Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND DIVISION
THE HERITAGE
HOTEL MANILA, acting through its owner, GRAND PLAZA HOTEL CORPORATION, Petitioner, - versus - NATIONAL Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 178296
Present: CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: January
12, 2011 |
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for
review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 30, 2005 and Resolution dated June 4, 2007.
The assailed Decision affirmed the dismissal of a petition for cancellation of
union registration filed by petitioner, Grand Plaza Hotel Corporation, owner of
Heritage Hotel Manila, against respondent, National Union of Workers in the Hotel, Restaurant and Allied
Industries-Heritage Hotel Manila Supervisors Chapter (NUWHRAIN-HHMSC), a labor organization of the supervisory
employees of Heritage Hotel Manila.
The
case stemmed from the following antecedents:
On October 11, 1995, respondent filed with the Department of Labor and Employment-National Capital Region
(DOLE-NCR) a petition for certification election.[2] The Med-Arbiter granted the petition on
February 14, 1996 and ordered the holding of a certification election.[3] On
appeal, the DOLE Secretary, in a Resolution dated August 15, 1996, affirmed the
Med-Arbiter’s order and remanded the case to the Med-Arbiter for the holding of
a preelection conference on February 26, 1997. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but it was denied on September 23, 1996.
The
preelection conference was not held as initially scheduled; it was held a year
later, or on February 20, 1998. Petitioner moved to archive or to dismiss the
petition due to alleged repeated non-appearance of respondent. The latter
agreed to suspend proceedings until further notice. The preelection conference
resumed on January 29, 2000.
Subsequently,
petitioner discovered that respondent had failed to submit to the Bureau of
Labor Relations (BLR) its annual financial report for several years and the list
of its members since it filed its registration papers in 1995. Consequently, on
May 19, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration of
respondent, on the ground of the non-submission of the said documents. Petitioner
prayed that respondent’s Certificate of Creation of Local/Chapter be cancelled
and its name be deleted from the list of legitimate labor organizations. It
further requested the suspension of the certification election proceedings.[4]
On
June 1, 2000, petitioner reiterated its request by filing a Motion to Dismiss
or Suspend the [Certification Election] Proceedings,[5] arguing
that the dismissal or suspension of the proceedings is warranted, considering
that the legitimacy of respondent is seriously being challenged in the petition
for cancellation of registration. Petitioner maintained that the resolution of
the issue of whether respondent is a legitimate labor organization is crucial
to the issue of whether it may exercise rights of a legitimate labor
organization, which include the right to be certified as the bargaining agent of
the covered employees.
Nevertheless,
the certification election pushed through on June 23, 2000. Respondent emerged
as the winner.[6]
On June 28, 2000, petitioner filed a
Protest with Motion to Defer Certification of Election Results and Winner,[7]
stating that the certification election held on June 23, 2000 was an exercise
in futility because, once respondent’s registration is cancelled, it would no
longer be entitled to be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of the
supervisory employees. Petitioner also claimed that some of respondent’s
members were not qualified to join the union because they were either confidential
employees or managerial employees. It then prayed that the certification of the
election results and winner be deferred until the petition for cancellation shall
have been resolved, and that respondent’s members who held confidential or
managerial positions be excluded from the supervisors’ bargaining unit.
Meanwhile,
respondent filed its Answer[8] to
the petition for the cancellation of its registration. It averred that the
petition was filed primarily to delay the conduct of the certification election,
the respondent’s certification as the exclusive bargaining representative of
the supervisory employees, and the commencement of bargaining negotiations.
Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the petition for the following reasons:
(a) petitioner is estopped from questioning respondent’s status as a legitimate
labor organization as it had already recognized respondent as such during the
preelection conferences; (b) petitioner is not the party-in-interest, as the
union members are the ones who would be disadvantaged by the non-submission of
financial reports; (c) it has already complied with the reportorial
requirements, having submitted its financial statements for 1996, 1997, 1998,
and 1999, its updated list of officers, and its list of members for the years
1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999; (d) the petition is already moot and academic,
considering that the certification election had already been held, and the
members had manifested their will to be represented by respondent.
Citing
National Union of Bank Employees v.
Minister of Labor, et al.[9]
and Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Pacific
Plastic v. Hon. Laguesma,[10]
the Med-Arbiter held that the pendency of a petition for cancellation of
registration is not a bar to the holding of a certification election. Thus, in
an Order[11] dated
January 26, 2001, the Med-Arbiter dismissed petitioner’s protest, and certified
respondent as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all supervisory
employees.
Petitioner
subsequently appealed the said Order to the DOLE Secretary.[12]
The appeal was later dismissed by DOLE Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas (DOLE
Secretary Sto. Tomas) in the Resolution of August 21, 2002.[13]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the motion was also denied.[14]
In
the meantime, Regional Director Alex E. Maraan (Regional Director Maraan) of
DOLE-NCR finally resolved the petition for cancellation of registration. While
finding that respondent had indeed failed to file financial reports and the
list of its members for several years, he, nonetheless, denied the petition,
ratiocinating that freedom of association and the employees’ right to
self-organization are more substantive considerations. He took into account the
fact that respondent won the certification election and that it had already been
certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of the supervisory employees. In
view of the foregoing, Regional Director Maraan—while emphasizing that the
non-compliance with the law is not viewed with favor—considered the belated
submission of the annual financial reports and the list of members as
sufficient compliance thereof and considered them as having been submitted on
time. The dispositive portion of the decision[15]
dated December 29, 2001 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition to
delist the National Union of Workers in the Hotel, Restaurant and Allied
Industries-Heritage Hotel Manila Supervisors Chapter from the roll of
legitimate labor organizations is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[16]
Aggrieved,
petitioner appealed the decision to the BLR.[17] BLR
Director Hans Leo Cacdac inhibited himself from the case because he had been a
former counsel of respondent.
In
view of Director Cacdac’s inhibition, DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas took cognizance
of the appeal. In a resolution[18]
dated February 21, 2003, she dismissed the appeal, holding that the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association and right of workers to
self-organization outweighed respondent’s noncompliance with the statutory
requirements to maintain its status as a legitimate labor organization.
Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration,[19] but the
motion was likewise denied in a resolution[20]
dated May 30, 2003. DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas admitted that it was the BLR
which had jurisdiction over the appeal, but she pointed out that the BLR Director
had voluntarily inhibited himself from the case because he used to appear as
counsel for respondent. In order to maintain the integrity of the decision and of
the BLR, she therefore accepted the motion to inhibit and took cognizance of
the appeal.
Petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari with
the CA, raising the issue of whether the DOLE Secretary acted with grave abuse of
discretion in taking cognizance of the appeal and affirming the dismissal of its
petition for cancellation of respondent’s registration.
In
a Decision dated May 30, 2005, the CA denied the petition. The CA opined that
the DOLE Secretary may legally assume jurisdiction over an appeal from the
decision of the Regional Director in the event that the Director of the BLR
inhibits himself from the case. According to the CA, in the absence of the BLR
Director, there is no person more competent to resolve the appeal than the DOLE
Secretary. The CA brushed aside the allegation of bias and partiality on the
part of the DOLE Secretary, considering that such allegation was not supported
by any evidence.
The
CA also found that the DOLE Secretary did not commit grave abuse of discretion
when she affirmed the dismissal of the petition for cancellation of
respondent’s registration as a labor organization. Echoing the DOLE Secretary,
the CA held that the requirements of registration of labor organizations are an
exercise of the overriding police power of the State, designed for the
protection of workers against potential abuse by the union that recruits them.
These requirements, the CA opined, should not be exploited to work against the
workers’ constitutionally protected right to self-organization.
Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration, invoking this Court’s ruling in Abbott Labs. Phils., Inc. v. Abbott Labs.
Employees Union,[21] which
categorically declared that the DOLE Secretary has no authority to review the
decision of the Regional Director in a petition for cancellation of union
registration, and Section 4,[22]
Rule VIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
In
its Resolution[23] dated
June 4, 2007, the CA denied petitioner’s motion, stating that the BLR Director’s
inhibition from the case was a peculiarity not present in the Abbott case, and that such inhibition
justified the assumption of jurisdiction by the DOLE Secretary.
In this petition, petitioner argues
that:
I.
The Court of Appeals seriously erred in
ruling that the Labor Secretary properly assumed jurisdiction over Petitioner’s
appeal of the Regional Director’s Decision in the Cancellation Petition x x x.
A.
Jurisdiction
is conferred only by law. The Labor Secretary had no jurisdiction to review the
decision of the Regional Director in a petition for cancellation. Such
jurisdiction is conferred by law to the BLR.
B.
The
unilateral inhibition by the BLR Director cannot justify the Labor Secretary’s
exercise of jurisdiction over the Appeal.
C.
The
Labor Secretary’s assumption of jurisdiction over the Appeal without notice
violated Petitioner’s right to due process.
II.
The Court of Appeals gravely erred in
affirming the dismissal of the Cancellation Petition despite the mandatory and unequivocal
provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.[24]
The petition has no merit.
Jurisdiction
to review the decision of the Regional Director lies with the BLR. This is
clearly provided in the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code and enunciated by
the Court in Abbott. But as pointed
out by the CA, the present case involves a peculiar circumstance that was not present
or covered by the ruling in Abbott. In
this case, the BLR Director inhibited himself from the case because he was a
former counsel of respondent. Who, then, shall resolve the case in his place?
In Abbott, the appeal from the Regional Director’s decision was
directly filed with the Office of the DOLE Secretary, and we ruled that the
latter has no appellate jurisdiction. In the instant case, the appeal was filed
by petitioner with the BLR, which, undisputedly, acquired jurisdiction over the
case. Once jurisdiction is acquired by
the court, it remains with it until the full termination of the case.[25]
Thus, jurisdiction remained with the
BLR despite the BLR Director’s inhibition. When the DOLE Secretary resolved the
appeal, she merely stepped into the shoes of the BLR Director and performed a
function that the latter could not himself perform. She did so pursuant to her
power of supervision and control over the BLR.[26]
Expounding
on the extent of the power of control, the Court, in Araneta, et al. v. Hon. M. Gatmaitan, et al.,[27] pronounced
that, if a certain power or authority is vested by law upon the Department
Secretary, then such power or authority may be exercised directly by the
President, who exercises supervision and control over the departments. This
principle was incorporated in the Administrative Code of 1987, which defines “supervision
and control” as including the authority to act directly whenever a specific
function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate.[28]
Applying the foregoing to the present case, it is clear that the DOLE
Secretary, as the person exercising the power of supervision and control over
the BLR, has the authority to directly exercise the quasi-judicial function
entrusted by law to the BLR Director.
It
is true that the power of control and supervision does not give the Department
Secretary unbridled authority to take over the functions of his or her
subordinate. Such authority is subject to certain guidelines which
are stated in Book IV, Chapter 8, Section 39(1)(a) of the Administrative Code
of 1987.[29]
However, in the present case, the DOLE Secretary’s act of taking over the
function of the BLR Director was warranted and necessitated by the latter’s
inhibition from the case and the objective to “maintain the integrity of the
decision, as well as the Bureau itself.”[30]
Petitioner
insists that the BLR Director’s subordinates should have resolved the appeal,
citing the provision under the Administrative Code of 1987 which states, “in
case of the absence or disability of the head of a bureau or office, his duties
shall be performed by the assistant head.”[31]
The provision clearly does not apply considering that the BLR Director was
neither absent nor suffering from any disability; he remained as head of the
BLR. Thus, to dispel any suspicion of bias, the DOLE Secretary opted to resolve
the appeal herself.
Petitioner
was not denied the right to due process when it was not notified in advance of
the BLR Director’s inhibition and the DOLE Secretary’s assumption of the case. Well-settled
is the rule that the essence of due process
is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings,
an opportunity to explain
one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.[32] Petitioner
had the opportunity to question the BLR Director’s inhibition and the DOLE
Secretary’s taking cognizance of the case when it filed a motion for
reconsideration of the latter’s decision. It would be well to state that a
critical component of due process is a hearing before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal, for all the elements of due process, like notice and hearing,
would be meaningless if the ultimate decision would come from a partial and
biased judge.[33] It was precisely to ensure a fair trial that
moved the BLR Director to inhibit himself from the case and the DOLE Secretary
to take over his function.
Petitioner
also insists that respondent’s registration as a legitimate labor union should
be cancelled. Petitioner posits that once it is determined that a ground
enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor Code is present, cancellation of
registration should follow; it becomes the ministerial duty of the Regional
Director to cancel the registration of the labor organization, hence, the use
of the word “shall.” Petitioner points
out that the Regional Director has admitted in its decision that respondent failed
to submit the required documents for a number of years; therefore, cancellation
of its registration should have followed as a matter of course.
We
are not persuaded.
Articles 238 and 239 of the Labor
Code read:
ART. 238. CANCELLATION
OF REGISTRATION; APPEAL
The
certificate of registration of any legitimate labor organization, whether
national or local, shall be canceled by the Bureau if it has reason to believe, after due hearing, that the said labor
organization no longer meets one or more
of the requirements herein prescribed.[34]
ART.
239. GROUNDS FOR CANCELLATION OF UNION
REGISTRATION.
The
following shall constitute grounds
for cancellation of union registration:
x
x x x
(d)
Failure to submit the annual financial report to the Bureau within thirty (30)
days after the closing of every fiscal year and misrepresentation, false
entries or fraud in the preparation of the financial report itself;
x
x x x
(i)
Failure to submit list of individual members to the Bureau once a year or whenever
required by the Bureau.[35]
These
provisions give the Regional Director ample discretion in dealing with a
petition for cancellation of a union’s registration, particularly, determining
whether the union still meets the requirements prescribed by law. It is sufficient
to give the Regional Director license to treat the late filing of required
documents as sufficient compliance with the requirements of the law. After all,
the law requires the labor organization to submit the annual financial report
and list of members in order to verify if it is still viable and financially
sustainable as an organization so as to protect the employer and employees from
fraudulent or fly-by-night unions. With the submission of the required
documents by respondent, the purpose of the law has been achieved, though
belatedly.
We
cannot ascribe abuse of discretion to the Regional Director and the DOLE
Secretary in denying the petition for cancellation of respondent’s
registration. The union members and, in fact, all the employees belonging to
the appropriate bargaining unit should not be deprived of a bargaining agent, merely
because of the negligence of the union officers who were responsible for the
submission of the documents to the BLR.
Labor authorities should, indeed, act with
circumspection in treating petitions for cancellation of union registration,
lest they be accused of interfering with union activities. In resolving the
petition, consideration must be taken of the fundamental rights guaranteed by
Article XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution, i.e., the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities. Labor
authorities should bear in mind that registration confers upon a union the
status of legitimacy and the concomitant right and privileges granted by law to
a legitimate labor organization, particularly the right to participate in or
ask for certification election in a bargaining unit.[36] Thus,
the cancellation of a certificate of registration is the equivalent of snuffing
out the life of a labor organization.
For without such registration, it loses - as a rule - its rights under the
Labor Code.[37]
It
is worth mentioning that the Labor Code’s provisions on cancellation of union
registration and on reportorial requirements have been recently amended by Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9481, An Act Strengthening
the Workers’ Constitutional Right to Self-Organization, Amending for the
Purpose Presidential Decree No. 442, As Amended, Otherwise Known as the Labor
Code of the Philippines, which lapsed into law on May 25, 2007 and became
effective on June 14, 2007. The amendment sought to strengthen the workers’
right to self-organization and enhance the
ART. 239. Grounds
for Cancellation of Union Registration.—The following may constitute
grounds for cancellation of union registration:
(a)
Misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with the adoption or
ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes
of ratification, and the list of members who took part in the ratification;
(b)
Misrepresentation, false statements or fraud in connection with the election of
officers, minutes of the election of officers, and the list of voters;
(c)
Voluntary dissolution by the members.
R.A.
No. 9481 also inserted in the Labor Code Article 242-A, which provides:
ART. 242-A. Reportorial Requirements.—The following are documents required to
be submitted to the Bureau by the legitimate labor organization concerned:
(a)
Its constitution and by-laws, or amendments thereto, the minutes of
ratification, and the list of members who took part in the ratification of the
constitution and by-laws within thirty (30) days from adoption or ratification
of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto;
(b)
Its list of officers, minutes of the election of officers, and list of voters
within thirty (30) days from election;
(c) Its annual financial report within thirty
(30) days after the close of every fiscal year; and
(d)
Its list of members at least once a year or whenever required by the Bureau.
Failure to comply with the above
requirements shall not be a ground for cancellation of union registration but
shall subject the erring officers or members to suspension, expulsion from
membership, or any appropriate penalty.
ILO
Convention No. 87, which we have ratified in 1953, provides that “workers’ and
employers’ organizations shall not be liable to be dissolved or suspended by
administrative authority.” The ILO has expressed the opinion that the
cancellation of union registration by the registrar of labor unions, which in
our case is the BLR, is tantamount to dissolution of the organization by
administrative authority when such measure would give rise to the loss of legal
personality of the union or loss of advantages necessary for it to carry out
its activities, which is true in our jurisdiction. Although the ILO has allowed
such measure to be taken, provided that judicial safeguards are in place, i.e., the right to appeal to a judicial
body, it has nonetheless reminded its members that dissolution of a union, and
cancellation of registration for that matter, involve serious consequences for
occupational representation. It has, therefore, deemed it preferable if such
actions were to be taken only as a last resort and after exhausting other
possibilities with less serious effects on the organization.[40]
The
aforesaid amendments and the ILO’s opinion on this matter serve to fortify our
ruling in this case. We therefore quote with approval the DOLE Secretary’s
rationale for denying the petition, thus:
It is undisputed that appellee failed to
submit its annual financial reports and list of individual members in
accordance with Article 239 of the Labor Code. However, the existence of this
ground should not necessarily lead to the cancellation of union registration.
Article 239 recognizes the regulatory authority of the State to exact
compliance with reporting requirements. Yet there is more at stake in this case
than merely monitoring union activities and requiring periodic documentation
thereof.
The
more substantive considerations involve the constitutionally guaranteed freedom
of association and right of workers to self-organization. Also involved is the
public policy to promote free trade unionism and collective bargaining as
instruments of industrial peace and democracy. An overly stringent
interpretation of the statute governing cancellation of union registration
without regard to surrounding circumstances cannot be allowed. Otherwise, it
would lead to an unconstitutional application of the statute and emasculation
of public policy objectives. Worse, it can render nugatory the protection to
labor and social justice clauses that pervades the Constitution and the Labor
Code.
Moreover,
submission of the required documents is the duty of the officers of the union.
It would be unreasonable for this Office to order the cancellation of the union
and penalize the entire union membership on the basis of the negligence of its
officers. In National
As
aptly ruled by respondent Bureau of Labor Relations Director Noriel: “The
rights of workers to self-organization finds general and specific
constitutional guarantees. x x x Such constitutional guarantees should not be
lightly taken much less nullified. A healthy respect for the freedom of
association demands that acts imputable to officers or members be not easily
visited with capital punishments against the association itself.”
At
any rate, we note that on 19 May 2000, appellee had submitted its financial
statement for the years 1996-1999. With this submission, appellee has
substantially complied with its duty to submit its financial report for the
said period. To rule differently would be to preclude the union, after having
failed to meet its periodic obligations promptly, from taking appropriate
measures to correct its omissions. For the record, we do not view with favor
appellee’s late submission. Punctuality on the part of the union and its
officers could have prevented this petition.[41]
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 30, 2005 and
Resolution dated June 4, 2007 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate
Justice |
JOSE CATRAL
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
* Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta per Raffle dated January 12, 2011.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes (now a retired member of this Court), with Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Fernanda Lampas Peralta, concurring; rollo, pp. 38-54.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] 196 Phil. 441 (1981).
[10] 334 Phil. 955 (1997).
[11] Rollo, pp. 100-103.
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] 380 Phil. 364 (2000).
[22] Sec.
4. Action on the petition; appeals. —
The Regional or Bureau Director, as the case may be, shall have thirty (30)
days from submission of the case for resolution within which to resolve the
petition. The decision of the Regional or Bureau Director may be appealed to
the Bureau or the Secretary, as the case may be, within ten (10) days from
receipt thereof by the aggrieved party on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion or any violation of these Rules.
The
Bureau or the Secretary shall have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
records of the case within which to decide the appeal. The decision of the
Bureau or the Secretary shall be final and executory.
[23] Rollo, pp. 56-59.
[24]
[25] Republic v. Asiapro Cooperative, G.R. No. 172101, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 659, 670.
[26] Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV, Chapter 8, Sec. 39(1).
[27] 101 Phil. 328 (1957).
[28] Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV, Chapter 7, Sec. 38(1).
[29] Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV, Chapter 8, Sec. 39(1), paragraph (a) provides:
Sec.
39. Secretary’s Authority.— (1) The Secretary shall have supervision and
control over the bureaus, offices, and agencies under him, subject to the
following guidelines:
(a) “Initiative and freedom of action on the part of subordinate units shall be encouraged and promoted, rather than curtailed, and reasonable opportunity to act shall be afforded those units before control is exercised.”
[30] Rollo, p. 205.
[31] Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV, Chapter 6, Sec. 32.
[32] Sarapat v. Salanga, G.R. No. 154110, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 324, 332.
[33] Busilac Builders, Inc. v. Aguilar, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1809, October 17, 2006, 504 SCRA 585, 597.
[34] Emphasis supplied.
[35] Emphasis supplied.
[36] S.S. Ventures International, Inc. v. S.S. Ventures Labor Union, G.R. No. 161690, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 435, 442.
[37]
[38] Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise.
[39] Sponsorship Speech of Senator Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada of Senate Bill No. 2466, Journal of the Senate, Session No. 25, September 19, 2006, pp. 384-385.
[40] Freedom of association and
collective bargaining: Dissolution and suspension of organizations by
administrative authority, Report III(4B), International Labour Conference, 81st
Session,
[41] Rollo, p. 189.