Republic of the
Supreme Court
FIRST DIVISION
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ISLRIZ TRADING/ VICTOR HUGO LU, |
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G.R. No. 168501 |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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- versus- |
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EFREN CAPADA, LAURO LICUP, NORBERTO NIGOS, RONNIE ABEL, GODOFREDO MAGNAYE,
ARNEL SIBERRE, EDMUNDO CAPADA, NOMERLITO MAGNAYE and ALBERTO DELA VEGA, |
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VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, PEREZ, JJ. Promulgated: |
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Respondents. |
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January
31, 2011 |
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D E C I S I O N
We reiterate in this petition the
settled view that employees are entitled to their accrued salaries during the
period between the Labor Arbiter’s order of reinstatement pending appeal and
the resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) overturning
that of the Labor Arbiter. Otherwise
stated, even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on
appeal, the employer is still obliged to reinstate and pay the wages of the
employee during the period of appeal until reversal by a higher court or
tribunal. In this case, respondents are
entitled to their accrued salaries from the time petitioner received a copy of
the Decision of the Labor Arbiter declaring respondents’ termination illegal
and ordering their reinstatement up to the date of the NLRC resolution
overturning that of the Labor Arbiter.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari
assails the Decision[1]
dated
Factual Antecedents
Respondents Efren Capada, Lauro
Licup, Norberto Nigos and Godofredo Magnaye were drivers while respondents Ronnie
Abel, Arnel Siberre, Edmundo Capada, Nomerlito Magnaye and Alberto Dela Vega
were helpers of Islriz Trading, a gravel and sand business owned and
operated by petitioner Victor Hugo Lu.
Claiming that they were illegally dismissed, respondents filed a
Complaint[3]
for illegal dismissal and non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, rest day pay,
allowances and separation pay against petitioner on August 9, 2000 before the
Labor Arbiter. On his part, petitioner
imputed abandonment of work against respondents.
Proceedings
before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
On
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1.
Declaring
respondent ISLRIZ TRADING guilty of illegal dismissal.
2.
Ordering
respondent to reinstate complainants to their former positions without loss of
seniority rights and the payment of full backwages from date of dismissal to
actual reinstatement which are computed as follows: (As of date of decision);
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1. EFREN
CAPADA |
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2. LAURO
LICUP |
87,040.00 (5,440.00X16) |
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3. NORBERTO
NIGOS |
87,040.00 (5,440.00X16) |
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4. RONNIE
ABEL |
76,800.00 (4,800.00X16) |
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5. GODOFREDO
MAGNAYE |
102,400.00 (6,400.00X16) |
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6. ARNEL
SIBERRE |
51,200.00 (3,200.00X16) |
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7. EDMUNDO CAPADA |
76,800.00 (4,800.00X16) |
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8. NOMERLITO MAGNAYE |
76,800.00 (4,800.00X16) |
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9. ALBERTO DELA VEGA |
51,200.00 (3,200.00X16) |
3.
Ordering
respondent to pay complainants 10% of the total monetary award as attorney’s
fees.
All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO
ORDERED.[5]
Aggrieved, petitioner
appealed[6]
to the NLRC which granted the appeal. The NLRC set aside the Decision of Labor
Arbiter Gan in a Resolution[7]
dated September 5, 2002. Finding that
respondents’ failure to continue working for petitioner was neither caused by termination
nor abandonment of work, the NLRC ordered respondents’ reinstatement but without
backwages. The dispositive portion of
said Resolution reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is
GRANTED and the Decision dated 21 December 2001 is hereby ordered SET ASIDE.
A New Decision is hereby rendered finding that the
failure to work of complainants-appellees is neither occasioned by termination (n)or
abandonment of work, hence, respondents-appellants shall reinstate complainants-appellees
to their former positions without backwages within ten (10) days from receipt
of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Respondents
filed a Motion for Reconsideration[9]
thereto but same was likewise denied in a Resolution[10]
dated
On December 9,
2003, however, respondents filed with the Labor Arbiter an Ex-Parte Motion to Set Case for Conference
with Motion.[12] They averred therein that since the Decision
of Labor Arbiter Gan ordered their reinstatement, a Writ of Execution[13]
dated April 22, 2002 was already issued for the enforcement of its
reinstatement aspect as same is immediately executory even pending appeal. But this notwithstanding and despite the
issuance and subsequent finality of the NLRC Resolution which likewise ordered
respondents’ reinstatement, petitioner still refused to reinstate them. Thus, respondents prayed that in view of the
orders of reinstatement, a computation of the award of backwages be made and
that an Alias Writ of Execution for its enforcement be issued.
The case was then
set for pre-execution conference on January 29, February 24 and P1,110,665.60 computed as follows:
Accrued Salary from
1. Efren
Capada P
6,400.00 x 24.97 months P 159,808.00
2. Lauro
Licup P 5,440.00 x 24.97 months P 135,836.80
3. Norberto
Nigos P 5,440.00 x 24.97 months P 135,836.80
4. Ronnie
Abel P 4,800.00 x 24.97 months P 119,856.00
5.
Godofredo Magnaye P 6,400.00 x 24.97 months P 159,808.00
6. Arnel
Siberre P 3,200.00
x 24.97 months P 79,
904.00
7. Edmundo
Capada P 4,800.00
x 24.97 months P 119, 856.00
8.
Nomerlito Magnaye P 4,800.00 x 24.97 months P 119, 856.00
9. Alberto
de la Vega P
3,200.00 x 24.97 months P 79,
904.00
Total P 1,110,665.60
Petitioner questioned
this computation in his Motion/Manifestation[15] claiming that
said computation was without any factual or legal basis considering that Labor
Arbiter Gan’s Decision had already been reversed and set aside by the NLRC and
that therefore there should be no monetary award.
Nevertheless, Labor
Arbiter Danna M. Castillon (Castillon) still issued a Writ of Execution[16]
dated March 9, 2004 to enforce the monetary award in accordance with the abovementioned
computation. Accordingly, the Sheriff issued
a Notice of Sale/Levy on Execution of
Personal Property[17] by virtue of which
petitioner’s properties were levied and set for auction sale on March 29,
2004. In an effort to forestall this
impending execution, petitioner then filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution with Prayer to Hold in Abeyance of
Auction Sale[18]
and a Supplemental Motion to
Quash/Stop Auction Sale.[19] He also served upon the Sheriff a
letter of protest.[20] All of these protest actions proved futile as
the Sheriff later submitted his Report dated March 30, 2004 informing the Labor
Arbiter that he had levied some of petitioner’s personal properties and sold
them in an auction sale where respondents were the only bidders. After each of the respondents entered a bid
equal to their individual shares in the judgment award, the levied properties
were awarded to them.
Later,
respondents claimed that although petitioner’s levied properties were already awarded
to them, they could not take full control, ownership and possession of said
properties because petitioner had allegedly padlocked the premises where the
properties were situated. Hence, they
asked Labor Arbiter Castillon to issue a break-open order.[21]
For his part and in a last ditch effort
to nullify the writ of execution, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution, Notice of Sale/Levy on Execution of
Personal Property and Auction Sale on Additional Grounds.[22] He reiterated that since the NLRC Resolution
which reversed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter ordered respondents’
reinstatement without payment of backwages or other monetary award, only the
execution of reinstatement sans any backwages or monetary award should
be enforced. It is his position that the
Writ of Execution dated March 9, 2004 ordering the Sheriff to collect respondents’
accrued salaries of P1,110,665.60 plus P1,096.00 execution fees
or the total amount of P1,111,761.60, in effect illegally amended the
said NLRC Resolution; hence, said writ of execution is null and void. And, as the writ is null and void, it follows
that the Labor Arbiter cannot issue a break-open order. In sum, petitioner prayed that the Writ of
Execution be quashed and all proceedings subsequent to it be declared null and
void and that respondents’ Urgent Motion for Issuance of Break Open Order be denied
for lack of merit.
Both motions were resolved in an
Order[23]
dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to
Quash Writ of Execution [and] Notice of Sale/Levy on Execution Sale filed by
the respondent(s) [are] hereby DENIED.
In view of the refusal of the respondents’ entry to its premises, Deputy
Sheriff S. Diega of this Office is hereby ordered to break-open the entrance of
the premises of respondent wherein the properties are located.
For this purpose, he may secure the assistance of
the local police officer having jurisdiction over the locality where the said
properties are located.
SO ORDERED.[26]
Undeterred, petitioner brought
the matter to the CA through a Petition for Certiorari.
Proceedings
before the Court of Appeals
Before the CA,
petitioner imputed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
upon Labor Arbiter Castillon for issuing the questioned Writ of Execution and
the Order dated June 3, 2004. He maintained
that since the December 21, 2001 Decision of Labor Arbiter Gan has already been
reversed and set aside by the September 5, 2002 Resolution of the NLRC, the
Writ of Execution issued by Labor Arbiter Castillon should have confined itself
to the said NLRC Resolution which ordered respondents’ reinstatement without
backwages. Hence, when Labor Arbiter
Castillon issued the writ commanding the Sheriff to satisfy the monetary award
in the amount of P1,111,761.60, she
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. For the same reason, her
issuance of the Order dated June 3, 2004 denying petitioner’s Motion to Quash Writ of Execution with
Prayer to Hold in Abeyance Auction Sale and granting respondents’ Urgent Motion for Issuance of Break Open
Order is likewise tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Aside from these, petitioner also questioned
the conduct of the auction sale. He likewise claimed that he was denied due
process because he was not given the opportunity to file a motion for
reconsideration of the Order denying his Motion
to Quash Writ of Execution considering that a break-open order was also
made in the same Order. For their part,
respondents posited that since they have already disposed of petitioner’s
levied properties, the petition has already become moot.
In a Decision[27]
dated March 18, 2005, the CA quoted the June 3, 2004 Order of Labor Arbiter
Castillon and agreed with her ratiocination that pursuant to Article 223 of the
Labor Code, what is sought to be enforced by the subject Writ of Execution is
the accrued salaries owing to respondents by reason of the reinstatement order
of Labor Arbiter Gan. The CA also found
as unmeritorious the issues raised by petitioner with regard to the conduct of
the auction sale. Moreover, it did not
give weight to petitioner’s claim of lack of due process considering that a
motion for reconsideration of a Writ of Execution is not an available
remedy. Thus, the CA dismissed the
petition. Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration[28]
suffered the same fate as it was also denied in a Resolution[29]
dated June 16, 2005.
Hence, petitioner is now before this
Court through this Petition for Review on Certiorari where he presents
the following issues:
1.
Whether the
provision of Article 223 of the Labor Code is applicable to this case x x x.
2.
Whether x x x
the Decision dated March 18, 2005 and the Resolution dated June 16, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to law and jurisprudence[.]
3.
Whether x x x
the award of accrued salaries has legal and factual bases[.][30]
The
Parties’ Arguments
Petitioner contends that the assailed
Decision and Resolution of the CA are contrary to law and jurisprudence. This is because in upholding the issuance of
the questioned Writ of Execution for the enforcement of respondents’ accrued
salaries, said Decision and Resolution, in effect, altered the NLRC Resolution
which only decreed respondents’ reinstatement without backwages. Moreover, he
posits that Article 223 of the Labor Code only applies
when an employee has been illegally dismissed from work. And since in this case the NLRC ruled that
respondents’ failure to continue working for petitioner was not occasioned by
termination, there is no illegal dismissal to speak of, hence, said provision
of the Labor Code does not apply. Lastly,
petitioner claims that the computation of respondents’ accrued salaries in the
total amount of P1,110,665.60 has no legal and factual bases since as
repeatedly pointed out by him, the NLRC Resolution reversing the Labor
Arbiter’s Decision has already ordered respondents’ reinstatement without
backwages after it found that there was no illegal termination.
Respondents, on the other
hand, maintain that the CA did not err in applying Article 223 of the Labor
Code to the instant case. They thus
contend that the computation of their accrued salaries covering the period
during which they were supposed to have been reinstated or from
Our Ruling
The petition is
not meritorious.
The core
issue to be resolved in this case is similar to the one determined in Garcia
v. Philippine Airlines Inc.,[31] that is,
whether respondents may collect their wages during the period between the Labor
Arbiter’s order of reinstatement pending appeal and the NLRC Resolution
overturning that of the Labor Arbiter.
In order to provide a thorough
discussion of the present case, an overview of Garcia is proper.
In Garcia, petitioners therein were
dismissed by Philippine Airlines Inc. (PAL) after they were allegedly caught in
the act of sniffing shabu during a raid at the
In
resolving the case, the Court examined its conflicting rulings with respect to
the application of paragraph 3 of Article 223 of the Labor Code, viz:
At the core of the seeming divergence is the
application of paragraph 3 of Article 223 of the Labor Code which reads:
‘In any event, the decision of
the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the
reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory,
pending appeal. The employee
shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions
prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the
employer, merely reinstated in the payroll.
The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for
reinstatement provided herein.’
The view as maintained in a number of cases is
that:
‘x x x [E]ven if
the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is
obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the
dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher
court. On the other hand, if the
employee has been reinstated during the appeal period and such reinstatement
order is reversed with finality, the employee is not required to
reimburse whatever salary he received for he is entitled to such, more so if he
actually rendered services during the period.
In other words, a dismissed employee whose case
was favorably decided by the Labor Arbiter is entitled to receive wages pending
appeal upon reinstatement, which is immediately executory. Unless there is a restraining order, it is
ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to implement the order of reinstatement and
it is mandatory on the employer to comply therewith.
The
opposite view is articulated in Genuino which states:
‘If
the decision of the labor arbiter is later reversed on appeal upon the finding
that the ground for dismissal is valid, then the employer has the right to
require the dismissed employee on payroll reinstatement to refund the
salaries s/he received while the case was pending appeal, or it can be
deducted from the accrued benefits that the dismissed employee was entitled to receive from
his/her employer under existing laws, collective bargaining agreement
provisions, and company practices.
However, if the employee was reinstated to work during the pendency of
the appeal, then the employee is entitled to the compensation received for
actual services rendered without need of refund.
x x
x x’
It has thus been advanced
that there is no point in releasing the wages to petitioners since their
dismissal was found to be valid, and to do so would constitute unjust
enrichment.” (Emphasis, italics and underscoring in the original; citations
omitted.)[32]
The Court then stressed that as opposed to the
abovementioned Genuino v. National Labor Relations Commission,[33] the social
justice principles of labor law outweigh or render inapplicable the civil law
doctrine of unjust enrichment. It then
went on to examine the precarious implication of the “refund doctrine” as
enunciated in Genuino, thus:
[T]he “refund doctrine” easily demonstrates how a
favorable decision by the Labor Arbiter could harm, more than help, a dismissed
employee. The employee, to make both
ends meet, would necessarily have to use up the salaries received during the
pendency of the appeal, only to end up having to refund the sum in case of a
final unfavorable decision. It is mirage
of a stop-gap leading the employee to a risky cliff of insolvency.
Advisably, the sum is
better left unspent. It becomes more
logical and practical for the employee to refuse payroll reinstament and simply
find work elsewhere in the interim, if any is available. Notably, the option of payroll reinstatement
belongs to the employer, even if the employee is able and raring to return to
work. Prior to Genuino, it is
unthinkable for one to refuse payroll reinstatement. In the face of the grim possibilities, the
rise of concerned employees declining payroll reinstatement is on the horizon.
Further, the Genuino ruling
not only disregards the social justice principles behind the rule, but also
institutes a scheme unduly favorable to management. Under such scheme, the salaries dispensed pendente
lite merely serve as a bond posted in installment by the
employer. For in the event of a reversal
of the Labor Arbiter’s decision ordering reinstatement, the employer gets back
the same amount without having to spend ordinarily for bond premiums. This circumvents, if not directly
contradicts, the proscription that the “posting of a bond [even a cash bond] by
the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement. [Underscoring in
the original][34]
In view
of this, the Court held this stance in Genuino as a stray posture and
realigned the proper course of the prevailing doctrine on reinstatement pending
appeal vis-à-vis the effect of a reversal on appeal, that is, even if the
order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is
obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the
dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher
court or tribunal. It likewise
settled the view that the Labor Arbiter’s order of reinstatement is
immediately executory and the employer has to either re-admit them to work
under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to their dismissal, or to
reinstate them in the payroll, and that failing to exercise the options in the
alternative, employer must pay the employee’s salaries.
The
discussion, however, did not stop there.
The court went on to declare that after the Labor Arbiter’s decision
is reversed by a higher tribunal, the employee may be barred from collecting
the accrued wages, if it is shown that the delay in enforcing the reinstatement
pending appeal was without fault on the part of the employer. It then provided for the two-fold test in
determining whether an employee is barred from recovering his accrued wages, to
wit: (1) there must be actual delay or that the order of reinstatement pending
appeal was not executed prior to its reversal; and (2) the delay must not be
due to the employer’s unjustified act or omission. If the delay is due to the employer’s
unjustified refusal, the employer may still be required to pay the salaries
notwithstanding the reversal of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision. In Garcia,
after it had been established that there was clearly a delay in the execution
of the reinstatement order, the court proceeded to ascertain whether same was
due to PAL’s unjustified act or omission.
In so doing, it upheld the CA’s finding that the peculiar predicament of
a corporate rehabilitation rendered it impossible for PAL, under the
circumstances, to exercise its option under Article 223 of the Labor Code. The suspension of claims dictated by
rehabilitation procedure therefore constitutes a justification for PAL’s
failure to exercise the alternative options of actual reinstatement or payroll
reinstatement. Because of this, the
Court held that PAL’s obligation to pay the salaries pending appeal, as the
normal effect of the non-exercise of the options, did not attach. Simply put, petitioners cannot anymore
collect their accrued salaries during the period between the Labor Arbiter’s
order of reinstatement pending appeal and the NLRC Resolution overturning that
of the Labor Arbiter because PAL’s failure to actually reinstate them or effect
payroll reinstatement was justified by the latter’s situation of being under
corporate rehabilitation.
Application of the Two-Fold Test
to the present case
As previously mentioned, the vital question that needs to be answered in
the case at bar is: Can respondents
collect their accrued salaries for the period between the Labor Arbiter’s order
of reinstatement pending appeal and the NLRC Resolution overturning that of the
Labor Arbiter? If in the
affirmative, the assailed CA Decision and Resolution which affirmed the June 3,
2004 Order of Labor Arbiter Castillon denying the Motion to Quash Writ of
Execution and ordering the break-open of petitioner’s premises as well as the
issuance of the subject Writ of Execution itself, have to be upheld. Otherwise, they need to be set aside as what petitioner
would want us to do.
To come up with the answer to said question, we shall apply the two-fold
test used in Garcia.
Was there an actual delay or was the order of reinstatement pending
appeal executed prior to its reversal? As can be recalled, Labor Arbiter Gan issued
his Decision ordering respondents’ reinstatement on December 21, 2001, copy of
which was allegedly received by petitioner on February 21, 2002.[35] On March 4, 2002, petitioner appealed said
decision to the NLRC. A few days later
or on
Now, the next question is: Was the delay not due to the employer’s
unjustified act or omission? Unlike
in Garcia where PAL, as the employer, was then under corporate
rehabilitation, Islriz Trading here did not undergo rehabilitation or was under
any analogous situation which would justify petitioner’s non-exercise of the
options provided under Article 223 of the Labor Code. Notably, what petitioner gave as reason in not
immediately effecting reinstatement after he was served with the Writ of
Execution dated April 22, 2002 was that he would first refer the matter to his
counsel as he could not effectively act on the order of execution without the
latter’s advice.[37] He gave his word that upon conferment with his
lawyer, he will inform the Office of the Labor Arbiter of his action on the
writ. Petitioner, however, without any
satisfactory reason, failed to fulfill this promise and respondents remained to
be not reinstated until the NLRC resolved petitioner’s appeal. Evidently, the delay in the execution of respondents’
reinstatement was due to petitioner’s unjustified refusal to effect the same.
Hence, the conclusion is that respondents have the right to collect
their accrued salaries during the period between the Labor Arbiter’s Decision
ordering their reinstatement pending appeal and the NLRC Resolution overturning
the same because petitioner’s failure to reinstate them either actually or
through payroll was due to petitioner’s unjustified refusal to effect reinstatement. In order to enforce this, Labor Arbiter
Castillon thus correctly issued the Writ of Execution dated March 9, 2004 as
well as the Order dated June 3, 2004 denying petitioner’s Motion to Quash Writ of Execution and
granting respondents’ Urgent Motion
for Issuance of Break-Open Order.
Consequently, we find no error on the part of the CA in upholding these
issuances and in dismissing the petition for certiorari before it.
Having settled this, we find it unnecessary to discuss further the
issues raised by petitioner except the one with respect to the computation of
respondents’ accrued salaries.
Correctness of the Computation of
Respondents’ Accrued Salaries
Petitioner contends that
respondents’ accrued salaries in the total amount of P1,110,665.60 have
no factual and legal bases. This is because
of his obstinate belief that the NLRC’s reversal of Labor Arbiter Gan’s Decision
has effectively removed the basis for such award.
Although we do not agree with petitioner’s line of reasoning, we,
however, find incorrect the computation made by Fiscal Examiner Trinchera.
In Kimberly Clark (Phils.), Inc., v. Facundo,[38]
we held that:
[T]he
Labor Arbiter’s order of reinstatement was immediately executory. After receipt
of the Labor Arbiter’s decision ordering private respondents’ reinstatement,
petitioner has to either re-admit them to work under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to their dismissal, or to reinstate them in the
payroll. Failing to exercise the
options in the alternative, petitioner must pay private respondents’ salaries which
automatically accrued from notice of the Labor Arbiter’s order of reinstatement
until its ultimate reversal of the NLRC.
x x x x
x x x
[S]ince private respondent’s reinstatement pending appeal was effective only
until its reversal by the NLRC on April 28, 1999, they are no longer
entitled to salaries from May 1, 1999 to March 15, 2001, as ordered by the
Labor Arbiter. (Emphasis supplied)
To clarify, respondents are entitled to their
accrued salaries only from the time petitioner received a copy of Labor Arbiter
Gan’s Decision declaring respondents’ termination illegal and ordering their
reinstatement up to the date of the NLRC Resolution overturning that of the Labor
Arbiter. This is because it is only
during said period that respondents are deemed to have been illegally dismissed
and are entitled to reinstatement pursuant to Labor Arbiter Gan’s Decision
which was the one in effect at that time.
Beyond that period, the NLRC Resolution declaring that there was no
illegal dismissal is already the one prevailing. From such point, respondents’ salaries did
not accrue not only because there is no more illegal dismissal to speak of but
also because respondents have not yet been actually reinstated and have not
rendered services to petitioner.
Fiscal Examiner Trinchera’s
computation of respondents’ accrued salaries covered the period January 1, 2002
to January 30, 2004. As there was no
showing when petitioner actually received a copy of Labor Arbiter Gan’s
decision except for petitioner’s self-serving claim that he received the same
on February 21, 2002,[39]
we are at a loss as to how Fiscal Examiner Trinchera came up with January 1,
2002 as the reckoning point for computing respondents’ accrued wages. We
likewise wonder why it covered the period up to January 30, 2004 when on
September 5, 2002, the NLRC already promulgated its Resolution reversing that
of the Labor Arbiter. Hence, we deem it
proper to remand the records of this case to the Labor Arbiter for the correct
computation of respondents’ accrued wages which shall commence from petitioner’s
date of receipt of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision ordering reinstatement up to
the date of the NLRC Resolution reversing the same. Considering, however, that petitioner’s
levied properties have already been awarded to respondents and as alleged by
the latter, have also already been sold to third persons, respondents are
ordered to make the proper restitution to petitioner for whatever excess amount
received by them based on the correct computation.
As a final note, since it appears that petitioner still failed to
reinstate respondents pursuant to the final and executory Resolution of the
NLRC, respondents’ proper recourse now is to move for the execution of the
same. It is worthy to note that Labor
Arbiter Castillon stated in her questioned Order of
NOW THEREFORE, you are commanded to proceed to the
premises of respondents Islriz Trading/Victor Hugo C. Lu located at Brgy.
Luciano Trece Martires[,] Cavite City or wherever it may be found to collect
the amount of One Million One Hundred Eleven Thousand Seven Hundred Sixty One
pesos & 60/100 (P1,111,761.60) inclusive [of] P1,096.00 as
execution fees and turn over the said amount to the NLRC Cashier for further
disposition. In case you fail to collect
the said amount in cash, you are directed to cause the satisfaction of the same
out of respondents’ chattels, movable/immovable properties not exempt from
execution. You are directed to return
these Writ One Hundred Eighty (180) days from receipt hereof, together with the
report of compliance.
SO ORDERED.[40]
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari
is DENIED. The assailed March 18, 2005 Decision and June
16, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84744 are AFFIRMED. The records of this case are ordered REMANDED
to the Office of the Labor Arbiter for the correct computation of respondents’
accrued salaries covering the date of petitioner’s receipt of the December 21,
2001 Decision of the Labor Arbiter up to the issuance of the NLRC Resolution on
September 5, 2002. Respondents are
ordered to make the proper restitution to petitioner
for whatever excess amount
which may be
determined to
have been received by them based on the correct computation.
SO
ORDERED.
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate
Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate
Justice |
JOSE
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] CA rollo, pp. 165-181; penned by Associate Justice Vicente S. E. Veloso and concurred in by Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Amelita G. Tolentino.
[2]
[3] Rollo, p. 57-58.
[4]
[5]
[6] See petitioners’ Notice of Appeal, Memorandum of Appeal and Joint Affidavit, id. at 66-71.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] CA rollo, pp. 69-71.
[13] Rollo, pp. 80-82.
[14]
[15]
[16]
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[19]
[20]
[21] Urgent Motion for Issuance of Break Open Order, id. at 116-119.
[22]
[23]
[24] Labor Code, Article 223, par. 3 provides:
“In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.”
[25] 449 Phil 437, 446 (2003).
[26] Rollo,
p. 132.
[27] CA rollo, pp. 165-181.
[28]
[29]
[30] Rollo, p. 13.
[31] G.R. No. 164856, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 479.
[32]
[33] G.R. Nos. 142732-33 & 142753-54, December 4, 2007, 539 SCRA 342.
[34] Garcia
v. Philippine Airlines Inc., supra note 31 at 491-492.
[35] As alleged by petitioners in their Notice of Appeal, Memorandum of Appeal and Joint Affidavit, rollo, pp. 66-71.
[36] Please see page 2 of the Writ of Execution dated April 22, 2002, id. at 80-82.
[37] See Sheriff’s Return, id. at 223.
[38] G.R. No. 144885 (Unsigned Resolution),
[39] Supra note 30.
[40] Rollo, p. 106.