SECOND DIVISION
|
EXXONMOBIL PETROLEUM
AND CHEMICAL HOLDINGS, INC. – PHILIPPINE BRANCH,
Petitioner, - versus - COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 180909 Present: CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated: January 19, 2011 |
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D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This
is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by petitioner Exxonmobil Petroleum
and Chemical Holdings, Inc. - Philippine Branch (Exxon) to set aside the September 7, 2007 Decision[1] of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc (CTA-En Banc) in
CTA E.B. No. 204, and its
November 27, 2007 Resolution[2] denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
THE FACTS
Petitioner Exxon is
a foreign corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State
of
Exxon is engaged in the business of selling petroleum
products to domestic and international carriers.[5] In
pursuit of its business, Exxon purchased from Caltex Philippines, Inc. (Caltex)
and Petron Corporation (Petron) Jet A-1 fuel and other petroleum
products, the excise taxes on which were paid for and remitted by both Caltex
and Petron.[6] Said taxes, however, were passed on to Exxon
which ultimately shouldered the excise taxes on the fuel and petroleum
products.[7]
From
November 2001 to June 2002, Exxon sold a total of 28,635,841 liters of Jet A-1
fuel to international carriers, free of excise taxes amounting to
Php105,093,536.47.[8]
On various dates, it filed administrative claims for refund with the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) amounting to Php105,093,536.47.[9]
On
Exxon and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR)
filed their Joint Stipulation of Facts and Issues on
During Exxon’s preparation of evidence, the CIR filed a
motion dated
On
Exxon filed a petition for review[16] with
the CTA En Banc assailing the
RULING OF THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS EN BANC
In its Decision dated
Citing
Sections 130 (A)(2)[18] and 204
(C) in relation to Section 135 (a)[19] of the
National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (NIRC), the CTA ruled that in consonance with its ruling in
several cases,[20]
only the taxpayer or the manufacturer of the petroleum products sold has the legal
personality to claim the refund of excise taxes paid on petroleum products sold
to international carriers.[21]
The
CTA stated that Section 130(A)(2) makes the manufacturer or producer of the
petroleum products directly liable for the payment of excise taxes.[22]
Therefore, it follows that the manufacturer or producer is the taxpayer.[23]
This determination of the identity of the taxpayer
designated by law is pivotal as the NIRC provides that it is only the taxpayer
who “has the legal personality to ask for a refund in case of erroneous payment
of taxes.”[24]
Further, the excise tax imposed on manufacturers upon the
removal of petroleum products by oil companies is an indirect tax, or a tax
which is primarily paid by persons who can shift the burden upon someone else.[25] The CTA
cited the cases of Philippine Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue,[26] Contex
Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,[27] and Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company,[28] and explained
that with indirect taxes, “although the burden of an indirect tax can be
shifted or passed on to the purchaser of the goods, the liability for the
indirect tax remains with the manufacturer.”[29]
Moreover, “the manufacturer has the option whether or not to shift the burden
of the tax to the purchaser. When shifted, the amount added by the manufacturer
becomes a part of the price, therefore, the purchaser does not really pay the
tax per se but only the price of the commodity.”[30]
Going by such logic, the CTA concluded that a refund of
erroneously paid or illegally received tax can only be made in favor of the
taxpayer, pursuant to Section 204(C) of the NIRC.[31] As
categorically ruled in the Cebu Portland Cement[32]
and Contex[33]
cases, in the case of indirect taxes, it is the manufacturer of the goods who
is entitled to claim any refund thereof.[34]
Therefore, it follows that the indirect taxes paid by the manufacturers or
producers of the goods cannot be refunded to the purchasers of the goods
because the purchasers are not the taxpayers.[35]
The CTA also emphasized that tax refunds are in the nature
of tax exemptions and are, thus, regarded as in derogation of sovereign
authority and construed strictissimi juris against the person or entity
claiming the exemption.[36]
Finally,
the CTA disregarded Exxon’s argument that “in effectively holding that only
petroleum products purchased directly from the manufacturers or producers are
exempt from excise taxes, the First Division of [the CTA] sanctioned a
universal amendment of existing bilateral agreements which the Philippines have
with other countries, in violation of the basic principle of ‘pacta sunt
servanda.’”[37]
The CTA explained that the findings of fact of the First Division (that when
Exxon sold the Jet A-1 fuel to international carriers, it did so free of tax)
negated any violation of the exemption from excise tax of the petroleum
products sold to international carriers.
Second, the right of international carriers to invoke the exemption
granted under Section 135(a) of the NIRC was neither affected nor restricted in
any way by the ruling of the First Division. At the point of sale, the
international carriers were free to invoke the exemption from excise taxes of
the petroleum products sold to them. Lastly, the lawmaking body was presumed to
have enacted a later law with the knowledge of all other laws involving the
same subject matter.[38]
THE ISSUES
Petitioner now raises the following issues in its petition
for review:
I.
WHETHER THE ASSAILED DECISION AND RESOLUTION ERRONEOUSLY
PROHIBITED PETITIONER, AS THE DISTRIBUTOR AND VENDOR OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS TO
INTERNATIONAL CARRIERS REGISTERED IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE EXISTING
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WITH THE PHILIPPINES, FROM CLAIMING A REFUND OF THE EXCISE
TAXES PAID THEREON; AND
II.
WHETHER THE ASSAILED DECISIONS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER’S CLAIM FOR REFUND BASED ON RESPONDENT’S “MOTION TO
RESOLVE FIRST THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER IS THE PROPER PARTY
THAT MAY ASK FOR A REFUND,” SINCE SAID MOTION IS ESSENTIALLY A MOTION TO
DISMISS, WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED OUTRIGHT BY THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS FOR
HAVING BEEN FILED OUT OF TIME.
RULING OF THE COURT
I. On respondent’s “motion to resolve first the
issue of whether or not the petitioner is the proper party that may ask for a
refund.”
For a
logical resolution of the issues, the court will tackle first the issue of
whether or not the CTA erred in granting respondent’s Motion to Resolve
First the Issue of Whether or Not the Petitioner is the Proper Party that may
Ask for a Refund.[39] In said motion, the CIR prayed that the CTA
First Division resolve ahead of the other stipulated issues the sole issue of
whether petitioner was the proper party to ask for a refund.[40]
Exxon
opines that the CIR’s motion is essentially a motion to dismiss filed out of
time,[41] as it
was filed after petitioner began presenting evidence[42] more
than a year after the filing of the Answer.[43] By
praying that Exxon be declared as not the proper party to ask for a refund, the
CIR asked for the dismissal of the petition, as the grant of the Motion to
Resolve would bring trial to a close.[44]
Moreover,
Exxon states that the motion should have also complied with the three-day
notice and ten-day hearing rules provided in Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.[45] Since
the CIR failed to set its motion for any hearing before the filing of the
Answer, the motion should have been considered a mere scrap of paper.[46]
Finally,
citing Maruhom v. Commission on Elections and Dimaporo,[47] Exxon
argues that a defendant who desires a preliminary hearing on special and
affirmative defenses must file a motion to that effect at the time of filing of
his answer.[48]
The
CIR, on the other hand, counters that it did not file a motion to dismiss.[49] Instead,
the grounds for dismissal of the case were pleaded as special and affirmative
defenses in its Answer filed on
The
CIR now argues that nothing in the Rules requires the preliminary hearing to be
held before the filing of an Answer.[52]
However, a preliminary hearing cannot be held before the filing of the Answer
precisely because any ground raised as an affirmative defense is pleaded in the
Answer itself.[53]
Further, the CIR contends that the case cited by
petitioner, Maruhom v. Comelec,[54] does
not apply here. In the said case, a
motion to dismiss was filed after the filing of the answer.[55] And,
the said motion to dismiss was
found to be a frivolous motion designed to prevent the early termination of the
proceedings in the election case therein.[56] Here,
the Motion to Resolve was filed not to delay the disposition of the case, but
rather, to expedite proceedings.[57]
Rule
16, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 6. Pleading
grounds as affirmative defenses. - If no motion to
dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this
Rule may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer, and in the
discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a
motion to dismiss had been filed.
The dismissal of the complaint under this
section shall be without prejudice to the prosecution in the same or separate
action of a counterclaim pleaded in the answer. (Underscoring supplied.)
This
case is a clear cut application of the above provision. The CIR did not file a
motion to dismiss. Thus, he pleaded the grounds for dismissal as affirmative
defenses in its Answer and thereafter prayed for the conduct of a preliminary
hearing to determine whether petitioner was the proper party to apply for the
refund of excise taxes paid.
The
determination of this question was the keystone on which the entire case was
leaning. If Exxon was not the proper party to apply for the refund of excise
taxes paid, then it would be useless to proceed with the case. It would not make any sense to proceed to try
a case when petitioner had no standing to pursue it.
In the
case of California and Hawaiian Sugar Company v. Pioneer Insurance and
Surety Corporation,[58] the
Court held that:
Considering that there was only one
question, which may even be deemed to be the very touchstone of the whole case,
the trial court had no cogent reason to deny the Motion for Preliminary
Hearing. Indeed, it committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied a preliminary hearing on a simple issue of fact that
could have possibly settled the entire case.
Verily, where a preliminary hearing appears to suffice, there is no
reason to go on to trial. One reason
why dockets of trial courts are clogged is the unreasonable refusal to use a
process or procedure, like a motion to dismiss, which is designed to abbreviate
the resolution of a case.[59] (Underscoring supplied.)
II.
On whether petitioner, as the distributor and vendor of petroleum products to
international carriers registered in foreign countries which have existing
bilateral agreements with the Philippines, can claim a refund of the excise
taxes paid thereon
This brings us now to
the substantive issue of whether Exxon, as the distributor and vendor of
petroleum products to international carriers registered in foreign countries
which have existing bilateral agreements with the Philippines, is the proper
party to claim a tax refund for the excise taxes paid by the manufacturers,
Caltex and Petron, and passed on to it as part of the purchase price.
Exxon argues that having paid the excise taxes on
the petroleum products sold to international carriers, it is a real party in
interest consistent with the rules and jurisprudence.[60]
It
reasons out that the subject of the exemption is neither the seller nor the
buyer of the petroleum products, but the products themselves, so long as they
are sold to international carriers for use in international flight operations,
or to exempt entities covered by tax treaties, conventions and other
international agreements for their use or consumption, among other conditions.[61]
Thus,
as the exemption granted under Section 135 attaches to the petroleum products
and not to the seller, the exemption will apply regardless of whether the same
were sold by its manufacturer or its distributor for two reasons.[62] First,
Section 135 does not require that to be exempt from excise tax, the products
should be sold by the manufacturer or producer.[63] Second,
the legislative intent was precisely to make Section 135 independent from
Sections 129 and 130 of the NIRC,[64]
stemming from the fact that unlike other products subject to excise tax, petroleum
products of this nature have become subject to preferential tax treatment by
virtue of either specific international agreements or simply of international
reciprocity.[65]
Respondent
CIR, on the other hand, posits that Exxon is not the proper party to seek a
refund of excise taxes paid on the petroleum products.[66] In so
arguing, the CIR states that excise taxes are indirect taxes, the liability for
payment of which falls on one person, but the burden of payment may be shifted
to another.[67]
Here, the sellers of the petroleum products or Jet A-1 fuel subject to excise
tax are Petron and Caltex, while Exxon was the buyer to whom the burden of
paying excise tax was shifted.[68] While
the impact or burden of taxation falls on Exxon, as the tax is shifted to it as
part of the purchase price, the persons statutorily liable to pay the tax are
Petron and Caltex.[69] As
Exxon is not the taxpayer primarily liable to pay, and not exempted from
paying, excise tax, it is not the proper party to claim for the refund of excise
taxes paid.[70]
The excise
tax, when passed on to the purchaser, becomes part of the purchase price.
Excise
taxes are imposed under Title VI of the NIRC. They apply to specific goods
manufactured or produced in the
There
are, however, certain exemptions to the coverage of excise taxes, such as
petroleum products sold to international carriers and exempt entities or
agencies. Section 135 of the NIRC provides:
SEC. 135. Petroleum Products Sold to International Carriers and
Exempt Entities or Agencies. - Petroleum products sold to the following are exempt from
excise tax:
(a) International carriers of Philippine or foreign registry on their
use or consumption outside the Philippines: Provided, That the petroleum
products sold to these international carriers shall be stored in a bonded
storage tank and may be disposed of only in accordance with the rules and regulations
to be prescribed by the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the
Commissioner;
(b) Exempt entities or agencies covered by tax treaties, conventions and
other international agreements for their use of consumption: Provided, however,
That the country of said foreign international carrier or exempt entities or
agencies exempts from similar taxes petroleum products sold to Philippine
carriers, entities or agencies; and
(c) Entities which are by law exempt from direct and indirect taxes. (Underscoring
supplied.)
Thus,
under Section 135, petroleum products sold to international carriers of foreign
registry on their use or consumption outside the Philippines are exempt from
excise tax, provided that the petroleum products sold to such international
carriers shall be stored in a bonded storage tank and may be disposed of only
in accordance with the rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary
of Finance, upon recommendation of the Commissioner.[73]
The
confusion here stems from the fact that excise taxes are of the nature of
indirect taxes, the liability for payment of which may fall on a person other
than he who actually bears the burden of the tax.
In
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company,[74]
the Court discussed the nature of indirect taxes as follows:
[I]ndirect
taxes are those that are demanded, in the first instance, from, or are paid by,
one person to someone else. Stated elsewise, indirect taxes are taxes wherein
the liability for the payment of the tax falls on one person but the burden
thereof can be shifted or passed on to another person, such as when the tax is
imposed upon goods before reaching the consumer who ultimately pays for it.
When the seller passes on the tax to his buyer, he, in effect, shifts the tax
burden, not the liability to pay it, to the purchaser, as part of the goods
sold or services rendered.
Accordingly,
the party liable for the tax can shift the burden to another, as part of the
purchase price of the goods or services. Although the manufacturer/seller is
the one who is statutorily liable for the tax, it is the buyer who actually
shoulders or bears the burden of the tax, albeit not in the nature of a tax,
but part of the purchase price or the cost of the goods or services sold.
As
petitioner is not the statutory taxpayer, it is not entitled to claim a refund
of excise taxes paid.
The
question we are faced with now is, if the party statutorily liable for the tax
is different from the party who bears the burden of such tax, who is entitled
to claim a refund of the tax paid?
Sections
129 and 130 of the NIRC provide:
SEC. 129. Goods subject
to Excise Taxes. - Excise taxes apply
to goods manufactured or produced in the
For purposes of this Title, excise taxes herein imposed and based on
weight or volume capacity or any other physical unit of measurement shall be
referred to as 'specific tax' and an excise tax herein imposed and based on
selling price or other specified value of the good shall be referred to as 'ad
valorem tax.'
SEC. 130. Filing of
Return and Payment of Excise Tax on Domestic Products. -
(A) Persons Liable to
File a Return, Filing of Return on Removal and Payment of Tax. -
(1) Persons Liable to
File a Return. - Every
person liable to pay excise tax imposed under this Title shall file a
separate return for each place of production setting forth, among others the
description and quantity or volume of products to be removed, the applicable
tax base and the amount of tax due thereon: Provided, however, That in the case
of indigenous petroleum, natural gas or liquefied natural gas, the excise tax
shall be paid by the first buyer, purchaser or transferee for local sale,
barter or transfer, while the excise tax on exported products shall be paid by
the owner, lessee, concessionaire or operator of the mining claim.
Should domestic products be removed from the place of production without
the payment of the tax, the owner or person having possession thereof shall be
liable for the tax due thereon.
(2) Time for Filing of
Return and Payment of the Tax. - Unless otherwise specifically allowed, the
return shall be filed and the excise tax paid by the manufacturer or producer
before removal of domestic products from place of production: Provided,
That the tax excise on locally manufactured petroleum products and indigenous
petroleum/levied under Sections 148 and 151(A)(4), respectively, of this Title
shall be paid within ten (10) days from the date of removal of such products
for the period from January 1, 1998 to June 30, 1998; within five (5) days from
the date of removal of such products for the period from July 1, 1998 to
December 31, 1998; and, before removal from the place of production of such
products from January 1, 1999 and thereafter: Provided, further, That the
excise tax on nonmetallic mineral or mineral products, or quarry resources
shall be due and payable upon removal of such products from the locality where
mined or extracted, but with respect to the excise tax on locally produced or
extracted metallic mineral or mineral products, the person liable shall file a
return and pay the tax within fifteen (15) days after the end of the calendar
quarter when such products were removed subject to such conditions as may be
prescribed by rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary of
Finance, upon recommendation of the Commissioner. For this purpose, the
taxpayer shall file a bond in an amount which approximates the amount of excise
tax due on the removals for the said quarter. The foregoing rules
notwithstanding, for imported mineral or mineral products, whether metallic or
nonmetallic, the excise tax due thereon shall be paid before their removal from
customs custody.
x x x
(Italics and
underscoring supplied.)
As
early as the 1960’s, this Court has ruled that the proper party to question, or
to seek a refund of, an indirect tax, is the statutory taxpayer, or the person
on whom the tax is imposed by law and who paid the same, even if he shifts the
burden thereof to another.[75]
In
Philippine
Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,[76] the
Court held that the sales tax is imposed on the manufacturer or producer and
not on the purchaser, “except probably in a very remote and inconsequential
sense.”[77] Discussing the “passing on” of the sales tax to
the purchaser, the Court therein cited Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ opinion
in Lash’s Products v. United States[78] wherein
he said:
“The phrase ‘passed the tax on’ is inaccurate,
as obviously the tax is laid and remains on the manufacturer and on him alone.
The purchaser does not really pay the tax. He pays or may pay the seller more
for the goods because of the seller’s obligation, but that is all. x x
x The price is the sum total paid
for the goods. The amount added because of the tax is paid to get the goods and
for nothing else. Therefore it is part of the price x x x.”[79]
Proceeding
from this discussion, the Court went on to state:
It
may indeed be that the economic burden of the tax finally falls on the
purchaser; when it does the tax becomes a part of the price which the purchaser
must pay. It does not matter that an additional amount is billed as tax to the
purchaser. x x x The
effect is still the same, namely, that the purchaser does not pay the tax. He
pays or may pay the seller more for the goods because of the seller’s obligation,
but that is all and the amount added because of the tax is paid to get the
goods and for nothing else.
But
the tax burden may not even be shifted to the purchaser at all. A decision to
absorb the burden of the tax is largely a matter of economics. Then it can no
longer be contended that a sales tax is a tax on the purchaser.[80]
The
above case was cited in the later case of Cebu Portland Cement Company v.
Collector (now Commissioner) of Internal Revenue,[81] where the Court ruled that as
the sales tax is imposed upon the manufacturer or producer and not on the
purchaser, “it is petitioner and not its customers, who may ask for a refund of
whatever amount it is entitled for the percentage or sales taxes it paid before
the amendment of section 246 of the Tax Code.”[82]
The Philippine Acetylene case was also cited in the
first Silkair (Singapore)
Pte, Ltd. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue[83] case, where the Court held that the proper party
to question, or to seek a refund of, an indirect tax is the statutory taxpayer,
the person on whom the tax is imposed by law and who paid the same even if he
shifts the burden thereof to another.[84]
In
the Silkair cases,[85]
petitioner Silkair (
In
both cases, the CIR argued that the excise tax on petroleum products is the
direct liability of the manufacturer/producer, and when added to the cost of
the goods sold to the buyer, it is no longer a tax but part of the price which
the buyer has to pay to obtain the article.
In the first Silkair
case, the Court ruled:
The proper party to
question, or seek a refund of, an indirect tax is the statutory taxpayer, the
person on whom the tax is imposed by law and who paid the same even if he
shifts the burden thereof to another. Section 130 (A) (2) of the NIRC provides
that "[u]nless otherwise specifically allowed, the return shall be filed
and the excise tax paid by the manufacturer or producer before removal of
domestic products from place of production." Thus, Petron Corporation, not
Silkair, is the statutory taxpayer which is entitled to claim a refund based on
Section 135 of the NIRC of 1997 and Article 4(2) of the Air Transport Agreement
between RP and
Even if Petron
Corporation passed on to Silkair the burden of the tax, the additional amount
billed to Silkair for jet fuel is not a tax but part of the price which Silkair
had to pay as a purchaser.[86] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Citing the above case, the second Silkair
case was promulgated a few months after the first, and stated:
The
issue presented is not novel. In a similar case involving the same parties,
this Court has categorically ruled that "the proper party to question, or
seek a refund of an indirect tax is the statutory taxpayer, the person on whom
the tax is imposed by law and who paid the same even if he shifts the burden
thereof to another." The Court added that "even if Petron Corporation
passed on to Silkair the burden of the tax, the additional amount billed to
Silkair for jet fuel is not a tax but part of the price which Silkair had to
pay as a purchaser."[87]
The CTA En Banc, thus, held that:
The determination of who is the
taxpayer plays a pivotal role in claims for refund because the same law
provides that it is only the taxpayer who has the legal personality to ask for
a refund in case of erroneous payment of taxes. Section 204 (C) of the 1997
NIRC, [provides] in part, as follows:
SEC. 204. Authority of the Commissioner to Compromise, Abate, and Refund
or Credit Taxes. – The Commissioner may –
xxx xxx xxx
(C)
Credit or refund taxes erroneously or illegally received or penalties imposed without authority, refund the value of internal
revenue stamps when they are returned in good condition by the purchaser, and,
in his discretion, redeem or change unused stamps that have been rendered unfit
for use and refund their value upon proof of destruction. No credit or refund
of taxes or penalties shall be allowed unless the taxpayer files in writing with the
Commissioner a claim for credit or refund
within two (2) years after the payment of the tax or
penalty: Provided, however, That a return showing an overpayment shall be
considered as a written claim for credit or refund.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis
shown supplied by the CTA.)[88]
Therefore,
as Exxon is not the party statutorily liable for payment of excise taxes under
Section 130, in relation to Section 129 of the NIRC, it is not the proper party
to claim a refund of any taxes erroneously paid.
There is no
unilateral amendment of existing bilateral agreements of the
Exxon
also argues that in effectively holding that only petroleum products purchased
directly from the manufacturers or producers are exempt from excise taxes, the
CTA En Banc sanctioned a unilateral amendment of existing bilateral agreements
which the Philippines has with other countries, in violation of the basic
international law principle of pacta sunt servanda.[89] The Court does not agree.
As correctly held by the CTA En Banc:
One final point, petitioner’s argument “that in effectively
holding that only petroleum products purchased directly from the manufacturers
or producers are exempt from excise taxes, the First Division of this Court
sanctioned a unilateral amendment of existing bilateral agreements which the
Philippines have (sic) with other countries, in violation of the basic
international principle of “pacta sunt servanda” is misplaced. First,
the findings of fact of the First Division of this Court that “when
petitioner sold the Jet A-1 fuel to international carriers, it did so free of
tax” negates any violation of the exemption from excise tax of the
petroleum products sold to international carriers insofar as this case is
concerned. Secondly, the right of international carriers to invoke the
exemption granted under Section 135 (a) of the 1997 NIRC has neither been
affected nor restricted in any way by the ruling of the First Division of this
Court. At the point of sale, the international carriers are free to invoke the
exemption from excise taxes of the petroleum products sold to them. Lastly, the
law-making body is presumed to have enacted a later law with the knowledge of
all other laws involving the same subject matter.”[90] (Underscoring supplied.)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
[1] Rollo, pp.
62-88. Penned
by Associate Justice Juanito C. Castañeda Jr., with Associate Justices Lovell
R. Bautista, Erlinda P. Uy, Caesar A. Casanova and Olga Palanca-Enriquez, concurring.
Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta issued a separate dissenting opinion.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] Docketed as CTA Case No. 6809.
[11] Rollo, p. 63.
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] SEC. 130. Filing of Return
and Payment of Excise Tax on Domestic Products. –
(A) Persons
Liable to File a Return, Filing of Return on Removal and Payment of Tax. –
x x x
(2) Time
for Filing of Return and Payment of the Tax. – Unless otherwise
specifically allowed, the return shall be filed and the excise tax paid by the
manufacturer or producer before removal of domestic products from place of
production: Provided, That the tax excise on locally manufactured petroleum
products and indigenous petroleum levied under Sections 148 and 151(A)(4),
respectively, of this Title shall be paid within ten (10) days from the date of
removal of such products for the period from January 1, 1998 to June 30, 1998;
within five (5) days from the date of removal of such products for the period
from July 1, 1998 to December 31, 1998; and, before removal from the place of production
of such products from January 1, 1999 and thereafter: Provided, further, That
the excise tax on nonmetallic mineral or mineral products, or quarry resources
shall be due and payable upon removal of such products from the locality where
mined or extracted, but with respect to the excise tax on locally produced or
extracted metallic mineral or mineral products, the person liable shall file a
return and pay the tax within fifteen (15) days after the end of the calendar
quarter when such products were removed subject to such conditions as may be
prescribed by rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary of
Finance, upon recommendation of the Commissioner. For this purpose, the
taxpayer shall file a bond in an amount which approximates the amount of excise
tax due on the removals for the said quarter. The foregoing rules
notwithstanding, for imported mineral or mineral products, whether metallic or
nonmetallic, the excise tax due thereon shall be paid before their removal from
customs custody.
x x x
[19] SEC. 135. Petroleum
Products Sold to International Carriers and Exempt Entities or Agencies.
- Petroleum products sold to the following are exempt from excise tax:
(a) International carriers of
Philippine or foreign registry on their use or consumption outside the
Philippines: Provided, That the petroleum products sold to these international
carriers shall be stored in a bonded storage tank and may be disposed of only
in accordance with the rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary
of Finance, upon recommendation of the Commissioner;
x x x
[20] Koyo Manufacturing (
[21] Rollo, p. 74.
[22]
[23]
[24] Id, citing Section 204(C) of the NIRC of 1997,
which reads:
SEC.
204. Authority of the Commissioner to Compromise, Abate and Refund or Credit
Taxes. - The Commissioner may -
x x x
(c)
Credit or refund taxes erroneously or illegally received or penalties imposed
without authority, refund the value of internal revenue stamps when they are
returned in good condition by the purchaser, and, in his discretion, redeem or
change unused stamps that have been rendered unfit for use and refund their
value upon proof of destruction. No credit or refund of taxes or penalties
shall be allowed unless the taxpayer files in writing with the Commissioner a
claim for credit or refund within two (2) years after the payment of the tax or
penalty: Provided, however, That a return filed showing an overpayment shall be
considered as a written claim for credit or refund.
x x x
[25]
[26] 127 Phil. 461 (1967).
[27] G.R. No. 151135,
[28] G.R. No. 140230,
[29] Rollo, p. 77.
[30]
[31]
[32] Cebu Portland Cement Company
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 134 Phil. 735 (1968).
[33] Contex Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra note 27.
[34] Rollo, p. 79, citing Section 204(C) of the 1997 NIRC and Cebu Portland Cement Company v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 134 Phil. 735 (1968).
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42]
[43]
[44]
[45]
[46]
[47] 387 Phil. 491 (2000).
[48] Rollo, p. 399.
[49]
[50]
[51]
[52]
[53]
[54] Supra note 47.
[55] Rollo, p. 280.
[56]
[57]
[58] 399 Phil. 795 (2000).
[59]
[60] Rollo, p. 39.
[61]
[62]
[63]
[64]
[65]
[66]
[67]
[68]
[69]
[70]
[71] J.C. Vitug and E.D. Acosta, Tax Law and
Jurisprudence, 271 (2006). See also Republic Act No. 8424 (1997), as
amended, Sec. 129.
[72]
[73]
[74] Supra note 28 at 72, citing Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Tours Specialists, Inc., 262 Phil. 437 (1990).
[75] Silkair (Singapore) Pte,
Ltd. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 173594, February 6,
2008, 544 SCRA 100, 112; J.C. Vitug and E.D. Acosta, Tax Law and Jurisprudence, 317
(2006), citing Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. American Rubber Company
and Court of Tax Appeals, 124 Phil. 1471 (1966); Cebu Portland Cement
Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 134 Phil. 735 (1968).
[76] Supra note 26.
[77]
[78] 278
[79] Supra note
26 at 465-466.
[80]
[81] Supra note 32.
[82]
[83] Supra note 75. See also Silkair (Singapore)
Pte, Ltd. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. Nos. 171383 and 172379,
November 14, 2008, 571 SCRA 141.
[84]
[85] Silkair (
[86]Silkair (
[87]Silkair (Singapore) Pte, Ltd. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. Nos. 171383 and 172379, November 14, 2008, 571 SCRA 141,
153-154.
[88] Rollo, pp. 75-76.
[89]
[90]