Republic of the
Philippines
Supreme
Court
Manila
EN BANC
Judge PHILBERT I. ITURRALDE, A.M. No.
P-03-1730
MARTIN GUMARANG, VIC (Formerly OCA IPI No.
02-1469-P)
JUMALON, LEONARDO LUCAS,
WILFREDO DEUS, CORAZON Present:
AZARRAGA and ALICE BUENAFE,
Complainants, CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
DEL
CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
OIC Branch Clerk of Court BABE SJ. SERENO, JJ.
RAMIREZ, Clerk VIOLETA P.
FLORDELIZA and Sheriff IV Promulgated:
CARLOS A. SALVADOR,
Respondents.
January 18, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
PER
CURIAM:
This administrative matter for grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service, arose from
the affidavit-complaint[1]
filed on August 21, 2002 by Judge Philbert I. Iturralde (Regional Trial Court [RTC], Branch 58, Angeles City); Martin
Gumarang, Vic Jumalon, Leonardo Lucas, Wilfredo Deus, Corazon Azarraga and
Alice Buenafe, against Babe SJ. Ramirez (Legal Researcher and OIC Branch Clerk
of Court), Violeta Flordeliza (clerk in charge of civil cases) and Carlos
Salvador (Sheriff), all of RTC, Branch 69, Binangonan, Rizal,
The Factual Antecedents
The
complainants were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 98-0006, entitled “
On
On
September 18, 2000, exactly a month after Judge Tiamson issued the order, Judge
Iturralde and Gumarang went to the court to inquire into the status of their
motion. They came upon clerk Flordeliza who appeared surprised when she saw
them. She also appeared at a loss,
nervous and apparently unaware of what to tell them. She seemed not to know where the records were,
and acted as if she was waiting for somebody to tell her what to do. They insisted that Flordeliza look for the
records. When the records were found, they
discovered to their dismay that the court order (with the original and all
carbon copies) was still attached to the records. They claimed that at that point the
defendants already had a copy of the order.
Judge
Iturralde and Gumarang further alleged that when they confronted Ramirez (the
OIC Branch Clerk of Court), she also appeared to be uneasy, hesitant and
apprehensive on what to do as Judge Tiamson was not then around. On their insistence and in the absence of any
valid reason not to act, Ramirez was compelled to issue the writ dated
September 18, 2000.[3]
Salvador,
the branch sheriff, unjustifiably and for unknown reasons, refused to implement
the writ. After a few days, Salvador
informed the complainants that the defendants had appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA). Upon inquiry with the CA, Judge Iturralde
discovered that instead of an appeal, the defendants had filed a petition for
annulment of judgment, which petition the CA dismissed. We likewise dismissed the appeal the
defendants filed. The dismissal lapsed
to finality.
The
plaintiffs’ counsel then filed a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of
execution, which the trial court granted in an order dated June 27, 2002. Ramirez issued the alias writ on July 3, 2002.[4] The plaintiffs, however, found the writ to be
defective as it had no case number and the two principal defendants – both
natural persons – were only mentioned in the case title as “ET AL.”[5]
They believe that the defects were designed to hide the principal defendants’
identities and to frustrate the garnishment and/or levy. Realizing the “devious scheme employed by the
Branch Clerk of Court and to correct the same,”[6]
the plaintiffs manually wrote the names of the principal defendants, “Renato J.
Mariñas and Felix B. Mariñas,” and also the case number.[7]
After
the issuance of the alias writ, Judge Iturralde brought Salvador to the
different banks in Antipolo City where the writ was served, including the
Metrobank Antipolo Branch which immediately denied that the defendants had
accounts with that branch. This denial
was subsequently corrected by the Metrobank head office with the statement that
the defendants’ corporation had an account with its Antipolo Branch.
On
July 29, 2002, the plaintiffs again brought Salvador to the Metrobank head
office to withdraw the garnished amount.
For the second time, Salvador refused to enforce the alias writ of
execution and even challenged Judge Iturralde to file an administrative case
against him. Salvador claimed that there
were still issues
to be resolved,
at the same time admitting that the non-enforcement of the writ was upon Judge
Tiamson’s instructions. No temporary restraining order (TRO) or injunction, however, had been issued
to lawfully stop the enforcement of the writ.
Judge
Iturralde wondered how the defendants could have filed a petition before the CA
when Flordeliza had not yet mailed copies of the court order to the parties.
Judge Iturralde surmised that the delay in mailing a copy of the order to the
parties was intended to give the defendants ample time to go to the CA in the
hope that a TRO or injunction could be secured.
The
complainants maintained that through their “several unlawful acts,”[8] Ramirez, Flordeliza and Salvador directly
disobeyed or resisted a lawful order of the court, thus impeding and
obstructing the administration of justice.
In
a 1st Indorsement dated September 12, 2002, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) required Salvador,[9]
Flordeliza[10] and
Ramirez[11]
to comment on the administrative complaint. The three respondents complied through their
individual counter-affidavits filed on December 3, 2002.[12] They likewise filed their respective
countercharges against Judge Iturralde.
Sheriff Salvador
Salvador
denied that he had refused to serve and enforce the writs subject of the
complaint. He claimed that he duly performed
his duties in the case, resulting in the garnishment of the accounts of
defendant FBM Construction and Agro-Industrial Corporation. It was not his
fault that the banks created problems for the complainants as he had no
influence over them. He recalled that the only instance when he refused to
accommodate Judge Iturralde’s demands was when the judge asked him to sign a writ
which was actually an authority prepared by the judge to withdraw money from
the garnished accounts; at that time, a case was pending with the higher court to
annul Judge Tiamson’s orders in the civil case.
He made it clear to Judge Iturralde that he would act on the case only
upon clearance by Judge Tiamson. Despite his refusal to act and notwithstanding
the pending case with the higher court, Judge Iturralde still managed to
withdraw P40,000.00 from the Metrobank Makati City branch, but failed to
pay the sheriff’s fee of P11,000.00.
Salvador
questioned Judge Iturralde’s active involvement in the case despite being an
incumbent RTC judge in Angeles City – an issue commonly known among the RTC
Binangonan court employees. He
insinuated that Judge Iturralde stood to gain financially from the civil case
and viewed this as the reason why the judge had been appearing at the hearings.
Because of the judge’s court appearances,
Salvador charged him with falsification of his daily time records and for
conduct unbecoming a lawyer and a member of the bench, as several of the
judge’s appearances before the RTC, Branch 69, Binangonan, Rizal were not
reflected in his leave records.
OIC Branch Clerk of Court Ramirez
Like
Ramirez
explained that there was no undue delay in the mailing of the court order of
August 18, 2000 in the Medalva Hills
Village case where Judge Iturralde had a financial interest and was a very
active participant. As a civil case, it must
give way to other cases, such as criminal cases where the accused are in
detention. She, nonetheless, issued the writ on the very same day Judge
Iturralde asked for it, although she bewailed the judge’s high-handedness in
securing the writ. On the alleged delay in the service of the court order
granting the writ, she asked that judicial notice be taken of the process
involved in the preparation of a court order up to its service or mailing to
the parties, intimating that this process takes time to complete.
On
Judge Iturralde’s complaint about the defective writ she issued, Ramirez argued
that the alias writ referred to the defendants “ET AL.,” since that was how the
plaintiffs wanted it, while the omission of the case number in the writ was due
to the attendant haste in the preparation of the writ. She decried the plaintiffs’ insistent demand
for the writ’s immediate issuance and cited this as the reason why she failed
to proofread the document.
Ramirez
threw back the obstruction of justice charge to Judge Iturralde, claiming that
it was not she but Judge Iturralde who was impeding the administration of
justice. She insisted that Judge
Iturralde tried to “railroad” the civil case in his favor by using his
influence as an incumbent judge. She claimed that while Judge Iturralde was
attending the hearings of the civil case at their branch in Binangonan, Rizal,
he was – on record – also present in his place of assignment – the RTC in
Angeles City; to avoid being noticed, the judge would ask his companions to
sign the minutes of hearings.
Ramirez
charged Judge Iturralde of unethical conduct and conduct unbecoming a lawyer
and a judge.
Clerk Flordeliza
Flordeliza
joined her co-employees Ramirez and Salvador in criticizing the high-handedness
Judge Iturralde exhibited in securing the execution of the judgment of the
court in the civil case. She also
questioned his active participation at the hearing of the case while at the
same time making it appear that he was attending to his duties at the RTC,
Angeles City.
Flordeliza
disputed Judge Iturralde’s statement that she admitted her fault in not mailing
the order dated August 18, 2000 for the issuance of a writ of execution. She
countered that in essence, she asked for the understanding of the judge
regarding the matter saying, “Pasensya na
po kayo Judge, wag po kayong mag-alala at aasikasuhin ko po. Sige po Judge, kayo na po ang bahalang
umintindi sa amin, tatapusin po namin ang hinihiling nyo.”[13]
Denying that there was a delay in
sending a copy of the order, she pointed out that Judge Iturralde himself
should have understood that under the rules, lower courts have 90 days within
which to rule on a motion, such as a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution. She then explained the
detailed procedure on how a court order is prepared up to its final release, a
process that takes into consideration the court’s order of priority in the
disposition of cases pursuant to directives of the Supreme Court.
Like
Ramirez and Salvador, Flordeliza charged Judge Iturralde of unethical conduct
and conduct unbecoming a lawyer and a judge.
Judge Iturralde’s Reply
In
his Reply dated November 10, 2002,[14]
Judge Iturralde assailed the respondents’ common general denial that the
complaint was “false, misleading, twisted out of context, malicious,
speculative and baseless.”[15] He
pointed out that the respondents did not squarely answer the issues raised in
the complaint.
Judge
Iturralde belittled the detailed description by both Ramirez and Flordeliza of
the procedure in the drafting of a court order up to its mailing to the
parties, stressing that it had nothing to do with the respondents’ actuations relative
to the enforcement of Judge Tiamson’s order for the issuance of a writ of execution.
In
the case of Salvador, Judge Iturralde explained that the complaint relates to the
sheriff’s continued defiance of a lawful order and refusal to implement the
writs despite the absence of a TRO or a contrary court order. He claimed that Salvador was lying when he insisted
that “there [was] an actual case before the higher courts seeking to annul or
reverse the orders of x x x Presiding Judge Tiamson,”[16] as
the case had long been decided by the Supreme Court and a final entry of
judgment had already been made.[17] He
labelled as a lie Salvador’s claim that the plaintiffs had not paid the sheriff’s
fees, for they had paid the corresponding fees.[18]
Judge
Iturralde reiterated his misgivings about the defects in the alias writ Ramirez
issued. He claimed that the writ’s
deficiencies clearly derailed and frustrated the enforcement of the alias writ
as the defendants raised the same deficiencies in their Consolidated Motion for
Reconsideration.[19]
On
the delay in the service of the court order, Judge Iturralde pointed out that
had the plaintiffs not made a follow-up, a copy of the order would not have
been released to them. They discovered that while they were waiting for a copy
of the order, the defendants had already gone to the CA.
Judge
Iturralde denied that he had exerted pressure on the respondents to have the
court judgment enforced because he stood to gain financially from the
case. He posited that this was not the respondents’
concern; neither should they show bias by giving the other party the opportunity
to oppose the writ. The judge argued that it was beyond the respondents’
authority or competence to question the interests of a party in a case, for
their functions are purely ministerial.
Judge
Iturralde admitted that there were instances when he was present at the RTC in
Binangonan, Rizal, but contended that the court did not conduct actual trials. The court merely conducted arbitration
conferences between the parties; two of the conferences were even held at his
residence.[20] While the dates mentioned in the respondents’
affidavits might have coincided with the dates set by the court for the
conferences, it did not follow that he had been present on these dates. He asked to be confronted with the
certificates of appearance with his signatures to ascertain the truth of the
respondents’ assertions.
Upon
the recommendation of the OCA, the Court resolved to: (1) re-docket the
complaint as a regular administrative matter; and (2) refer the case to a
consultant in the OCA for investigation.[21]
The Investigation, Report and Recommendation
In
a letter dated September 30, 2004,[22]
Investigator-Designate Narciso T. Atienza submitted his report,[23]
recommending that: (1) Flordeliza and Ramirez be found guilty of negligence and
be penalized with a reprimand; (2) Salvador be made liable for misconduct and
be sanctioned with a fine of P10,000.00; and (3) the countercharge
against Judge Iturralde be dismissed for lack of merit.
On
the whole, Investigator Atienza found the respondents liable for the difficulties
the plaintiffs (the complainants in the present administrative matter) suffered
in the execution of the favorable judgment they had secured in the civil case.
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with Investigator Atienza
that respondents Ramirez, Flordeliza and Salvador deserve to be sanctioned, but
we differ in the degree of the respondents’ culpability and in the imposable
penalties.
Ramirez and Flordeliza
The
explanation by Ramirez and Flordeliza on the process in the drafting, issuance
and service of a court order to the parties, insinuating that the process takes
time and that Judge Iturralde had been high-handed in securing the enforcement
of the decision in the plaintiff’ favor, cannot erase the fact that the two
court personnel were patently remiss in the performance of their duties.
The
court records clearly show that the court order granting the motion for
execution in the civil case had already been drafted, finalized and signed by
Judge Tiamson and only had to be released.
One month after its supposed issuance, its original and all the
duplicate copies were still attached to the record of the case, unserved on the
parties. Strangely, the defendants
already had a copy of the unserved order. Had Judge Iturralde and Gumarang not made a
personal inquiry into the status of the case, the order could have remained attached
to the records, unserved for a longer period.
As the investigator observed, Flordeliza
was wrong to expect that the parties, especially the plaintiffs, should
periodically follow up the status of their cases with the court. This is an unacceptable attitude on the part
of court personnel, especially under the circumstances of this case when nothing
more remained to be done but to serve the order. Flordeliza’s excuse – that the records were
still in the chambers of Judge Tiamson or that she had been busy attending to
her other duties – was a lame attempt to avoid liability for her inaction. For
this inaction, she committed not only simple neglect of duty, but the more
serious violation of conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service.
Ramirez,
the clerk of court (officer-in-charge), is no less guilty. She has the duty, under the rules,[24]
to issue the writ of execution as there was already a court order for the
purpose. The writ should have been
issued as a matter of course, but it took Ramirez one month to do so. In fact, the issuance was not done at her
initiative but at the insistence of Judge Iturralde and Gumarang who went to
the court on September 18, 2000 to ask for the immediate issuance of the writ.[25]
Ramirez
compounded the problem by issuing a writ that was, on its face, defective, thus
creating additional enforcement difficulties.
In the original writ issued on September 18, 2000, instead of having the
names of the defendants – the corporation and the defendants who are natural
persons – only “ET AL.” was typed to represent Renato J. Mariñas and Felix B. Mariñas
in the civil case, thereby concealing the identities of the natural persons on
whom the writ should be served.[26] Ramirez committed a worse second error when she
issued the alias writ of execution without any case number.[27] The complainants had to correct these errors
by writing the names of the defendants and the case number.[28]
Significantly,
Ramirez admitted the writ’s deficiencies, although she claimed that she signed
the alias writ in a hurry and thus was not able to check its details. She offered the excuse that she had plenty of
work to do, and had trusted the stenographer to look at the details.[29]
Like
Flordeliza, Ramirez is guilty not only of negligence but also of conduct
prejudicial to the interest of the service.
At the very least, they placed the court in a bad light as they presented
an image of a court whose personnel were bumbling and remiss in performing
their duties, to the prejudice of the administration of justice. Worse, they exposed court processes to the suspicion
that they can be fixed through arrangements with court personnel.
As
had happened in this case, the non-service of the court order granting the
motion for execution and the delayed issuance of the writ of execution stalled
the execution of the judgment in the civil case and gained time for the
defendants. This is a classic case of
justice delayed. As Investigator Atienza
correctly noted: “The defendants have conveniently made use of the negligence
of respondents Violeta Flordeliza and Babe SJ. Ramirez to prevent and/or
frustrate the immediate implementation of the writ of execution”[30]
by going to the CA and to this Court. The writ’s implementation, according to
the investigator, “was delayed for almost two (2) years from
Needless
to say, Ramirez and Flordeliza acted in a way that could cause an erosion of
public trust in the judiciary. In
Under
Civil Service rules,[33]
conduct prejudicial to the service is punishable by suspension (6 months and 1
day to 1 year) for the first offense. In
light of the effect of the violation on the administration of justice and the
strong hint of the concerted dilatory effort, we deem it proper to impose the
penalty of suspension without pay in its maximum period of one year.
Sheriff Salvador
We
find Sheriff Salvador liable for grave misconduct for his refusal to implement
the writ of execution in the civil case and for interposing obstacles in the
enforcement of the writ on grounds not within the scope of his duty.
Based
on Atienza’s investigation, it appears that two groups of sheriffs served the
alias writ of execution on the defendants in the civil case and the notices of
garnishment on the banks. Salvador
headed the first group, while Sheriff Joey Cariño headed the second group. The
first group served the alias writ at FBM Construction and Agro-Industrial
Corporation[34] in
Antipolo City and the notices of garnishments on the banks in the city,
including Metrobank. Salvador, accompanied by Gumarang, proceeded to the Register
of Deeds in Marikina City and levied on the properties in the name of defendant
FBM Construction and Agro-Industrial Corporation.
On
July 29, 2002, plaintiffs Leonardo Lucas, Gumarang and Judge Iturralde
accompanied Salvador to the Metrobank head office in Makati City to withdraw
the garnished amount, but Salvador refused to sign a prepared “Sheriff’s Letter
of Demand,”[35] claiming
that a case was still pending before the higher courts to annul Judge Tiamson’s
order. Later, Salvador required the
plaintiffs to file a motion to withdraw garnished amount, which they did.[36] At the time the plaintiffs asked Salvador to
withdraw the garnished amounts, the Court had already dismissed with finality
the defendants’ petition for certiorari
in its Resolution dated April 9, 2002.
Again,
as Investigator Atienza noted,
We
find it obvious from Salvador’s actuations that he was interposing obstacles to
prevent the speedy enforcement of the alias writ of execution, for reasons only
known to him. Thus, he first argued that
there was still a pending case in the higher court. When he realized that this was untenable, he
imposed the requirement that the plaintiffs secure a court order for the withdrawal
of the garnished amount. The result, of
course, was Salvador’s failure to levy on the personal assets of the defendants
who are natural persons.
In
a different vein, Gumarang testified during the investigation that Salvador
asked P10,000.00 from the plaintiffs for the expenses of his team in the
implementation of the writ of execution;[38]
Gumarang gave Salvador P6,000.00 in a white envelope inside the Bamboo Grill
Restaurant when the sheriffs met on their way home to Binangonan, Rizal.[39]
Salvador denied that he had asked P10,000.00 from Gumarang, claiming
that he was surprised when Gumarang arrived at the Bamboo Grill Restaurant and
gave them the money; only he and the other sheriffs knew of their rendezvous at
the Bamboo Grill Restaurant.[40]
We
agree with Investigator Atienza’s view that Salvador’s claim that Gumarang
voluntarily gave Salvador the money was highly unbelievable. Gumarang clearly
knew that the sheriffs were at the Bamboo Grill Restaurant at the time he
delivered the money. This could only mean that Salvador had informed Gumarang beforehand
of the meeting and the meeting place, belying the claim that Gumarang simply
came and voluntarily gave the money to Salvador. Since the plaintiffs had not then recovered a
single centavo from the defendants, Gumarang must have been there to secure the
prompt implementation of the writ through payment of the demanded sum to Salvador.
As
Investigator Atienza pointed out, even assuming that Gumarang indeed voluntarily
gave money to the sheriffs, Salvador should still be answerable for receiving
money from litigants under terms not allowed by the Rules of Court. In Atty.
Stanley G. Zamora v. Ramon P. Villanueva,[41]
the Court stressed that Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court requires the
sheriff to secure the court’s prior approval of the estimated expenses and fees
needed to implement the writ.
Specifically, it provides:
In addition to the fees hereinabove fixed, the party requesting the process of any court, preliminary, incidental, or final, shall pay the sheriff’s expenses in serving or executing the process, or safeguarding the property levied upon, attached or seized, including kilometrage for each kilometer of travel, guard’s fees, warehousing and similar charges, in an amount estimated by the sheriff, subject to the approval of the court. Upon approval of said estimated expenses, the interested party shall deposit such amount with the clerk of court and ex officio sheriff, who shall disburse the same to the deputy sheriff assigned to effect the process, subject to liquidation within the same period for rendering a return on the process. Any unspent amount shall be refunded to the party making the deposit. A full report shall be submitted by the deputy sheriff assigned with his return, and the sheriff’s expenses shall be taxed as costs against the judgment debtor.
No
evidence in the case exists showing that P10,000.00
from the plaintiffs. He likewise failed to render an accounting and to
liquidate the amount to the court. In the above cited Zamora case, the Court
declared that any act deviating from the established procedures is misconduct
that warrants disciplinary action.
“Misconduct,”
according to the Court in P10,000.00 and received P6,000.00 from the complainants,
which sum – by his own admission – was spent for food and drinks,[43]
in clear violation of the Rules. Earlier, we found that he refused to implement
the alias writ even after its issuance and even posed obstacles to its speedy
enforcement. All these point to the
commission of a grave misconduct.
Under
the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,[44]
grave misconduct is classified as a grave offense punishable by dismissal for
the first offense. Section 58 of the
same Rules provides that dismissal carries with it cancellation of eligibility,
forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification for re-employment
in the government, unless otherwise provided in the decision.
As
a final word in
By the nature of their functions, sheriffs must conduct themselves with propriety and decorum, to be above suspicion. Sheriffs are court officers and, like everyone else in the judiciary, are called upon to discharge their sworn duties with great care and diligence. They cannot afford to err in serving court writs and processes and in implementing court orders lest they undermine the integrity of their office and the efficient administration of justice.[45]
The
countercharge
Investigator
Atienza found that the respondents failed to adduce evidence supporting their
countercharge against Judge Iturralde. They failed to submit the minutes of the
proceedings in the RTC, Branch 69, Binangonan, Rizal, where Judge Iturralde was
present when he was supposed to be in Angeles City.
Judge
Iturralde explained that he was suspended from office for almost two years; after
he was cleared by the Supreme Court, he was detailed at Branch 72, Antipolo
City, a site not too far from Binangonan, Rizal. The respondents mentioned in
their counter-affidavits the dates from 1998 to 2002 when Judge Iturralde was
present during the hearings of the civil case, but they did not present any
document from the RTC, Branch 58, Angeles City, that, indeed, the judge was not
in his court on the dates mentioned in the countercharge.
We
approve Investigator Atienza’s recommendation that the countercharge be
dismissed for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1.
Babe
SJ. Ramirez (OIC Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 69,
Binangonan, Rizal) and Violeta Flordeliza (clerk in charge of civil cases of
the same court), are hereby found LIABLE
for conduct prejudicial to the service, and are accordingly SUSPENDED without pay from the service,
for ONE YEAR.
2.
Carlos
Salvador, Sheriff, same court, is declared LIABLE
for grave misconduct and is DISMISSED from the service, with
forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits. He is further BARRED from re-employment in any branch or office of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
3.
The
countercharge against Judge Philbert I. Iturralde, Regional Trial Court, Branch
58,
SO ORDERED.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice |
|
|
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice MARIANO C.
DEL CASTILLO Associate
Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate
Justice |
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice ARTURO D.
BRION Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate
Justice MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO Associate
Justice |
|
|
|
[1] Rollo, pp. 1-3.
[2] Id. at 83-85.
[3] Id. at 4-6; Affidavit-Complaint, Annex “A.”
[4] Id. at 8-11; Affidavit-Complaint, Annex “C.”
[5] Id. at 8, Affidavit-Complaint, Exh. “F.”
[6] Supra note 1, par. q.
[7] Id, at 8, Affidavit-Complaint, Exh. “K-1.”
[8] Supra note 1, par u.
[9] Rollo, p. 14
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24] Rules of Court, Section 5.
[25] Supra note 1, par. d.
[26] Rollo, p. 4, Exhibit “F-1.”
[27] Supra note 5.
[28] Supra note 7.
[29] Rollo, pp. 645-648; TSN,
[30]
[31]
[32] A.M.
No. P-07-2263,
[33] Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Section 52 A(20).
[34] Rollo, pp. 460-461; TSN,
[35]
[36]
[37] Rules of Court, Rule 39, Section 9 which provides:
Section 9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced – (a) Immediate payment on demand. – The officer shall enforce an execution of a judgment for money by demanding from the judgment obligor the immediate payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution and all lawful fees. The judgment obligor shall pay in cash, certified check payable to the judgment obligee, x x x the amount of the judgment debt under proper receipt directly to the judgment obligee or his authorized representative if present at the time of payment. The lawful fees shall be handed under proper receipt to the executing sheriff who shall turn over the said amount within the same day to the clerk of court of the court that issued the writ.
[38] Rollo, pp. 520-522; TSN,
[39]
[40]
[41] A.M.
No. P-04-1898,
[42] Supra note 41, at 39-40.
[43] Rollo, p. 697; TSN,
[44] Supra note 33, Section 52(a)(3).
[45] Supra note 41, at 39.