Republic
of the Philippines
Supreme
Court
Manila
|
ALEXANDER B. GATUS, Petitioner, - versus
- SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 174725
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson, VELASCO,
JR., LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, DEL
CASTILLO, and PEREZ, JJ.
Promulgated: January 26, 2011 |
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D
E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a
petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals dated May 24, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 88691 (the assailed Decision) and the Resolution[2]
dated August 7, 2006 issued by the same court in said case.
The facts, as
summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
[Petitioner
Alexander B.] Gatus worked at the Central Azucarera de Tarlac beginning on
January 1, 1972. He was a covered member
of the SSS (SS No. 02-0055015-6). He
optionally retired from Central Azucarera de Tarlac upon reaching 30 years of
service on January 31, 2002, at the age of 62 years. By the time of his retirement, he held the
position of Tender assigned at the Distillery Cooling Tower.
In the
course of his employment in Central Azucarera de Tarlac, he was certified fit
to work on October 21, 1975 and was accordingly promoted to a year-round
regular employment.
He
suffered chest pains and was confined at the Central Luzon Doctor’s Hospital in
Tarlac City on August 12, 1995. Upon
discharge on August 17, 1995, he was diagnosed to be suffering from Coronary
Artery Disease (CAD): Triple Vessel and Unstable Angina. His
medical records showed him to be hypertensive for 10 years and a smoker.
On
account of his CAD, he was given by the SSS the following EC/SSS Permanent
Partial Disability (PPD) benefits: (a) 8 monthly pensions effective September
1, 1994 and (b) 4 monthly pensions effective January 3, 1997. He became an SSS retirement pensioner on
February 1, 2002.
Sometime
in 2003, an SSS audit revealed the need to recover the EC benefits already paid
to him on the ground that his CAD, being attributed to his chronic smoking, was
not work-related. He was notified
thereof through a letter dated July 31, 2003.
Convinced
that he was entitled to the benefits, he assailed the decision but the SSS maintained
its position. The SSS also denied his motion for reconsideration.
He elevated the matter to the
ECC, which denied his appeal on December 10, 2004, essentially ruling that
although his CAD was a cardiovascular disease listed as an occupational disease
under Annex A of the Implementing Rules
on Employees’ Compensation, nothing on record established the presence of
the qualifying circumstances for responsibility; that it was incumbent upon him
to prove that the nature of his previous employment and the conditions
prevailing therein had increased the risk of contracting his CAD; and that he
had failed to prove this requisite. The
ECC concluded:
As explained medically, the
development of IHD or otherwise termed as Coronary Artery Disease (CAD) is caused
by atherosclerosis, the hardening of the inner lining of arteries. One of the risk factors considered by medical
science for the development of atherosclerosis is smoking. Appellant had been documented to be a chronic
smoker and such factor which is not in any way related to any form of
employment increased his risk of contracting heart disease.
Hence,
this recourse, wherein he contends that he had contracted the disease due to
the presence of harmful fuel smoke emission of methane gas from a nearby biological
waste digester and a railway terminal where diesel-fed locomotive engines had
“spew(ed) black smoke;” and that he had been exposed for 30 years to various
smoke emissions that had contained carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, sulfur,
oxide of nitrogen and unburned carbon.[3] (Emphases added.)
In the assailed
Decision, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner is not entitled to
compensation benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, affirming
the Decision of the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), which was
likewise a confirmation of the audit conducted by the Social Security System
(SSS).
Thus, this
petition wherein, even without assistance of counsel, petitioner comes to this
Court contending that “the appellate court’s decision is flawed [and] if not reversed will
result in irreparable damage to the interest of the petitioner.”[4]
Petitioner lists the following as
errors in the questioned Decision:
I.
The
appellate court’s decision is against existing jurisprudence on increased risk
theory of rebook condition and progression and deterioration of illness that
supervened during employment and persisted after optional retirement.
II.
Violation
of due process.[5]
The Court of Appeals agreed with
the ECC’s findings that based on his medical records, petitioner has been
hypertensive for ten (10) years and smokes 20 packs of cigarettes a year.[6] His medical condition was explained in the
following manner by the ECC:
Ischemic
Heart Disease (IHD) is the generic designation for a group of closely related
syndromes resulting from ischemia – an imbalance between the supply and demand
of the heart for oxygenated blood.
Because coronary artery narrowing or obstruction owing to
atherosclerosis underlies MI, it is often termed coronary artery disease (CAD).
Atherosclerosis which is primarily due
to smoking, diet, hypertension and diabetes is the main culprit in the
development of CAD. (Pathologic Basis of Disease by Robbins, 5th
edition.)[7]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner claims that he was in
good health when he first entered the Central
Azucarera de Tarlac as a factory worker at the Alcohol Distillery Plant in
1972.[8] He alleges that in the course of his
employment he suffered “essential hypertension” starting 1995, when he
experienced chest pains and was confined at the Central Luzon Doctor’s Hospital
in Tarlac City; that he was diagnosed as having “Coronary Artery Disease (CAD)
[Triple] Vessel and Angina Pectoris” and hypertension; that he was initially
granted disability benefits by the SSS but his request for additional benefits
was denied; and that the ECC denied his appeal due to allegations of smoking.
He asserts that he has cited “technical, scientific and medical authorities to
bolster his claim” including the exposure he experienced for thirty (30) years
from the alcohol distillery to “hydrocarbons and [locomotives],” carbon
monoxide, carbon dioxide, sulfur, phosphorous, nitrogen oxides and soot
(particulate matter). [9]
Petitioner uses various
references, including encyclopedia and medical books, to discuss the
general effects of pollution, mostly caused by the burning of fossil fuels, to
people with cardiovascular diseases; and the aggravation of coronary artery
diseases brought about by exposure to carbon monoxide.[10] Petitioner claims that “air pollution (carbon
monoxide and lead from gasoline) contributed to the development of essential
hypertension and its complications: [c]oronary artery disease, hypertensive
cardiovascular disease and stroke.”[11]
Petitioner insists that the
allegation of cigarette smoking was not proven and that the ECC did not present
a document signed by competent medical authority to back such claim. Petitioner claims that there is no showing
that the ECC records were elevated to the Court of Appeals, and that the latter
had completely ignored his evidence.
In its Comment[12]
dated December 11, 2006, respondent SSS alleges that the Decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming the Decision of the ECC was in accordance with law
and existing jurisprudence. Respondent
SSS further alleges that as viewed from the records of the case,
the petitioner failed to show proof by mere substantial evidence that the
development of his disease was work-related;[13]
that petitioner’s heart ailment had no causal relation with his employment; and
that “[as] viewed from by his lifestyle,
he was a chain smoker, a habit [which had] contributed to the development of
his heart ailment.”[14]
Respondent further alleges that
medical findings have revealed that nicotine in cigarette smoke damages the
blood vessels of the heart, making them susceptible to the hardening of the
inner lining of the arteries. As to
petitioner’s contention that there were harmful fuel and smoke emissions due to
the presence of methane gas from a nearby biological waste as well as a railway
terminal where diesel-fed locomotive engines spewed black smoke, respondent
counters that these were mere allegations that were not backed by scientific
and factual evidence and that petitioner had failed to show which harmful
emissions or substances were present in his working environment and how much
exposure thereto had contributed to the development of his illness. Respondent points out that petitioner’s “bare
allegations do not constitute such evidence that a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support the conclusion that there is a causal relationship
between his working conditions” and his sickness and that “the law is clear
that award of compensation cannot rest on speculations or presumptions.”[15]
The sole issue to be determined is
whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming
the finding of the ECC that petitioner’s ailment is not compensable under
Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.
The grounds for compensability are
set forth in Section 1, Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation (the “Amended Rules”), the pertinent portion of which states:
RULE III
Compensability
Sec. 1. Grounds
— x x x
(b) For the sickness
and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be
the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex “A” of these
Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown
that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions.
Further,
under Annex “A” of the Amended Rules,
For
an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, all of the following conditions must be satisfied:
1. The
employee's work must involve the risks described herein;
2. The disease was
contracted as a result of the employee's exposure to the described risks;
3. The disease
was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors
necessary to contract it;
4.
There
was no notorious negligence on the part of the employee.
Cardiovascular diseases are considered as occupational when contracted
under any of the following conditions:
(a) If the
heart disease was known to have been present during employment there must be
proof that an acute exacerbation clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by
reason of the nature of his work.
(b) The strain
of work that brings about an acute attack must be of sufficient severity and
must be followed within twenty-four (24) hours by the clinical signs of a
cardiac insult to constitute causal relationship.
(c) If a
person who was apparently asymptomatic before subjecting himself to strain at
work showed signs and symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his
work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal
relationship.[16]
The burden of proof is thus on
petitioner to show that any of the above conditions have been met in his
case. The required proof is further
discussed in Ortega v. Social Security Commission[17]:
The
requisite quantum of proof in cases filed before administrative or
quasi-judicial bodies is neither proof beyond reasonable doubt nor
preponderance of evidence. In this type of cases, a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion. In this case, substantial evidence abounds.[18]
As found by the Court of Appeals,
petitioner failed to submit substantial evidence that might have shown that he
was entitled to the benefits he had applied for. We thus affirm in toto the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals in the
questioned Decision and quote with approval the following pronouncements of the
appellate court:
The
degree of proof required under P.D. 626 is merely substantial evidence, which
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. Accordingly, the
claimant must show, at least by substantial evidence, that the development of the
disease was brought about largely by the conditions present in the nature of
the job. What the law requires is a
reasonable work connection, not a direct causal relation.
Gatus was
diagnosed to have suffered from CAD; Triple Vessel and Unstable Angina,
diseases or conditions falling under the category of Cardiovascular Diseases
which are not considered occupational diseases under the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation. His disease not being listed as an
occupational disease, he was expected to show that the illness or the fatal
disease was caused by his employment and the risk of contracting the disease
was increased or aggravated by the working conditions. His proof would constitute a reasonable basis
for arriving at a conclusion that the conditions of his employment had caused
the disease or that such working conditions had aggravated the risk of
contracting the illness or the fatal disease.
Under ECC
Resolution No. 432 dated July 20, 1977, cardiovascular disease is deemed
compensable under any of the following conditions, viz:
(a)
If
the heart disease was known to have been present during employment, there must
be proof that an acute exacerbation was clearly precipitated by the unusual
strain by reasons of the nature of his work.
(b)
The
strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be of sufficient severity
and must be followed within 28 hours of the clinical signs of cardiac insult to
constitute causal relationship.
x x x x
Gatus did
not discharge the burden of proof imposed under the Labor Code to show that his ailment was work-related. While he might have been exposed to various
smoke emissions at work for 30 years, he did not submit satisfactory evidence
proving that the exposure had contributed to the development of his disease or
had increased the risk of contracting the illness. Neither did he show that the disease had
progressed due to conditions in his job as a factory worker. In fact, he did not present any physician’s
report in order to substantiate his allegation that the working conditions had
increased the risk of acquiring the cardiovascular disease.
Verily,
his mere contention of exposure to various smoke emissions in the working
environment for a period of time does not ipso
facto make the resulting disability compensable. Awards of compensation cannot rest on
speculations or presumptions, for the claimant must prove a positive
proposition. As pronounced in Sante v. Employees’ Compensation Commission:
x x x
What kind and quantum of evidence would constitute an adequate basis for a
reasonable man (not necessarily a medical scientist) to reach one or the other
conclusion, can obviously be determined only on a case-to-case basis. That evidence must, however, be real and
substantial, and not merely apparent; for the duty to prove work-causation or
work-aggravation imposed by existing law is real… not merely apparent…
Moreover,
he failed to show the presence of any of the conditions imposed for
cardio-vascular diseases by Sec. 18.
Hence, the affirmance of the SSS decision was properly made.
The
petitioner’s plight might call for sympathy, particularly in the light of his
30 years of service to the company, but his petition cannot be granted on that
basis alone. The policy of extending the
applicability of P.D. 626 as many qualified employees as possible should be
balanced by the equally vital interest of denying undeserving claims for
compensation.
In fine,
Gatus was not qualified for the disability benefits under the employees
compensation law.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Employees
Compensation Commission is AFFIRMED.[19]
Petitioner filed
a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution dated August 7, 2006,
which states:
Finding
nothing cogent and persuasive in the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration dated June 20, 2006, we DENY the motion.
We point
out that our decision of May 24, 2006 has fully explained the bases for the
ruling we have made, including the matters being discussed by the petitioner in
his Motion for Reconsideration. We consider it repetitious and redundant to
discuss them herein again.[20]
The questioned Decision deemed as
established fact that petitioner is a cigarette smoker; but petitioner
vehemently denies this, saying there is no competent evidence to prove he had
that habit. What petitioner would like
this Court to do is to pass upon a question of fact, which the ECC, the SSS,
and the Court of Appeals have used to deny his claim for compensation. This is not allowed under Section 1 of Rule
45, which states that "[t]he petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth."[21] Hence, questions of fact may not be taken up
in a petition for review on certiorari
such as this case now before us. As we
have held previously:
A question
of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts while a question of law exists if the doubt centers on what the law is on
a certain set of facts. There is a question of fact if the issue requires a
review of the evidence presented or requires the re-evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses. However, if the issue raised is capable of being
resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence, the
question is one of law.[22]
This was
emphasized in La Union Cement Workers
Union v. National Labor Relations Commission,[23]
thus:
As an overture, clear and
unmistakable is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Just
as well entrenched is the doctrine that pure issues of fact may not be the proper
subject of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court as
this mode of appeal is generally confined to questions of law. We therefore
take this opportunity again to reiterate that only questions of law, not
questions of fact, may be raised before the Supreme Court in a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This Court cannot be tasked to go
over the proofs presented by the petitioners in the lower courts and analyze,
assess and weigh them to ascertain if the court a quo and the appellate court
were correct in their appreciation of the evidence.[24]
The matter of petitioner’s cigarette smoking, established by two
competent government agencies and the appellate court, is thus a matter that
cannot be questioned before us via petition for review.
There is no
doubt that petitioner deserves sympathy because even the benefits already given
to him were questioned after the SSS found that he was a chronic cigarette
smoker. For humanitarian reasons, as he
pursued his claim all the way to the Court as an indigent litigant, and due to
his advancing age, we would like to clarify that what had already been given
him should no longer be taken away from him.
But he is not entitled to further compensation for his condition.
We have once
more put great weight to the factual findings of administrative agencies and
quasi-judicial bodies, namely the SSS and the ECC, as they have acquired
expertise in all matters relating to employee compensation and disability
benefits. As we have held in Ortega v. Social Security Commission[25]:
It is
settled that the Court is not a trier of facts and accords great weight to the
factual findings of lower courts or agencies whose function is to resolve
factual matters. It is not for the Court to weigh evidence all over again.
Moreover, findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial
bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to
specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect but finality when affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.[26]
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice
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MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice
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JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice |
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[1] Rollo, pp. 15-20; penned by Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member of this Court) with Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Mariflor Punzalan Castillo, concurring.
[2] Id. at 28.
[3] Id.
at 16-17.
[4] Id.
at 2.
[5] Id.
[6] CA
rollo, p. 17.
[7] Id.
at 18.
[8] Rollo, p. 2.
[9] Id.
at 3.
[10] Id.
at 3-5.
[11] Id. at 5.
[12] Id.
at 54-59.
[13] Id.
at 55.
[14] Id.
at 56.
[15] Id.
at 57.
[16] No.
18, Annex “A,” Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation.
[17] G.R. No. 176150,
June 25, 2008, 555 SCRA 353.
[18] Id.
at 364.
[19] Rollo, pp. 18-20.
[20] Id. at 28.
[21] The Petition was filed on August 31,
2006, prior to the amendment of Rule 45 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC on December 27,
2007. The text of Rule 45, Section 1
then read:
A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from
a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by
law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari.
The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set
forth.
[22] Development Bank of the Philippines v. Traders Royal
Bank,
G.R. No. 171982, August 18, 2010.
[23] G.R. No. 174621,
January 30, 2009, 577 SCRA 456.
[24] Id. at 462.
[25] Supra note 17.
[26] Id. at 363-364.