SECOND DIVISION
|
LOADMASTERS CUSTOMS
SERVICES, INC., Petitioner, - versus - glodel brokerage
corporation and r&B INSURANCE
CORPORATION, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 179446 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: January 10, 2011 |
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D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This
is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court assailing the August 24, 2007 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 82822, entitled “R&B
Insurance Corporation v. Glodel Brokerage Corporation and Loadmasters Customs
Services, Inc.,” which held petitioner Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. (Loadmasters)
liable to respondent Glodel Brokerage Corporation (Glodel) in the amount
of P1,896,789.62 representing the insurance indemnity which R&B
Insurance Corporation (R&B Insurance) paid to the insured-consignee,
Columbia Wire and Cable Corporation (Columbia).
THE FACTS:
On
The goods were loaded on board twelve
(12) trucks owned by Loadmasters, driven by its employed drivers and
accompanied by its employed truck helpers.
Six (6) truckloads of copper cathodes were to be delivered to Balagtas,
Bulacan, while the other six (6) truckloads were destined for Lawang Bato,
Later
on, the said truck, an Isuzu with Plate No. NSD-117, was recovered but without
the copper cathodes. Because of this incident,
P1,903,335.39. After the requisite investigation and
adjustment, R&B Insurance paid P1,896,789.62 as insurance indemnity.
R&B Insurance, thereafter, filed
a complaint for damages against both Loadmasters and Glodel before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 14, Manila (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No.
02-103040. It sought reimbursement of
the amount it had paid to
On
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, the
plaintiff having established by preponderance of evidence its claims against
defendant Glodel Brokerage Corporation, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
the latter:
1. To pay plaintiff R&B Insurance
Corporation the sum of P1,896,789.62 as actual and compensatory damages,
with interest from the date of complaint until fully paid;
2. To pay plaintiff R&B Insurance
Corporation the amount equivalent to 10% of the principal amount recovered as
and for attorney’s fees plus P1,500.00 per appearance in Court;
3. To pay plaintiff R&B Insurance
Corporation the sum of P22,427.18 as litigation expenses.
WHEREAS, the defendant Loadmasters
Customs Services, Inc.’s counterclaim for damages and attorney’s fees against
plaintiff are hereby dismissed.
With costs
against defendant Glodel Brokerage Corporation.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Both R&B Insurance and Glodel
appealed the RTC decision to the CA.
On
Considering that appellee is an agent of
appellant Glodel, whatever liability the latter owes to appellant R&B
Insurance Corporation as insurance indemnity must likewise be the amount it
shall be paid by appellee Loadmasters.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the
appeal is PARTLY GRANTED in that the appellee Loadmasters is likewise held liable
to appellant Glodel in the amount of P1,896,789.62 representing the
insurance indemnity appellant Glodel has been held liable to appellant R&B
Insurance Corporation.
Appellant Glodel’s appeal to absolve it
from any liability is herein DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Hence, Loadmasters filed the present
petition for review on certiorari before this Court presenting the following
ISSUES
1. Can
Petitioner Loadmasters be held liable to Respondent Glodel in spite of the fact that the
latter respondent Glodel did not file a cross-claim against it (Loadmasters)?
2. Under the
set of facts established and undisputed in the case, can petitioner Loadmasters
be legally considered as an Agent of respondent Glodel?[6]
To totally exculpate itself from
responsibility for the lost goods, Loadmasters argues that it cannot be
considered an agent of Glodel because it never represented the latter in its
dealings with the consignee. At any rate, it further contends that Glodel has
no recourse against it for its (Glodel’s) failure to file a cross-claim
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Glodel,
in its Comment,[7] counters
that Loadmasters is liable to it under its cross-claim because the latter was
grossly negligent in the transportation of the subject cargo. With respect to Loadmasters’ claim that it is
already estopped from filing a cross-claim, Glodel insists that it can still do
so even for the first time on appeal because there is no rule that provides
otherwise. Finally, Glodel argues that
its relationship with Loadmasters is that of Charter wherein the transporter
(Loadmasters) is only hired for the specific job of delivering the
merchandise. Thus, the diligence
required in this case is merely ordinary diligence or that of a good father of
the family, not the extraordinary diligence required of common carriers.
R&B
Insurance, for its part, claims that Glodel is deemed to have interposed a
cross-claim against Loadmasters because it was not prevented from presenting
evidence to prove its position even without amending its Answer. As to the relationship between Loadmasters and
Glodel, it contends that a contract of agency existed between the two
corporations.[8]
Subrogation
is the substitution of one person in the place of another with reference to a
lawful claim or right, so that he who is substituted succeeds to the rights of
the other in relation to a debt or claim, including its remedies or securities.[9]
Doubtless, R&B
Insurance is subrogated to the rights of the insured to the extent of the
amount it paid the consignee under the marine insurance, as provided under
Article 2207 of the Civil Code, which reads:
ART. 2207. If the plaintiff’s property has been insured,
and he has received indemnity from the insurance company for the injury or loss
arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, the insurance
company shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrong-doer
or the person who has violated the contract.
If the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the
injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency
from the person causing the loss or injury.
As
subrogee of the rights and interest of the consignee, R&B Insurance has the
right to seek reimbursement from either Loadmasters or Glodel or both for
breach of contract and/or tort.
The issue now is who, between Glodel
and Loadmasters, is liable to pay R&B Insurance for the amount of the
indemnity it paid Columbia.
At
the outset, it is well to resolve the issue of whether Loadmasters and Glodel
are common carriers to determine their liability for the loss of the subject
cargo. Under Article 1732 of the Civil
Code, common carriers are
persons, corporations, firms, or associations engaged in the business of
carrying or transporting passenger or goods, or both by land, water or air for
compensation, offering their services to the public.
Based on the aforecited definition,
Loadmasters is a common carrier because it is engaged in the business of transporting
goods by land, through its trucking service. It is a common
carrier as distinguished from a private
carrier wherein the
carriage is generally undertaken by special agreement and it does not hold itself
out to carry goods for the general public.[10] The distinction is significant in the sense
that “the rights and obligations of the parties to a contract of private
carriage are governed principally by their stipulations, not by the law on
common carriers.”[11]
In the present case, there is no
indication that the undertaking in the contract between Loadmasters and Glodel was
private in character. There is no showing
that Loadmasters solely and exclusively rendered services to Glodel.
In fact, Loadmasters admitted
that it is a common carrier.[12]
In the same vein, Glodel is also considered
a common carrier within the context of Article 1732. In its Memorandum,[13]
it states that it “is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws
of the Republic of the
Loadmasters and Glodel, being both common
carriers, are mandated from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, to observe the extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods transported by them according to all the circumstances of such case, as
required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code.
When the Court speaks of extraordinary diligence, it is that extreme measure of care and
caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection observe for
securing and preserving their own property or rights.[15] This exacting standard imposed on common
carriers in a contract of carriage of goods is intended to tilt the scales in
favor of the shipper who is at the mercy of the common carrier once the goods
have been lodged for shipment.[16]
Thus, in case of loss of the goods, the common carrier is presumed to have been
at fault or to have acted negligently.[17] This presumption of fault or negligence,
however, may be rebutted by proof that the common carrier has observed
extraordinary diligence over the goods.
With respect to the time frame of
this extraordinary responsibility, the Civil Code provides that the exercise of
extraordinary diligence lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally
placed in the possession of, and received by, the carrier for transportation
until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the
consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them.[18]
Premises considered, the Court is of
the view that both Loadmasters and Glodel are jointly and severally liable to R
& B Insurance for the loss of the subject cargo. Under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code, “the
responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is
solidary.”
Loadmasters’ claim that it was never privy to
the contract entered into by Glodel with the consignee
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there
is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Pertinent is the ruling enunciated in
the case of Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Service, Inc. v. Phoenix
Assurance Company of New York,/McGee & Co., Inc.[19]
where this Court held that a tort may arise despite the absence of a
contractual relationship, to wit:
We
agree with the Court of Appeals that the complaint filed by
In connection therewith, Article 2180
provides:
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
x x x x
Employers
shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
It is not disputed that the subject
cargo was lost while in the custody of Loadmasters whose employees (truck
driver and helper) were instrumental in the hijacking or robbery of the
shipment. As employer, Loadmasters
should be made answerable for the damages caused by its employees who acted
within the scope of their assigned task of delivering the goods safely to the
warehouse.
Whenever
an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly
arises a presumption juris tantum
that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi
patris families in the selection (culpa
in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa
in vigilando) of its employees.[20] To avoid liability for a quasi-delict
committed by its employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by
presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.[21] In this regard, Loadmasters failed.
Glodel is also liable because of its
failure to exercise extraordinary diligence.
It failed to ensure that Loadmasters would fully comply with the
undertaking to safely transport the subject cargo to the designated
destination. It should have been more prudent
in entrusting the goods to Loadmasters by taking precautionary measures, such
as providing escorts to accompany the trucks in delivering the cargoes. Glodel should, therefore, be held liable with
Loadmasters. Its defense of force
majeure is unavailing.
At this juncture, the Court clarifies that there
exists no principal-agent relationship between Glodel and Loadmasters, as
erroneously found by the CA. Article
1868 of the Civil Code provides: “By the contract of agency a person binds
himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on
behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter.” The
elements of a contract of agency are: (1) consent, express or implied, of the
parties to establish the relationship; (2) the object is the execution of a
juridical act in relation to a third person; (3) the agent acts as a
representative and not for himself; (4) the agent acts within the scope of his
authority.[22]
Accordingly, there can be no contract
of agency between the parties.
Loadmasters never represented Glodel. Neither was it ever authorized to make such
representation. It is a settled rule
that the basis for agency is representation, that is, the agent acts for and on
behalf of the principal on matters within the scope of his authority and said
acts have the same legal effect as if they were personally executed by the
principal. On the part of the principal,
there must be an actual intention to appoint or an intention naturally
inferable from his words or actions, while on the part of the agent, there must
be an intention to accept the appointment and act on it.[23] Such mutual intent is not obtaining in this
case.
What then is the extent of the
respective liabilities of Loadmasters and Glodel? Each wrongdoer is liable for the total damage
suffered by R&B Insurance. Where there are several causes for the resulting
damages, a party is not relieved from liability, even partially. It is sufficient that the negligence of a
party is an efficient cause without which the damage would not have resulted. It is no defense to one of the concurrent
tortfeasors that the damage would not have resulted from his negligence alone,
without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor. As stated in the case of Far Eastern
Shipping v. Court of Appeals,[24]
X
x x. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an
efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury
may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against
any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the
case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed
by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor's negligence ceases to
be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other
actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as
though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.
There
is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since
both of them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or
successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting
independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single
injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each
contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the
whole injury. Where their
concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they
become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage
under Article 2194 of the Civil Code. [Emphasis supplied]
The Court now resolves the issue of whether Glodel can
collect from Loadmasters, it having failed to file a cross-claim against the
latter.
Undoubtedly, Glodel has a definite
cause of action against Loadmasters for breach of contract of service as the
latter is primarily liable for the loss of the subject cargo. In this case, however, it cannot succeed in
seeking judicial sanction against Loadmasters because the records disclose that
it did not properly interpose a cross-claim against the latter. Glodel
did not even pray that Loadmasters be liable for any and all claims that it may
be adjudged liable in favor of R&B Insurance. Under the Rules, a compulsory counterclaim, or
a cross-claim, not set up shall be barred.[25] Thus, a cross-claim cannot be set up for the
first time on appeal.
For the
consequence, Glodel has no one to blame but itself. The Court cannot come to its aid on equitable
grounds. “Equity, which has been aptly described as ‘a
justice outside legality,’ is applied only in the absence of, and never
against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure.”[26] The Court cannot be a lawyer and take the
cudgels for a party who has been at fault or negligent.
WHEREFORE, the petition
is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
WHEREFORE,
judgment is rendered declaring petitioner Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc.
and respondent Glodel Brokerage Corporation jointly and severally liable to respondent
R&B Insurance Corporation for the insurance indemnity it paid to consignee
Columbia Wire & Cable Corporation and ordering both parties to pay, jointly
and severally, R&B Insurance Corporation a] the amount of P1,896,789.62
representing the insurance indemnity; b] the amount equivalent to ten (10%)
percent thereof for attorney’s fees; and c] the amount of P22,427.18 for
litigation expenses.
The
cross-claim belatedly prayed for by respondent Glodel Brokerage Corporation
against petitioner Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 33-48. Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga, with Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas and Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia, concurring.
[2] Petition for review on certiorari, p. 4; id. at 26.
[3]
[4]
[5] Annex A, Petition, id. at 47.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v.
Chubb and Sons, Inc.,
G.R. No. 147724, June 8, 2004, 431 SCRA 266, 275, citing Black’s Law Dictionary
(6th ed. 1990).
[10] National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 345, 361 (1997).
[11] Lea Mer Industries, Inc. v. Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., 508 Phil. 656, 663 (2005), citing National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 345, 362 (1997).
[12]
Pre-Trial Order dated
[13]
Dated
[14] 496 Phil. 437, 450 (2005), citing Calvo v. UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc., 429 Phil. 244 (2002).
[15] National Trucking and Forwarding Corporation v. Lorenzo Shipping Corporation, 491 Phil. 151, 156 (2005), citing Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) 411.
[16]
[17] Civil Code, Art. 1735.
[18] Civil Code, Art. 1736.
[19] G.R. No. 162467, May 8, 2009, 587
SCRA 429, 434, citing Air France v. Carrascoso, 124 Phil.722, 739
(1966); Singson v. Bank of the
Philippine
[20] Tan v. Jam Transit, Inc., G.R. No. 183198, November 25,
2009, 605 SCRA 659, 675, citing Delsan
Transport Lines, Inc. v. C &
A Construction, Inc., 459 Phil. 156
(2003).
[21]
[22] Eurotech Industrial Technologies, Inc. v. Cuizon, G.R. No. 167552, April 23, 2007, 521 SCRA 584, 593, citing Yu Eng Cho v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 385 Phil. 453, 465 (2000).
[23] Yun
Kwan Byung v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, G.R. No.
163553,
[24] 357 Phil 703, 751-752 (1998).
[25] Section 2, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[26] Causapin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107432, July 4, 1994, 233 SCRA 615, 625.