Republic of the
Supreme Court
SECOND
DIVISION
|
MILAGROS
SALTING, Petitioner, - versus - JOHN VELEZ and CLARISSA R.
VELEZ, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 181930
Present: CARPIO,
J., Chairperson, NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD,
and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: January
10, 2011 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a
petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the Court
of Appeals (CA) Decision[1]
dated November 29, 2007 and Resolution[2]
dated February 27, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 97618.
The factual
and procedural antecedents leading to the instant petition are as follows:
On October 7, 2003, respondents John
Velez and Clarissa Velez filed a complaint[3]
for ejectment against petitioner Milagros Salting involving a property covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 38079. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 2524. On March 28, 2006, respondents obtained a favorable
decision[4]
when the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch LXXIV, of
Thereafter, petitioner instituted an action
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 153, for Annulment of Sale of the
Property covered by TCT No. 38079, with
prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction against respondents, Hon. Ma. Paz Yson, Deputy Sheriff
Ernesto G. Raymundo, Jr., Teresita Diokno-Villamena, and Heirs of Daniel B.
Villamena (Heirs of Villamena).[5]
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 70859-TG. Petitioner claimed that she
purchased the subject parcel of land from Villamena as evidenced by a notarized
document known as Sale of Real Estate. She further explained that respondents
were able to obtain title to the subject property through the fraudulent acts
of the heirs of Villamena. Finally, she averred that the decision in Civil Case
No. 2524 had not attained finality as she was not properly informed of the MeTC
decision. Petitioner thus prayed that a TRO be issued, restraining respondents
and all persons acting for and in their behalf from executing the MeTC decision
dated March 28, 2006. She further sought the declaration of nullity of the sale
by the heirs of Villamena to respondents involving the subject parcel of land,
and, consequently, the cancellation of the title to the property in the name of
respondents.
Finding that petitioner would suffer
grave and irreparable damage if respondents would not be enjoined from
executing the March 28, 2006 MeTC decision while respondents would not suffer
any prejudice, the RTC, in an Order dated October 26, 2006, granted the writ of
preliminary injunction applied for.[6]
Aggrieved, respondents filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA,
raising the sole issue of whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction against the execution of a judgment for ejectment.
In a Decision[7]
dated November 29, 2007, the CA resolved the issue in the affirmative. The CA
noted that the principal action in Civil Case No. 70859-TG is the annulment of
the deed of sale executed between respondents and the heirs of Villamena, while
the subject of the ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction is the execution
of the final judgment in a separate proceeding for ejectment in Civil Case No.
2524. The appellate court concluded that petitioner had no clear and
unmistakable right to possession over the subject parcel of land in view of the
March 28, 2006 MeTC decision. Hence, contrary to the conclusion of the RTC, the
CA opined that petitioner was not entitled to the writ of preliminary
injunction. The CA thus set aside the October 26, 2006 Order of the RTC.
Petitioner now comes before this Court
in this petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, claiming that:
In rendering the assailed Decision and Resolution, the Court of Appeals
has decided in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court. (Section 6 (a), Rule 45, 1997 Rule[s] of Civil
Procedure). The Court of Appeals disregarded the rule that service of decision
to a deceased lawyer is invalid and that the party must be duly served by the
final judgment in order that the final judgment will become final and
executory. The Court of Appeals, likewise, disregarded the existence of a clear
and existing right of the petitioner which should be protected by an injunctive
relief and the rule that the pendency of an action assailing the right of a
party to eject will justify the suspension of the proceedings of the ejectment
case.[8]
Petitioner claims that she
was denied her right to appeal when the March 28, 2006 MeTC decision was
declared final and executory despite the fact that the copy of the decision was
served on her deceased counsel. She further claims that the MeTC decision had
not attained finality due to improper service of the decision. Moreover,
petitioner avers that she has a clear and existing right and interest over the
subject property which should be protected by injunction. Finally, petitioner
argues that jurisprudence allows the suspension of proceedings in an ejectment
case at whatever stage when warranted by the circumstances of the case.
In their Comment,[9]
respondents allege that the petition is already moot and academic in view of
the execution of the MeTC decision. They claim that it is not proper to restrain
the execution of the MeTC decision as the case instituted before the RTC was
for the annulment of the sale executed between respondents and the heirs of
Villamena, and not an action for annulment of judgment or mandamus to compel
the MeTC to entertain her belated appeal. Respondents add that the finality of
the ejectment case is not a bar to the case instituted for the annulment of the
sale and the eventual recovery of ownership of the subject property. The
actions for ejectment and for annulment of sale are two different cases that
may proceed independently, especially when the judgment in the ejectment case
had attained finality, as in the instant case. Finally, respondents fault the
petitioner herself for not informing the MeTC of the death of her former
counsel the moment she learned of such death.
We
find no merit in the petition.
.
We first determine the
validity of the service of the March 28, 2006 MeTC decision on petitioner’s counsel
who, as of that date, was already deceased. If a party to a case has appeared
by counsel, service of pleadings and judgments shall be made upon his counsel
or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court.[10] Thus, when the MeTC decision was sent to
petitioner’s counsel, such service of judgment was valid and binding upon
petitioner, notwithstanding the death of her counsel. It is not the duty of the courts to inquire,
during the progress of a case, whether the law firm or partnership continues to
exist lawfully, the partners are still alive, or its associates are still
connected with the firm.[11]
Litigants, represented by counsel, cannot simply sit back, relax, and await the
outcome of their case.[12]
It is the duty of the party-litigant to be in contact with her counsel from
time to time in order to be informed of the progress of her case.[13]
It is likewise the duty of the party to inform the court of the fact of her
counsel’s death. Her failure to do so means that she is negligent in the
protection of her cause, and she cannot pass the blame to the court which is
not tasked to monitor the changes in the circumstances of the parties and their
counsels.
It is noteworthy that when petitioner came to know of the
death of her counsel and upon obtaining the services of a new counsel,
petitioner instituted another action for the annulment of the deed of sale
between her and the heirs of Villamena, instead of questioning the MeTC
decision through an action for annulment
of judgment. Obviously, the annulment case instituted by petitioner is separate
and distinct from the ejectment case filed by respondents. She cannot,
therefore, obtain relief through the second case for alleged errors and
injustices committed in the first case.
With the foregoing
disquisition, we find that the March 28, 2006 MeTC decision had, indeed, become
final and executory. A
final and executory decision can only be annulled by a petition to annul the
same on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, or by a
petition for relief from a final order or judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules
of Court. However,
no petition to that effect was filed.[14]
Well-settled is the rule that once a judgment becomes final and executory, it can no longer be
disturbed, altered, or modified in any respect except to correct clerical
errors or to make nunc pro tunc entries.
Nothing further can be done to a final judgment except to execute it.[15]
In the present case, the finality of the March 28, 2006 decision
with respect to possession de facto
cannot be affected by the pendency of the annulment case where the ownership of
the property is being contested.[16]
We are inclined to adhere to settled jurisprudence that suits involving
ownership may not be successfully pleaded in abatement of the enforcement of
the final decision in an ejectment suit. The rationale of the rule has been
explained in this wise:
This rule is not without good
reason. If the rule were otherwise, ejectment cases could easily be frustrated
through the simple expedient of filing an action contesting the ownership over
the property subject of the controversy. This would render nugatory the
underlying philosophy of the summary remedy of ejectment which is to prevent
criminal disorder and breaches of the peace and to discourage those who,
believing themselves entitled to the possession of the property, resort to
force rather than to some appropriate action in court to assert their claims.[17]
Unlawful detainer and
forcible entry suits under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court are designed to
summarily restore physical possession of a piece of land or building to one who
has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the
settlement of the parties’ opposing claims of juridical possession in
appropriate proceedings.[18]
Finally, as aptly held by
the CA, petitioner is not entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain the execution of the MeTC decision. Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for the
issuance of preliminary injunction, viz.:
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. – A
preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole
or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of
the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or
acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or
acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the
applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is
attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts
probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of
the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
And as clearly
explained in Ocampo v. Sison Vda. de
Fernandez[19] ¾
To be entitled to the injunctive
writ, the applicant must show that there exists a right to be protected which
is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined. Furthermore, there must
be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and substantial and
that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage. The applicant’s right must be clear and unmistakable. In the absence of
a clear legal right, the issuance of the writ constitutes grave abuse of
discretion. Where the applicant’s right or title is doubtful or disputed,
injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof
of an actual existing right is not a ground for injunction.
A clear and positive right
especially calling for judicial protection must be shown. Injunction is not a
remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will
not issue to protect a right not in esse
and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a
cause of action. There must exist an actual right. There must be a patent
showing by the applicant that there exists a right to be protected and that the
acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of said right.[20]
In this case, the
enforcement of the writ of execution which would evict petitioner from her
residence is manifestly prejudicial to her interest. However, she possesses no
legal right that merits the protection of the courts through the writ of
preliminary injunction. Her right to possess the property in question has been
declared inferior or inexistent in relation to respondents in the ejectment
case in the MeTC decision which has become final and executory.[21]
In any event, as
manifested by respondents, the March 28, 2006 MeTC decision has already been
executed. Hence, there is nothing more to restrain.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
November 29, 2007 and Resolution dated February 27, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No.
97618 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA Associate Justice |
ROBERTO
A. ABAD Associate Justice |
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section
13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, with Associate Justices Juan Q.
Enriquez, Jr. and Marlene Gonzales-Sison, concurring; rollo, pp. 26-33.
[2]
[3]
[4] Penned
by Presiding Judge Maria Paz Reyes-Yson; id. at 51-56.
[5]
[6]
[7] Supra
note 1.
[8] Rollo, p. 15.
[9]
[10] RULES
OF COURT, Rule 13, Sec. 2.
[11] Amatorio v. People, 445 Phil. 481, 490 (2003); Bernardo v. CA, 341 Phil. 413, 427 (1997).
[12] Bernardo v. CA, supra, at 428.
[13]
[14] Estate of Salud Jimenez v. Phil. Export
Processing Zone, 402 Phil. 271 (2001).
[15] Tamayo v. People, G.R. No. 174698, July
28, 2008, 560 SCRA 312.
[16] Soco v. CA, 331 Phil. 753, 762 (1996).
[17] Samonte v. Century Savings Bank, G.R.
No. 176413, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 478, 485-486.
[18]
[19] G.R.
No. 164529, June 19, 2007, 525 SCRA 79.
[20] Ocampo v. Sison Vda. de Fernandez, id.
at 94-95.
[21]