Republic
of the Philippines
Supreme
Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
|
JOSE REYNALDO
B. OCHOSA, Petitioner, - versus - BONA J. ALANO and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 167459
Present: CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson, VELASCO,
JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, DEL CASTILLO, and PEREZ, JJ. Promulgated: January
26, 2011 |
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LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision[1]
dated October 11, 2004 as well as the Resolution[2]
dated March 10, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65120, which
reversed and set aside the Decision[3]
dated January 11, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140
in Civil Case No. 97-2903. In the said
January 11, 1999 Decision, the trial court granted petitioner Jose Reynaldo
Ochosa’s (Jose) petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage between him
and private respondent Bona J. Alano (Bona).
The relevant facts of this case, as
outlined by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
It appears that Jose met Bona in August 1973 when he
was a young lieutenant in the AFP while the latter was a seventeen-year-old
first year college drop-out. They had a whirlwind romance that culminated into
sexual intimacy and eventual marriage on 27 October 1973 before the Honorable
Judge Cesar S. Principe in Basilan. The couple did not acquire any property. Neither
did they incur any debts. Their union produced no offspring. In 1976, however,
they found an abandoned and neglected one-year-old baby girl whom they later
registered as their daughter, naming her Ramona Celeste Alano Ochosa.
During their marriage, Jose was often assigned to
various parts of the Philippine archipelago as an officer in the AFP. Bona did
not cohabit with him in his posts, preferring to stay in her hometown of
Basilan. Neither did Bona visit him in his areas of assignment, except in one
(1) occasion when Bona stayed with him for four (4) days.
Sometime in 1985, Jose was appointed as the
Battalion Commander of the Security Escort Group. He and Bona, along with
Ramona, were given living quarters at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City where they
resided with their military aides.
In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion for his
alleged participation in the failed coup d’etat. He was incarcerated in Camp
Crame.
It appears that Bona was an unfaithful spouse. Even
at the onset of their marriage when Jose was assigned in various parts of the
country, she had illicit relations with other men. Bona apparently did not
change her ways when they lived together at Fort Bonifacio; she entertained
male visitors in her bedroom whenever Jose was out of their living quarters. On
one occasion, Bona was caught by Demetrio Bajet y Lita, a security aide, having
sex with Jose’s driver, Corporal Gagarin. Rumors of Bona’s sexual infidelity
circulated in the military community. When Jose could no longer bear these rumors,
he got a military pass from his jail warden and confronted Bona.
During their confrontation, Bona admitted her
relationship with Corporal Gagarin who also made a similar admission to Jose.
Jose drove Bona away from their living quarters. Bona left with Ramona and went
to Basilan.
In 1994, Ramona left Bona and came to live with
Jose. It is Jose who is currently supporting the needs of Ramona.
Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 97-2903 with the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 140, seeking to nullify his marriage to Bona on the ground of the
latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations of
marriage.
Summons with a copy of the petition and its annexes
were duly served upon Bona who failed to file any responsive pleading during
the reglementary period.
Pursuant to the order of the trial court, the Public
Prosecutor conducted an investigation to determine whether there was collusion
between the parties. Said prosecutor submitted a report that she issued a
subpoena to both parties but only Jose appeared; hence, it can not be
reasonably determined whether or not there was collusion between them.
Trial on the merits of the case ensued. Petitioner along with his two military aides,
Gertrudes Himpayan Padernal and Demetrio Bajet y Lita, testified about
respondent’s marital infidelity during the marriage.
The fourth and final witness was Elizabeth E.
Rondain, a psychiatrist, who testified that after conducting several tests, she
reached the conclusion that respondent was suffering from histrionic
personality disorder which she described as follows:
“Her personality is that she has an excessive
emotion and attention seeking behavior. So therefore they don’t develop
sympathy in feelings and they have difficulty in maintaining emotional
intimacy. In the case of Mr. Ochosa he has been a military man. It is his duty
to be transferred in different areas in the Philippines. And while he is being
transferred from one place to another because of his assignments as a military
man, Mrs. Bona Alano refused to follow him in all his assignments. There were
only few occasions in which she followed him. And during those times that they
were not living together, because of the assignments of Mr. Ochosa she
developed extra marital affair with other man of which she denied in the
beginning but in the latter part of their relationship she admitted it to Mr.
Ochosa that she had relationship with respondent’s driver. I believe with this
extra marital affair that is her way of seeking attention and seeking emotions
from other person and not from the husband. And of course, this is not
fulfilling the basic responsibility in a marriage.”
According to Rondain, respondent’s psychological
disorder was traceable to her family history, having for a father a gambler and
a womanizer and a mother who was a battered wife. There was no possibility of a
cure since respondent does not have an insight of what is happening to her and
refused to acknowledge the reality.
With the conclusion of the witnesses’ testimonies,
petitioner formally offered his evidence and rested his case.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submitted
its opposition to the petition on the ground that “the factual settings in the
case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required
to decree a nullity of marriage (Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA 20 [1995]).”
In
a Decision dated 11 January 1999, the trial court granted the petition and
nullified the parties’ marriage on the following findings, viz:
x x x x
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides
as follows:
‘A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.’
Such a ground to be invalidative (sic) of marriage,
the degree of incapacity must exhibit GRAVITY, ANTECEDENCE and INCURABILITY.
From the evidence presented, the Court finds that
the psychological incapacity of the respondent exhibited GRAVITY, ANTECEDENCE
and INCURABILITY.
It is grave because the respondent did not carry out
the normal and ordinary duties of marriage and family shouldered by any average
couple existing under everyday circumstances of life and work. The gravity was
manifested in respondent’s infidelity as testified to by the petitioner and his
witnesses.
The psychological incapacity of the respondent could
be traced back to respondent’s history as testified to by the expert witness
when she said that respondent’s bad experience during her childhood resulted in
her difficulty in achieving emotional intimacy, hence, her continuous illicit
relations with several men before and during the marriage.
Considering that persons suffering from this kind of
personality disorder have no insight of their condition, they will not submit
to treatment at all. As in the case at bar, respondent’s psychological
incapacity clinically identified as Histrionic Personality Disorder will remain
incurable.[4]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the dispositive portion of
the trial court Decision dated January 11, 1999 read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered DECLARING the marriage of JOSE REYNALDO B. OCHOSA and BONA J. ALANO on
October 27, 1973 at Basilan City VOID AB INITIO on ground of psychological
incapacity of the respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code as amended
with all the effects and consequences provided for by all applicable provisions
of existing pertinent laws.
After this Decision becomes final, let copies
thereof be sent to the Local Civil Registrar of Basilan City who is directed to
cancel the said marriage from its Civil Registry, and the Local Civil Registrar
of Makati City for its information and guidance.[5]
The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) appealed the said ruling to the Court of Appeals which sided with the
OSG’s contention that the trial court erred in granting the petition despite
Jose’s abject failure to discharge the burden of proving the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife, Bona, to comply with the essential
marital obligations.
Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed
and set aside the trial court Decision in its assailed Decision dated October 11,
2004, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED, the appealed
Decision dated 11 January 1999 in Civil Case No. 97-2903 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 140, is accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
another is entered DISMISSING the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage.[6]
Jose filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but this was denied by the Court of Appeals for lack of merit
in its assailed Resolution dated March 10, 2005.
Hence, this Petition.
The only issue before this Court is
whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations.
The petition is without merit.
The
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage which Jose filed in the trial
court hinges on Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In the landmark case of Santos
v. Court of Appeals,[7]
we observed that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such
that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required
in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after marriage; and it must
be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means
of the party involved.
Soon after, incorporating the three
basic requirements of psychological incapacity as mandated in Santos, we
laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina[8]
the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of
the Family Code:
(1)
The burden of proof to show the
nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution
and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus,
our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it “as
the foundation of the nation.” It decrees marriage as legally “inviolable,”
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be “protected” by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on
marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability
and solidarity.
(2)
The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that
the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.
(3)
The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must
show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.”
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4)
Such incapacity must also be shown
to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession
or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children
as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5)
Such illness must be grave
enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outburst” cannot be accepted as root
causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6)
The essential marital obligations
must be those embraced by Article 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
(7)
Interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became
effective in 1983 and which provides:
“The following are incapable of contracting
marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage
due to causes of psychological nature.”
Since the purpose of including such
provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious
faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally – subject to our law on evidence – what is decreed as
canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view
of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and
the Church – while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other –
shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8)
The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date
the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.[9]
(Citations omitted.)
In Marcos v. Marcos,[10]
we previously held that the foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact,
the root cause may be “medically or clinically identified.” What is important is the presence of evidence
that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For, indeed, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
It is also established in
jurisprudence that from these requirements arise the concept that Article 36 of
the Family Code does not really dissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes that
there never was any marriage in the first place because the affliction –
already then existing – was so grave and permanent as to deprive the afflicted
party of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
he or she was to assume or had assumed.[11]
A little over a decade since the
promulgation of the Molina guidelines, we made a critical assessment of
the same in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,[12]
to wit:
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the
Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving
all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then
alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and
was sensitive to the OSG’s exaggeration of Article 36 as the “most liberal
divorce procedure in the world.” The unintended consequences of Molina,
however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior,
moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites,
consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic
social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has
become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it.
Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina,
has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists
and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.
Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality
disorders of the said individuals.[13]
However, our critique did not mean
that we had declared an abandonment of the Molina doctrine. On the contrary, we simply declared and,
thus, clarified in the same Te case that there is a need to emphasize
other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36.
Furthermore, we reiterated in the same case the principle that each case
must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections
or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.[14]
In the case at bar, the trial court
granted the petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the basis of
Dr. Elizabeth Rondain’s testimony[15]
and her psychiatric evaluation report[16]
as well as the individual testimonies of Jose[17]
and his military aides - Mrs. Gertrudes Himpayan Padernal[18]
and Corporal Demetrio Bajet.[19]
We are sufficiently convinced,
after a careful perusal of the evidence presented in this case, that Bona had
been, on several occasions with several other men, sexually disloyal to her
spouse, Jose. Likewise, we are persuaded
that Bona had indeed abandoned Jose.
However, we cannot apply the same conviction to Jose’s thesis that the
totality of Bona’s acts constituted psychological incapacity as determined by
Article 36 of the Family Code. There is
inadequate credible evidence that her “defects” were already present at the
inception of, or prior to, the marriage.
In other words, her alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the
jurisprudential requisite of “juridical antecedence.”
With regard to Bona’s sexual
promiscuity prior to her marriage to Jose, we have only the uncorroborated
testimony of Jose made in open court to support this allegation. To quote the pertinent portion of the
transcript:
Q: So,
what was the reason why you have broken with your wife after several years -
A: Well,
I finally broke up with my wife because I can no longer bear the torture
because of the gossips that she had an affair with other men, and finally, when
I have a chance to confront her she admitted that she had an affair with other
men.
Q: With
other men. And, of course this – her life with other men of course before the
marriage you have already known –
A: Yes,
your honor.
Q: So,
that this gossips – because you said that you thought that this affair would go
to end after your marriage?
A: Yes,
I was thinking about that.
Q: So,
that after several years she will not change so that’s why you can’t bear it
anymore?
A: Yes,
ma’am.[20]
Dr. Rondain’s testimony and
psychiatric evaluation report do not provide evidentiary support to cure the
doubtful veracity of Jose’s one-sided assertion. Even if we take into account the
psychiatrist’s conclusion that Bona harbors a Histrionic Personality Disorder
that existed prior to her marriage with Jose and this mental condition
purportedly made her helplessly prone to promiscuity and sexual infidelity, the
same cannot be taken as credible proof of antecedence since the method by which
such an inference was reached leaves much to be desired in terms of meeting the
standard of evidence required in determining psychological incapacity.
The psychiatrist’s findings on
Bona’s personality profile did not emanate from a personal interview with the
subject herself as admitted by Dr. Rondain in court, as follows:
Q: How
about, you mentioned that the petitioner came for psychological test, how about
the respondent, did she come for interview and test?
A: No,
ma’am.
Q: Did
you try to take her for such?
A: Yes,
ma’am.
Q: And
what did she tell you, did she come for an interview?
A: There
was no response, ma’am.[21]
As a consequence thereof, Dr.
Rondain merely relied on her interview with Jose and his witness, Mrs.
Padernal, as well as the court record of the testimonies of other witnesses, to
wit:
Q: And
you said you did interviews. Who did the interview?
A: I
interviewed Mr. Ochosa and their witness Padernal, ma’am.
Q: When
you say Padernal are you referring to Gertrudes Himpayan Padernal who testified
in this court?
A: Yes, ma’am.
x x
x x
Q: Other
than the interviews what else did you do in order to evaluate members of the
parties?
A: I
also interviewed (sic) the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimonies
of other witnesses, ma’am.
x x
x x
Q: Was
there also a psychological test conducted on the respondent?
A: Yes,
your honor.
Q: It
was on the basis of the psychological test in which you based your evaluation
report?
A: It
was based on the psychological test conducted and clinical interview with the
other witnesses, your Honor.[22]
Verily, Dr. Rondain evaluated
Bona’s psychological condition indirectly from the information gathered solely
from Jose and his witnesses. This factual circumstance evokes the possibility that
the information fed to the psychiatrist is tainted with bias for Jose’s cause,
in the absence of sufficient corroboration.
Even if we give the benefit of the doubt to the
testimonies at issue since the trial court judge had found them to be credible enough
after personally witnessing Jose and the witnesses testify in court, we cannot
lower the evidentiary benchmark with regard to information on Bona’s
pre-marital history which is crucial to the issue of antecedence in this case
because we have only the word of Jose to rely on. In fact, Bona’s dysfunctional family portrait
which brought about her Histrionic Personality Disorder as painted by Dr.
Rondain was based solely on the assumed truthful knowledge of Jose, the spouse
who has the most to gain if his wife is found to be indeed psychologically
incapacitated. No other witness
testified to Bona’s family history or her behavior prior to or at the beginning
of the marriage. Both Mrs. Padernal and
Corporal Bajet came to know Bona only during their employment in petitioner’s
household during the marriage. It is undisputed that Jose and Bona were
married in 1973 while Mrs. Padernal and Corporal Bajet started to live with
petitioner’s family only in 1980 and 1986, respectively.
We have previously held that, in
employing a rigid and stringent level of evidentiary scrutiny to cases like
this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type
of examination is not a mandatory requirement.
While such examination is desirable, we recognize that it may not be
practical in all instances given the oftentimes estranged relations between the
parties. For a determination though of a
party’s complete personality profile, information coming from persons with
personal knowledge of the juridical antecedents may be helpful. This is an approach in the application of
Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same time that it avoids, if not
totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by supposedly expert opinion
based entirely on doubtful sources of information.[23]
However, we have also ruled in past
decisions that to make conclusions and generalizations on a spouse’s
psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side, similar
to what we have pointed out in the case at bar, is, to the Court’s mind, not
different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the
content of such evidence.[24]
Anent the accusation that, even at
the inception of their marriage, Bona did not wish to be with Jose as a further
manifestation of her psychological incapacity, we need only to look at the
testimonial records of Jose and his witnesses to be convinced otherwise, to
wit:
Q: How
long did you stay with your wife?
A: We
were married in 1973 and we separated in 1988 but in all those years there were
only few occasions that we were staying together because most of the time I’m
in the field.
Q: Now,
you said most of the time you were in the field, did you not – your wife come
with you in any of your assignments?
A: Never,
but sometimes she really visited me and stayed for one (1) day and then –
Q: And,
where did your wife stayed when she leaves you?
A: She
was staying with her mother in Basilan.
Q: Where
were you assigned most of the time?
A: I was
assigned in Davao, Zamboanga, Cotabato, Basilan.
Q: And,
of course she would come to your place every now and then because it is not
very far –
A: No, ma’am,
once in a while only.
Q: Did
you not go home to your conjugal home?
A: I
have a chanced also to go home because we were allowed to at least three (3)
days every other month.
Q: So,
if you start from the marriage up to 1988 so that is 16 years you were supposed
to have been living together?
A: No,
actually in 19 – middle of 1987 because in 1987 I was in x x x.[25]
GERTRUDES PADERNAL’S TESTIMONY:
Q: Now,
do you know when they lived together as husband and wife?
A: 1979.
Q: And
you said that you have known the petitioner and the respondent in this case
because in fact, you lived with them together in the same quarters. Does the
quarters have different rooms?
A: Yes,
ma’am.
Q: But
very near each other?
A: Yes,
ma’am.
Q: You
know them because of the proximity of the quarters?
A: Yes,
ma’am.
Q: It
was only during this 1980 to 1983, three (3) years that you lived together that
you have a chance to be with the spouses?
x x x x
A: Since
1980 to 1983 we lived together in the same house.
x x x x
Q: Now,
Madam Witness, after 1983, where did you reside together with your husband?
A: In
Cagayan de Oro and in 1986 we came back to Manila, in Fort Bonifacio.
Q: You
mean, in the same house where petitioner and the respondent lived together?
A: Yes.
Ma’am.
Q: How
long did you live in the house where the petitioner and the respondent stay?
A: Twelve
years now since 1983 to 1995.
Q: Where
was the petitioner working at that time, from 1982 to 1995?
A: He
is a soldier, a Colonel.
Q: Do
you know where he was assigned during this time?
A: Yes,
ma’am, G-3.
Q: May
we know where this G-3 is?
A: Fort
Bonifacio, ma’am.
Q: What
about the wife, where does she stay?
A: At
Fort Bonifacio, in their house.[26]
DR. ELIZABETH E. RONDAIN’S
TESTIMONY:
Q: Now,
they got married in 1973, am I correct?
A: Yes,
ma’am.
Q: But
the matter of the work or assignment of the petitioner, he was assigned in
different Provinces or Barangays in the Philippines?
A: Yes,
ma’am.
Q: Now,
when the wife or the respondent in this case did not go with the husband in
different places of his assignment did you ask her why what was the reason why
she did not like to go those places?
A: She
just did not want to. The wife did not go with him because… by transferring
from one place to another, she just don’t want to go, she just wanted to stay
in Basilan where her hometown is, ma’am.
Q: Did
the petitioner herein tell you why the respondent don’t want to go with him?
A: Yes,
I asked, the answer of the petitioner was she simply did not want to go with
him because she did not want him to be appointed to far away places.
Q: And
would it be that since she did not like to go with the husband in some far away
different assignments she also assumed that the assignments were in this war
regions they were always fighting considering the place in Basilan they were in
fighting atmosphere?
A: It is
possible but he was transferred to Manila and she also refused to stay in
Manila, ma’am.
Q: When
was that that she refused to come to Manila?
A: I
think, sometime in 1983, ma’am. She did not follow immediately. She stayed with
him only for four (4) months, ma’am.
Q: Now,
do you know if the petitioner and the respondent were living together as
husband and wife for this period of time during the relationship?
A: Yes,
ma’am. After their marriage I believe their relationship was good for a few
months until he was transferred to Julu. I believe during that time when they
were together the husband was giving an attention to her. The husband was
always there and when the husband transferred to Basilan, the attention was not
there anymore, ma’am.[27]
It
is apparent from the above-cited testimonies that Bona, contrary to Jose’s
assertion, had no manifest desire to abandon Jose at the beginning of their
marriage and was, in fact, living with him for the most part of their
relationship from 1973 up to the time when Jose drove her away from their
conjugal home in 1988. On the contrary,
the record shows that it was Jose who was constantly away from Bona by reason
of his military duties and his later incarceration. A reasonable explanation for Bona’s refusal
to accompany Jose in his military assignments in other parts of Mindanao may be
simply that those locations were known conflict areas in the seventies. Any
doubt as to Bona’s desire to live with Jose would later be erased by the fact
that Bona lived with Jose in their conjugal home in Fort Bonifacio during the
following decade.
In view of the foregoing, the
badges of Bona’s alleged psychological incapacity, i.e., her sexual
infidelity and abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period of
time after her marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said marriage.
We
have stressed time and again that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefore manifest themselves. It refers
to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These
marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and
225 of the Family Code.[28]
While
we are not insensitive to petitioner’s suffering in view of the truly appalling
and shocking behavior of his wife, still, we are bound by judicial precedents
regarding the evidentiary requirements in psychological incapacity cases that must
be applied to the present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice |
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JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice |
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[1] Rollo, pp. 28-39; penned by Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador with Associate Justices Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and Aurora Santiago-Lagman, concurring.
[2] Id. at 41.
[3] Id. at 42-46.
[4] Id. at 28-33.
[5] Id. at 46.
[6] Id. at 39.
[7] 310 Phil. 21, 39 (1995).
[8] 335 Phil. 664 (1997).
[9] Id. at 676-680.
[10] 397 Phil. 840, 850 (2000).
[11] Toring v. Toring, G.R. No. 165321, August 3, 2010.
[12] G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 193.
[13] Id. at 224-225.
[14] Id. at 228.
[15] TSN, September 14, 1998.
[16] Records, pp. 70-74.
[17] TSN, March 3, 1998.
[18] TSN, July 1, 1998.
[19] TSN, August 21, 1998.
[20] TSN, March 3, 1998, p. 8.
[21] TSN, September 14, 1998, p. 8.
[22] Id. at 6-17.
[23] Suazo v. Suazo, G.R. No. 164493, March 12, 2010.
[24] Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, G.R. No. 166738, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 157, 181.
[25] TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 9-10.
[26] TSN, July 1, 1998, pp. 7-10.
[27] TSN, September 14, 1998, pp. 13-15.
[28] Marcos v. Marcos, supra note 10 at 857.