THIRD DIVISION
HEIRS OF RAMON C. GAITE, CYNTHIA GOROSTIZA GAITE and
RHOGEN BUILDERS, Petitioners, - versus - |
G.R. No. 177685 Present: CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson, NACHURA,* BRION, VILLARAMA, JR., and SERENO, JJ. |
THE PLAZA, INC. and FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, Respondents. |
Promulgated: January 26, 2011 |
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DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, which seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision[1]
dated June 27, 2006 and Resolution[2]
dated April 20, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 58790. The CA affirmed with modification the
Decision[3]
dated July 3, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63,
in Civil Case Nos. 1328 (43083) and 40755.
The
facts are as follows:
On P7,600,000.00.
On P1,155,000.00
in favor of The Plaza. On P1,155,000.00 less withholding taxes as down payment to Gaite. Thereafter, Rhogen commenced construction of
the restaurant building.
In a
letter dated
On
1) No permit for Temporary Structure.
2) No notice of concrete pouring.
3) Some workers have no safety devices.
4) The Secretary and
Construction Foreman refused to [receive] the Letter of Stoppage dated
5) Mr. Ramon Gaite [is] questioning the authority of the Building Official’s Inspector.
6) Construction plans use[d] on the job site is not in accordance to the approved plan.[7]
On September 19, 1980, the Project Manager (Tayzon) in his Construction
Memo #23 reported on his evaluation of Progress Billing #1 submitted by Rhogen.
Tayzon stated that actual jobsite
assessment showed that the finished works fall short of Rhogen’s claimed
percentage of accomplishment and Rhogen was entitled to only P32,684.16
and not P260,649.91 being demanded by Rhogen. Further, he recommended that said amount
payable to Rhogen be withheld pending compliance with Construction Memo #18,
resolution of cases regarding unauthorized withdrawal of materials from jobsite
and stoppage of work by the Municipal Engineer’s Office of Makati.[8]
On
On the same day, Gaite notified Reyes that he is suspending all
construction works until Reyes and the Project Manager cooperate to resolve the
issue he had raised to address the problem.[10]
This was followed by another letter
dated P1,155,000.00,
which compensation so far exceeds the work completed by Rhogen before the
municipal authorities stopped the construction for several violations. Reyes made it clear they have no obligation to
help Rhogen get out of the situation arising from non-performance of its own
contractual undertakings, and that The Plaza has its rights and remedies to
protect its interest.[12]
Subsequently, the correspondence between Gaite and Reyes involved the
custody of remaining bags of cement in the jobsite, in the course of which
Gaite was charged with estafa for ordering the removal of said items. Gaite complained that Reyes continued to be
uncooperative in refusing to meet with him to resolve the delay. Gaite further answered the estafa charge by
saying that he only acted to protect the interest of the owner (prevent
spoilage/hardening of cement) and that Reyes did not reply to his request for
exchange.[13]
On P63,058.50 from The Plaza representing the
work that has already been completed by Rhogen.[14]
On
In a subsequent letter dated P1,155,000.00 from the value of the works correctly
completed by Rhogen, or if none, to reimburse the entire down payment plus
expenses of removal and replacement. Rhogen
was also asked to turn over the jobsite premises as soon as possible.[16] The Plaza sent copy of said letter to FGU
but the latter replied that it has no liability under the circumstances and
hence it could not act favorably on its claim against the bond.[17]
On March 3, 1981, The Plaza notified Gaite that it could no longer credit
any payment to Rhogen for the work it had completed because the evaluation of
the extent, condition, and cost of work done revealed that in addition to the
violations committed during the construction of the building, the structure was
not in accordance with plans approved by the government and accepted by
Ayala. Hence, The Plaza demanded the
reimbursement of the down payment, the cost of uprooting or removal of the
defective structures, the value of owner-furnished materials, and payment of
liquidated damages.[18]
On
On P32,684.16 and not P260,649.91. The other valid grounds for the withholding
of payment were the pending estafa case against Gaite, non-compliance by Rhogen
with Construction Memorandum No. 18 and the non-lifting of the stoppage order.[22]
Regarding the non-lifting of the stoppage order, which the trial court
said was based on simple infractions, the same was held to be solely
attributable to Rhogen’s willful inaction.
Instead of readily rectifying the violations, Rhogen continued with the
construction works thereby causing more damage.
The trial court pointed out that Rhogen is not only expected to be aware
of standard requirements and pertinent regulations on construction work, but
also expressly bound itself under the General Construction Contract to comply
with all the laws, city and municipal ordinances and all government
regulations. Having failed to complete
the project within the stipulated period and comply with its obligations,
Rhogen was thus declared guilty of breaching the Construction Contract and is
liable for damages under Articles 1170 and 1167 of the Civil Code.[23]
The dispositive portion of the
trial court’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 40755, defendants Ramon Gaite, Cynthia Gaite and Rhogen Builders are jointly and severally ordered to pay plaintiff:
1.
the amount of P525,422.73 as actual damages
representing owner-furnished materials with legal interest from the time of
filing of the complaint until full payment;
2.
the amount of P14,504.66 as actual damages
representing expenses for uprooting with interest from the time of filing the
complaint until full payment;
3.
the amount of P1,155,000.00 as actual damages
representing the downpayment with legal interest from the time of filing the complaint until full payment;
4.
the amount of P150,000.00 for moral damages;
5.
the amount of P100,000.00 for exemplary damages;
6.
the amount of P500,000.00 as liquidated damages;
7.
the amount of P100,000.00 as reasonable
attorney’s fees; and,
8. the cost of suit.
Under the surety bond, defendants
Rhogen and FGU are jointly and severally ordered to pay plaintiff the amount of
P1,155,000.00 with legal interest from the time of filing the complaint
until full payment. In the event [that]
FGU pays the said amount, third-party defendants are jointly and severally
ordered to pay the same amount to FGU plus P50,000.00 as reasonable
attorney’s fees, the latter having been forced to litigate, and the cost of
suit.
Civil Case No. 1328 is hereby ordered dismissed with no pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.[24]
Dissatisfied, Ramon and Cynthia Gaite, Rhogen and FGU appealed to the CA.[25] In view of the death of Ramon C. Gaite on
In their appeal, the heirs of Ramon C. Gaite, Cynthia G. Gaite and Rhogen
assigned the following errors, to wit:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT RHOGEN BUILDERS IN TERMINATING THE CONTRACT ARE UNTENABLE;
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE NON-LIFTING
OF THE STOPPAGE ORDER OF THE THEN MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT IT WAS THE WILLFUL INACTION OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE WHICH MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR DEFENDANT–APPELLANT RHOGEN TO PERFORM ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CONTRACT;
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ACTUAL DAMAGES AS WELL AS MORAL, EXEMPLARY, AND LIQUIDATED DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES SINCE THERE WERE NO FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASES THEREFOR; AND
V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD
ACTUAL, MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES IN FAVOR OF
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.[27]
For its part, FGU interposed the following assignment of errors:
I. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT RAMON GAITE VALIDLY TERMINATED THE CONTRACT BETWEEN HIM AND PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE.
II. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT RAMON GAITE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE STOPPAGE OF THE CONSTRUCTION.
III. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT RAMON GAITE TO PAY THE AMOUNT OF P525,422.73 FOR THE OWNER FURNISHED MATERIALS.
IV. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT RAMON GAITE TO PAY PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE THE AMOUNT OF P14,504.66 AS ALLEGED EXPENSES FOR UPROOTING THE WORK HE PERFORMED.
V. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT RAMON GAITE TO REFUND THE DOWN PAYMENT OF P1,155,000.00 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE PAID HIM.
VI. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE.
VII. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING EXEMPLARY DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE.
VIII. THE REGIONAL TRIAL [COURT] ERRED IN AWARDING LIQUIDATED DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE.
IX. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY’S FEES TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE.
X.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE.[28]
On
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 3, 1997 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63 in Civil Case Nos. 40755 and 1328 is AFFIRMED with the modification that: (a) the award for actual damages representing the owner-furnished materials and the expenses for uprooting are deleted, and in lieu thereof, the amount of P300,000.00 as temperate damages is awarded; and (b) the awards for moral, exemplary, liquidated and attorney’s fees are likewise deleted.
SO ORDERED.[29]
According to the CA, The Plaza cannot now be demanded to comply with its
obligation under the contract since Rhogen has already failed to comply with
its own contractual obligation. Thus, The Plaza had every reason not to pay the
progress billing as a result of Rhogen’s inability to perform its obligations
under the contract. Further, the
stoppage and revocation orders were issued on account of Rhogen’s own
violations involving the construction as found by the local building
official. Clearly, Rhogen cannot blame The
Plaza for its own failure to comply with its contractual obligations. The CA stressed that Rhogen obliged itself to
comply with “all the laws, city and municipal ordinances and all government
regulations insofar as they are binding upon or affect the parties [to the
contract] , the work or those engaged thereon.”[30] As such, it was responsible for the lifting
of the stoppage and revocation orders.
As to Rhogen’s act of challenging the validity of the stoppage and
revocation orders, the CA held that it cannot be done in the present case
because under Section 307 of the National Building Code, appeal to the
Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) – whose
decision is subject to review by the Office of the President -- is available as
remedy for Rhogen.[31]
However, the CA modified the award of damages holding that
the claim for actual damages of P525,422.73 representing the damaged
owner-furnished materials was not supported by any evidence. Instead, the CA granted temperate damages in
the amount of P300,000.00. As to
moral damages, no specific finding for the factual basis of said award was made
by the trial court, and hence it should be deleted. Likewise, liquidated damages is not proper
considering that this is not a case of delay but non-completion of the
project. The Plaza similarly failed to
establish that Rhogen and Gaite acted with malice or bad faith; consequently, the
award of exemplary damages must be deleted.
Finally, there being no bad faith on the part of the defendants, the
award of attorneys’ fees cannot be sustained.[32]
The motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision was denied in
the Resolution dated
Before us, petitioners submit the following issues:
I.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction, when it found that Petitioner Rhogen had no factual or legal basis to terminate the General Construction Contract.
II.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction, when, as a consequence of its finding that Petitioners did not have valid grounds to terminate the Construction Contract, it directed Petitioners to return the downpayment paid by The Plaza, with legal interest.
III.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction, when, in addition thereto, it awarded temperate damages to The Plaza.
IV.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction, when it failed to award damages in favor of Petitioners.[33]
Petitioners contend that the CA
gravely erred in not holding that there were valid and legal grounds for Rhogen
to terminate the contract pursuant to Article 1191 of the Civil Code and
Article 123 of the General Conditions of the Construction Contract. Petitioners claim that Rhogen sent Progress
Billing No. 1 dated P473,554.06
for the work it had accomplished from
We deny the petition.
Reciprocal
obligations are those which arise from the same cause, and in which each party
is a debtor and a creditor of the other, such that the obligation of one is
dependent upon the obligation of the other. They are to be performed
simultaneously such that the performance of one is conditioned upon the
simultaneous fulfillment of the other.
Respondent The Plaza predicated its action on Article 1191[34]
of the Civil Code, which provides for the remedy of “rescission” or more
properly resolution, a principal
action based on breach of faith by the other party who violates the reciprocity
between them. The breach contemplated in
the provision is the obligor’s failure to comply with an existing
obligation. Thus, the power to rescind
is given only to the injured party. The
injured party is the party who has faithfully fulfilled his obligation or is
ready and willing to perform his obligation.[35]
The construction contract between
Rhogen and The Plaza provides for reciprocal obligations whereby the latter’s
obligation to pay the contract price or progress billing is conditioned on the
former’s performance of its undertaking to complete the works within the
stipulated period and in accordance with approved plans and other
specifications by the owner. Pursuant to
its contractual obligation, The Plaza furnished materials and paid the agreed
down payment. It also exercised the option of furnishing and delivering
construction materials at the jobsite pursuant to Article III of the
Construction Contract. However, just two
months after commencement of the project, construction works were ordered
stopped by the local building official
and the building permit subsequently revoked on account of several
violations of the National Building Code and other regulations of the
municipal authorities.
Petitioners reiterate their position that the stoppage order was
unlawful, citing the fact that when the new contractor (ACK Construction, Inc.)
took over the project, the local government of
Article 123 of the Articles of General
Conditions states the grounds for the termination of the work or contract by
the Contractor:
123. CONTRACTOR’S
RIGHT TO STOP WORK OR TERMINATE
CONTRACT
If work should be stopped under order of any court, or other public authority, for period of three (3) months through no act or fault of Contractor or of anyone employed by him, or if Owner’s Representative should fail to issue any certificate of payment within seven (7) days after its maturity and presentation of any sum certified by Owner’s Representative or awarded arbitrator, then contractor, may, stop work or terminate Contract, recover from Owner payment for work executed, loss sustained upon any plant or materials, reasonable profit, damages.[37] (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners may not justify Rhogen’s termination of the contract upon
grounds of non-payment of progress billing and uncooperative attitude of
respondent The Plaza and its employees in rectifying the violations which were
the basis for issuance of the stoppage order.
Having breached the contractual obligation it had expressly assumed, i.e., to comply with all laws, rules and
regulations of the local authorities, Rhogen was already at fault. Respondent The Plaza, on the other hand, was
justified in withholding payment on Rhogen’s first progress billing, on account
of the stoppage order and additionally due to disappearance of owner-furnished
materials at the jobsite. In failing to have the stoppage and revocation orders
lifted or recalled, Rhogen should take full responsibility in accordance with
its contractual undertaking, thus:
In the performance of the works, services, and obligations subject of this Contract, the CONTRACTOR binds itself to observe all pertinent and applicable laws, rules and regulations promulgated by duly constituted authorities and to be personally, fully and solely liable for any and all violations of the same.[38] (Emphasis supplied.)
Significantly, Rhogen did not mention in its communications to Reyes that
Gaite was merely a victim of abuse by a local official and this was the primary
reason for the problems besetting the project.
On the contrary, the site appraisal inspection conducted on February 12 and
13, 1981 in the presence of representatives from The Plaza, Rhogen, FGU and
Municipal Engineer Victor Gregory, disclosed that in addition to the violations
committed by Rhogen which resulted in the issuance of the stoppage order,
Rhogen built the structure not in accordance with government approved plans
and/or without securing the approval of the Municipal Engineer before making
the changes thereon.[39]
Such non-observance of laws and regulations of the local authorities
affecting the construction project constitutes a substantial violation of the
Construction Contract which entitles The Plaza to terminate the same, without
obligation to make further payment to Rhogen until the work is finished or
subject to refund of payment exceeding the expenses of completing the works.
This is evident from a reading of Article 122 which states:
122. OWNER’S RIGHT TO TERMINATE CONTRACT
A. If Contractor
should be adjudged bankrupt, or if he should make general assignment for
benefit of his creditors, or if receiver should be appointed on account of his
insolvency, or if he should persistently or repeatedly refuse or should fail,
except in cases for which extension of time is provided, to supply enough
properly skilled workmen or proper materials, or if he should fail to make
prompt payment to Sub-Contractors or for materials of labor, or persistently disregard laws, ordinances,
or instructions of Owner’s Representative or
otherwise be guilty of substantial violation of any provision of [the]
Contract, then Owner, upon
certification by Owner’s Representative that sufficient cause exists to justify
such action, may, without prejudice
to any right or remedy, after giving Contractor seven days written notice, terminate contract with Contractor, take
possession of premises, materials, tools, appliances, thereon, finish work by
whatever method he may deem expedient.
In such cases, Contractor shall
not be entitled to receive any further payment until work is finished.
B. If unpaid balance of Contract sum shall exceed expense of finishing work including compensation for additional managerial and administrative services, such excess, paid to Contractor. Refund the difference to Owner if such expense shall exceed unpaid balance.[40] (Emphasis supplied.)
Upon the facts duly established, the CA therefore
did not err in holding that Rhogen committed a serious breach of its contract
with The Plaza, which justified the latter in terminating the contract. Petitioners are thus liable for damages for
having breached their contract with respondent The Plaza. Article 1170 of the Civil Code
provides that those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of
fraud, negligence or delay and those who in any manner contravene the tenor
thereof are liable for damages.
Petitioners assail the order for the return of down payment, asserting
that the principle of quantum meruit demands
that Rhogen as contractor be paid for the work already accomplished.
We disagree.
Under the principle of quantum
meruit, a contractor is allowed to recover the reasonable value of the
thing or services rendered despite the lack of a written contract, in order to
avoid unjust enrichment. Quantum meruit means
that in an action for work and labor, payment shall be made in such amount as
the plaintiff reasonably deserves. To deny payment for a building almost
completed and already occupied would be to permit unjust enrichment at the
expense of the contractor.[41]
Rhogen failed to finish even a substantial portion of the
works due to the stoppage order issued just two months from the start of
construction. Despite the down payment
received from The Plaza, Rhogen, upon evaluation of the Project Manager, was
able to complete a meager percentage much lower than that claimed by it under
the first progress billing between July and September 1980. Moreover, after it relinquished the project
in January 1981, the site inspection appraisal jointly conducted by the Project
Manager, Building Inspector Engr. Gregory
and representatives from FGU and Rhogen, Rhogen was found to have
executed the works not in accordance with the approved plans or failed to seek
prior approval of the Municipal Engineer.
Article 1167 of the Civil Code is explicit on this point that if
a person obliged to do something fails to do it, the same shall be executed at
his cost.
Art.
1167. If a person obliged to do something fails to do it, the same shall be
executed at his cost.
This
same rule shall be observed if he does it in contravention of the tenor of the
obligation. Furthermore, it may be decreed that what has been poorly done be
undone.
In addition, Article 122 of the
Articles of General Conditions provides that the contractor shall not be
entitled to receive further payment “until the work is finished.” As the works completed by Rhogen were not in
accordance with approved plans, it should have been executed at its cost had it
not relinquished the project in January 1981.
The CA thus did not err in sustaining the trial court’s order for the
return of the down payment given by The Plaza to Rhogen.
As to temperate damages, Article 2224 of the Civil Code provides that temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. The rationale behind temperate damages is precisely that from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be offered. When the court is convinced that there has been such loss, the judge is empowered to calculate moderate damages, rather than let the complainant suffer without redress from the defendant’s wrongful act.[42] Petitioners’ contention that such award is improper because The Plaza could have presented receipts to support the claim for actual damages, must fail considering that Rhogen never denied the delivery of the owner-furnished materials which were under its custody at the jobsite during the work stoppage and before it terminated the contract. Since Rhogen failed to account either for those items which it had caused to be withdrawn from the premises, or those considered damaged or lost due spoilage, or disappeared for whatever reason – there was no way of determining the exact quantity and cost of those materials. Hence, The Plaza was correctly allowed to recover temperate damages.
Upon the foregoing, we
find petitioners’ claim for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees lacking in legal basis and undeserving of further discussion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
With costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
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MARTIN S. VILLARAMA,
JR. Associate Justice |
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WE CONCUR: CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice Chairperson |
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ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
ARTURO D.
BRION Associate Justice |
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MARIA Associate Justice |
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A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice Chairperson, Third
Division |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
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RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice |
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*
Designated additional member per
Special Order No. 937 dated
[1] Rollo, pp. 88-102. Penned by
Associate Justice
[2]
[3]
[4] Records, pp. 202-210.
[5] Rollo, p. 139.
[6]
[7]
[8] Records, Exhibits “DD” to “HH”.
[9] Rollo, pp. 368-370.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25] Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 58790.
[26] CA rollo, p. 84.
[27] Rollo, pp. 450-451.
[28]
[29]
[30] Art. II, paragraph (4), General Construction Contract, records, pp. 733-734.
[31] Rollo, pp. 96-98.
[32]
[33]
[34] ART. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.
The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period.
This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the thing, in accordance with Articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.
[35] Heirs of Antonio F. Bernabe v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154402, July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 53, 66, citing Ong v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil. 243, 252 (1999), Sps. Velarde v. Court of Appeals, 413 Phil. 360, 373 (2001) and Almira v. Court of Appeals, 447 Phil. 467, 482 (2003).
[36] Rollo, pp. 55-58.
[37] Records, Exhibit “AAA”.
[38] Art. IX, paragraph (2), General Construction Contract, records, p. 737.
[39] Records, Exhibits “T,” “RR” and “SS”.
[40]
[41] H. L. Carlos Construction, Inc. v. Marina Properties Corporation, G.R. No. 147614, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 428, 439, citing Melchor v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 95398, August 16, 1991, 200 SCRA 704, 713; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 359 Phil. 530, 640 (1998); and Eslao v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 89745, April 8, 1991, 195 SCRA 730, 738-739.
[42] Government Service Insurance
System v.
Labung-Deang,
G.R. No. 135644,