Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
PRIMO E.
CAONG, JR., ALEXANDER J. TRESQUIO, and LORIANO D. DALUYON, Petitioners, - versus - AVELINO REGUALOS, Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 179428
Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: January
26, 2011 |
|
|
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DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Is the policy of suspending drivers pending
payment of arrears in their boundary obligations reasonable? The Court of Appeals
(CA) answered the question in the affirmative in its Decision[1]
dated December 14, 2006 and Resolution dated July 16, 2007. In this petition
for review on certiorari, we take a
second look at the issue and determine whether the situation at bar merits the
relaxation of the application of the said policy.
Petitioners Primo E. Caong, Jr.
(Caong), Alexander J. Tresquio (Tresquio), and Loriano D. Daluyon (Daluyon) were
employed by respondent Avelino Regualos under a boundary agreement, as drivers
of his jeepneys. In November 2001,
they filed separate complaints[2]
for illegal dismissal against respondent who barred them from driving the
vehicles due to deficiencies in their boundary payments.
Caong was hired by respondent in
September 1998 and became a permanent driver sometime in 2000. In July 2001, he
was assigned a brand- new jeepney for
a boundary fee of P550.00 per day. He was suspended on October 9-15,
2001 for failure to remit the full amount of the boundary. Consequently, he filed
a complaint for illegal suspension. Upon expiration of the suspension period,
he was readmitted by respondent, but he was reassigned to an older jeepney for a boundary fee of P500.00
per day. He claimed that, on November 9, 2001, due to the scarcity of passengers,
he was only able to remit P400.00 to respondent. On November 11, 2001,
he returned to work after his rest day, but respondent barred him from driving
because of the deficiency in the boundary payment. He pleaded with respondent
but to no avail.[3]
Tresquio was employed by respondent
as driver in August 1996. He became a permanent driver in 1997. In 1998, he was
assigned to drive a new jeepney for a
boundary fee of P500.00 per day. On November 6, 2001, due to the
scarcity of passengers, he was only able to remit P450.00. When he returned
to work on November 8, 2001 after his rest day, he was barred by respondent
because of the deficiency of P50.00. He pleaded with respondent but the
latter was adamant.[4]
On the other hand, Daluyon started
working for respondent in March 1998. He became a permanent driver in July
1998. He was assigned to a relatively new jeepney
for a boundary fee of P500.00 per day. On November 7, 2001, due to the
scarcity of passengers, he was only able to pay P470.00 to respondent.
The following day, respondent barred him from driving his jeepney. He pleaded but to no avail.[5]
During the mandatory conference,
respondent manifested that petitioners were not dismissed and that they could
drive his jeepneys once they paid
their arrears. Petitioners, however, refused to do so.
Petitioners averred that they were
illegally dismissed by respondent without just cause. They maintained that respondent
did not comply with due process requirements before terminating their
employment, as they were not furnished notice apprising them of their
infractions and another informing them of their dismissal. Petitioners claimed
that respondent’s offer during the mandatory conference to reinstate them was
an insincere afterthought as shown by the warning given by respondent that, if
they fail to remit the full amount of the boundary yet again, they will be
barred from driving the jeepneys.
Petitioners questioned respondent’s policy of automatically dismissing the drivers
who fail to remit the full amount of the boundary as it allegedly (a) violates
their right to due process; (b) does not constitute a just cause for dismissal;
(c) disregards the reality that there are days when they could not raise the full
amount of the boundary because of the scarcity of passengers.
In his Position Paper, respondent
alleged that petitioners were lessees of his vehicles and not his employees;
hence, the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction. He claimed that he noticed that
some of his lessees, including petitioners, were not fully paying the daily
rental of his jeepneys. In a list
which he attached to the Position Paper, it was shown that petitioners had
actually incurred arrears since they started working. The list showed that
Caong’s total arrears amounted to P10,315.00, that of Tresquio was P10,760.00, while that of Daluyon was P6,890.00.
He made inquiries and discovered that his lessees contracted loans with third
parties and used the income of the jeepneys
in paying the loans. Thus, on November 4, 2001, he gathered all the lessees in
a meeting and informed them that, effective November 5, 2001, those who would fail
to fully pay the daily rental would not be allowed to rent a jeepney on the following day. He
explained to them that the jeepneys were
acquired on installment basis, and that he was paying the monthly amortizations
through the lease income. Most of the lessees allegedly accepted the condition
and paid their arrears. Petitioners, however, did not settle their arrears.
Worse, their remittances were again short of the required boundary fee. Petitioner
Daluyon’s rent payment was short of P20.00 on November 5, 2001 and P80.00
on November 7, 2001. On November 6, 2001, it was Tresquio who incurred an
arrear of P100.00. On November 7 and 9, 2001, petitioner Caong was in arrear
of P50.00 and P100.00, respectively. Respondent stressed that,
during the mandatory conference, he manifested that he would renew his lease
with petitioners if they would pay the arrears they incurred during the said
dates.[6]
On
March 31, 2003, the Labor Arbiter decided the case in favor of respondent,
thus:
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered, DISMISSING the above-entitled cases for lack of
merit. However, respondent Regualos is directed to accept back complainants
Caong, Tresquio and Daluyon, as regular drivers of his passenger jeepneys,
after complainants have paid their respective arrearages they have incurred in
the remittance of their respective boundary payments, in the amount of P150.00,
P100.00 and P100.00. Complainants, if still interested to work as
drivers, are hereby ordered to report to respondent Regualos within fifteen (15)
days from the finality of this decision. Otherwise, failure to do so means
forfeiture of their respective employments.
Other claims of complainants are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[7]
According
to the Labor Arbiter, an employer-employee relationship existed between respondent
and petitioners. The latter were not dismissed considering that they could go
back to work once they have paid their arrears. The Labor Arbiter opined that, as
a disciplinary measure, it is proper to impose a reasonable sanction on drivers
who cannot pay their boundary payments.
He emphasized that respondent acquired the jeepneys on loan or
installment basis and relied on the boundary payments to comply with his
monthly amortizations.[8]
Petitioners appealed the decision to
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). In its resolution[9]
dated March 31, 2004, the NLRC agreed with the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the
appeal. It also denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.[10]
Forthwith,
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA.
In its Decision[11]
dated December 14, 2006, the CA found no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the NLRC. According to the CA, the employer-employee relationship of the
parties has not been severed, but merely suspended when respondent refused to
allow petitioners to drive the jeepneys
while there were unpaid boundary obligations. The CA pointed out that the fact
that it was within the power of petitioners to return to work is proof that
there was no termination of employment. The condition that petitioners should first pay
their arrears only for the period of November 5-9, 2001 before they can be
readmitted to work is neither impossible nor unreasonable if their total unpaid
boundary obligations and the need to sustain the financial viability of the
employer’s enterprise—which would ultimately redound to the benefit of the
employees—are taken into consideration.[12]
The
CA went on to rule that petitioners were not denied their right to due process.
It pointed out that the case does not involve a termination of employment;
hence, the strict application of the twin-notice rule is not warranted. According
to the CA, what is important is that petitioners were given the opportunity to
be heard. The meeting conducted by respondent on November 4, 2001 served as
sufficient notice to petitioners. During the said meeting, respondent informed
his employees, including petitioners, to strictly comply with the policy
regarding remittances and warned them that they would not be allowed to take
out the jeepneys if they did not
remit the full amount of the boundary.[13]
Dissatisfied,
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in
its Resolution dated July 16, 2007.[14]
Petitioners are now before this Court
resolutely arguing that they were illegally dismissed by respondent, and that
such dismissal was made in violation of the due process requirements of the
law.
The petition is without
merit.
In an action for certiorari,
petitioner must prove not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
respondent. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be shown that public respondent
exercised its power in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and this must be so
patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law.[15]
As correctly held by the
CA, petitioners failed to establish that the NLRC committed grave abuse
of discretion in affirming the Labor Arbiter’s ruling, which is supported by
the facts on record.
It is already settled that the
relationship between jeepney
owners/operators and jeepney drivers
under the boundary system is that of employer-employee and
not of lessor-lessee. The fact that the drivers do not receive fixed wages but
only get the amount in excess of the so-called “boundary”
that they pay to the owner/operator is not sufficient to negate the
relationship between them as employer and employee.[16]
The Labor Arbiter, the NLRC,
and the CA uniformly declared that petitioners were not dismissed from
employment but merely suspended pending payment of their arrears. Findings of
fact of the CA, particularly where they are in absolute agreement with those of
the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter, are accorded not only respect but even finality,
and are deemed binding upon this Court so long as they are supported by
substantial evidence.[17]
We have no reason to
deviate from such findings. Indeed, petitioners’ suspension cannot be
categorized as dismissal, considering that there was no intent on the part of
respondent to sever the employer-employee relationship between him and
petitioners. In fact, it was made clear that petitioners could put an end to
the suspension if they only pay their recent arrears. As it was, the suspension
dragged on for years because of petitioners’ stubborn refusal to pay. It would
have been different if petitioners complied with the condition and respondent
still refused to readmit them to work. Then there would have been a clear act
of dismissal. But such was not the case. Instead of paying, petitioners even filed
a complaint for illegal dismissal against respondent.
Respondent’s policy of
suspending drivers who fail to remit the full amount of the boundary was fair
and reasonable under the circumstances. Respondent explained that he noticed
that his drivers were getting lax in remitting their boundary payments and, in
fact, herein petitioners had already incurred a considerable amount of arrears.
He had to put a stop to it as he also relied on these boundary payments to
raise the full amount of his monthly amortizations on the jeepneys. Demonstrating their obstinacy, petitioners, on the days
immediately following the implementation of the policy, incurred deficiencies
in their boundary remittances.
It is
acknowledged that an employer has free rein and enjoys a wide latitude of
discretion to regulate all aspects of employment, including the prerogative to
instill discipline on his employees and to
impose penalties, including dismissal, if warranted, upon erring employees. This is a management prerogative. Indeed, the manner in which management conducts its own affairs to achieve its
purpose is within the management’s discretion.
The only limitation on the exercise of management prerogative is that the policies, rules, and regulations
on work-related activities of the employees must always be
fair and reasonable, and the corresponding penalties, when prescribed,
commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree of the infraction.[18]
Petitioners argue that
the policy is unsound as it does not consider the times when passengers are
scarce and the drivers are not able to raise the amount of the boundary.
Petitioners’ concern
relates to the implementation of the policy, which is another matter. A company
policy must be implemented in such manner as will accord social justice and
compassion to the employee. In case of noncompliance with the company policy,
the employer must consider the surrounding circumstances and the reasons why
the employee failed to comply. When the circumstances merit the relaxation of
the application of the policy, then its noncompliance must be excused.
In the present case,
petitioners merely alleged that there were only few passengers during the dates in question. Such
excuse is not acceptable without any proof or, at least, an explanation as to
why passengers were scarce at that time. It is simply a bare allegation, not
worthy of belief. We also find the excuse unbelievable considering that petitioners
incurred the shortages on separate days, and it appears that only petitioners
failed to remit the full boundary payment on said dates.
Under a boundary scheme, the
driver remits the “boundary,” which is a fixed amount, to the owner/operator and
gets to earn the amount in excess thereof. Thus, on a day when there are many
passengers along the route, it is the driver who actually benefits from it. It
would be unfair then if, during the times when passengers are scarce, the
owner/operator will be made to suffer by not getting the full amount of the
boundary. Unless clearly shown or explained by an event that irregularly and
negatively affected the usual number of passengers within the route, the scarcity
of passengers should not excuse the driver from paying the full amount of the
boundary.
Finally, we sustain the
CA’s finding that petitioners were not denied the right to due process. We thus
quote with approval its discussion on this matter:
Having established that the case
at bench does not involve termination of employment, We find that the strict,
even rigid, application of the twin-notice rule is not warranted.
But the due process safeguards
are nonetheless still available to petitioners.
Due process is not a matter of
strict or rigid or formulaic process. The essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at
all times and in all instances essential, as the due process requirements are
satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy at hand. x x x.
x x x x
In the case at bench, private
respondent, upon finding that petitioners had consistently failed to remit the
full amount of the boundary, conducted a meeting on November 4, 2001 informing
them to strictly comply with the policy regarding their remittances and warned
them to discontinue driving if they still failed to remit the full amount of
the boundary.[19]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated December 14, 2006 and Resolution
dated July 16, 2007 are AFFIRMED.
SO
ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A
T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Romulo V. Borja, with Associate Justices Sixto C. Marella, Jr. and Mario V. Lopez, concurring; rollo, pp. 38-54.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] Solvic Industrial Corporation v. NLRC, 357 Phil. 430, 438 (1998).
[16]
[17] San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 146121-22, April 16, 2008, 551 SCRA 410, 422.
[18] St. Michael’s Institute v. Santos, 422 Phil. 723, 732-733 (2001).
[19] Rollo, pp. 50-51.