SECOND DIVISION
|
DEL
MONTE PHILIPPINES INC. EMPLOYEES AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES COOPERATIVE
(DEARBC), Petitioner, - versus - JESUS
SANGUNAY and SONNY LABUNOS, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 180013 Present: CARPIO,
J., Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA,
ABAD
and MENDOZA,
JJ. Promulgated: January 31, 2011 |
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D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1]
assailing the Resolutions[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 01715, which dismissed the
petition filed by Del Monte Philippines Inc. Employees Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries Cooperative (DEARBC), challenging the May 12, 2006 Decision[3] of
the Central Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). For lack of jurisdiction, the DARAB reversed
and set aside the ruling of the DARAB Regional Adjudicator (Adjudicator)
who ordered the respondents to peacefully vacate certain portions of the subject
landholding.[4]
The Court is now urged to rule on the issue of jurisdiction
of regular courts over petitions for recovery of possession vis-à-vis
the original, primary and exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) and the DARAB over agrarian disputes and/or agrarian reform
implementation as provided for under Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657 (R.A.
6657).
The Facts
The property subject of this case is a portion of an entire landholding
located in Sankanan, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, with an area of 1,861,922 square
meters, more or less, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. AO-3 [Certificate of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA)].[5] The said landholding was awarded to DEARBC,
an agrarian cooperative and beneficiary under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). Subsequently,
DEARBC leased a substantial portion of the land to Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (DMPI)
under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6657 through a Grower’s Contract dated
On
Essentially, DEARBC claimed that both Sangunay and Labunos
illegally entered portions of its property called “Field 34.” Sangunay utilized
approximately one and a half (1 ½) hectare portion[7]
where he planted corn, built a house and resided from 1986 to the present. Labunos, on the other hand, tilled an area of
approximately eight (8) hectares where he planted fruit trees, gmelina,
mahogany and other crops as a source of his livelihood.[8] Both respondents refused to return the
parcels of land notwithstanding a demand to vacate them. This illegal occupation resulted in the
deprivation of the proper and reasonable use of the land and damages.
On
In the series
of hearing conducted by this Adjudicator and in the position papers submitted
by some of the defendants, none of them was able to present proof, either
documentary or otherwise, that they owned the areas they respectively occupied
and cultivate[d], or that their occupation and cultivation was with the consent
and authority of the complainant.
X x x against
all reasons, the fact remains that their occupation and cultivation thereof,
granting it is true, have not been validated by the DAR and they were not among
the identified FB’s over the said subject landholding.[9]
Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case to the DARAB Central
Office before which Sangunay filed his position paper. He claimed that the subject property was
located along the
For his part, Labunos reiterated the above arguments and
added that the subject portion of the landholding was previously owned by one
Genis Valdenueza who sold it to his father, Filoteo, as early as 1950. Like Sangunay, he asserted rights of retention
and ownership by prescription because he had been in open, public, adverse,
peaceful, actual, physical, and continuous possession of the landholding in the
concept of an owner.[10]
In its
X x
x the plaintiff-appellee’s cause of action is for the recovery of possession
and specific performance with damages with respect to the subject landholding.
Such cause of action flows from the plaintiff-appellee’s contention that it
owns the subject landholding. On the
other hand, defendant-appellants refuted and assailed such ownership as to
their respective landholdings. Thus, the
only question in this case is who owns the said landholdings. Without doubt, the said question classified
the instant controversy to a regular case.
At this premise, We hold that the only issue to be resolved by this
Board is whether or not the instant case presents an agrarian dispute and is
therefore well within Our jurisdiction.
x x x
In
the case at bar, petitioner-appellants wanted to recover x x the subject
landholding on the premise of ownership xxx. Defendants-appellants assail such
allegations saying that the landholdings are accrual deposits and maintaining
their open, peaceful and adverse possession over the same. Indubitably, there
assertions and issues classify the present controversy as a regular case. As such, clearly, this Board has no
jurisdiction to rule upon the instant case. Obviously, the dispute between the
parties does not relate to any tenurial arrangement. Thus, this Board has no jurisdiction over the
same.
DEARBC challenged the DARAB Decision in the CA through a
petition for review filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. In its Resolution dated
1)
The
Verification and Certification is defective due to the following reasons:
a)
There
is no assurance that the allegations in the petition are based on personal
knowledge and in authentic records, in violation of Section 4 par. (2), Rule 7
of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure;
b)
The
Community Tax Certificate Nos. of the affiant therein are not indicated;
c)
The
affiant is not authorized to sign the same for and in behalf of the petitioner
cooperative;
2)
The
attached copies of the Motion for Reconsideration filed before the DARAB Quezon
City and the Complaint filed before the DAR, Region XD, and the Decision and
Resolution rendered therein are mere plain photocopies, in violation of Sec. 6
par. (c), Rule 43, supra.
In a motion for reconsideration, DEARBC invoked substantial
compliance with the pertinent procedural rules, pointing to the attached
Secretary’s Certificate as sufficient proof of authority given to the President
and Chairman of the Board, Dennis Hojas (Hojas), to represent DEARBC. On
Hence, this petition for
review.
With regard to the dismissal of the
case by the CA on technical grounds, the Court is of the view that it was
correct. DEARBC clearly failed to comply
with the rules which mistake was a fatal error warranting the dismissal of the
petition for review. However, it has
been the constant ruling of this Court that every party-litigant should be
afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his
cause, free from constraints of technicalities.[15] Rules of procedure are mere tools
designed to expedite the resolution of cases and other matters pending in
court. A strict and rigid application of the rules that would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote justice must be avoided.[16] Thus, the Court opts to brush
aside the procedural flaw and resolve the core issue of jurisdiction as it has
been discussed by the parties anyway.
Position of the Parties
DEARBC claims that the action it filed for recovery of
possession falls within the jurisdiction of the DARAB because it partakes of
either a boundary dispute, a correction of a CLOA or an ouster of an interloper
or intruder found under Section 1 of Rule 11 of the 2003 DARAB Rules of
Procedure[17]
and Administrative Order 03 Series of 2003.[18] Under those rules, any conflict involving
agricultural lands and the rights of beneficiaries is within the jurisdiction
of the DARAB.
In his Comment,[19]
Labunos argues that only questions of law may be resolved in appeals under Rule
45 and that it is the decision of the CA which must be challenged and not the
DARAB decision. On the merits, he cites
cases where this Court ruled that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited only
to agrarian disputes and other matters relating to the implementation of the
CARP. The subject land has not been
transferred, distributed and/or sold to tenants, and it is obvious that the
complaint is not for the correction of a title but for the recovery of
possession and specific performance. Issues
of possession may be dealt with by the DARAB only when they relate to agrarian
disputes. Otherwise, jurisdiction lies with the regular courts.
Sangunay prays that he be declared as the owner of the land,
particularly his area in Field 34, based on the following grounds: 1] that the tax receipts and Tax Declaration No.
15-018 were issued in his name; 2] that R.A. No. 6657 provides that farmers
already in place and those not accommodated in the distribution of
privately-owned lands must be given preferential rights in the distribution of
lands from the public domain (to which the subject land as an accretion
belongs); and 3] that acquisitive prescription had set in his favor.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court finds no merit in
the petition.
Where a question of
jurisdiction between the DARAB and the Regional Trial Court is at the core of a
dispute, basic jurisprudential tenets come into play. It is the rule that the jurisdiction of a tribunal,
including a quasi-judicial office or government agency, over the nature and
subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material
allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for[20] irrespective of whether the petitioner or
complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs.[21]
In the same vein, jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is not
affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a
motion to dismiss. Otherwise,
jurisdiction will become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the
defendant.[22]
Under Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657[23] and as held in a string of cases, “the DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program.”[24] The DARAB was created, thru Executive Order No. 109-A, to assume the powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases. Hence, all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform are within the DAR’s primary, exclusive and original jurisdiction. At the first instance, only the DARAB, as the DAR’s quasi-judicial body, can determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the CARP.[25] An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship, or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers’ associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowner to farmworkers, tenants, and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.[26]
The following allegations were essentially contained in the
complaints filed separately against the respondents before the DARAB with some
variance in the amount of damages and fees prayed for:
1.
The
complainant is an agrarian cooperative duly registered and organized under the
laws of the Republic of the
2.
Complainant
is an awardee of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), situated at
Limbona, Bukidnon under Original Certificate of Title A-3 as evidenced by
Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) xxx.
x x x x
5. The
defendant illegally entered and tilled the land owned by the complainant,
inside the portion of Field 34, with an area of one and a half (1 ½) hectares,
more or less, located at Sankanan, Manolo Fortrich, Bukidnon xxx.
x x x x
8. Demands were
made by the complainant for the defendant to vacate the premises but the latter
adamantly refused and did not vacate the area xxx.
9. The
defendant has caused actual damages in the amount of xxx in the form of back rentals and an
estimated amount of xxx brought about by the defendant for all his unlawful
acts towards the land and the owner of the land.
10. To recover
the possession of the land and to protect and vindicate its rights, the
complainant was compelled to engage the servces of a legal counsel x x x
P R A Y E R
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Board,
that a decision be rendered:
Ejecting the defendant from the
subject landholding and/or causing him to cede possession of the land to
complainant. [Emphasis ours]
x x x x
Verily, all that DEARBC prayed for was the ejectment of the respondents
from the respective portions of the subject lands they allegedly entered and
occupied illegally. DEARBC avers that, as the owner of the subject landholding,
it was in prior physical possession of the property but was deprived of it by respondents’
intrusion.
Clearly, no “agrarian dispute” exists between the
parties. The
absence of tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or
otherwise,
cannot be overlooked. In this case, no
juridical tie of landownership and tenancy was alleged between DEARBC and
Sangunay or Labunos, which would so categorize the controversy as an agrarian
dispute. In fact, the respondents were
contending for the ownership of the same parcels of land.[27]
This set of facts clearly comprises an action for recovery of
possession. The claim of being
farmer-beneficiaries with right of retention will not divest the regular courts
of jurisdiction, since the pleas of the defendant in a case are immaterial.
The ruling in DAR v. Hon. Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Yupangco
Cotton Mills, Inc.[28] is inapplicable to the present case. The complaint in Abdulwahid “impugn(ed)
the CARP coverage of the landholding involved and its redistribution to farmer
beneficiaries, and (sought) to effect a reversion thereof to the original
owner, Yupangco” and essentially prayed for the annulment of the coverage of
the disputed property within the CARP. The dispute was on the “terms and
conditions of transfer of ownership from landlord to agrarian reform
beneficiaries over which DARAB has primary and exclusive original jurisdiction,
pursuant to Section 1(f), Rule II, DARAB New Rules of Procedure.”[29]
Although the complaint filed by DEARBC was similarly
denominated as one for recovery of possession, it utterly lacks allegations to
persuade the Court into ruling that the issue encompasses an agrarian dispute.
DEARBC’s argument that
this case partakes of either a boundary dispute, correction of a CLOA, and
ouster of an interloper or intruder, as
found under Section 1, Rule 11 of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure,[30]
is unavailing. Nowhere in the complaint
was the correction or cancellation of the CLOA prayed for, much less
mentioned. DEARBC merely asserted its
sole ownership of the awarded land and no boundary dispute was even hinted at.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
ROBERTO
A. ABAD
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second
Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section
13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1] This is a petition filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2] Dated
[3] Rollo, pp. 58-67.
[4]
[5]
[6] Docketed as DARAB Case Nos. 8162 and 8163, id. at 58-67.
[7] Rollo, p. 72.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] R.A. 6657 Section 3 (d) – “any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms and conditions of such tenurial arrangements. On the other hand, regular cases involving issues of ownership over a landholding is a regular case and is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
[13] Rollo, pp. 31-33.
[14]
[15] Asta Moskowsky v. Court of Appeals, Antonio C. Doria, Edgardo L. Alcaraz
and Evangeline E. Doria, 366 Phil. 189 (1999), citing Nerves
v. Civil Service Commission, 342
Phil. 578 (1997).
[16] Cusi- Hernandez v. Spouses Diaz, 390 Phil. 1245, 1252 (2000).
[17] Section 1. Primary and Exclusive jurisdiction. The Adjudicator shall have primary and exclusive original jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate the following cases:
xxx
1.6 Those involving the correction, partition, cancellation, secondary and subsequent issuances of Certificates of Landownership Awards; xxx
1.10 Those cases involving boundary disputes xxx
1.11 Those cases involving the determination of title to agricultural lands where the issue raised in an agrarian dispute by any of the parties or a third person in connection with the possession thereof for the purpose of preserving the tenure of the agricultural lessee xxx or effecting the ouster of the interloper or intruder in one and the same proceeding.
[18] Section 3 DARAB cases xxx include:
xxx
3.1 The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical, engaged in the management, cultivation, and use of all agricultural lands covered by RA 6657 and other related agrarian laws.
[19] Rollo, pp. 82-88.
[20] Department of Agrarian
Reform, rep. by Regional Director Naser M. Musali v. Hon. Hakim S. Abdulwahid,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
[21] Heirs of Julian dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz, 512 Phil. 389 (2005).
[22]
[23] Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the
DAR – The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform,
except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
x x x.
[24]
Cipriano Centeno, Leonila C. Calonzo, and
Ramona Adriano, v. Ignacia Centeno, 397
Phil. 170(2000).
[25] Supra note 20.
[26] R.A. No. 6657, Sec. 3(d).
[27] Rodrigo Almuete and Ana Amuete v. Marcelo Andres and the Court of
Appeals, 421 Phil. 522
(2001), citing Chico v. Court of
Appeals, 348 Phil. 37 (1998) and Heirs
of the Late Herman Rey Santos v. Court of Appeals, 384 Phil. 27 (2000).
[28] Supra note 20.
[29]
[30] 1.6 Those involving the correction, partition, cancellation, secondary and subsequent issuances of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs) which are registered with the Land Registration Authority;
x
x x
1.10
Those cases involving boundary disputes over lands under the administration and
disposition of the DAR and the LBP, which are transferred, distributed, and/or
sold to tenant-beneficiaries and are covered by deeds of sale, patents, and
certificates of title;
x
x x
1.11
Those cases involving the determination of title to agricultural lands where
this issue is raised in an agrarian dispute by any of the parties or a third
person in connection with the possession thereof for the purpose of preserving
the tenure of the agricultural lessee or actual tenant-farmer or
farmer-beneficiaries and effecting the ouster of the interloper or intruder in
one and the same proceeding;
x x x