Republic of
the Philippines
SUPREME
COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus - Ng Yik Bun,
Kwok Wai Cheng, Chang Chaun Shi, Chua Shilou
Hwan, Kan Shun Min, and RaymOnd
S. Tan, Accused-Appellants. |
|
G.R. No. 180452 Present: CORONA,
C.J., Chairperson VELASCO,
JR., LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, DEL
CASTILLO, and PEREZ,
JJ. Promulgated: January
10, 2011 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This
is an appeal from the January 16, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00485 entitled People
of the Philippines v. Ng Yik Bun, Kwok Wai Cheng, Chang Chaun Shi, Chua Shilou
Hwan, Kan Shun Min and Raymond S. Tan,
which affirmed the April 1, 2004 Decision in Criminal Case No. Q-01-99437 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
103 in Quezon City. The RTC found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. (RA) 6425 or the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
The Facts
An
Information indicted accused-appellants of the following:
That on or about the 24th day of August 2000, at Barangay Bignay II, Municipality of Sariaya, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there knowingly, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport, deliver and distribute, without authority of law, on board an L-300 Mitsubishi van, bearing Plate No. UBU 827, and have in their possession, custody, and control, without the corresponding license or prescription, twenty-five (25) heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated drug, each containing: 2.954 grams, 2.901 grams, 2.926 grams, 2.820 grams, 2.977 grams, 2.568 grams, 2.870 grams, 2.941 grams, 2.903 grams, 2.991 grams, 2.924 grams, 2.872 grams, 2.958 grams, 2.972 grams, 2.837 grams, 2.908 grams, 2.929 grams, 2.932 grams, 2.899 grams, 2.933 grams, 2.938 grams, 2.943 grams, 2.955 grams, 2.938 grams and 2.918 grams, respectively, with a total weight of 72.707 kilos, and one hundred forty seven (147) self-sealing transparent plastic bags likewise containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), also a regulated drug, with a total weight of 291.350 kilos, or with a grand total weight of 364.057 kilos.
That the above acts were committed by a syndicate with the use of two (2) motor vehicles, namely: L-300 Mitsubishi Van bearing Plate No. UBU 827 and a Nissan Sentra Exalta car without Plate Number.
Contrary to law.[1]
As
summarized in the appealed CA decision, the facts are as follows:
On
August 24, 2000, at around 9:00 p.m., Capt. Danilo Ibon of Task Force Aduana
received information from an operative that there was an ongoing shipment of
contraband in Barangay Bignay II,
Sariaya, Quezon Province. Upon instructions
from his superior, Major Carlo Magno Tabo, Capt. Ibon formed a team in
coordination with a Philippine National Police detachment, and, along with the
operative, the team then proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya.
The members of the team were able to
observe the goings-on at the resort from a distance of around 50 meters. They spotted six Chinese-looking men loading
bags containing a white substance into a white van. Having been noticed, Capt. Ibon identified
his team and asked accused-appellant Chua Shilou Hwan (Hwan) what they were
loading on the van. Hwan replied that it
was shabu and pointed, when probed
further, to accused-appellant Raymond Tan as the leader. A total of 172 bags of suspected shabu were then confiscated. Bundles of
noodles (bihon) were also found on the premises.
A
laboratory report prepared later by Police Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo on
samples of the 172 confiscated bags showed the white substance to be shabu.
On
January 10, 2001, an Amended Information for violation of Sec. 16, Article III
of RA 6425 was filed against accused-appellants, who entered a plea of not
guilty upon re-arraignment.
Accused-appellants
all maintained their innocence and presented the following defenses:
(1) Accused-appellant
Hwan testified that he was planning to buy cheap goods at Villa Vicenta Resort
on August 24, 2000, when he saw a van full of bihon at the resort and
inquired if it was for sale. He went to
relieve himself 15 meters away from the van.
A group of police officers arrested him upon his return.
(2) Accused-appellant
Tan testified that he was a businessman collecting a debt in Lucena City on
August 24, 2000. He was at a restaurant
with his driver when three persons identified themselves as police officers and
forcibly brought him inside a car. He
was handcuffed, blindfolded, and badly beaten.
He was later brought to a beach and was ordered to hold some bags while
being photographed with five Chinese-looking men he saw for the first
time. A tricycle driver, Ricky Pineda,
corroborated his story by testifying that he saw Tan being forced into a white
Nissan car on August 24, 2000.
(3) Accused-appellant
Ng Yik Bun (Bun) testified that he arrived in the Philippines as a tourist on
August 22, 2000. On August 24, 2000, he
was at a beach with some companions when four armed men arrested them. He was made to pose next to some plastic bags
along with other accused-appellants, whom he did not personally know. He was then charged with illegal possession
of drugs at the police station. A friend of his, accused-appellant Kwok Wai
Cheng (Cheng), corroborated his story.
(4) Accused-appellant
Kan Shun Min (Min) testified that he arrived in the Philippines on July 1, 2000
for business and pleasure. On August 24,
2000, he checked into a beach resort.
While walking there, he was suddenly accosted by four or five men who
poked guns at him. He was brought to a
cottage where he saw some unfamiliar Chinese-looking individuals. He likewise testified that he was made to
take out white packages from a van while being photographed. His friend, accused-appellant Chang Chaun Shi
(Shi), corroborated his story.
The RTC convicted accused-appellants
of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby renders judgment finding the six (6) accused namely Ng Yik Bun, Kwok Wai Cheng, Chang Chaun Shi, Chua Shilou Hwan, Kan Shun Min and Raymond S. Tan (some also known by other names), GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 16 of RA 6425, as amended and each is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) each.
The shabu involved in this case and their accompanying paraphernalia are ordered disposed of in accordance with law, now RA 9165. The two (2) vehicles are forfeited in favor of the government.
SO ORDERED.[2]
In questioning the RTC Decision
before the CA, accused-appellants Bun, Cheng, Shi, Min, and Tan raised the lone
issue of: whether the trial court erred
in ruling that there was a valid search and arrest despite the absence of a
warrant.
On the other hand, accused-appellant
Hwan sought an acquittal on the basis of the following submissions:
I
The trial court erred when it held as valid the warrantless search, seizure and subsequent arrest of the accused-appellants despite the non-concurrence of the requisite circumstances that justify a warrantless arrest as held in the case of People vs. [Cuizon].
II
The trial court violated Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution as well as Rule 115 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when it heard the case at bench on June 26, 2001 at the chemistry division of the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City without the presence of both the herein accused-appellant and his counsel de parte.
III
The trial court erred when it issued and dictated in open hearing a verbal order denying accused’s formal “Motion to Suppress Illegally Procured Evidence” upon a [ratiocination] that is manifestly contrary to law [and] jurisprudence set in the Cuizon case, supra.
IV
The trial court erred when with lack of the desired circumspection, it sweepingly ruled the admission in evidence the 731 exhibits listed in the prosecution’s 43-page formal offer of evidence over the itemized written objections of the defense in a terse verbal order (bereft of reason for the denial of the raised objections) dictated in open hearing which reads: “All the exhibits of the prosecution are hereby admitted. The court believes that as far as the evidence submitted goes, these exhibits of the prosecution consisting of several plastic bags of shabu were not yet shown to be the fruit of a poisonous plant.” x x x
V
The trial court also erred in admitting the prosecution’s photographs (Exhibit “K” and “M,” inclusive of their sub-markings), the photographer who took the shots not having taken the witness stand to declare, as required by the rules, the circumstances under which the photographs were taken.
VI
The trial court erred when it tried and applied the provisions of R.A. 9165, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, in the instant case even though [the] crime charged took place on 24 August 2000.
VII
The trial court erred in finding conspiracy among the accused.[3]
The appellate court found
accused-appellants’ contentions unmeritorious as it consequently affirmed in
toto the RTC Decision.
The CA ruled that, contrary to
accused-appellants’ assertion, they were first arrested before the seizure of
the contraband was made. The CA held
that accused-appellants were caught in
flagrante delicto loading transparent plastic bags containing white
crystalline substance into an L-300 van which, thus, justified their arrests
and the seizure of the contraband. The
CA agreed with the prosecution that the urgency of the situation meant that the
buy-bust team had no time to secure a search warrant. Moreover, the CA also found that the
warrantless seizure of the transparent plastic bags can likewise be sustained
under the plain view doctrine.
The CA debunked accused-appellant
Hwan’s arguments in seriatim. First,
the CA ruled that People v. Cuizon[4]
was not applicable to the instant case, as, unlike in Cuizon, the apprehending officers immediately acted on the information
they had received about an ongoing shipment of drugs.
Second, the CA
also noted that accused-appellant Hwan effectively waived his right to be
present during the inspection of exhibits and hearing, for the manifestation
made by the prosecution that accused-appellant Hwan waived his right to be
present was never raised in issue before the trial court.
And third, the CA found accused-appellant Hwan’s other arguments
untenable. It held that the trial court
correctly admitted Exhibits “K” and “M” even if the photographer was not
presented as a witness. The CA based its
ruling on Sison v. People,[5]
which held that photographs can be identified either by the photographer or by
any other competent witness who can testify to its exactness and accuracy. It agreed with the Solicitor General that
accused-appellants were correctly tried and convicted by the trial court under
RA 6425 and not RA 9165, as can be gleaned from the fallo of the RTC Decision.
The CA likewise dismissed the argument that conspiracy was not proved by
the prosecution, noting that the evidence presented established that
accused-appellants were performing “their respective task[s] with the objective
of loading the plastic bags of shabu into an L-300 van.”[6]
The CA disposed of the appeal as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated April 1, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. Q-01-99437, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[7]
On February 18, 2008, the Court, acting on the appeal of
accused-appellants, required the parties to submit supplemental briefs if they
so desired.
On
March 27, 2008, accused-appellants Bun, Cheng, Shi, Min, and Tan filed their
Supplemental Brief on the sole issue that:
THERE WAS NO VALID SEARCH AND ARREST DUE TO ABSENCE OF A WARRANT
On June 4, 2008, accused-appellant Hwan filed
his Supplemental Brief, raising the following errors, allegedly committed by
the trial court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED ARTICLE III, SECTION 14 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AS WELL AS RULE 115 OF THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE WHEN IT CONDUCTED A HEARING ON JUNE 26, 2001 AT THE CHEMISTRY DIVISION OF THE PNP CRIME LABORATORY IN CAMP CRAME, QUEZON CITY WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF BOTH THE HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND HIS COUNSEL IN SUCH VITAL [PROCEEDINGS].
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD AS VALID THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH, SEIZURE AND SUBSEQUENT ARREST OF THE HEREIN APPELLANT DESPITE THE NON-CONCURRENCE OF THE REQUISITE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT JUSTIFY A WARRANTLESS ARREST.
Essentially,
accused-appellants claim that no valid in flagrante delicto arrest was
made prior to the seizure and that the police officers placed
accused-appellants under arrest even when there was no evidence that an offense
was being committed. Since there was no
warrant of arrest, they argue that the search sans a search warrant
subsequently made on them was illegal.
They contend that a seizure of any evidence as a result of an illegal
search is inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose.
Accused-appellant
Hwan additionally claims that he was deliberately excluded when the trial court
conducted a hearing on June 26, 2001 to identify 172 bags of shabu for trial purposes. He asserts that no formal notice of the
hearing was sent to him or his counsel, to his prejudice.
The Court’s Ruling
On
the issue of warrantless arrest, it is apropos to mention what the Bill of
Rights under the present Constitution provides in part:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
A settled exception to the right
guaranteed in the aforequoted provision is that of an arrest made during
the commission of a crime, which does not require a warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered
reasonable and valid under Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which states:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (Emphasis
supplied.)
The foregoing proviso refers to
arrest in flagrante delicto.[8] In the instant case, contrary to
accused-appellants’ contention, there was indeed a valid warrantless arrest in
flagrante delicto. Consider the
circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of
accused-appellants: (1) the police
officers received information from an operative about an ongoing shipment of
contraband; (2) the police officers, with the operative, proceeded to Villa
Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II,
Sariaya, Quezon; (3) they observed the goings-on at the resort from a distance
of around 50 meters; and (4) they spotted the six accused-appellants loading
transparent bags containing a white substance into a white L-300 van. The following exchange between Capt. Ibon and
the prosecutor sheds light on the participation of all six accused-appellants:
Q: Upon arriving at Villa Vicenta Resort in Brgy. Bignay II, [in] what specific area [did] you position yourselves?
A: Initially we [were] about three hundred meters away from Villa Vicenta Resort, then we walked [stealthily] so as not to [be] [spotted] until we were about fifty meters sir.
Q: So you [positioned] yourself about fifty meters away from the point of Villa Vicenta Resort?
A: From the actual location we saw about six personnel walking together loading contraband.
Q: You said you [were] about fifty meters away from these six persons who were loading contraband, is that what you mean?
A: Yes sir.
Q: In that place where you [positioned] yourself, could you tell us, what was the lighting condition in the place where you positioned yourselves?
A: It was totally dark in our place sir.
Q: How about the position of the six persons who were loading contraband?
A: They were well-lighted sir.
Q: Why do you say that they are well-lighted?
A: There were several [fluorescent] lamps sir.
Q: Where?
A: One search light placed near where they were loading the shipment sir.
Q: How about the other?
A: About two fluorescent lamps at the house near the six persons your honor.
COURT: Are these portable lamps:
A: Fixed lamps your honor.
Q: Where else?
A: Another at the right corner[.] There was also somewhat a multi-purpose house and it [was] well-lighted your honor.
Q: This is a resort and that multi-purpose house that you are referring to are the cottages of the resort?
A: Yes your honor.
FISCAL: You said you saw six persons who were loading goods[.] In what vehicle [were they] transferring those things?
A: Into [an] L-300 van sir.
Q: What is the color of the van?
A: White sir.
Q: What did you see that these six persons [were] loading?
A: We saw [them] holding white plastic with white substance your honor.
Q: What container [were they] loading?
A: Actually there were several checkered bags and other plastic [bags] sir.
Q: How [were] they loading these bags?
A: [Manually] your honor.
Q: Will you please describe how they [were] loading it, Mr. Witness?
A: Actually the plastic bags [some were] repacked [into] checkered [bags] while others [were] loading inside the checkered bag sir.
Q: Did they put that on their shoulder or what?
A: Holding and holding [sic] sir.
Q: Nobody carrying [it] on their back?
A: Nobody sir.
x x x x
Q: You said you saw these six persons, will you please look around this courtroom and tell us if these six persons that you are referring to are present?
COURT: Considering that there are many persons inside this courtroom, will you please stand up and please [tap] the shoulder of these six persons?
x x x x
INTERPRETER: Witness tapped the [shoulders] of six male persons inside the courtroom.
x x x x
FISCAL: May we manifest your honor that when these six persons stood up when their names [were] called on the basis [of] what [was] written [on] the information [were] once tapped on their shoulder by this witness.
The last question I have [is] how long you stayed in this position watching these six persons loading those [products] in the L-300 van?
A: Ten to fifteen minutes sir.
Q: Within that period could you tell us what transpired?
A: I called Major Tabo to inform [him of] what I saw, I called Major Tabo through the hand-held radio sir.
Q: What was the reply of major Tabo with respect to your information?
A: He directed me to get closer to these six persons and find out if really the contraband is shabu that was first reported sir.
Q: So did you in fact go closer?
A: Yes sir.
Q: How [close] were you [to] the six persons at the time?
A: When we were closing [in] somebody noticed us and they were surprised, I immediately shouted “Freeze, don’t move, we are Filipino soldiers,” we further identified [ourselves] sir.
Q: What was the reaction of the six persons when you shouted those words?
A: They [froze] sir.
x x x x
Q: When you went closer and they [froze], what happened?
A: I asked them who among them are English-speaking?
Q: What was the reply given to you?
A: Somebody replied “tagalog lang.”
Q: Who was that person who replied “tagalog lang?”
A: Chua Shilou Hwan sir.
Q: Will you please [identify] for us who answered that in [T]agalog?
COURT: Please [tap] his shoulder.
A: This man sir.
COURT: Witness tapped the shoulder of a man who identified himself as Chua Shilou Hwan.
CHUA SHILOU HWAN: Opo.
FISCAL: After answering you [with] “tagalog lang,” what happened?
A: I further asked them “Ano ang dala ninyo?”
Q: What was the reply?
A: Chua Shilou Hwan said shabu.
Q: So [what] did you do next?
A: I asked them who is their leader, sir.
Q: What was the reply?
A: He told me it was Raymond Tan, sir.
Q: Is he inside this courtroom now?
A: Yes sir.
COURT: Please tap [his] shoulder.
WITNESS: This man sir.
COURT: Ikaw ba Raymond Tan?
INTERPRETER: A man stood and [nodded] his head.
x x x x
FISCAL: Now after they [froze], what did you do?
A: I inspected the contraband and I found these bags and I immediately called Major Tabo and informed [him of] the matter sir.
Q: How many bags were you able to confiscate in the scene?
A: All in all 172 your honor.
Q: That 172, one of them is the bag in front of you [which] you identified earlier?
A: Yes sir.
Q: When you saw that bag could you tell us what particular [contents] attracted you upon seeing these bags?
A: It was marked by the members (interrupted).
Q: No what attracted you?
A: Something crystalline white sir.
Q: Are
you referring to all the bags?
A: All the bags sir.[9] x x x
Evidently, the arresting police
officers had probable cause to suspect that accused-appellants were loading and
transporting contraband, more so when Hwan, upon being accosted, readily
mentioned that they were loading shabu
and pointed to Tan as their leader.
Thus, the arrest of accused-appellants––who were caught in flagrante
delicto of possessing, and in the act of loading into a white L-300 van, shabu, a prohibited drug under RA 6425,
as amended––is valid.
In People v. Alunday, we held
that when a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears
the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene, he may
effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, as the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within
his view.[10] In the instant case, it can plausibly be
argued that accused-appellants were committing the offense of possessing shabu and were in the act of loading
them in a white van when the police officers arrested them. As aptly noted by the appellate court, the
crime was committed in the presence of the police officers with the contraband,
inside transparent plastic containers, in plain view and duly observed by the
arresting officers. And to write finis
to the issue of any irregularity in their warrantless arrest, the Court notes,
as it has consistently held, that accused-appellants are deemed to have waived
their objections to their arrest for not raising the issue before entering
their plea.[11]
Moreover, present in the instant case
are all the elements of illegal possession of drugs: (1) the accused is in possession of an item
or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is
not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possesses the
said drug.[12] Accused-appellants were positively identified
in court as the individuals caught loading and possessing illegal drugs. They were found to be in possession of
prohibited drugs without proof that they were duly authorized by law to possess
them. Having been caught in flagrante delicto, there is,
therefore, a prima facie evidence of animus
possidendi on the part of accused-appellants.[13] There is, thus, no merit to the argument of
the defense that a warrant was needed to arrest accused-appellants.
Accused-appellants were not able to show that there was any
truth to their allegation of a frame-up in rebutting the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. They relied on
mere denials, in contrast with the testimony of Capt. Ibon, who testified that
he and his team saw accused-appellants loading plastic bags with a white
crystalline substance into an L-300 van at the Villa Vicenta Resort. Accused-appellants, except for Tan, claimed
that they were ordered by the police officers to act like they were loading
bags onto the van. Accused-appellant Tan told a different tale and claims he
was arrested inside a restaurant. But as
the trial court found, the persons who could have corroborated their version of
events were not presented in court. The
only witness presented by Tan, a tricycle driver whose testimony corroborated
Tan’s alone, was not found by the trial court to be credible.
As no ill motive can be imputed to
the prosecution’s witnesses, we uphold the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties and affirm the trial court’s finding that the
police officers’ testimonies are deserving of full faith and credit. Appellate courts generally will not disturb
the trial court’s assessment of a witness’ credibility unless certain material
facts and circumstances have been overlooked or arbitrarily disregarded.[14] We find no reason to deviate from this rule
in the instant case.
On
the alleged lack of notice of hearing, it is now too late for accused-appellant
Hwan to claim a violation of his right to examine the witnesses against
him. The records show the following
exchange on June 26, 2001:
FISCAL LUGTO:
I would like to manifes[t] that Atty. Agoot, counsel of accused Chua
Shilou Hwan, waived his right to be present for today’s trial for purposes of identification of the alleged shabu.
ATTY SAVELLANO:
[Are] we made to understand that this hearing is for identification of shabu only?
FISCAL LUGTO:
Yes despite the testimony of the Forensic Chemist, this is for continuation with the direct testimony for purposes of identification which was confiscated or seized by the joint operation of the Military and the PNP at Sariaya, Quezon.
For the record, this
[is] for the continuation of the direct testimony of Forensic Chemist Mary Jean
Geronimo.[15]
As
the records confirm, accused-appellant Hwan and his counsel were not present
when the forensic chemist testified. The
prosecution made a manifestation to the effect that accused-appellant Hwan
waived his right to be present at that hearing.
Yet Hwan did not question this before the trial court. No evidence of deliberate exclusion was
shown. If no notice of hearing were made
upon him and his counsel, they should have brought this in issue at the trial,
not at the late stage on appeal.
All
told, we hold that the findings of both the RTC and the CA must be
affirmed. The trial court’s
determination as to the credibility of witnesses and its findings of fact
should be accorded great weight and respect more so when affirmed by the
appellate court. To reiterate, a look at
the records shows no facts of substance and value that have been overlooked,
which, if considered, might affect the outcome of the instant appeal. Deference to the trial court’s findings must
be made as it was in the position to easily detect whether a witness is telling
the truth or not.[16]
Penalty Imposed
Accused-appellants
were each sentenced by the lower court to reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of PhP 5,000,000. This is within the range provided by RA 6425,
as amended.[17]
We, therefore, affirm the penalty imposed on accused-appellants.
WHEREFORE, the
appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00485, finding accused-appellants Ng Yik Bun, Kwok Wai
Cheng, Chang Chaun Shi, Chua Shilou Hwan, Kan Shun Min, and Raymond S. Tan
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 16, Art. III of RA 6425, as
amended, is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, p. 5.
[2] CA
rollo, p. 46. Penned by Judge Jaime N. Salazar.
[3] Id. at 124-125.
[4] G.R. No. 109287, April 18, 1996, 256 SCRA 325.
[5] G.R. Nos. 108280-83 & 114931-33, November 16, 1995, 250 SCRA 58, 75-76.
[6] Rollo, p. 25.
[7] Id. at 26. Penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Jose C. Mendoza (now a member of this Court).
[8] People v. Alunday, G.R. No. 181546, September 3, 2008, 564 SCRA 135, 146; citing People v. Doria, G.R. No. 125299, January 22, 1999, 301 SCRA 668.
[9] TSN, July 24, 2001, pp. 22-34.
[10] Supra note 8, at 147; citing People v. Sucro, G.R. No. 93239, March 18, 1991, 195 SCRA 388.
[11] People v. Tidula, G.R. No. 123273, July 16, 1998, 292 SCRA 596, 611; People v. Montilla, G.R. No. 123872, January 30, 1998, 285 SCRA 703; People v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 112035, January 16, 1998, 284 SCRA 199, 210; People v. Mahusay, G.R. No. 91483, November 18, 1997, 282 SCRA 80, 87; People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 87187, June 29, 1995, 245 SCRA 421, 430; and People v. Lopez, Jr., G.R. No. 104662, June 16, 1995, 245 SCRA 95, 105.
[12] People v. Sy, G.R. No. 147348, September 24, 2002, 389 SCRA 594, 604-605; citing Manalili v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113447, October 9, 1997, 280 SCRA 400, 418.
[13] People v. Pagkalinawan, G.R. No. 184805, March 3, 2010.
[14] People v. Gregorio, Jr., G.R. No. 174474, May 25, 2007, 523 SCRA 216, 227; citing People v. Abaño, G.R. No. 142728, January 23, 2002, 374 SCRA 431.
[15] TSN, June 26, 2001, p. 1.
[16] People v. Macabare, G.R. No. 179941, August 25, 2009, 597 SCRA 119, 132; citing People v. Mateo, G.R. No. 179036, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 375, 394.
[17] Secs. 16 and 17 of RA 6425, as amended, provide:
Sec. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs.––The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos [PhP 500,000] to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
Sec. 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime.––The penalties for offenses under Section 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:
x x x x
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride.