FIRST
DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE
Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus - MARK
LESTER DELA ROSA y SUELLO, Accused-Appellant. |
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G.R. No. 185166 Present:
Chairperson, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, PEREZ,
JJ. Promulgated: January 26, 2011 |
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PEREZ, J.:
The subject of this present appeal is
the Decision[1] dated 24
April 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02642, affirming the
Decision[2]
dated 8 December 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch
135, in Criminal Case Nos. 06-1870 to 06-1871, finding herein appellant Mark
Lester Dela Rosa y Suello guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal sale and illegal possession of marijuana, a dangerous drug, in violation of Sections 5[3] and
11,[4] Article
II of Republic Act No. 9165,[5] thereby,
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00
for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (Criminal Case
No. 06-1870) and an indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 day, as minimum, to
14 years and 8 months, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P300,000.00 for
violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (Criminal Case No.
06-1871).
In
two separate Informations[6]
both dated 26 September 2006, appellant Mark Lester Dela Rosa y Suello was charged with violation of
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, which were respectively
docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-1870 and Criminal Case No. 06-1871. The Informations read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 06-1870
That on or about the 25th day of September 2006, in the City of Makati, Philippines, and a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [appellant], not being lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drug and without the corresponding license or prescription did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, distribute and transport three point zero two (3.02) grams of marijuana, which is a dangerous drug in consideration of the amount of one hundred (Php100.00) pesos.[7] [Emphasis supplied].
Criminal
Case No. 06-1871
That on or about the 25th day of September 2006, in the City of Makati, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [appellant], not being lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drug and without the corresponding license or prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession five point six zero (5.60) grams of [m]arijuana, which is a dangerous drug.[8] [Emphasis supplied].
When
arraigned,[9]
appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio,
pleaded “NOT GUILTY” to both charges.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The
prosecution presented the testimony of its lone witness, Police Officer 3
Eusebio Lowaton, Jr. (PO3 Lowaton), of the Special Anti Illegal Drug-Special
Operation Task Force (SAID-SOTF),
The
facts of the case as culled from the records and testimony of PO3 Lowaton are
as follows:
On
On the basis thereof, the SAID-SOTF,
After a complete coordination with
PDEA, the briefing of the members of the buy-bust team followed, wherein PO3
Lowaton was designated as poseur-buyer. He was also given P100.00, bearing Serial Nos. FR 485129 and
CY 532084, respectively, with markings “ATS” on the upper right portion of the
serial number of each bill.[15]
Thereafter, the buy-bust team,
together with the informant, proceeded to the target area in P100.00 worth of marijuana. Appellant immediately took one plastic sachet
of marijuana from his pocket that
corresponds to the amount agreed upon and handed the same to PO3 Lowaton. The latter, in turn, handed the two marked Fifty
Peso bills to appellant as payment for the purchased item.[16]
Upon the consummation of the sale,
PO3 Lowaton executed their pre-arranged signal by holding appellant’s right
hand. At this juncture, the other
members of the buy-bust team who were in the vicinity of the target area came
in to help PO3 Lowaton, who at that moment had already introduced himself as a
police officer, in arresting appellant. Appellant
was arrested at around
After appellant’s arrest, he was
brought to the office of SAID-SOTF,
After
PO3 Lowaton’s testimony, the parties agreed and stipulated that the testimony
of Jeffrey Abellana, one of MADAC operatives, would be that he was a member of
the back up team that assisted in the arrest of appellant. The prosecution,
thus, decided to dispense with his testimony.[24]
The
defense, on the other hand, presented appellant as their sole witness and
offered a different version of what transpired on the day of his arrest.
Appellant
narrated that on 25 September 2006, at around 12:00 noon, he was sleeping
inside his house located at 4041 Kalayaan Street, Barangay Singkamas, Makati City, when suddenly he was awakened by
three persons, who introduced themselves as MADAC operatives. These MADAC operatives were looking for a
certain Richard. Upon asking them the
reason why they were looking for Richard inside his house and at the same time telling
them that he was not the person they were looking for, the MADAC operatives
simply told him to just go with them peacefully. Without offering any resistance, appellant
went with the MADAC operatives. The
latter brought him to their office where he was asked to reveal the whereabouts
of Richard to which the appellant replied that he does not know the person they
were looking for. At this juncture, the
MADAC operatives told him that if he will not reveal the whereabouts of Richard,
then, they will charge him with possession of marijuana that they were carrying at that moment. Thereafter, he was detained at their office
for about eight to nine days.[25]
Appellant
further stated that when the MADAC operatives brought him out of the detention
cell, he was subsequently brought inside a building where there was a fiscal. The latter then informed him that he was
charged with the crime of illegal sale and possession of marijuana in violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165. Appellant, however, denied
the same.[26]
After
all the documentary and testimonial evidence offered by both parties were meticulously
evaluated, the trial court concluded that all the elements of the offenses charged
against appellant were satisfactorily proven by the prosecution. Thus, in its Decision dated
WHEREFORE, it appearing that the guilt of [appellant] MARK LESTER DE LA ROSA y SUELLO was proven beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, with no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, for violation [of] Section[s] 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, he is hereby sentenced:
1.
In Criminal Case No. 06-1870, to
suffer life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P500,000.00;
2. In Criminal
Case No. 06-1871, to suffer imprisonment for an indeterminate term of twelve [12] years and one [1] day, as minimum,
to fourteen [14] years, and eight [8] months, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P300,000.00;
and
3. To pay the costs.
Let the plastic sachets containing 3.02grams, 2.95 grams, and 2.65 grams of marijuana be turned over to the PDEA for proper disposition.[27] [Emphasis supplied].
Aggrieved,
appellant appealed the aforesaid
The Court of Appeals, after a
thorough study of the records, rendered the assailed Decision dated
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED and the questioned Decision of the RTC of Makati City, Branch 135, in Criminal Case Nos. 06-1870 and 06-1871, convicting the [appellant] beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, AFFIRMED.[29] [Emphasis supplied].
Still
unsatisfied, appellant elevated the aforesaid Decision of the appellate court to
this Court via a Notice of Appeal.[30]
In
a Resolution[31] dated
Appellant, on the other hand, opted
to file a Supplemental Brief[33] reiterating
therein the arguments raised in his Appellant’s Brief filed before the Court of
Appeals.
In his brief, appellant raised the
following assignment of errors:
I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION WHICH FAILED TO OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN FAVOR OF THE [APPELLANT].
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE [APPELLANT] GUILTY OF THE CRIMES CHARGED NOTWITHSTANDING THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[34]
Appellant argues that the fact of
sale of marijuana was not
conclusively established because PO3 Lowaton’s testimony was incredible for no
person in his right mind would boldly sell prohibited drugs in broad daylight and
in a public place. The inconsistency in
the testimony of PO3 Lowaton as regards their pre-arranged signal similarly casts
doubt on the credibility of his testimony.
More so, the alleged buy-bust operation was conducted without any prior
surveillance. Appellant likewise maintains
that his arrest was tainted with irregularity as there was an evident violation
of Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. By reason of the foregoing, appellant insists
that his constitutional right to presumption of innocence remains because there
is reasonable doubt that calls for his acquittal.
After
a painstaking review of the records, this Court affirms appellant’s conviction
for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
In
every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like marijuana, the following elements must
be sufficiently proved to sustain a conviction therefor: (1) the identity of the buyer, as well as
the seller, the object and consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment therefor.[35] What
is material is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled
with the presentation in court of the dangerous drugs seized as evidence. We reiterate the meaning of the term corpus
delicti which is the actual commission by someone of the particular crime
charged.[36] The commission
of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like marijuana, requires
merely the consummation of the selling transaction, which happens the moment
the buyer receives the drug from the seller. Settled is the rule that as long as the police
officer went through the operation as a buyer and his offer was accepted by
appellant and the dangerous drugs delivered to the former; the crime is considered consummated by the delivery of the goods.[37]
In the case at bench, this Court is
fully convinced that the prosecution has adequately and satisfactorily proved
all the aforesaid elements of illegal sale of marijuana.
Appellant, who was caught in flagrante delicto, was positively
identified by PO3 Lowaton, who acted as the poseur-buyer,
as the same person who sold the one plastic sachet of marijuana to him weighing 3.02 grams for a consideration of P100.00. Such one plastic sachet of marijuana was presented in court, which PO3
Lowaton identified to be the same object sold to him by appellant. He further stated that the markings “EBL”
found on the said object were his initials, which he placed thereon at the time
the appellant was arrested.[38] PO3 Lowaton similarly identified in court the
recovered marked money from the appellant that consists of P100.00
with markings “ATS” on the upper right portion of the serial number of each
bill.[39]
More so, the testimony of PO3 Lowaton
clearly established in detail how his transaction with appellant happened
starting from the moment their informant introduced him to appellant as someone
interested in buying his stuff from the time appellant handed him the one
plastic sachet of marijuana and, in
turn, he handed appellant the two Fifty Peso bills marked money for a total
amount of P100.00 that consummated the sale transaction between him and
appellant. PO3 Lowaton caused the one
plastic sachet of marijuana to be
examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory.
The item weighing 3.02 grams was tested positive for marijuana as evidenced by Physical
Science Report No. D-659-06S prepared by Engineer Richard Allan B. Mangalip,
Forensic Chemical Officer/Chief, Physical Science Section of the PNP Crime
Laboratory-Southern Police District Crime Laboratory Office.
Thus, it is already beyond question
that appellant’s guilt for the crime of illegal sale of marijuana, a dangerous drug, in violation of Section 5, Article II
of Republic Act No. 9165 was proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant’s contention that PO3
Lowaton’s testimony was not credible for no person in his right mind would
boldly sell prohibited drugs in broad daylight and in a public place deserves
scant consideration.
This Court has consistently
pronounced that drug pushers sell their prohibited articles to any prospective
customer, be he a stranger or not, in
private, as well as in public places, even in the daytime. Indeed, drug pushers have become increasingly
daring, dangerous and, worse, openly defiant of the law. Hence,
what matters is not the existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller
or the time and venue of the sale, but the fact of agreement and the acts
constituting sale and delivery of the prohibited drugs.[40]
Similarly, the alleged contradiction
and inconsistency pointed to by appellant in the testimony of PO3 Lowaton as
regards the pre-arranged signal agreed upon by the buy-bust team is only minor,
trivial, immaterial, and does not in any way affect the credibility of PO3
Lowaton’s testimony, since his testimony clearly and categorically established the
sale of marijuana. Such minor inconsistency referring to the
details of the sale of marijuana may
be considered as badges of truth rather than of falsehood.[41]
In People v. Nicolas,[42]
this Court held that the employment of a pre-arranged signal, or the lack of
it, is not indispensable in a buy-bust
operation. What determines if there
was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs is proof of the concurrence of all the
elements of the offense. With more
reason that a mere inconsistency thereof does not and will not affect the
credibility of the prosecution witness so long as all the elements of the
offense have been established with certainty.
That no test buy was conducted before
the arrest is of no moment for there is no rigid or textbook method of
conducting buy-bust operations. For the
same reason, the absence of evidence of
a prior surveillance does not affect the regularity of a buy-bust operation,
especially when, like in this case, the buy-bust team members were accompanied
to the scene by their informant. The
Court will not pretend to establish on a priori
basis what detailed acts police authorities might credibly undertake and carry
out in their entrapment operations. The
selection of appropriate and effective means of entrapping drug traffickers is
best left to the discretion of police authorities.[43]
For illegal
possession of a dangerous drug, like marijuana, it must be shown that (1) the
accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited
or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the
accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug.[44]
All the aforesaid
elements were clearly established by the prosecution. As an incident to his
lawful arrest resulting from the buy-bust operation, appellant was similarly found
to have in his possession two more plastic sachets of marijuana with a total weight of 5.60 grams, the same kind of
dangerous drug he was caught selling in flagrante
delicto. The said two plastic
sachets of marijuana was also
presented in court, which PO3 Lowatan identified to be the same objects
recovered from appellant while he was being frisked on the occasion of his
arrest for illegally selling marijuana. PO3 Lowaton likewise explained that the
markings “EBL-1” and “EBL-2” written on the two plastic sachets of marijuana were his initials and the same
were done by him.
Further, the record is
bereft of any evidence that would show that appellant had the legal authority
to possess the two plastic sachets of marijuana
recovered from him. This Court held in a
catena of cases that a mere
possession of a regulated drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a
satisfactory explanation of such possession – the onus probandi is shifted to the accused, to explain the absence of
knowledge or animus possidendi.[45]
With
that, appellant’s guilt for the crime of illegal possession of marijuana, a dangerous drug, in clear
violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, was also proven
by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
As a last ditch effort, appellant
claims that his arrest was tainted with irregularity as the seized items were
not photographed in accordance with the
provisions of Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, thus, an evident
violation thereof. The said argument is
baseless.
Section
21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition
of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall
take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; [Emphasis supplied].
The
aforesaid provision is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165, viz.:
(a) The apprehending team having initial
custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided,
further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. [Emphasis supplied].
The afore-quoted Section
21(a), Article II of the IRR of Republic Act No. 9165, offers some flexibility
in complying with the express requirements. Indeed, the evident purpose of the
procedure is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt
of or innocence of the accused. Thus,
the proviso stating that
non-compliance with the stipulated procedure, under justifiable grounds, shall
not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items, for
as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officers.[46]
In
the present case, the records and the transcribed stenographic notes clearly
showed that the seized
items from appellant were physically inventoried by PO3 Lowaton at the place
where appellant was arrested and in his presence, as evidenced by an
Acknowledgment Receipt[47]
dated
Even
granting arguendo that the
prosecution failed to show that the police officers conducted the required
physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant to the
aforesaid guidelines, the same is not fatal and does not automatically render
appellant's arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him
inadmissible. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items, as it would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.[52]
The chain of custody requirement performs
the function of ensuring that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts as to the identity of
the evidence are removed. To be
admissible, the prosecution must show by records or testimony, the continuous
whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into possession of
the police officers and until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its
composition up to the time it was offered in evidence.[53]
The
prosecution, in this case, has adequately shown the continuous and unbroken
possession and subsequent transfers of the three plastic sachets of marijuana from the time appellant handed
to PO3 Lowaton the one plastic sachet of marijuana
to consummate the sale thereof; then the subsequent recovery by PO3 Lowaton of
two more plastic sachets of marijuana
from appellant; followed by the markings made by PO3 Lowaton of his initials on
the said three plastic sachets of marijuana
at the place where appellant was arrested and in his presence; until they were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination that
yielded positive result for the presence of marijuana,
a dangerous drug, as evidenced by a Physical Science Report No. D-659-06S; and up
to the time that the marked three plastic sachets of marijuana were offered in
court. Such fact persuasively proves that
the three plastic sachets of marijuana
presented in court were the same items seized from appellant during the
buy-bust operation. The integrity and
evidentiary value thereof was duly preserved.
It has been judicially settled that in
buy-bust operations, the testimony of the police officers who apprehended the
accused is usually accorded full faith and credit because of the presumption that they have performed their
duties regularly. This presumption
is overturned only if there is clear and convincing evidence that they were not
properly performing their duty or that they were inspired by improper
motive. The courts, nonetheless, are
advised to take caution in applying the presumption of regularity. It should not by itself prevail over the
presumption of innocence and the constitutionally-protected rights of the
individual.[54]
In People v. De Guzman[55]
citing People v. Doria,[56]
this Court took pain in discussing the “objective” test in buy-bust operations
to determine the credibility of the testimony of the police officers involved
in the operation:
We therefore stress that the “objective” test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the “buy-bust” money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Criminals must be caught but not at all cost. At the same time, however, examining the conduct of the police should not disable courts into ignoring the accused’s predisposition to commit the crime. If there is overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must also be considered. Courts should look at all factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are relevant to determine the validity of the defense of inducement.[57]
As aptly
observed by both the trial court and the appellate court:
We find the testimony of the poseur-buyer, [PO3 Lowaton] clear and credible. He recounted in full detail how the deal was set by the informant, the actual exchange of the plastic sachet of marijuana and the [marked money] consisting of two (2) [F]ifty [P]eso bills, and the apprehension of the [appellant] [and the incidental recovery of two more plastic sachets of marijuana in his possession]. x x x.
The totality of evidence presented is convincing and points to appellant as being engaged in the sale of the illegal drugs. The testimony of the prosecution witness identifying the appellant to be a seller of illegal drugs appears to be categorical and unfabricated. No ill motive on the part of [PO3 Lowaton] has been shown to tarnish his testimony. Such positive evidence certainly prevails over mere denial and alibi which, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving unworthy of credible weight in law.[58]
The Court finds no reason
to deviate from the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals. It is a settled rule that factual
findings of the trial courts, including their assessment of the witnesses’
credibility, are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court,
particularly when the Court of Appeals affirm the findings. Trial courts are in the best position to assess
the witnesses’ credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and
candor.[59]
In
comparison to the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, all that the
appellant could muster is the defense of denial and frame-up.
Denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been viewed with disfavor for
it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in
most prosecutions for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. The defense of frame-up or denial in drug
cases requires strong and convincing evidence because of the presumption that
the law enforcement agencies acted in the regular performance of their official
duties. Bare denial of appellant cannot
prevail over the positive testimony of the prosecution witness.[60]
In People v. Rosialda[61] citing People v. Rodrigo,[62]
this Court pronounced that once the
prosecution overcomes the presumption of innocence by proving the elements of
the crime and the identity of the accused as perpetrator beyond reasonable
doubt, the burden of evidence then shifts to the defense which shall then
test the strength of the prosecution's case either by showing that no crime was
in fact committed or that the accused could not have committed or did not
commit the imputed crime, or at the very least, by casting doubt on the guilt
of the accused.[63]
In this case, it has been
established beyond doubt that the prosecution was able to prove with certainty
all the elements of the crimes charged and the identity of the appellant after
he was positively identified by the prosecution witness. Thus, appellant’s self-serving assertions
unsupported by any plausible proof to
bolster his allegations have no leg to stand on. His defense of denial or frame–up must
necessarily fail.
To
repeat, in cases
involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the
narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are
police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular
manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary. Moreover, in the absence of proof of motive
to falsely impute such a serious crime against the appellant, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over petitioner’s self-serving and
uncorroborated denial.[64]
This Court will now
determine the penalties to be imposed upon appellant.
Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, provides for the imposable penalties for illegal sale of
marijuana, thus:
Sec. 5. P500,000.00)
to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall
sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all
species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall
act as a broker in any of such transactions.
[Emphasis supplied].
From
the afore-quoted provision, the sale of any dangerous drug, like marijuana, regardless of the quantity
and purity involved is punishable by life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00. In light of the effectivity of Republic Act
No. 9346, otherwise known as “An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty in the
Section
11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, on the other hand, expressly provides
the penalty for illegal possession of marijuana,
thus:
Sec. 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. – The
penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00)
shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess
any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of the degree of
purity thereof:
x x x x
Otherwise, if the
quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be
graduated as follows:
(1)
x x x
(2) Imprisonment
of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a fine ranging
from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are five (5)
grams or more but less than ten (10) grams of opium, morphine, heroin,
cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana
resin or marijuana resin oil,
methamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu,”
or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or “ecstasy,” PMA,
TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their
derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed
is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or three hundred (300) grams or more
but less than five hundred (500) grams of marijuana.
[Emphasis supplied].
The aforesaid provision
clearly states that the imposable penalty for illegal possession of any
dangerous drug, like marijuana, with a quantity of five grams or more but
less than 10 grams, is imprisonment of 20 years and 1 day to life imprisonment
and a fine ranging from P400,000.00 to P500,000.00.
The prosecution in
Criminal Case No. 06-1871 established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant,
without any legal authority, had in his possession 5.60 grams of marijuana. Therefore, the penalty imposed upon appellant
by the lower courts for illegal possession of marijuana is not proper as the said penalty was only for illegal
possession of marijuana having a quantity
of less than five grams.
Following the penalty
provided for under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, for illegal
possession of five grams or more but less than 10 grams of marijuana, this Court, thus, imposed upon appellant the penalty of imprisonment
of 20 years and one day and a fine of P400,000.00.
The Indeterminate
Sentence Law finds no application in this case as the penalty of imprisonment
provided for illegal possession of five grams or more but less than 10 grams of
marijuana is indivisible.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02642
dated 24 April 2008 finding herein appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation
of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that for the
crime of illegal possession of marijuana
in violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 06-1871, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment of 20 years and 1 day and a fine of P400,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
|
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
MARIANO C.
Associate
Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C.
CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. with Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes,
Jr. and Ramon M. Bato, Jr., concurring. Rollo,
pp. 2-19.
[2] Penned
by Judge Francisco B. Ibay. CA rollo, pp. 11-15.
[3] SEC.
5. P500,000.00)
to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person,
who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense,
deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the
quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any or such
transactions.
[4] SEC.
11. Possession
of Dangerous Drugs. – The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million
pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless
authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following
quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof:
x x x x
Otherwise, if the quantity involved
is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be graduated as
follows:
(1) x x x
(2) Imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1)
day to life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00)
to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantities of
dangerous drugs are five (5) grams or more but less than ten (10) grams of
opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana
resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu,” or other dangerous drugs
such as, but not limited to, MDMA or “ecstasy,” PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those
similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without
having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond
therapeutic requirements; or three hundred (300) grams or more but less than
five hundred (500) grams of marijuana.
[5] Otherwise
known as “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.”
[6] CA
rollo, pp. 7-8.
[7]
[8]
[9] As
evidenced by Certification of Arraignment dated
[10] TSN,
[11] Records,
p. 16.
[12]
[13] TSN,
[14] Records, p. 50.
[15] As
contained in the Joint Affidavit of Arrest executed by PO3 Lowaton and Jeffrey
Abellana, one of MADAC operatives, which was adopted as part of the direct
testimony of PO3 Lowaton. Records, pp. 21-22; TSN,
[16] TSN,
[17] Records,
p. 13.
[18] TSN,
27 October 2006, pp. 7 and 9; Joint Affidavit of Arrest that has been adopted
as part of PO3 Lowaton’s direct testimony, records, pp. 21-22; TSN, 27 October
2006, p. 12.
[19] Records,
p. 19.
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23] TSN,
[24]
[25] TSN,
[26]
[27] CA
rollo, p. 15.
[28]
[29] Rollo, p. 18.
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34] CA rollo, p. 27.
[35] People v. Alao, 379 Phil. 402, 412
(2000).
[36] People v. Sembrano, G.R. No. 185848,
[37] People v. Dumlao, G.R. No. 181599,
[38] TSN,
[39]
[40] People v. Requiz, 376 Phil. 750, 759-760
(1999).
[41] People v. Chang, 382 Phil. 669, 695
(2000) citing People v. Salinas, G.R.
No. 107192, 18 November 1993, 228 SCRA 45, 50.
[42] G.R.
No. 170234,
[43] People v. Zheng Bai Hui, 393 Phil. 68,
133 (2000).
[44] People v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 187070,
[45] People v. Sembrano, supra note 36 citing
People v. Noque, G.R. No.
175319, 15 January 2010 and People v.
Tee, 443 Phil. 521, 551 (2003).
[46] People
v. Lorenzo, G.R. No. 184760,
[47] Records,
p. 13.
[48] TSN,
27 October 2006, pp. 7 and 9; Joint Affidavit of Arrest that has been adopted
as part of PO3 Lowaton’s direct testimony, records, pp. 21-22; TSN, 27 October
2006, p. 12.
[49] Records,
p. 19.
[50]
[51]
[52] People
v. Rosialda, G.R. No. 188330,
[53]
[54] People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 151205,
[55]
[56] G.R. No. 125299,
[57]
[58] Rollo, pp. 11-12.
[59] Perez v. People, 515 Phil. 195, 203-204 (2006).
[60] People
v. Soriano, G.R. No. 173795,
[61] People v. Rosialda, supra note 52.
[62] G.R.
No. 176159,
[63] People v. Rodrigo, id.
[64] People v. Dumlao, supra note 37 at 770.
[65] People v. Sembrano, supra note 36.