Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND DIVISION
EDWARD GARRICK VILLENA and
PERCIVAL DOROJA, Petitioners, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 184091
Present: CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: January
31, 2011 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Assailed
in this petition[1] for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court are the Resolutions dated April 30, 2008[2]
and August 1, 2008[3] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 103224.
The
antecedents—
Petitioners
Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Edward Garrick Villena and Police Officer 1 (PO1) Percival
Doroja, together with PO2 Nicomedes Lambas (PO2 Lambas), PO3 Dan Fermalino (PO3
Fermalino),[4] Police
Chief Inspector Jovem C. Bocalbos, PO3 Reynaldo Macalinao (PO3 Macalinao), PO1
Alvaro Yumang (PO1 Yumang), and Imelda Borcelis, were indicted for the crime of
robbery (extortion)[5] before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 202, Las Piñas City. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
05-0025.
After
arraignment, where the accused all pled “not guilty,” and pre-trial, trial on
the merits ensued. Petitioners failed to
appear before the trial court to adduce evidence in their defense. It was only PO3 Macalinao who appeared before
the court to present his evidence.
On
August 29, 2007, the RTC rendered its decision[6]
convicting petitioners, together with PO2 Lambas, PO3 Fermalino, PO3 Macalinao,
and PO1 Yumang, of the crime charged.
During
the promulgation of judgment on September 3, 2007, petitioners again failed to
appear despite proper notices to them at their addresses of record. In the absence of petitioners, the
promulgation was made pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5, Section 6, Rule 120 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Consequently, the RTC issued warrants of arrest against them.
On
October 11, 2007, petitioners, through their new counsel, Atty. William F. delos
In
the Order[8]
dated November 20, 2007, the RTC denied due course to petitioners’ notices of
appeal. The RTC ratiocinated in this
wise—
Case record shows that the Decision of the
court dated August 29, 2007 was promulgated on September 3, 2007. The appropriate notices and subpoenas were
duly sent to the accused but [they were] returned with the notation that they
are no longer residing at their given address/es. In the present case, all three accused raised
the excuse that they were not notified of the setting of the promulgation. The Court finds this ground unmeritorious
since the accused have the obligation to inform the Court of the changes in
their address in order that the orders, notices and other court processes may
be properly sent to them. In any case,
the counsels on record for the accused Macalinao, Doroja and Villena were duly
notified of the scheduled hearings and promulgation of judgment.
Moreover, with the non-appearance of the
accused-movants during the presentation of defense evidence and on the
scheduled promulgation of the decision, the Court already issued a Warrant of
Arrest against the three accused. This
means that they have lost their standing in court and unless they surrender or
submit to the jurisdiction of the court, they are deemed to have waived any
right to seek relief from the court. (People
v. Del Rosario, et al., G.R. Nos. 107297-98, December 19, 2000, citing People
v. Mapalao, 197 SCRA 79, 87-88 [1991]).
IN VIEW THEREOF, the Notices of Appeal filed
by accused PO3 Reynaldo Macalinao, PO1 Percival Doroja and P/Insp. Edward
Garrick Villena are hereby DENIED DUE COURSE.
SO ORDERED.
Subsequently,
PO3 Macalinao filed a Motion with Leave of Court to Reconsider the November 20,
2007 Order.[9] Petitioners likewise filed a joint Motion for
Reconsideration (of the Order of November 20, 2007).[10]
Resolving
the said motions, the RTC issued its Order[11]
dated February 8, 2008, granting the prayer for reconsideration of PO3 Macalinao,
giving his notice of appeal due course.
However, the said Order denied herein petitioners’ motion, for failure
to adduce any valid excuse or compelling justification for the reconsideration,
reversal, and setting aside of the November 20, 2007 Order. The RTC found—
x x x In the case of accused Reynaldo
Macalinao, it is pristinely clear from the case records that he has been
actually attending the scheduled hearings of the case since its inception. He was also the only one, among the police
officers accused in this case, who testified in Court in defense of the charges
leveled against him.
Moreover, the Court,
after a second look at the records finds that his failure to attend the
promulgation of judgment on September 3, 2007 (of the Decision dated August 29,
2007) was due to an excusable and justifiable reason. As stated in his Manifestation/Motion on the
Subpoena dated August 29, 2007, the basis for his non-appearance was for the
reason that he was transferred from Raxa Bago, Tondo, Police Station (PS-1) to
Police Station 11, Meisic located at Felipe II, Binondo, Manila, since July 26,
2006, as evidenced by [the] Certification dated September 19, 2007 issued by
P/Insp. Ricardo Tibay Tangunan, Chief Administration Section.
We cannot say the same
thing for the other two (2) accused, namely, PO1 Percival Doroja and P/Insp.
Edward Garrick Villena as they have not manifested nor informed the Court of
the cause of their non-appearances despite notices and subpoenas sent to them
nor sought for the lifting of the Bench Warrant issued against them unlike
accused Reynaldo Macalinao. Also, it can
be keenly observed that they both failed to appear in several if not most of
the hearings set by the Court since the commencement of the trial of the
instant case against them. Noteworthy of
such non-appearances in court despite due notices and subpoenas are the
scheduled hearings on November 23, 2005, February 8, 2006, February 15 and 22,
2006, April 26, 2006, May 10, 2006, June 21, 2006, September 20, 2006, October
11 and 25, 2006, November 29, 2006, January 24, 2007, February 26, 2007, March
14 and 19, 2007, April 25, 2007 and the promulgation of judgment on September
3, 2007.
From all the foregoing
actions during the trial of this instant criminal case, and after their
conviction by this Court, it is only accused PO3 Reynaldo Macalinao who had
shown sufficient interest in defending his case. The records show no unusual and deliberate
delay caused by him in the trial of the criminal case.
As to the other two
accused, it can[not] be gainsaid that they have not proffered any cogent and
excusable reason to justify their non-appearance during the aforesaid dates and
they only asked for judicial leniency, which this Court cannot give. They have only themselves to be blamed.[12]
Aggrieved,
petitioners filed a petition[13]
for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA. The CA, in its Resolution[14]
dated April 30, 2008, initially dismissed the petition for not being
accompanied with clearly legible duplicate originals or certified true copies
of the questioned Orders. Petitioners
thus moved to reconsider the April 30, 2008 Resolution.
In the August 1, 2008 Resolution,[15] even
as it took into account the merits of petitioners’ motion for reconsideration,
the CA nevertheless resolved to deny the same for failure to show prima facie evidence of any grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the RTC.
Hence, this petition ascribing error to the CA in dismissing their
petition and in not finding grave abuse of discretion against the RTC for
denying their notices of appeal.
Petitioners
now argue that the CA erred in upholding the RTC in its denial of their
respective notices of appeal since they already contained the required
manifestation and information as to the cause of their non-appearance on the
scheduled promulgation on September 3, 2007, i.e., lack of notice.
According to them, their notices of appeal have substantially complied
with the requirement of Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, and have
effectively placed them under the RTC’s jurisdiction. They allege further that their motion for
reconsideration should have been considered by the CA since they have offered
the explanations that their failure to appear during the promulgation of
judgment was due to the change of their respective addresses, and that their
former counsel of record did not inform them of the need to notify the RTC
thereof, much less properly advise them of the current status of the
proceedings. As regards their failure to
move for the lifting of the bench warrants issued for their arrest, petitioners
asseverate that the Rules of Court do not provide for such a requirement before
they could avail of the remedies they seek.
The
petition is without merit.
While
it is true that an appeal is perfected upon the mere filing of a notice of
appeal and that the trial court thereupon loses jurisdiction over the case, this
principle presupposes that the party filing the notice of appeal could validly
avail of the remedy of appeal and had not lost standing in court. In this case, petitioners have lost their
standing in court by their unjustified failure to appear during the trial and,
more importantly, during the promulgation of judgment of conviction, and to surrender
to the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Petitioners insist that their failure
to attend the promulgation of judgment was due to the lack of notice of the
date thereof, allegedly because they were transferred to another police
station. Notably, however, petitioners
did not proffer any documentary and convincing proof of their supposed
transfer, not even to inform the court as to which police station they were
transferred. In contrast, their fellow
accused PO3 Macalinao submitted to the RTC a Certification issued by P/Insp.
Ricardo Tibay Tangunan, Chief of the Philippine National Police Administrative
Section, evidencing his transfer from Police Station (PS-1), Raxa Bago, Tondo
Manila to Police Station 11, Meisic in Binondo, Manila. Petitioners were duty bound to inform the RTC
of their transfer, assuming its truth, so that notices may be sent to their respective
new mailing addresses. They were remiss
in the discharge of this responsibility.
Petitioners
contend that their act of filing notices of appeal was already substantial
compliance with the requirements of Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.
We differ. Said provision states—
Sec. 6. Promulgation
of judgment.—The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of
the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light
offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or
representative. When the judge is absent
or outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk
of court.
If the accused is confined or detained in
another province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the executive
judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place of
confinement or detention upon request of the court which rendered the
judgment. The court promulgating the
judgment shall have the authority to accept the notice of appeal and to approve
the bail bond pending appeal; provided, that if the decision of the trial court
convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to
bailable, the application for bail can only be filed and resolved by the
appellate court.
The proper clerk of court shall give notice
to the accused personally or through his bondsman or warden and counsel,
requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. If the accused was tried in absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the
notice to him shall be served at his last known address.
In case the accused fails to appear at the
scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation
shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him
a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the
failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose
the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court shall
order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the
accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these
remedies. He shall state the reasons for
his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was
for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within
fifteen (15) days from notice.[16]
Thus,
the accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction shall lose the remedies available under the Rules of Court against
the judgment—(a) the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration (Rule
121), and (b) an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122). However, the Rules allow the accused to
regain his standing in court in order to avail of these remedies by: (a) his surrender, and (b) his filing of a
motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies, stating therein the
reasons for his absence, within 15 days from the date of promulgation of
judgment. If the trial court finds that
his absence was for a justifiable cause, the accused shall be allowed to avail
of the said remedies within 15 days from notice or order finding his absence
justified and allowing him the available remedies against the judgment of
conviction.[17]
Thus,
petitioners’ mere filing of notices of appeal through their new counsel,
therein only explaining their absence during the promulgation of judgment,
cannot be considered an act of surrender, despite the fact that said notices
were filed within 15 days from September 28, 2007, the purported date when
their new counsel personally secured a copy of the judgment of conviction from
the RTC. The term “surrender” under
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court contemplates an act whereby a
convicted accused physically and voluntarily submits himself to the
jurisdiction of the court to suffer the consequences of the verdict against
him. The filing of notices of appeal
cannot suffice as a physical and voluntary submission of petitioners to the
RTC’s jurisdiction. It is only upon
petitioners’ valid surrender, and only after proper motion, that they can avail
of the remedy of appeal. Absent
compliance with these requirements, their notices of appeal, the initiatory
step to appeal from their conviction, were properly denied due course.
Even
if petitioners’ notices of appeal were given due course, the CA would only be
constrained to dismiss their appeal.
This is because petitioners, who had standing warrants of arrest but did
not move to have them lifted, are considered fugitives from justice. Since it is safe to assume that they were out
on bail during trial, petitioners were deemed to have jumped bail when they
failed to appear at the promulgation of their sentence. This is a ground for dismissal of an appeal
under Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, which provides—
Sec. 8. Dismissal
of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute.—The Court of Appeals
may, upon motion of the appellee or motu
proprio and with notice to the appellant in either case, dismiss the appeal
if the appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this
Rule, except where the appellant is represented by a counsel de officio.
The
Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from
prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal.[18]
Once
an accused escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail (as in the case of
petitioners), or flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in
court. Unless he surrenders or submits
to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek
relief from the court.[19]
What is more, the judgment of
conviction against petitioners had already acquired finality. Under Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court, they had only 15 days from the date of promulgation of judgment within
which to surrender and to file the required motion for leave of court to avail
of the remedies against the judgment. As
the judgment was promulgated on September 3, 2007, petitioners had only until
September 18, 2007 to comply with the mandatory requirements of the said rule.
This
Court has invariably ruled that the right to appeal is neither a natural right
nor a part of due process. It is merely
a statutory privilege, and, as such, may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of the law.
The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the
requirements of the Rules. Failing to do
so, the right to appeal is lost.[20]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The Resolutions dated April 30, 2008 and August 1, 2008 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103224 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate
Justice |
JOSE CATRAL
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-22.
[2] Per Associate Justices Rebecca de Guia-Salvador, Vicente S.E. Veloso, and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.; id. at 28.
[3] Penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., with Associate Justices Rebecca de Guia-Salvador and Vicente S.E. Veloso, concurring; id. at 30-32.
[4] Also
known as PO3 Dan Firmalino in other documents.
[5] Per the Information for Robbery (Extortion); id. at 77-78.
[6]
[7] Notices of Appeal of Doroja and Villena, respectively; id. at 63-64 and 66-67.
[8]
[9] As mentioned in the RTC Order dated February 8, 2008; id. at 60.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Supra note 2.
[15] Supra note 3.
[16] Emphasis supplied.
[17] People v. De Grano, G.R. No. 167710, June 5, 2009, 588 SCRA 550, 570, citing Pascua v. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 350, 363 (2000).
[18] Emphasis supplied.
[19] Estrada v. People, 505 Phil. 339, 352 (2005), citing People v. Mapalao, et al., 274 Phil. 354, 363 (1991).
[20] De Guzman v. People, G.R. No. 167492, March 22, 2007, 518 SCRA 767, 771-772, citing Balgami v. Court of Appeals, 487 Phil. 102, 115 (2004).