Republic of the
Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
CYNTHIA E. YAMBAO, Petitioner, - versus - REPUBLIC OF THE Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 184063
Present: CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: January
24, 2011 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is yet another tale
of marital woe.
Petitioner Cynthia E. Yambao (petitioner)
is assailing the Decision[1] dated
April 16, 2008 and the Resolution[2]
dated August 4, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89262. The
CA affirmed the decision[3] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Petitioner and respondent were
married on December 21, 1968 at the
In her petition before the RTC,
petitioner narrated that, since the beginning, her and respondent’s married
life had been marred by bickering, quarrels, and recrimination due to the
latter’s inability to comply with the essential obligations of married life.[8]
Petitioner averred that through all
the years of their married life, she was the only one who earned a living and
took care of the children. Respondent, she alleged, did nothing but eat and
sleep all day, and spend time with friends. When respondent would find a job,
he would not be able to stay in it for long. Likewise, respondent went into
several business ventures, which all failed. In addition, respondent loved to
gamble and would gamble away whatever money would come his way.
Petitioner also claimed that, when
their children were babies, respondent did not even help to change their diapers
or feed them, even while petitioner was recovering from her caesarean
operation, proffering the excuse that he knew nothing about children.[9] Later,
respondent became insecure and jealous and would get mad every time he would
see petitioner talking to other people, even to her relatives. When respondent
started threatening to kill petitioner, she decided to leave the conjugal abode
and live separately from him.[10] She
then consulted a psychiatrist who concluded that respondent was indeed
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.[11]
In his Answer, respondent denied that
he has refused to work. He claimed that he had been trying to find a decent job,
but was always unable to because of his old age and lack of qualifications. He
also claimed that he did not stay long in the jobs he had because the same
could not support the needs of his family, and yielded benefits that were not
commensurate to the efforts he exerted. He had ventured into small businesses
but they failed due to various economic crises. Respondent further claimed that
he was not, in fact, contented with living with petitioner’s relatives since
his every move was being watched with eagle eyes.[12]
Respondent denied that he gambled, positing
that since he had no income, he would not have the funds for such activity. He alleged
that even without a steady source of income, he still shared in the payment of
the amortization of their house in BF Homes,
As to the care of their children,
respondent countered that no fault should be attributed to him because that is
the duty of the household help.[13]
Respondent also denied that he
threatened to kill petitioner, considering that there was never any evidence
that he had ever harmed or inflicted physical injury on petitioner to justify
the latter having a nervous breakdown.[14]
He further alleged that he never
consulted any psychiatrist, and denied that he was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.[15]
On February 9, 2007, the RTC rendered
a decision[16] dismissing
the petition for lack of merit. The RTC held that petitioner’s evidence failed
to support her argument that respondent was totally unaware of and
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations such that the marriage was
void from the beginning. The court said that, even as petitioner claimed to be
unhappy in the marriage, it is incontrovertible that the union lasted for over
thirty years and the parties were able to raise three children into adulthood
without suffering any major parenting problems. The court also noted that
respondent was faithful to petitioner and never physically abused her. Likewise, when the parties lived with
petitioner’s parents, respondent got along well enough with her family.[17]
The RTC recognized that respondent
did indeed have many faults, such as his indolence and utter irresponsibility.
However, the RTC said, respondent’s failure to find decent work was due to his not
having obtained a college degree and his lack of other qualifications.
Likewise, respondent’s failure in business could not be entirely attributed to
him, since petitioner was a business partner in some of these ventures.[18]
The RTC also rejected the supposed negative
effect of respondent’s Dependent Personality Disorder. The RTC said that,
although the evidence tended to show that respondent would unduly rely upon
petitioner to earn a living for the family, there was no evidence to show that
the latter resented such imposition or suffered with the additional financial
burdens passed to her by her husband. On the contrary, the RTC averred that,
despite a supposedly horrible married life, petitioner was able to rise in the
ranks in her company and buy properties with hardly any help from respondent.[19]
The RTC concluded that while
respondent might have been deficient in providing financial support, his
presence, companionship, and love allowed petitioner to accomplish many things.
Thus, respondent could be relied on for love, fidelity, and moral support,
which are obligations expected of a spouse under Article 68 of the Family Code.[20]
Lastly, the RTC rejected petitioner’s
claim that she suffered through respondent’s overbearing jealousy. It found
that respondent only became jealous when he thought that petitioner was
cheating on him. The RTC determined that jealousy was not a character trait
that contributed to respondent’s psychological dysfunction; much less did it
amount to psychological or mental torture on petitioner.[21]
Thus, the RTC concluded that the parties might have indeed entered into a bad
marriage, but this did not in itself prove that the marriage did not exist,
given the 30 years they remained together through the various ups and downs of
their volatile relationship.[22]
Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied on May 21, 2007.[23]
Petitioner subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal,[24] which
was given due course by the RTC in an Order dated June 8, 2007.[25]
She then appealed to the CA.
In a Decision[26]
dated April 16, 2008, the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. The CA held that petitioner
failed to show that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage. It pointed out that respondent exerted
efforts to find a source of income to support his family. However, his failure
to find a suitable job and the failure of his business ventures were not mental
but physical defects and, hence, could not be considered “psychological
incapacity” as contemplated under the law.
The CA also found that petitioner’s
claims that she lived in misery during the marriage and that respondent failed
to keep his promises to her were not duly established. The CA held that the
fact that the parties lived together for 35 years and raised three children
well, and the fact that respondent never physically abused petitioner belied
the former’s psychological incapacity. The CA also held that respondent’s
refusal to care for the children was not psychological incapacity but “merely
constituted refusal to perform the task,” which is not equivalent to an
incapacity or inability.[27]
The appellate court also rejected
petitioner’s allegation of respondent’s unbearable jealousy. It said that the
same must be shown as a manifestation of a disordered personality which would
make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state.[28] The CA
averred that a jealous attitude simply evinced respondent’s love for his wife,
whom he could not bear to lose to another man. Meanwhile, the CA construed the
purported threats to kill petitioner as “emotional immaturity” and not
psychological incapacity.[29]
Lastly, the CA found the report of
expert witness Dr. Edgardo Juan Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino) to be unsupported by
sufficient evidence since the findings therein were not corroborated by any
other witness. Moreover, the CA said, neither the report nor petitioner’s
testimony established that respondent’s psychological condition was grave
enough to bring about the inability of the latter to assume the essential
obligations of marriage, so that the same was medically permanent or incurable.[30]
Petitioner’s subsequent motion for
reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated August 4, 2008.[31]
Petitioner is now before this Court
in a last ditch effort to gain freedom from her marriage to respondent. In her
petition for review, petitioner submits the following assignment of errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO SHOW THAT RESPONDENT WAS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT WAS MERELY REFUSING TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE AND NOT DOWNRIGHT INCAPACITATED OR UNABLE
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT’S UNBEARABLE JEALOUSY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED A CHARACTER TRAIT CONTRIBUTING TO PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITION OF RESPONDENT WAS GRAVE ENOUGH, INCURABLE AND HAD NO ANTECEDENCE (sic)[32]
Petitioner argues that respondent’s
Dependent Personality Disorder was sufficiently established by her testimony
and that of her sister, which testimonies were both credible considering that
they have personal knowledge of the circumstances prior to and during the
parties’ marriage. On the other hand, respondent’s evidence consisted merely of
his sole testimony, which were self-serving and full of inconsistencies.[33] Petitioner
points out that what the CA characterized as respondent’s “efforts” in finding
jobs were merely the result of short-lived bursts of industry, failing to note
that the jobs were few and very far between.[34] The
rest of the time, respondent did nothing but eat, sleep, and party with his
friends.[35]
Petitioner also alleges that respondent was given the opportunity to finish his
studies, first by his parents, and then by petitioner herself, but he never
took up these offers.[36]
Petitioner also highlighted respondent’s
failure to earn his keep, participate in household chores, or take care of
their children. She argues that respondent had the obligation to help and
contribute to all the needs of the family, whether the same be in the form of
material or physical support.[37]
Petitioner also refutes the CA’s
conclusion that respondent was merely
refusing to attend to his family’s needs. She insists that respondent’s
inability is due to a psychological affliction, i.e., Dependent Personality Disorder, as attested to by the expert
witness she presented during trial.[38]
Part of this same disorder, according to petitioner, is respondent’s jealous
tendencies, which the CA belittled and attributed to emotional immaturity.[39]
Finally, petitioner argues against
the CA’s finding that respondent’s laziness and dependence could not be
characterized as inability but just plain refusal. Petitioner contends that she
has complied with the guidelines laid down by the Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina. She further contends that the framers of the Family Code
never intended to give such a suppressed definition of psychological
incapacity, and, in fact, declared that a restrictive definition would limit
the applicability of the provision.[40] Moreover,
she asserts that she has proven that respondent’s unbearable jealousy and
Dependent Personality Disorder manifested themselves even before the marriage
of the parties, although not in the same degree as when they were already
married.[41]
The petition has no merit and, perforce,
must be denied.
Article 36 of the Family Code states:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Preliminarily, the Court reiterates
its recent pronouncement that each case for declaration of nullity under the
foregoing provision must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections, or generalizations, but according to its own facts. And, to
repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.[42]
Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving
standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in
psychological and even canonical thought, and experience.[43]
While the Court has not abandoned the
standard set in Molina,[44] the
Court has reiterated the tenet that the factual milieu of each case must be
treated as distinct and, as such, each case must be decided based on its own
set of facts.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[45] the
Court held that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. These guidelines do not
require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be “medically or clinically
identified.”[46] What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's
psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination
of the person concerned need not be resorted to.[47]
Hence, the issue in this case can be
summed up, thus: Does the totality of petitioner’s evidence establish
respondent’s psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of
marriage?
The
Court holds that it does not.
The intendment of the law has been to
confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.[48]
Thus, for a marriage to be annulled under Article 36 of the Family Code, the
psychologically incapacitated spouse must be shown to suffer no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes him or her to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants.[49]
It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[50]
In this case, there is no showing
that respondent was suffering from a psychological condition so severe that he
was unaware of his obligations to his wife and family. On the contrary,
respondent’s efforts, though few and far between they may be, showed an understanding
of his duty to provide for his family, albeit he did not meet with much
success. Whether his failure was brought about by his own indolence or
irresponsibility, or by some other external factors, is not relevant. What is
clear is that respondent, in showing an awareness to provide for his family,
even with his many failings, does not suffer from psychological incapacity.
Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations
and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will.[51] This
incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to
the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to
the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life
and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of
offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality.[52] It is
not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as
a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of
doing so due to some psychological illness.[53]
That respondent, according to
petitioner, “lack[ed] effective sense of rational judgment and responsibility”[54]
does not mean he is incapable to meet his marital obligations. His refusal to
help care for the children, his neglect for his business ventures, and his alleged
unbearable jealousy may indicate some emotional turmoil or mental difficulty,
but none have been shown to amount to a psychological abnormality.
Moreover,
even assuming that respondent’s faults amount to psychological incapacity, it
has not been established that the same existed at the time of the celebration
of the marriage.
In his psychological report,[55]
Dr. Tolentino merely said, “[b]ecause one’s personality or character is formed
early in life, it has a clear ANTECEDENT and it has an enduring pattern of
inner experience that deviates from the expectations of the individual’s
culture,”[56] without
explaining this antecedent. Even petitioner, in her allegations, never
explained how the alleged psychological incapacity manifested itself prior to
or at the time of the celebration of their marriage.
Likewise
militating against petitioner’s cause is the finding of the trial court, and
the same was affirmed by the CA, that respondent never committed infidelity or
physically abused petitioner or their children. In fact, considering that the
children lived with both parents, it is safe to assume that both made an impact
in the children’s upbringing. And still, as found by the RTC and the CA, the
parties were able to raise three children into adulthood “without any major
parenting problems.”[57] Such
fact could hardly support a proposition that the parties’ marriage is a
nullity.
Respondent may not have turned out to
be the ideal husband, or may have failed to meet petitioner’s exacting
standards. Yet this Court finds it impossible to believe that, as petitioner
alleges, there was nothing but heartache and strife in their over 35 years
(prior to filing the petition for declaration of nullity) of marriage.
To be sure, respondent, perhaps with
a little more effort on his part, could have been more helpful and could have made
life that much easier for his wife. The fact that he did not, however, does not
mean that he is psychologically incapacitated to discharge his marital
obligations, as to give the Court a reason to declare the marriage null and
void.
Certainly, the marriage was beset by
difficulties, or as petitioner puts it, “marred by bickerings, quarrels, and
recrimination.” It is a fact, however, that all marriages suffer through the
same trials at one point or another, with some going through more rough patches
than others. The Court concedes that petitioner and respondent’s marriage, as
characterized by the former, may indeed be problematic, even tumultuous.
However, that they had gone through 35 years together as husband and wife is an
indication that the parties can, should they choose to do so, work through their
problems.
WHEREFORE, the
foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 16, 2008 and the Resolution dated
August 4, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89262 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A
T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I
C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
RENATO C.
CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, with Associate Justices Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and Rosmari D. Carandang, concurring; rollo, pp. 99-106.
[2]
[3] CA rollo, pp. 26-42.
[4] Rollo, pp. 32-35.
[5] Records (Vol. 1), p. 1.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Penned by Judge Marissa Macaraig-Guillen; rollo, pp. 41-57.
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
[21] Rollo, p. 56.
[22]
[23] Records (Vol. 1), p. 236.
[24]
[25]
[26] Supra note 1.
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31] Supra
note 2.
[32] Rollo, pp. 15-16.
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42] Ngo
Te v. Yu-Te, G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 193, 228.
[43] Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353, 370.
[44] Ting v. Velez-Ting, G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009, 582 SCRA 694, 708.
[45] G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20.
[46]
[47] So
v.
[48] Ting v. Velez-Ting, supra note 43, at
711; Dedel v. Court of Appeals, 466
Phil. 226, 232 (2004).
[49]
[50] Marcos v. Marcos, supra note 46, at 851.
[51] Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, G.R. No. 166738, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 157, 179, citing Navales v. Navales, G.R. No. 167523, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 272, 288.
[52]
[53] Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, supra note 50, at 188.
[54] Rollo, p. 32.
[55] Records (Vol. 1), pp. 28-32.
[56]
[57] CA rollo, p. 40.