows:
Sec. 2. – Judges shall
ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and
enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in
the impartiality of the judge and the judiciary.
Sec. 3. – Judges shall, so
far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the occasions on
which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding
cases.
Judge Dinopol
violated the above provisions when he received accommodations from Sy for the
building materials he needed for the construction of his house. He compromised his position as a judge. Although at the time he and his family had
business dealings with Sy there was no pending case involving the businessman,
he should have been more circumspect in securing the construction
materials. The sphere of Sy’s business
operations was within his territorial jurisdiction. As the OCA aptly noted, “it is neither
impossible nor remote that a case might be filed in his court with complainant
as a party. In such a case, his
(respondent) business and financial dealings with complainant would create a
doubt about his fairness and impartiality in deciding the case and would tend
to corrode the respect and dignity of the court.”[32]
In addition,
we find that Judge Dinopol also violated Section 1 of Canon 1, Canon 2 and
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Section 1 of Canon
1 highlights the independence of a judge in performing his official duties,
thus:
SEC. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function
independently on the basis of their assessment
of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law,
free of any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure,
threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any
quarter or for any reason.
Canon 2
requires a judge to promote integrity in the discharge of his official
functions:
Integrity
is essential not only in the proper discharge of the judicial office but also
to the personal demeanor of judges.
SEC.
1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that
it is perceived to be so in view of a reasonable observer.
SEC.
2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the
integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be
seen to be done.
Moreover,
Canon 4 mandates a judge to observe and maintain proper decorum and its
appearance in his public office:
Propriety
and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge.
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
By his own
admissions, Judge Dinopol failed to observe these ethical standards. In his
Answer/Comment, Judge Dinopol admitted that he talked with Sy on several
occasions to discuss Misc. Case No. 1440-24.[33] Judge Dinopol also admitted that Sy, in at
least two instances, requested him to delay the resolution of the writ of possession.[34]
Judge Dinopol’s actions no doubt created the inference that at some point, he
acceded to Sy’s requests to delay the proceedings. This conclusion, is in fact, bolstered by
Judge Dinopol’s knowledge that the counsel for Metrobank was instructed to
immediately secure the order for the issuance of the writ of possession.[35]
Regardless of the representations allegedly made to him by Sy, Judge Dinopol
should have immediately issued the writ of possession in Metrobank’s favor.
From
these inappropriate actions, we find that Judge Dinopol compromised not only
his impartiality in handling Misc. Case No. 1440-24 but also his independence
and integrity as a judge. His actions no doubt diminished public confidence and
public trust in him as a judge. His
actions gave the public the impression and the appearance that he can be
influenced by extraneous factors - other than the legal arguments and the court
evidence – in discharging his judicial functions.
In addition,
we find that Judge Dinopol committed impropriety in talking with litigants
outside court proceedings. His improper conduct was further aggravated by the
fact that these conversations took place in the absence of the opposing
litigants and/or the opposing counsel.
In Agustin v. Mercado,[36] we declared that employees
of the court have no business meeting with litigants or their
representatives under any circumstance. In Re: Affidavit of Frankie N. Calabines,[37]
the Court minced no words in explaining that such unethical conduct constitutes “a
brazen and outrageous betrayal of public trust.”[38] The Court further declared in the said case:
x
x x The Court cannot overemphasize the need for
honesty and integrity on the part of all those who are in the service of the
judiciary. x x x
The
image of a court as a bastion of justice depends to a large extent on the
personal and official conduct of its employees.
Thus, from the judge to the lowest clerk, judicial personnel have the
sacred duty to maintain the good name of the Judiciary.
All
employees in the judiciary should be examples of responsibility, competence and
efficiency. As officers of the court and
agents of the law, they must discharge their duties with due care and utmost
diligence. Any conduct they exhibit
tending to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary will not be condoned.[39]
Certainly, these responsibilities become more
exacting when one occupies the position of a judge. Time and again, we have
emphasized that judges
are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that would enhance respect and
confidence of the people in the judicial system.[40]
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that
judges must not only maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality;
they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may
erode the people’s faith in the Judiciary.[41] These
standards apply not only to the decision itself, but also to the process by
which the decision is made.[42]
Without a
doubt, Judge Dinopol is liable for gross misconduct in office and deserves to be
sanctioned under the above findings. His track record as a judge, in this
regard, is far from exemplary. He is
a repeat offender, as
demonstrated by the following cases where we penalized him for questionable
conduct:
First, in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1969 decided
on P20,000.00. [43]
Second, in A.M. No. RTJ-06-2020 decided on
September 20, 2006, he was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and abuse
of authority, and was fined P20,000.00. [44]
Third, in A.M. No. RTJ-06-2003 decided on
August 23, 2007, he was found liable for undue delay in rendering a decision or
order and for violating the clear provisions of A.M. No. 01-1-07-SC, and was
fined P11,000.00.[45]
Fourth, in A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2173-RTJ decided on
August 28, 2006, he was strongly admonished, even as the complainant desisted
from pursuing the complaint against the judge for gross ignorance of the law,
grave abuse of authority and discretion.[46]
And more
recently, in A.M.
No. RTJ-07-2052 decided on March 30, 2009, Judge Dinopol had been reminded and
warned against entertaining litigants outside court premises.[47]
Section 8,
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross misconduct constituting a
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct as a serious charge. Under Section 11 of the same Rule, the
respondent found guilty of a serious charge may be meted any of the following
sanctions:
1. Dismissal
from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or reappointment to any
public office;
2. Suspension
from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) months
but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of
more than P20,000.00
but not exceeding P40,000.00.
Considering
his repeated infractions and numerous breaches of the standard ethical conduct
demanded of judges, we find Judge Dinopol unfit to discharge the functions of a
judge. We impose upon him the severest penalty of dismissal from the service,
with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave benefits,
and disqualification from reinstatement or reappointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.[48]
Lastly, as we
sanction Judge Dinopol, we remind the members of the bench that:
[a]lthough every office in
the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand
on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the [J]udiciary. A magistrate of the law must compose himself
at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official and otherwise, can
bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the
epitome of integrity and justice.[49]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judge Oscar E.
Dinopol, Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal City, is declared GUILTY
OF GROSS MISCONDUCT and is hereby DISMISSED
from the service, with FORFEITURE of
all benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to his
re-employment in any branch or service of the government, including
government-owned and controlled corporations.
SO
ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice |
|
|
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice MARIANO C.
DEL CASTILLO Associate
Justice MARTIN S.
VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate
Justice |
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice ARTURO D.
BRION Associate Justice LUCAS P.
BERSAMIN Associate Justice ROBERTO A.
ABAD Associate Justice No part. Acted on the
matter as OIC, OCA JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate
Justice MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO Associate
Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 1-13.
[2] Id. at 219-228.
[3] Id. at 25-26.
[4] Id. at 44-56.
[5] Id. at 175; Writ of Possession, p. 2, par. 1.
[6] Id. at 174-185.
[7] Id. at 155-164.
[8] Id. at 171-172.
[9] Id. at 193-194.
[10]
[11] Supra note 1.
[12] Supra note 6.
[13] Supra note 8.
[14] Supra note 10.
[15] Rollo, p. 15-A; Complaint, Annex “C.”
[16] Id., Annex “D.”
[17] Id. at 15, Annex “A.”
[18]
[19] Id. at 21-24-A; Annexes “G,” ”H,” ”I,” ”J,” ”K,” ”L,” ”M,” ”N,” & “O.”
[20]
[21]
[22] Supra note 2.
[23]
G.R. No. 147820,
[24] Chailease Finance Corporation v. Ma, G.R. No. 151941, August 15, 2003, 409 SCRA 250.
[25] Ong
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121494,
[26] New
Frontier Sugar Corp. v. RTC,
[27]
[28] Supra notes 15, 17 and 18.
[29] Supra note 30.
[30] Rollo, p. 24-F.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Id. at 226, par. 2.
[33] Id. at 6-8; Counter-Statement of Facts.
[34] Ibid.
[35]
[36]
A.M. No. P-07-2340,
[37]
A.M. No. 04-5-20-SC,
[38] Id. at 298, par. 4.
[39]
[41]
[42] Ibid.
[43] Balayon, Jr. v. Judge Dinopol, A.M. No. RTJ-06-1969, June 15, 2006, 490 SCRA 547.
[44] Beltran v. Judge Dinopol, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2020, September 20, 2006, 502 SCRA 446.
[45] Flaviano v. Judge Dinopol, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2003, August 23, 2007, 530 SCRA 787.
[46] Rollo, p. 227.
[47] Ong v. Judge Dinopol, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2052, March 30, 2009, 582 SCRA 487.
[48] Verginesa-Suarez
v. Judge Dilag, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2014,
[49]
Casimiro v. Fernandez, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1525,