Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
VELASCO,
JR.,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
PEREZ,
JJ.
FRANCISCO MANLANGIT y Promulgated:
TRESBALLES,
Accused-Appellant. January 12, 2010
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D E C I
S I O N
VELASCO,
JR., J.:
The Case
This
is an appeal from the August 28, 2009 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03273, which affirmed in toto the Decision dated July 12, 2007[2] in
Criminal Case Nos. 03-4735 and 03-4961 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 64 in Makati City. The RTC found accused-appellant
Francisco Manlangit y Tresballes guilty of drug-sale and drug-use penalized by
Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
On
November 25, 2003, an information was filed charging Manlangit with violating
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of
November 2003, in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized
by law, did then and there willfully and feloniously sell, give away,
distribute and deliver zero point zero four (0.04) gram of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride (shabu), which is a dangerous drug.[3]
On December 11, 2003, another information
was filed against Manlangit for breach of Sec. 15, Art. II of RA 9165, to wit:
That sometime on or before or about the 24th
day of November 2003, in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being
authorized by law to use dangerous drugs, and having been arrested and found
positive for use of Methylamphetamine, after a confirmatory test, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use Methylamphetamine, a dangerous
drug in violation of the said law.[4]
During the arraignment for both
cases, Manlangit pleaded not guilty. Afterwards,
the cases were tried jointly.
At the trial of the case, the
prosecution adduced evidence as follows:
On November 24, 2003, the Makati
Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC) Cluster 4 office received information from an
informant that a certain “Negro” was selling prohibited drugs along
Upon arrival on
Manlangit denied that such buy-bust
operation was conducted and claimed that the recovered shabu was not from him. He claimed that he was pointed out by a
certain Eli Ballesteros to Serrano and Bayona. Thereafter, he was allegedly detained at the
Barangay Hall of Brgy. Pitogo. There, he
was allegedly interrogated by Serrano as to the location of the shabu and its proceeds, as well as the
identity of the drug pushers in the area. He also claimed that whenever he answered that
he did not know what Serrano was talking about, he was boxed in the chest. Later on, he said that he was brought to
On July 12, 2007, the RTC rendered a
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered as follows:
1)
In
Criminal Case No. 03-4735, finding accused Francisco Manlangit y Tresballes
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of
Violation of Section 5, Art II, RA 9165 (drug-sale) and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of
P500,000.00. Said accused shall be given credit for the period of his
preventive detention.
2)
In
Criminal Case No. 03-4735,[7]
finding accused Francisco Manlangit y Tresballes GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
of Violation of Section 15, Art II, RA 9165 (drug-use), and sentencing him to
undergo rehabilitation for at least six (6) months in a government
rehabilitation Center under the auspices of the Bureau of Correction subject to
the provisions of Article VIII, RA 9165.
It is further ordered that the plastic sachet
containing shabu, subject of Criminal Case No. 03-4735, be transmitted to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for the latter’s appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.[8]
From such Decision, Manlangit
interposed an appeal with the CA.
In his Brief, accused-appellant Manlangit
claimed that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
To support such contention,
accused-appellant claimed that there was no buy-bust operation conducted. He pointed out that he was not in the list of suspected
drug pushers of MADAC or of the AIDSTOF. He further emphasized that the buy-bust
operation was conducted without first conducting a surveillance or test buy to
determine the veracity of the report made by the informant. He assailed the fact that despite knowledge of
his identity and location, the buy-bust team failed to secure even a search
warrant.
Accused-appellant also raised the
issue that the buy-bust team failed to comply with the procedure for the
custody and control of seized prohibited drugs under Sec. 21 of RA 9165. He
argued that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
function was overturned by the officers’ failure to follow the required
procedure in the conduct of a buy-bust operation, as well as the procedure in
the proper disposition, custody, and control of the subject specimen.
On August 28, 2009, the CA rendered
the decision which affirmed the RTC’s Decision dated July 12, 2007. It ruled
that contrary to accused-appellant’s contention, prior surveillance is not a
prerequisite for the validity of a buy-bust operation. The case was a valid example of a warrantless
arrest, accused-appellant having been caught in flagrante delicto. The CA
further stated that accused-appellant’s unsubstantiated allegations are
insufficient to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by
improper motive, in this case the members of the buy-bust team; thus, their
testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. After examining the
testimonies of the witnesses, the CA found them credible and found no reason to
disturb the RTC’s findings. Finally, the
CA found that chain of evidence was not broken.
Hence, the instant appeal.
In a Manifestation (In lieu of
Supplemental Brief) dated February 22, 2010, accused-appellant expressed his
desire not to file a supplemental brief and reiterated the same arguments
already presented before the trial and appellate courts.
The Issues
The
issues, as raised in the Brief for the Accused-Appellant dated September 29,
2008, are:
1. The Court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite the prosecution’s failure to prove his built beyond reasonable doubt.[9]
2. The Court a quo gravely erred in finding that the procedure for the custody and control of prohibited drugs was complied with.[10]
The Ruling of the Court
The appeal is bereft of merit.
First Issue:
Accused-appellant’s guilt was proved
beyond reasonable doubt
The
first paragraph of Sec. 5 of RA 9165 punishes the act of selling dangerous drugs. It provides:
Section 5.
While
Sec. 15, RA 9165 states:
Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs.¾A
person apprehended or arrested, who is found to be positive for use of any
dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a
minimum of six (6) months rehabilitation in a government center for the first
offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If apprehended using any dangerous drug for
the second time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from
six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from
Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00):
Provided, That this Section shall not be applicable where the person tested is
also found to have in his/her possession such quantity of any dangerous drug
provided for under Section 11 of this Act, in which case the provisions stated
therein shall apply. (Emphasis supplied.)
People v. Macatingag[11]
prescribed the requirements for the successful prosecution of the crime of
illegal sale of dangerous drugs, as follows.
The elements necessary for the prosecution of
illegal sale of drugs are (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor. What is material to
the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction
or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence
of corpus delicti.
The
pieces of evidence found in the records amply demonstrate that all the elements
of the crimes charged were satisfied. The
lower courts gave credence to the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies, which
established the guilt of accused-appellant for the crimes charged beyond
reasonable doubt. The testimonies––particularly
those of the police officers involved, which both the RTC and the CA found credible––are
now beyond question. As the Court ruled
in Aparis v. People:[12]
As to the question of credibility of the
police officers who served as principal witnesses for the prosecution, settled
is the rule that prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the
credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. It is
a fundamental rule that findings of the trial courts which are factual in
nature and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring
errors; gross misapprehension of facts; or speculative, arbitrary, and
unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The reason for this
is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of
witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying during the trial. The rule finds an even more stringent
application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals, as in
the present case.
Moreover,
accused-appellant’s defense of denial, without substantial evidence to support
it, cannot overcome the presumption of regularity of the police officers’ performance
of official functions. Thus, the Court
ruled in People v. Llamado:[13]
In cases involving violations of Dangerous
Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of the incident by the
prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed
to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to
the contrary. Moreover, in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute such a
serious crime against the appellant, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over appellant’s self-serving and
uncorroborated denial. (Emphasis supplied.)
Contrary to accused-appellant’s
challenge to the validity of the buy-bust operation, the Court categorically stated
in Quinicot v. People that a prior
surveillance or test buy is not required for a valid buy-bust operation, as
long as the operatives are accompanied by their informant, thus:
Settled
is the rule that the absence of a prior surveillance or test buy does not
affect the legality of the buy-bust operation. There is no textbook method
of conducting buy-bust operations. The Court has left to the discretion of
police authorities the selection of effective means to apprehend drug dealers.
A prior surveillance, much less a lengthy one, is not necessary, especially
where the police operatives are accompanied by their informant during the
entrapment. Flexibility is a trait of good police work. We have held that when
time is of the essence, the police may dispense with the need for prior
surveillance. In the instant case,
having been accompanied by the informant to the person who was peddling the
dangerous drugs, the policemen need not have conducted any prior surveillance
before they undertook the buy-bust operation.[14]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Furthermore, accused-appellant’s
contention that the buy-bust team should have procured a search warrant for the
validity of the buy-bust operation is misplaced. The Court had the occasion to
address this issue in People v. Doria:[15]
We also hold that the warrantless arrest of
accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests are allowed in
three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, to wit:
“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.¾A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.”
Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a
person may be arrested without a warrant if he “has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.” Appellant Doria was caught
in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a
buy-bust operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest
him even without a warrant.
The
Court reiterated such ruling in People v.
Agulay:[16]
Accused-appellant contends his arrest was
illegal, making the sachets of shabu allegedly recovered from him inadmissible
in evidence. Accused-appellant’s claim
is devoid of merit for it is a well-established rule that an arrest made after
an entrapment operation does not require a warrant inasmuch as it is considered
a valid “warrantless arrest,” in line with the provisions of Rule 113, Section
5(a) of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when
lawful.¾A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment
which in recent years has been accepted as a valid and effective mode of
apprehending drug pushers. In a buy-bust
operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without
anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. If carried out with due
regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust operation deserves
judicial sanction.
Second Issue:
The chain of custody of the seized drug
was unbroken
Accused-appellant
contends that the arresting officers did not comply with the requirements for
the handling of seized dangerous drugs as provided for under Sec. 21(1) of RA
9165:
Section
21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment.¾The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous
drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following
manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; (Emphasis supplied.)
In
particular, accused-appellant argues that:
While the marking of the specimen was done in
the place of incident by MADAC operative Soriano, the inventory of the item was
done at Cluster 4. There was no photograph made of the plastic sachet in the
presence of the accused, media, any elected local official, or the DOJ
representatives, in clear violation of Section 21, R.A. No. 9165.[17]
Based
on such alleged failure of the buy-bust team to comply with the procedural
requirements of Sec. 21, RA 9165, accused-appellant posits that he should,
therefore, be acquitted. Such reasoning is flawed.
In
People v. Rosialda,[18]
the Court addressed the issue of chain of custody of dangerous drugs, citing People v. Rivera, as follows:
Anent the second element, Rosialda raises the
issue that there is a violation of Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165, particularly
the requirement that the alleged dangerous drugs seized by the apprehending
officers be photographed “in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel.” Rosialda argues that such
failure to comply with the provision of the law is fatal to his conviction.
This contention is untenable.
The Court made the following enlightening
disquisition on this matter in People v.
Rivera:
The procedure to be followed in the custody
and handling of seized dangerous drugs is outlined in Section 21, paragraph 1,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 which stipulates:
(1) The apprehending team having initial
custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
The same is implemented by Section 21(a),
Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165,
viz.:
(a) The apprehending team having initial custody
and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department
of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, further,
that non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
The
failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the
required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant
to said guidelines, is not fatal and does not automatically render
accused-appellant’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible. Indeed, the
implementing rules offer some flexibility when a proviso added that ‘non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
and custody over said items.’ The same provision clearly states as well, that
it must still be shown that there exists justifiable grounds and proof that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence have been preserved.
This Court can no longer find out what
justifiable reasons existed, if any, since the defense did not raise this issue
during trial. Be that as it may, this
Court has explained in People v. Del
Monte that what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The
existence of the dangerous drug is a condition sine qua non for conviction for
the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the
very corpus delicti of the crime and the fact of its existence is vital to a
judgment of conviction. Thus, it is essential that the identity of the
prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. The chain of custody requirement
performs the function of ensuring that the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts as to the
identity of the evidence are removed.
To
be admissible, the prosecution must show by records or testimony, the
continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into
possession of the police officers and until it was tested in the laboratory to
determine its composition up to the time it was offered in evidence. (Emphasis supplied.)
Here,
accused-appellant does not question the unbroken chain of evidence. His only contention
is that the buy-bust team did not inventory and photograph the specimen on site
and in the presence of accused-appellant or his counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official.
However, as ruled by the Court in Rosialda,
as long as the chain of custody remains unbroken, even though the procedural
requirements provided for in Sec. 21 of RA 9165 was not faithfully observed,
the guilt of the accused will not be affected.
And
as aptly ruled by the CA, the chain of custody in the instant case was not
broken as established by the facts proved during trial, thus:
Lastly, the contention of appellant, that the
police officers failed to comply with the provisions of paragraph 1, Section 21
of R.A. No. 9165 for the proper procedure in the custody and disposition of the
seized drugs, is untenable. Record shows that Serrano marked the confiscated
sachet of shabu in the presence of
appellant at the place of incident and was turned over properly to the
investigating officer together with the marked buy-bust money. Afterwards, the
confiscated plastic sachet suspected to be containing “shabu” was brought to
the forensic chemist for examination. Likewise, the members of the buy-bust
team executed their “Pinagsanib na
Salaysay sa Pag-aresto” immediately after the arrest and at the trial,
Serrano positively identified the seized drugs. Indeed, the prosecution
evidence had established the unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs from
the buy-bust team, to the investigating officer and to the forensic chemist. Thus,
there is no doubt that the prohibited drug presented before the court a quo was
the one seized from appellant and that indeed, he committed the crimes imputed
against him.
WHEREFORE, the
appeal is DENIED. The
CA’s August 28, 2009 Decision in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03273 is hereby AFFIRMED
IN
TOTO.
No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO C.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE
PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
C E R
T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section
13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 2-9. Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and concurred in by Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Francisco P. Acosta.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 17-24. Penned by Judge Maria Cristina J. Cornejo.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Should be Criminal Case No. 03-4961.
[8] CA rollo, pp. 23-24.
[9]
[10]
[11] G.R. No. 181037, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 354, 361-362.
[12] G.R. No. 169195, February 17, 2010.
[13] G.R. No. 185278, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 544, 552; citing Dimacuha v. People, G.R. No. 143705, February 23, 2007, 516 SCRA 513.
[14] G.R. No. 179700, June 22, 2009, 590 SCRA 458, 470.
[15] G.R. No. 125299, January 22, 1999, 301 SCRA 668, 704.
[16] G.R. No. 181747, September 26, 2008, 566 SCRA 571, 593-594.
[17] CA rollo, pp. 46-47.
[18] G.R. No. 188330, August 25, 2010; citing People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 182347, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 879.