SECOND DIVISION
JOSE MARQUES and MAXILITE G.R. No. 171379
TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
Petitioners,
- versus -
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,
FAR EAST BANK INSURANCE BROKERS,
INC., and MAKATI INSURANCE COMPANY,
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY G.R.
No. 171419
and MAKATI INSURANCE COMPANY,
Petitioners, Present:
CARPIO,
J., Chairperson,
- versus -
BRION,*
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
JOSE MARQUES and MAXILITE Promulgated:
TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
Respondents. January 10, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO,
J.:
The Case
These
consolidated petitions for review1
assail the 31 May 2005 Decision2
and the 26 January 2006 Resolution3
of the Court of Appeals-Cebu City in CA-G.R. CV No. 62105. The Court of Appeals
affirmed with modifications the 4 September 1998 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 58, in Civil Case No. CEB-18979.
The Facts
Maxilite
Technologies, Inc. (Maxilite) is a domestic corporation engaged in the
importation and trading of equipment for energy-efficiency systems. Jose N.
Marques (Marques) is the President and controlling stockholder of Maxilite.
Far East
Bank and Trust Co. (FEBTC)5 is
a local bank which handled the financing and related requirements of Marques
and Maxilite. Marques and Maxilite maintained accounts with FEBTC. Accordingly,
FEBTC financed Maxilite’s capital and operational requirements through loans
secured with properties of Marques under the latter’s name. Among Maxilite’s
and Marques’ transactions with FEBTC were:
a.
A straight loan in the name of Jose N. Marques for Maxilite at the original
principal amount of P1 million. This is secured by real estate mortgage.
From said original principal amount, the bank increased it by P300,000.00
about 26 October 1994 to enable the wiping out of Maxilite’s Trust Receipts
Account and simplify the remaining accounts into straight loan accounts.
b.
A straight loan in the name of Maxilite Technologies, Inc. for a principal
amount of P2 million. This is secured with a Real Estate Mortgage of
Marques’ residential property.
c.
Master Card transactions covering two (2) Master Card Accounts of Marques, and
d.
Local credit card transactions covering one credit card account of Marques.6
Far East
Bank Insurance Brokers, Inc. (FEBIBI) is a local insurance brokerage
corporation while Makati Insurance Company7
is a local insurance company. Both companies are subsidiaries of FEBTC.8
On 17 June
1993, Maxilite and Marques entered into a trust receipt transaction with FEBTC,
in the sum of US$80,765.00, for the shipment of various high-technology
equipment from the United States,9
with the merchandise serving as collateral. The foregoing importation was
covered by a trust receipt document signed by Marques on behalf of Maxilite,
which pertinently reads:
The
undersigned (Marques) further agree(s) to keep said merchandise insured against
fire to its full value, payable to the said bank, at the cost and expense of the
undersigned, who hereby further agree(s) to pay all charges for storage on said
merchandise or any or other expenses incurred thereon.
x
x x x10
Sometime
in August 1993, FEBIBI, upon the advice of FEBTC, facilitated the procurement
and processing from Makati Insurance Company of four separate and independent
fire insurance policies over the trust receipted merchandise: (1) Policy No.
BR-F-1016333, issued on 15 September 1993, covering the period 12 August 1993 to
12 November 1993 in the amount of P1,000,000.00;11
(2) Policy No. BR-F-1016888, issued on 15 September 1993 covering the period 8
September 1993 to 8 December 1993 in the amount of P605,494.28;12 (3) Policy No. BR-F-1016930,
issued on 18 October 1993, covering the period 14 October 1993 to 12 January
1994 in the amount of P527,723.66;13
and (4) Policy No. BR-F-1018392, issued on 14 December 1993, covering the
period 1 December 1993 to 1 March 1994 in the amount of P725,000.00.14 Maxilite paid the premiums for
these policies through debit arrangement. FEBTC would debit Maxilite’s account
for the premium payments, as reflected in statements of accounts sent by FEBTC
to Maxilite.
On 19
August 1994, Insurance Policy No. 1024439, covering the period 24 June 1994 to
24 June 1995, was released to cover the trust receipted merchandise. The policy
relevantly provides:
2. This policy including any renewal
thereof and/or any endorsement thereon is not in force until the premium has
been fully paid to and duly receipted by the Company in the manner provided
herein.
Any
supplementary agreement seeking to amend this condition prepared by agent,
broker or Company official, shall be deemed invalid and of no effect.15
Finding
that Maxilite failed to pay the insurance premium in the sum of P8,265.60
for Insurance Policy No. 1024439 covering the period 24 June 1994 to 24 June
1995, FEBIBI sent written reminders to FEBTC, dated 19 October 1994,16 24 January 1995,17 and 6 March 1995, to debit
Maxilite’s account.18
On 24 and
26 October 1994, Maxilite fully settled its trust receipt account.
On 9 March
1995, a fire gutted the Aboitiz Sea Transport Building along M.J. Cuenco
Avenue, Cebu City, where Maxilite’s office and warehouse were located. As a
result, Maxilite suffered losses amounting to at least P2.1 million,
which Maxilite claimed against the fire insurance policy with Makati Insurance
Company. Makati Insurance Company denied the fire loss claim on the ground of non-payment
of premium. FEBTC and FEBIBI disclaimed any responsibility for the denial of
the claim.
Maxilite
and Marques sued FEBTC, FEBIBI, and Makati Insurance Company. Maxilite prayed
for (1) actual damages totaling P2.3 million representing full insurance
coverage and “business opportunity losses,” (2) moral damages, and (3)
exemplary damages.19
On the other hand, Marques sought payment of actual, moral and exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses. Maxilite and Marques also
sought the issuance of a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining to
enjoin FEBTC from (1) imposing penalties on their obligations; (2) foreclosing
the real estate mortage securing their straight loan accounts; and (3)
initiating actions to collect their obligations.
FEBTC,
FEBIBI, and Makati Insurance Company countered that Maxilite and Marques have
no cause of action against them and essentially denied the allegations in the
complaint.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In ruling
in favor of Maxilite and Marques, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch
58, explained:
Considering
the interest of the defendant FEBTC in the property insured, hence, its concern
that the insurance policy therefor has to be effected and enforceable, and
considering that the payment of the premium thereof was the procedure adopted
by debiting the plaintiffs’ account, the Court is of the view that the
non-payment of the premium of the insurance policy in question was due to the
fault or negligence of the defendant FEBTC. What could have happened to the
interest of the defendant FEBTC in the insurance policy in question had the
fire occurred prior to the full settlement and payment of plaintiff’s Maxilite
trust receipt account? Would defendant FEBTC have tossed the blame on the
non-payment of premium to the plaintiffs?
Although
there were reminders by defendant FEBIBI of the non-payment of the premium, the
same were made by said defendant through the defendant FEBTC and not to the
plaintiffs directly. Despite said reminders, the first of which was made on
October 19, 1994 when plaintiff Maxilite has sufficient fund in its trust
receipt account, defendant FEBTC did not heed the same and more so did it not
care to pay the premium after the plaintiff Maxilite fully and finally settled
its trust receipt account with defendant FEBTC as the latter has already lost
its interest in the insurance policy in question by virtue of said full payment.
But despite the non-payment of the insurance premium, the defendant Makati
Insurance did not cancel the policy in question nor informed plaintiffs of its
cancellation if the insurance premium should not be paid. Just as defendant
FEBIBI failed to notify directly the plaintiffs of the said non-payment.
Considering the relationship of the three (3) defendants herein, as undeniably
sister companies, the non-payment of the premium of the insurance policy in
question should be imputable to their fault or negligence. Under the factual
milieu in the case at bar, the Court finds it just and equitable to hold said
defendants liable to pay all the consequent damages suffered by the plaintiffs
and their liability is solidary (Art. 2194, Civil Code).20
The trial
court disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants to pay
jointly and severally to the plaintiff Maxilite the sum of Two Million One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,100,000.00), Philippine Currency,
representing the full coverage of Insurance Policy No. 1024439 (Exh. ‘A’), as
actual damages, plus interest of 12% per annum from filing of Complaint on July
11, 1996 until fully paid, to the plaintiff Marque[s] the sum of P400,000.00
as moral damages, to both plaintiffs the sum of P500,000.00 as exemplary
damages, the sum of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees, the sum of P23,082.50,
representing the filing fees, as litigation expenses, and to pay the costs.
The
counter-claims are hereby dismissed.
The
writ of preliminary injunction is hereby made permanent.
SO
ORDERED.21
The Ruling of the Court of
Appeals
The Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, with modifications, on the
following grounds:
First,
the relations among defendants with each other are closely related and so
intertwined. The said three defendants, FEBTC, FEBIBI and MICI, are sister
companies. This was never denied by the defendants themselves.
Second,
the insurance coverage was the business of sister companies FEBIBI and Makati
Insurance, not with FEBTC, which has been the bank of plaintiffs which handled
the latter’s financing and related transactions. Stated a bit differently,
defendant FEBTC handled the financing and related requirements of plaintiffs;
defendant FEBIBI on the other hand is an insurance brokerage company of
defendant FEBTC, while Makati Insurance is the insurance (arm) company of both
defendants FEBIBI and FEBTC.
Third,
defendant FEBTC caused FEBIBI to facilitate the insurance coverage of
plaintiffs. FEBIBI then asked Makati Insurance to issue the subject policy.
Makati Insurance delivered the policy to FEBIBI which it tasked with the
collection of premium. FEBIBI in turn delivered the policy to FEBTC from where
it sought the payment of the premiums.
Fourth,
it must be noted that the cover note and policy was supposedly issued and made
effective on June 24, 1994, when the trust receipt account was still
outstanding and the insured merchandise was still theoretically owned by the
bank. Thus, for all intents and purposes, it was to the best interest and
protection of the bank to see to it that the goods were properly covered by
insurance.
Fifth,
the payment of premium has never been made an issue when the subject policy was
still separated into three. Or even after the said consolidation into one
policy (No. 1024439), still, payment of the premium has never become an issue.
x
x x x
For
another, if We were to believe defendants’ claim that the premium for the
subject policy was not paid, then defendants should have cancelled the policy
long before. But even up to the time the fire gutted plaintiffs’ warehouse in
March 1995, defendants acknowledged that the subject policy remained effective.
x x x
Furthermore,
there was no notice of cancellation or any communication from defendants sent
to plaintiffs that the policy shall be cancelled because of non-payment of
premiums. Thus, the more reasonable and logical conclusion is that the subject
policy was still fully in force because plaintiffs are still paying its
premiums and defendants are collecting the same through debit account.22
The Court of Appeals disposed of the case as follows:
UPON
THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, judgment appealed from is hereby MODIFIED in
such that:
a.
the interest shall be at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum to run from the
time of demand on April 11, 1995, in accordance with Article 1589 of the Civil
Code, until the finality of this decision;
b.
the moral damages of P400,000.00 is reduced to P50,000.00;
c.
the exemplary damages of P500,000.00 is reduced to P50,000.00;
and
d.
the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued lifted and set aside.
In
all other respects, judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED. Without pronouncement
as to costs.
SO
ORDERED.23
Hence, these petitions.
The Issues
In G.R. No.
171379, petitioners assail the Court of Appeals’ reduction of (1) the interest
rate from 12% to 6% per annum to be imposed on respondents’ liabilities; and
(2) the award of moral and exemplary damages. Petitioners also question the
portion of the Court of Appeals’ judgment allowing FEBTC to foreclose the real
estate mortgage securing petitioners’ loans and disallowing legal compensation
for the parties’ mutual obligations.
In G.R.
No. 171419, petitioners challenge the Court of Appeals’ findings that (1) the
premium for the subject insurance policy has in fact been paid; (2) FEBTC,
FEBIBI and Makati Insurance Company are jointly and severally liable to pay
respondents the full coverage of the subject insurance policy despite (a) their
separate juridical personalities; (b) the absence of any fault or negligence on
their part; and (c) respondents’ failure to prove the extent of the alleged
loss. Petitioners further impugn the award of damages and attorney’s fees.
The Court’s Ruling
The
petition in G.R. No. 171319 lacks merit, whereas the petition in G.R. No.
171419 is partially meritorious.
Essentially,
Maxilite and Marques invoke estoppel in claiming against FEBTC, FEBIBI, and
Makati Insurance Company the face value of the insurance policy. In their complaint,
Maxilite and Marques alleged they were led to believe and they in fact believed
that the settlement of Maxilite’s trust receipt account included the payment of
the insurance premium.24
Maxilite and Marques faulted FEBTC “if it failed to transmit the premium
payments on subject insurance coverage contrary to its represented standard
operating procedure of solely handling the insurance coverage and past practice
of debiting [Maxilite’s] account.”25
Article
1431 of the Civil Code defines estoppel as follows:
Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered
conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as
against the person relying thereon.
Meanwhile,
Section 2(a), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC.
2. Conclusive presumptions. – The following are instances of conclusive
presumptions:
(a)
Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally
and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing is true, and to act
upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration,
act or omission, be permitted to falsify it.
In
estoppel, a party creating an appearance of fact, which is false, is bound by
that appearance as against another person who acted in good faith on it.26 Estoppel is based on public
policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice.27
Its purpose is to forbid one to speak against his own act, representations, or
commitments to the injury of one who reasonably relied thereon.28 It springs from equity, and is designed
to aid the law in the administration of justice where without its aid injustice
might result.29
In Santiago
Syjuco, Inc. v. Castro,30
the Court stated that “estoppel may arise from silence as well as from words.” ‘Estoppel by silence’ arises where a
person, who by force of circumstances is obliged to another to speak, refrains
from doing so and thereby induces the other to believe in the existence of a
state of facts in reliance on which he acts to his prejudice.31 Silence may support an estoppel
whether the failure to speak is intentional or negligent.32
Both trial
and appellate courts basically agree that FEBTC is estopped from claiming that
the insurance premium has been unpaid. That FEBTC induced Maxilite and Marques
to believe that the insurance premium has in fact been debited from Maxilite’s
account is grounded on the the following facts: (1) FEBTC represented and
committed to handle Maxilite’s financing and capital requirements, including
the related transactions such as the insurance of the trust receipted
merchandise; (2) prior to the subject Insurance Policy No. 1024439, the
premiums for the three separate fire insurance policies had been paid through
automatic debit arrangement; (3) FEBIBI sent FEBTC, not Maxilite nor Marques,
written reminders dated 19 October 1994, 24 January 1995, and 6 March 1995 to
debit Maxilite’s account, establishing FEBTC’s obligation to automatically
debit Maxilite’s account for the premium amount; (4) there was no written
demand from FEBTC or Makati Insurance Company for Maxilite or Marques to pay
the insurance premium; (5) the subject insurance policy was released to
Maxilite on 19 August 1994; and (6) the subject insurance policy remained
uncancelled despite the alleged non-payment of the premium, making it appear
that the insurance policy remained in force and binding.
Moreover,
prior to the full settlement of the trust receipt account on 24 and 26 October
1994, FEBTC had insurable interest over the merchandise, and thus had greater
reason to debit Maxilite’s account. Further, as found by the trial court, and
apparently undisputed by FEBTC, FEBIBI and Makati Insurance Company, Maxilite
had sufficient funds at the time the first reminder, dated 19 October 1994, was
sent by FEBIBI to FEBTC to debit Maxilite’s account for the payment of the
insurance premium. Since (1) FEBTC committed to debit Maxilite’s account
corresponding to the insurance premium; (2) FEBTC had insurable interest over
the property prior to the settlement of the trust receipt account; and (3)
Maxilite’s bank account had sufficient funds to pay the insurance premium prior
to the settlement of the trust receipt account, FEBTC should have debited
Maxilite’s account as what it had repeatedly done, as an established practice,
with respect to the previous insurance policies. However, FEBTC failed to debit
and instead disregarded the written reminder from FEBIBI to debit Maxilite’s
account. FEBTC’s conduct clearly constitutes negligence in handling Maxilite’s
and Marques’ accounts. Negligence is defined as “the omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something
which a prudent man and reasonable man could not do.”33
As a consequence of its negligence, FEBTC must be held liable for
damages pursuant to Article 2176 of the Civil Code which states “whoever by act
or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done.” Indisputably, had the insurance premium
been paid, through the automatic debit arrangement with FEBTC, Maxilite’s fire
loss claim would have been approved. Hence, Maxilite suffered damage to the
extent of the face value of the insurance policy or the sum of P2.1
million.
Contrary
to Maxilite’s and Marques’ view, FEBTC is solely liable for the payment of the
face value of the insurance policy and the monetary awards stated in the Court
of Appeals’ decision. Suffice it to state that FEBTC, FEBIBI, and Makati
Insurance Company are independent and separate juridical
entities, even if FEBIBI and Makati Insurance Company are subsidiaries of
FEBTC. Absent any showing of its illegitimate or illegal functions, a
subsidiary’s separate existence shall be respected, and the liability of the
parent corporation as well as the subsidiary shall be confined to those arising
in their respective business.34
Besides, the records are bereft of any evidence warranting the piercing
of corporate veil in order to treat FEBTC, FEBIBI, and Makati Insurance Company as a single entity. Likewise, there is no
evidence showing FEBIBI’s and Makati Insurance Company’s negligence as regards
the non-payment of the insurance premium.
The Court
agrees with the Court of Appeals in reducing the interest rate from 12% to 6% as the obligation to pay does not arise from a loan
or forbearance of money. In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,35
the Court laid down the following guidelines for the application of the proper
interest rates:
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e.,
law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the
contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on
“Damages” of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable
damages.
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of
actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual
thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a
sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest
due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the
interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially
demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per
annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or
extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the
Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of
money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed
at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest,
however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or
until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly,
where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall
begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially
(Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably
established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run
only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification
of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base
for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be . . . the amount
finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final
and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under
paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality
until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an
equivalent to forbearance of credit. (Emphasis supplied)
With
respect to Maxilite’s and Marques’ invocation of legal compensation, we find
the same devoid of merit. Aside from their bare allegations, there is no clear
and convincing evidence that legal compensation exists in this case. In other
words, Maxilite and Marques failed to establish the essential elements of legal
compensation. Therefore, Maxilite’s and Marques’ claim of legal compensation
must fail.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM with
MODIFICATION the 31 May 2005 Decision and the 26 January 2006 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals-Cebu City in CA-G.R. CV No. 62105. Only Far East Bank and
Trust Company, and not Far East Bank Insurance Brokers, Inc. or Makati
Insurance Company, is ORDERED to PAY the face value of the
subject insurance policy and the monetary awards stated in the Court of
Appeals’ decision.
SO
ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
JOSE C.
MENDOZA
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
* Designated additional member per Raffle dated
9 June 2010.
1 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2 Rollo
(G.R. No. 171419), pp. 94-113. Penned by Associate Justice Vicente L. Yap, with
Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Enrico A. Lanzanas concurring.
3 Id. at 114-118.
4 Id. at 631-664. Penned by Judge Jose P.
Soberano, Jr.
5 FEBTC has been merged with Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI), which is the surviving corporation.
6 Rollo (G.R. No. 171379), p. 157.
7 Now known as BPI/MS Insurance Corporation
(BPI/MS-IC), id. at 198.
8 Rollo
(G.R. No. 171419), p. 330; TSN, 9 February 1998, p. 20.
9 Id. at 251.
10 Id. at 225; TSN, 31 July 1997, p. 8 (Benjamin
Torno).
11 Id. at 306.
12 Id. at 309.
13 Id. at 310.
14 Id. at 308.
15 Id. at 414.
16 Id. at 403.
17 Id. at 404.
18 Id. at 405.
19 Id. at 616-617.
20 Id. at 661-662.
21 Id. at 663-664.
22 Id. at 107-109.
23 Id. at 112-113.
24 Id. at 605.
25 Id. at 608.
26 Aquino, Ramon C., The Civil Code of the
Philippines, Vol. 2, 1990 Edition, p. 508, citing Strong v. Gutierrez Repide,
6 Phil. 680, 685.
27 Id. at 509.
28 Id.
29 Id., citing 28 Am Jur 2nd 28; PNB
v. Perez, 183 Phil. 54 (1979); Lazo v. Republic Surety & Ins. Co.,
Inc., 142 Phil. 158 (1970).
30 G.R. No. 70403, 7 July 1989, 175
SCRA 171, 192, citing 31 C.J.S., pp. 490-494.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Bank of the Philippine Islands v.
Suaez, G.R. No. 167750, 15 March 2010, 615 SCRA
291, 298.
34 Nisce v. Equitable PCI Bank,
Inc.,
G.R. No. 167434, 19 February 2007, 516 SCRA 231, 258.
35 G.R. No. 97412, 12 July 1994, 234
SCRA 78, 95-97.