Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
JAIME
ALFEREZ, Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 182301
Present: CARPIO,
J., Chairperson, NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD,
and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: January
31, 2011 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a
petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1]
dated December 13, 2007 and Resolution[2]
dated March 4, 2008 in CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 00300.
The facts of the case, as culled from
the records, are as follows:
Petitioner
Jaime Alferez purchased construction materials from Cebu ABC Sales Commercial.
As payment for the goods, he issued three (3) checks for the total amount of P830,998.40. However, the
checks were dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account.
Petitioner was thus charged with three (3) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 22
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
1. BPI Check No. 492089 dated 29 April 1994 in
the sum of P78, 889.95;
2. BPI Check No. 492010 dated 22 June 1994 in
the sum of P30,745.90;
3. BPI Check No. 492011 dated 22 June 1994 in
the sum of P721,362.55;
4. The demand letter dated 7 July 1994 addressed
to petitioner;
5. The registry receipt of the Post Office;
6. The face of the Registry Return Receipt;
7. The dorsal side of the Registry Return
Receipt;
8. The Returned Check Ticket dated 23 June 1994;
and
9. The reason for the dishonor.[5]
Instead of
presenting evidence, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence[6]
on August 8, 2003, or approximately ten (10) months after the prosecution
rested its case. Petitioner averred that the prosecution failed to show that he
received the notice of dishonor or demand letter.
On March 4,
2005, the MTCC issued a resolution[7]
denying petitioner’s Demurrer to Evidence, and rendering judgment finding
petitioner guilty as charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of issuing bouncing checks as defined and
penalized under Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and hereby sentences the
accused the following:
1. To
pay a fine of Php830,998.40 and in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment;
2. To
pay private complainant the total face value of the checks in the amount of
Php830,998.40 plus 1% interest per month beginning from the filing of the
complaint.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Aggrieved,
petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21,
Undaunted,
petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via
a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. In the assailed
Decision, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It sustained petitioner’s conviction as the
elements of the crime had been sufficiently established. As to the service on
petitioner of the notice of dishonor, the appellate court pointed out that
petitioner did not testify, and that he did not object to the prosecution’s
evidence aimed at proving the fact of receipt of the notice of dishonor.
Consequently, the registry receipt and the return card adequately show the fact
of receipt. As to petitioner’s contention that he was denied his right to present
evidence after the denial of his demurrer to evidence, the CA held that there
was no such denial since it was merely the consequence of the filing of
demurrer without leave of court. Finally, as to the imposition of the penalty
of imprisonment instead of fine, the CA found no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the RTC since it was shown that petitioner acted in bad faith.[11]
On March 4,
2008, the CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
petition anchored on the following issues:
Whether the Registry Receipt and Registry
Return Receipt alone without presenting the person who mailed and/or served the
demand letter is sufficient notice of dishonor as required by BP 22.
Whether the filing of the Demurrer of (sic)
Evidence without leave and denied by the trial court is a waiver of the right
of the petitioner (the accused before the trial court) to present his evidence
in support and to rebut the evidence of the respondent particularly with
respect to the civil aspect of the case.
On the alternative (if the petitioner is
guilty), whether the accused should only be mete[d] the penalty of fine as
imposed by the trial court (MTCC).[12]
The
petition is partly meritorious.
After a
careful evaluation of the records of the case, we believe and so hold that the
totality of the evidence presented does not support petitioner’s conviction for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Section 1
of B.P. Blg. 22 defines the offense, as follows:[13]
Section 1. Checks without sufficient funds.—Any
person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for
value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not
more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double
the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any
person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he
makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to
maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a
period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it
is dishonored by the drawee bank.
Where the check is drawn by a corporation,
company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in
behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
Accordingly,
this Court has held that the elements of the crime are, as follows: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance
of any check to apply on account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker,
drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank
for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason had not
the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.[14]
In this case, the first and third
elements of the crime have been adequately established. The prosecution,
however, failed to prove the second element. Because this element involves a
state of mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22
creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds under the
following circumstances:[15]
Sec. 2. Evidence
of knowledge of insufficient funds. — The making, drawing, and issuance of
a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds
in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety days from the date of
the check, shall be prima facie
evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such
maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes
arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5)
banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the
drawee.
In Suarez v. People,[16] which is on all fours with the instant
case, two Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed against
petitioner therein. After the
prosecution presented its evidence, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence
without leave of court on the ground that no notice of dishonor had been sent
to and received by him. When the case
reached this Court, we acquitted petitioner on reasonable doubt as there was
insufficient proof that he received notice of dishonor. We explained that:
The presumption arises when it is proved that
the issuer had received this notice, and that within five banking days from its
receipt, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for
its payment. The full payment of the amount appearing in the check within five
banking days from notice of dishonor is a complete defense. Accordingly,
procedural due process requires that a notice of dishonor be sent to and
received by the petitioner to afford the opportunity to avert prosecution under
B.P. Blg. 22.
x x x.
[I]t is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of
dishonor was sent to the petitioner. It is also incumbent upon the prosecution
to show “that the drawer of the check received the said notice because the fact
of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of
dishonor by the drawee of the check.
A
review of the records shows that the prosecution did not prove that the
petitioner received the notice of dishonor. Registry return cards must be
authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of letters sent through registered
mail.[17]
In this
case, the prosecution merely presented a copy of the demand letter, together
with the registry receipt and the return card, allegedly sent to petitioner.
However, there was no attempt to authenticate or identify the signature on the
registry return card.[18]
Receipts for registered letters and return receipts do not by themselves prove
receipt; they must be properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of
the letter, claimed to be a notice of dishonor.[19]
To be sure, the presentation of the registry card with an unauthenticated
signature, does not meet the required proof beyond reasonable doubt that
petitioner received such notice. It is not enough for the prosecution to prove
that a notice of dishonor was sent to the drawee of the check. The prosecution
must also prove actual receipt of said notice, because the fact of service
provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by
the drawee of the check.[20]
The burden of proving notice rests upon the party asserting its existence. Ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove notice. In
criminal cases, however, the quantum of proof required is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Hence, for B.P. Blg. 22 cases, there should be clear proof of
notice.[21]
Moreover, for notice by mail, it must
appear that the same was served on the addressee or a duly authorized agent of
the addressee. From the registry receipt
alone, it is possible that petitioner or his authorized agent did receive the
demand letter.[22] Possibilities, however, cannot replace proof
beyond reasonable doubt.[23]
The consistent rule is that penal statutes have to be construed strictly
against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.[24]
The absence of a notice of dishonor
necessarily deprives the accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal
prosecution.[25] As
there is insufficient proof that petitioner received the notice of dishonor,
the presumption that he had knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot arise.[26]
This is so
even if petitioner did not present his evidence to rebut the documentary
evidence of the prosecution as he had waived his right to present evidence for
having filed a demurrer to evidence without leave of court. We must emphasize
that the prosecution has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt each
element of the crime as its case will rise or fall on the strength of its own
evidence, never on the weakness or even absence of that of the defense.[27]
The failure of the prosecution to prove the receipt by petitioner of the
requisite notice of dishonor and that he was given at least five (5) banking
days within which to settle his account constitutes sufficient ground for his
acquittal.[28]
Nonetheless,
petitioner’s acquittal for failure of the prosecution to prove all elements of
the offense beyond reasonable doubt does not include the extinguishment of his
civil liability for the dishonored checks.[29]
In case of acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly liable. The
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the
civil action where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the
liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the
accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused
was acquitted.[30] In
a number of similar cases, we have held that an acquittal based on reasonable
doubt does not preclude the award of civil damages.[31]
In view of the foregoing, we sustain
the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, as to petitioner’s
civil liability.
Finally, in
answer to petitioner’s insistence that he should have been allowed by the trial
court to present his evidence on the civil aspect of the case, suffice it to
state that when petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence without leave of court,
the whole case was submitted for judgment on the basis of the evidence
presented by the prosecution as the accused is deemed to have waived the right
to present evidence. At that juncture, the court is called upon to decide the
case including its civil aspect.[32]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of
Appeals Decision dated December 13, 2007 and Resolution dated March 4, 2008 in
CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 00300 are MODIFIED.
Petitioner Jaime Alferez is ACQUITTED
on reasonable doubt of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. However, the civil liability
imposed on petitioner is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA Associate Justice |
ROBERTO
A. ABAD Associate Justice |
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section
13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Francisco P. Acosta, with Associate Justices Pampio A.
Abarintos and Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, concurring;
rollo, pp. 16-25.
[2]
[3] CA
rollo, p. 18.
[4] Rollo, p. 17.
[5] CA
rollo, pp. 22-23.
[6]
[7] Penned
by Presiding Judge Gil R. Acosta; id. at 18-21.
[8]
[9] Penned
by Presiding Judge Eric F. Menchavez; id. at 14-15.
[10]
[11] Rollo, pp. 19-24.
[12]
[13] King v. People, 377 Phil. 692, 706
(1999).
[14] Suarez v. People, G.R. No. 172573, June
19, 2008, 555 SCRA 238, 245; Moster v. People, G.R. No. 167461,
February 19, 2008, 546 SCRA 287, 296.
[15] Suarez v. People, supra, at 245; King v. People, supra note 13, at
708-709.
[16] Supra.
[17]
[18] Moster v. People, supra note 14, at
297-298.
[19]
[20] Moster v. People, supra, at 299, citing Cabrera v. People, 454 Phil. 759, 774
(2003).
[21] Cabrera v. People, supra, at 774.
[22] Ting
v. Court of Appeals, 398 Phil. 481, 494 (2000).
[23] Moster v. People, supra note 14, at 299.
[24] Ambito v. People, G.R. No. 127327, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 69, 94.
[25]
[26] Suarez v. People, supra note 14, at 247.
[27] Moster v. People, supra note 14, at 299;
King v. People, supra note 13, at
711.
[28] Moster v. People, supra, at 299.
[29] Ambito v. People, supra note 24, at 94.
[30]
[31] Ambito v. People, supra note 24, at 94, citing Bax v. People, G.R. No. 149858,
September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 284, 292-293; Rico
v. People, supra note 19, at 74; Domangsang
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139292, December 5, 2000, 347 SCRA 75, 84-85.
[32]