G.R. No. 193459
- Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on
Justice, Committee on Justice Risa Hontiveros Baraquel, Danilo D. Lim, Felipe
Pestaño, Evelyn Pestaño, Renato M. Reyes, Jr., Secretary General of Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), Mother Mary John Mananzan, Co-Chairperson of
Pagbabago, Danilo Ramos, Secretary General of Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas
(KMP), Atty. Edre Olalia, Acting Secretary General of the National Union of
People’s Lawyers (NUPL), Ferdinand R. Gaite, Chairperson, Confederation for
Unity, Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees (COURAGE); and James
Terry Ridon of the League of Filipino Students (LFS); Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. –
Respondent-Intervenor
Promulgated:
February
15, 2011
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CONCURRING
OPINION
SERENO,
J.
“No point is of
more importance than that right of impeachment should be continued. Shall any
man be above justice? Above all, shall that man be above it who can commit the
most extensive injustice.”
– George Mason, Delegate from
I concur with the ponencia of Justice Conchita Carpio Morales particularly with
respect to the following rulings:
1.
The expanded certiorari jurisdiction of
the Court allows it to review the acts of Congress and measure them against
standards expressed in the Constitution. The power to arrive at a determination
of whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Legislature in the exercise of its functions and prerogatives under the
Constitution is vested in the Court.
2.
The instant Petition is not premature;
it raises issues that are ripe for adjudication. The Court is presented with
“constitutional vagaries” that must be resolved forthwith – with respect to the
legal meaning of the simultaneous referral of two impeachment complaints by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives to its Committee on Justice (public
respondent Committee), and the extent of the legal need to publish the House
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings.
3.
There was no violation of petitioner
Merciditas Gutierrez’s right to due process of law.
4.
The “one offense, one complaint” rule in
ordinary rules of criminal procedure cannot work to bar multiple complaints in
impeachment proceedings, as the Constitution allows indictment for multiple
impeachment offenses.
5.
The determination of the permissibility
of the consolidation of impeachment complaints is at the moment premature,
conjectural or anticipatory; public respondent Committee has yet to rule on the
consolidation.
I diverge however, from the ponencia of the highly-respected Justice Conchita Carpio Morales,
on the reckoning point of the one-year time bar on subsequent impeachment
proceedings under the Constitution. I
believe this Court, despite its several decisions on impeachment, has not paid
sufficient attention to the full implication of the inherently discretionary
character of the power of impeachment.
The Court has straitjacketed its interpretation of
the one-year bar by failing to go beyond the records of the deliberations of
the Commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. It has a duty to look
beyond, when the records demonstrate that the Commissioners were so
inordinately pressed to declare a starting point for “initiation of impeachment
proceedings” during the deliberations to the unfortunate extent that they
appear to have forgotten the nature of the power of impeachment. I refer to the
deliberations during which Commissioner Maambong attempted to define the
“initiation of impeachment proceedings.” The Commissioners were unable to
recognize during the deliberations that the entirety of steps involved in the
process of impeachment is a mix of clerical/ministerial and discretionary acts,
even while the power of impeachment itself is wholly discretionary. The apparent failure of one of the
Commissioners to remember the inherently discretionary nature of the power of
impeachment while being interpellated, such that he reckons the “initiation” to
start with the filing of an impeachment complaint, however, should not be
followed by this Court’s own failure to look at the right place for an answer –
at the essential character of the power of impeachment. Reason is the
foundation of all legal interpretation, including that of constitutional
interpretation. And the most powerful tool of reason is reflecting on the
essence of things. This is most especially needed when the Commissioners of the
Constitutional Commission failed at an important time to articulate an
interpretation of the constitution that is founded on reason; rather, they
chose an interpretation that on the surface seemed reasonable, but on
examination, turns out to have been arbitrary and highly problematic.
The Constitution provides: “No impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within
a period of one year.”[2]
The impeachment proceedings in the House of
Representatives[3] are constitutionally defined
to consist of the following steps:
A.
Filing of the
Verified Complaint.
A verified complaint for impeachment is filed by either: (a) a Member of the
House of Representatives; or (b) any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement
by any Member thereof.[4]
B.
Inclusion in the
Order of Business.
After filing, the complaint shall be included in the Order of Business within
ten session days.[5]
C.
Referral to the
Committee.
During the House Session when the complaint is calendared to be taken up, the
Speaker of the House shall refer the complaint for impeachment to the proper
committee within three session days.[6]
D.
Committee Report. The Committee,
after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members shall submit its
report to the House within sixty (60) session days from the referral, together
with the corresponding resolution.[7]
The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.[8]
E.
House Plenary
Vote.
A vote of a least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary
either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or override its contrary resolution.[9]
F.
Transmittal of
Articles of Impeachment. In case the verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the
same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate
shall forthwith proceed.[10]
Since
these are the only constitutionally described steps in the process of
impeachment in the House of Representatives, the starting point for the
one-year bar must be among these steps; the question is, where? Note that none
of these steps is constitutionally described as the “initiation of the
impeachment proceedings.” The parties to the case have advocated their
positions on this issue in their respective Memoranda.[11]
Petitioner
Gutierrez espouses the view that the very “act of filing the complaint is the
actual initiation – beginning or commencement – of impeachment proceedings”
that would commence the one-year time-bar.[12]
On
the other hand, public respondent Committee, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), argues that the “impeachment is a process beginning
with the filing of a complaint and terminating in its disposition by the vote
of at least one-third of all the members of the House”; and that the one-year
period should be counted from the plenary action of the House on the
Committee’s report.[13]
Meanwhile,
private respondents Renato Reyes, Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos,
Atty. Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (private respondents
Reyes) claim that the “term ‘initiated’ therein takes place by the act of the
House of Representatives of transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the
Senate for the conduct of the impeachment trial proceedings”; and, thus, the
one-year period should commence from the transmittal by the House of
Representatives of the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.[14]
Finally,
respondent-intervenor Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., as Speaker of the House,
theorizes that the better interpretation of the constitutional time bar should
be reckoned from the recommendation of the Committee to the House of
Representatives.[15]
All the parties to the case, and the
Court, are keenly aware of the latter’s ruling in Francisco v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang
Pilipino, Inc.[16]
That ruling was categorical in stating that the impeachment proceeding is
“initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to
the Committee on Justice for action.”[17]
Considering the factual circumstances of the instant case, and the experiences
of the country with impeachment proceedings in the House since the Francisco
ruling, the Court is faced with a good opportunity to reexamine its earlier
disposition.
Petitioner Gutierrez’s argument that
the one-year time bar on a second impeachment complaint should be counted from
the mechanical act of filing the complaint alone[18]
is pregnant with a multitude of problems. Congress’ exclusive power to initiate
impeachment cases would be effectively rendered inutile. This country’s
experience with impeachment in the past decade has shown that pegging the time bar
to the mechanical act of filing has transformed impeachment into a race on who
gets to file a complaint the fastest – regardless of whether such a first
complaint is valid, proper, substantial or supported by evidence. Enterprising
yet unscrupulous individuals have filed patently sham, frivolous or defective
complaints in the House in order to commence the one-year period and thus bar
the subsequent filing of “legitimate” complaints against the same impeachable
officer. In embracing the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, the Filipino
people certainly did not countenance a technical loophole that would be misused
to negate the only available and effective mechanism against abuse of power by
impeachable officers.
The opposite extreme propounded by private respondents Reyes that the period of the time bar starts from the filing of the Articles of Impeachment in the Senate is likewise untenable. Following their proposition, the one-year period will only commence when the report of the Committee favoring impeachment is approved by the required vote of the House, and the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to the Senate. Consequently, if there is no transmittal of the Articles of Impeachment, then there is no one-year time bar. As a result, multiple parties may continue to file numerous complaints, until Articles of Impeachment are transmitted by the House to the Senate.
This
scenario of persistent filing until there is a transmittal of the Articles of
Impeachment is equally abhorrent to the constitutional prohibition on multiple,
successive and never-ending impeachment proceedings (not complaints). The
machine-gun approach to the filing of an impeachment complaint until there is a
successful transmittal to the Senate will greatly impede the discharge of
functions of impeachable officers, who are not given any refuge from such
repetitive proceedings. Justice and the efficient administration of government
would be defeated, if the impeachment time bar is made to commence solely from the favorable transmittal of the Articles of Impeachment.
The time consumed by impeachable officers fending off impeachment proceedings
is the same, regardless of the result – the time bar, therefore, must equally
apply to unsuccessful impeachment attempts voted down by the House.
Finally, the Court is confronted with
the positions of public respondent Committee and respondent-intervenor Belmonte
as opposed to the Court’s ruling in Francisco.
In Francisco, the time bar is counted
from the acts of filing the impeachment complaint and its referral to a Committee,[19]
where the latter is a purely ministerial
act of the Speaker of the House. On the other hand, both public respondent
Committee and respondent-intervenor Belmonte propose that the period of one
year begin from discretionary acts,
namely, from the submission of the Committee report on the complaint according
to the Speaker, and from the one-third House plenary action on the report
according to the public respondent Committee. With all due respect to the
Court’s ruling in Francisco, I uphold
the position of the public respondent Committee. The doctrine of separation of powers in our theory of government
pertains to the apportionment of state powers among coequal branches; namely,
the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary. In establishing the
structures of government, the ideal that the Constitution seeks to achieve is
one of balance among the three great departments of government —with each
department undertaking its constitutionally assigned task as a check against
the exercise of power by the others, while all three departments move forward
in working for the progress of the nation.[20] The system of checks and balances has been
carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of
these three branches.[21]
The
power of impeachment is the Legislature’s check against the abuses of the President,
the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman.[22]
Having been elected or appointed for fixed terms, these impeachable officers
enjoy security of tenure, which is intended to enhance their capability to
perform their governmental functions efficiently and independently. However,
their tenure, arising from either direct election by the people or indirect
appointment by the people’s representatives, is not carte blanche authority for them to abuse their powers. In the face
of gross governmental abuse, the people have not been made so powerless by the
Constitution as to suffer until the impeachable officer’s term or appointment
expires. The Legislature’s impeachment power is the very solution provided by
the fundamental law to remove, in the interim, public officers who have failed
to uphold the public’s trust. The Ombudsman is the public official
constitutionally tasked to investigate and prosecute complaints against other
public officials[23] except for impeachable
officers and members of the national legislature. She is continually required
by the Constitution to be of recognized probity and independence, [24] and must maintain this public trust during
her term of office. Avoidance of the prospect of impeachment is the negative
incentive for the Ombudsman, and all other impeachable officers, to keep that
public trust.
Within
the limitations set forth in the Constitution, impeachment is inarguably a political act exercised by the
Legislature, a political body elected by and directly accountable to the
people. This power “is lodged in those who represent the great body of the
people, because the occasion for its exercise will arise from acts of great
injury to the community, and the objects of it may be such as cannot easily be
reached by an ordinary tribunal.”[25]
Full
discretion is vested in Congress, both the House and the Senate, to determine
whether or not an officer should be impeached, subject only to constitutionally
provided limits. Even if the expanded certiorari jurisdiction allows the Court
to review legislative acts that contravene the express provisions of the
Constitution, the Court cannot supplant with its own determination, that of
Congress in finding whether a public officer has performed acts that are
grounds for impeachment. The political character of the process is underscored
by a degree of imprecision in the offenses subject of impeachment,[26]
thus allowing Congress sufficient leeway to describe the acts as impeachable or
not.[27]
Since
the power of impeachment is inherently discretionary, owing to its political
character, then the time bar limitation imposed by the Constitution on this
legislative discretion must likewise be counted from a discretionary, and not a
ministerial, act. The one-year period was meant to be a restraint on the
discretionary power of impeachment; otherwise, the Legislature would have been
allowed to exercise that discretion at will repeatedly and continuously, to the
detriment of the discharge of functions of impeachable officers. It is
counterintuitive and illogical to place a limitation on discretionary powers,
which is triggered not by the exercise of the discretion sought to be limited,
but by a mere ministerial, ceremonial act perfunctorily performed preparatory
to such exercise.
We observe that the Constitution has
placed time conditions on the performance of acts (both discretionary and
ministerial in nature) in pursuit of the House’s exclusive power to initiate
impeachment proceedings.[28]
These specific time conditions in the form of session days, however, have
primarily been imposed for the purpose of avoiding delays or filibusters, which
members of the House may resort to in order to prolong or even defeat the
impeachment process. Whether the step is discretionary or ministerial, the
constitutional deadlines for the execution of impeachment steps regulate only
the speed at which the proceeding is to take place.
In contrast, the rule against the initiation
of more than one impeachment proceeding against the same impeachable officer in
a span of one year is a time constraint on the frequency with which the discretionary act of impeachment is to be
exercised. The time bar regulates how often this power can be exercised by the
House of Representatives. The rationale is that the extreme measure of removal
of an impeachable officer cannot be used as Congress’ perennial bargaining chip
to intimidate and undermine the impeachable officer’s independence.
While
each chamber of Congress is constitutionally empowered to determine its rules
of proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or
violate fundamental rights.[29]
Further, there should be a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and
the result that is sought to be attained.[30]
I
respectfully differ from my colleagues when in effect they rule that the
one-year limitation on a discretionary power is to begin from the ministerial
act of the Speaker in referring the impeachment complaint to the appropriate
committee of the House of Representatives. I cannot reconcile the incongruity
between the constitutional largeness of the power of impeachment – an
inherently discretionary power lodged in the entire Congress – and the
controlling effect that a small act of the Speaker in referring a complaint to
the Committee has, over this large power of impeachment. Retired Justice
Serafin Cuevas, counsel for petitioner Gutierrez, goes so far as to
characterize the Speaker’s ministerial referral of the complaint as merely
“ceremonial in character”:
JUSTICE
SERENO:
And you are basically … your
contention if [I] understand it is that this is the initiation? This is the act
of initiating an impeachment complaint?
RET.
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Yes, we subscribed to the view or we
uphold the view that upon the filing thereof, it was already initiated because the referral to the Committee on
Justice is only ceremonial in character. The Secretary of Justice cannot do
anything with it except to refer or not. Why did it take him twenty two (22)
days?[31]
(Emphasis supplied)
Even
on the part of the Speaker of the House, there is no exercise of discretion
over the referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice.[32]
The Speaker simply performs a ministerial function under the Constitution.[33]
The Speaker cannot evaluate the complaint as to its sufficiency in form and
substance. And even if there is a technical defect in the impeachment
complaint, the Speaker is duty-bound to refer the matter to the committee
within three session days from its inclusion in the Order of Business.
Moreover, as pointed out by Justice Carpio Morales, members of the House cannot
even raise issues against the propriety or substance of the impeachment
complaint during the referral, as in fact the only objection that can be
entertained is the propriety of the committee to which the complaint is
referred. There is a dissonance on how the House Speaker’s clerical/ministerial
act of referring the complaint can commence the time bar on the discretionary power
of the entire House to initiate an impeachment proceeding.
The
stark incompatibility between a small ministerial act controlling the
substantive right of the House to initiate impeachment proceedings is viewed
with concern by no less than retired Justice Cuevas, counsel for petitioner
Gutierrez, who agrees with me in this wise:
ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE SERENO:
I
am sure, sir. But let us now go to the real question of the constitutional
right of the House on impeachment and the clerical act of receiving impeachment
complaints. Which is superior and which
should be given more weight, the substantive right of the House to exercise its
right to initiate impeachment complaints or is it the mere clerical act of
finding out which complaint on its face bears the stamp, the first the earliest
of stamp?
RET.
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
I am not aware of any law, Your
Honor, that authorizes a mere clerk to do what you are trying to tell us, Your
Honor. It is the House, that is the responsibility of the House.
ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE SERENO:
Yes,
thank you.
RET.
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
If they were designated by the
Secretary General, the physical acceptance of the complaint lies there.
ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE SERENO:
Correct.
RET.
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
But that acceptance does not
automatically …
ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE SERENO:
Correct.
RET.
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
... initiate the impeachment
proceedings.
ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE SERENO:
Thank
you very much, that is exactly what I wanted to hear viz-a-viz the substantive
right of the House to initiate impeachment proceedings, this cannot be defeated
by the clerical act of accepting an impeachment complaint.
RET.
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
I agree, Your Honor. (Emphasis
supplied)[34]
Proceedings,
as understood in law, include “any and all of the steps or measures adopted or
taken, or required to be taken in the prosecution or defense of an action, from
the commencement of the action to its termination, such as to the execution of
the judgment.”[35] “Proceedings, both in
common parlance and in legal acception, imply action, procedure, prosecution.
If it is a progressive course, it must be advancing; and cannot be satisfied by
remaining at rest.”[36]
In
Macondray & Co., Inc., v. Bernabe,[37]
the Court ordered the payment of fees by the custodian of the attached
properties, since the plaintiff’s recovery of the costs includes any lawful
fees paid by him or her for the “service of the summons and other process in
the action.” The Court defined the word “process” in this wise:
As
a legal term, process is a generic word of very comprehensive signification and
many meanings. In its broadest sense process, it is equivalent to, or synonymous with, ‘proceedings’ or procedure and embraces all steps and proceedings in a
cause from its commencement to its conclusion. Sometimes the term is also
broadly defined as the means whereby a court compels a compliance with its
demands.[38]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Therefore,
the term “impeachment proceedings” should include the entire gamut of the
impeachment process in the House – from the filing of the verified complaint,
to its referral to the appropriate committee, to the committee’s deliberations
and report, up to the very vote of the House in plenary on the same report. It
is only at the time that the House of Representatives as a whole either affirms
or overrides the Report, by a vote of one third of all the members, that the
initiation of the impeachment proceedings in the House is completed and the
one-year bar rule commences. This is because the plenary House vote is the
first discretionary act exercised by the House in whom the power of initiating
impeachment proceedings repose.
When
the Court pegged, in Francisco, the time bar on the initiation of
impeachment proceedings to the filing of the complaint and its referral to the
appropriate committee, it may have failed to anticipate the actions of parties
who would subvert the impeachment process by racing to be the first to file
sham and frivolous impeachment complaints. These unintended consequences, which
make a mockery of the power of impeachment, justify a second look at the
premises considered in Francisco.
Reckoning the beginning of the time
bar from a ministerial and preparatory act, instead of the exercise of the
discretionary power of impeachment, tends to focus attention on the procedural
loopholes. Thus, impeachable officers subject of the proceedings, as well as
their counsel, abuse these technical gaps in the legal framework of
impeachment. Their purpose is to escape removal or perpetual disqualification
despite the serious and grave charges leveled against them. Questions on the
number of complaints filed, the date or even the time of filing, and whether
the complaints have been consolidated or even simultaneously referred become
monkey wrenches that impede the entire process and frustrate the mechanism of
impeachment to the point of infeasibility.
As argued by public respondent
Committee through retired Justice Vicente Mendoza during oral argument,[39]
these technical loopholes can be cured by rendering the plenary vote of the
entire House on the report of the committee as the starting point of the
one-year ban. The intensity of legal wrangling over the definition of the words
“proceedings” and “initiate” diminishes in significance if the Court is to
focus its attention on the sole, discretionary and exclusive power granted to
the House as a whole body to initiate all impeachment cases. Aside from the
fact that the plenary vote pertains to the very discretionary act of
impeachment, which requires the vote of one-third of its members, the
difficulties inherent in pegging the period to ministerial acts are lessened,
if not eliminated. Let us look at some problems that this approach eliminates.
First,
whether there is a single complaint or multiple complaints filed before the
House or taken up by the committee, the House in plenary will only vote once,
in one impeachment proceeding, on whether to approve or disapprove the
committee’s resolution.
Second,
the proposal also removes the undesired proclivity of parties to be the first
to file or the first to be referred, since the ban regulates not the speed of
filing, but the frequency of the exercise by the House plenary of voting on the
impeachment complaint/s.
Third,
it makes no difference whether the complaint is filed and/or referred successively
or simultaneously, as was being deliberated upon in the public respondent
Committee.[40] The excessive emphasis on
the physical time and date of filing or referral becomes inconsequential, if
not absurd.
Finally,
the time limitation is reckoned from a discretionary act, which embraces a
deliberate, informed and debated process, and not from the ministerial act of a
single public officer. The one-year period from the plenary vote of the House
on the committee report eliminates even the possibility, however remote, that
the Speaker of the House and/or the Majority Floor Leader would include a sham
impeachment complaint in the Order of Business and refer the complaint to the
Committee on Justice in just a single session day, in order to bar any other
subsequent impeachment complaint/s.
The plenary vote by the House on the
committee report is definite, determinable, and not ministerial; it is
precisely the discretionary exercise of the power to initiate impeachments. As
elucidated by retired Justice Mendoza during the oral argument:
ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE NACHURA:
Justice Mendoza, just two things, I
agree with you that the impeachment proceeding is really a process, is really a
process. And I am open, my mind is at least open, to your suggestion that the
initiation should be the entire proceedings in the House of Representatives.
This would mean of course that the Committee would have prepared its report and
submitted the report to the House of representatives in plenary. That would end
the initiation, is that your position?
RET.
JUSTICE MENDOZA:
Yes,
Sir.
ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE NACHURA:
Irrespective
of the action taken by plenary do we have to await the action of the plenary on
the report of the Committee on Justice before we say that these (sic) have been
initiation on the impeachment?
RET.
JUSTICE MENDOZA:
It is actually the action on the House because the
power to initiate is vested in the House not to the Committee of the House.
Up to the submission of the report there is only action by the Committee.
Action by the House to initiate the proceedings is the action on the Committee
report. The point Mr. Justice is this, the
House delegates the task of screening good from bad complaints so that its time
will not be wasted to a Committee also and to protect the public officials from
unnecessarily being made to face impeachment proceedings. So what is given
to the Committee is the task of investigating and recommending action on the
complaints. So unless action is taken
therefore finally by the House, the exclusive power to initiate impeachment proceedings
has not been discharged. (Emphasis supplied)[41]
Of
course, there still exists the possibility that the complaining parties would
file multiple complaints at the 11th hour before the entire House
votes on the committee report. This last minute maneuver is presumably intended
to delay the voting, until the belated complaint is referred and deliberated
upon by the committee within the number of session days enumerated under the
Constitution. However, the deadlines for the committee report and the subsequent
voting by the plenary should be counted from the date of the complaint/s first
referred, regardless of any subsequent complaints. Any pending impeachment
complaint will be immediately barred once the House votes on the committee
report. This rule will prevent the filing of subsequent complaints (albeit sham
or frivolous), which would continually reset the sixty-session day period and,
thus, result in the circumvention of the constitutional deadlines.
A party who has a legitimate grievance supported by evidence against an impeachable officer will ordinarily not wait until the last minute to lodge the complaint. Ordinary diligence and good faith dictate that a person who has sufficient proof of wrongdoing and abuse against an impeachable officer will join and lend support to an impeachment complaint that is already being deliberated upon by the House committee, at the soonest possible time. Hence, it is natural that all complaints with valid grounds and sufficient evidence will be collectively or separately raised at the first opportunity, in order that the committee and eventually the House will be able to perform its deliberative function and exercise discretion within the specified number of session days.
Contrary to the position of
respondent-intervenor Belmonte,[42]
the mere submission of the committee report to the plenary is not a good
reckoning point for the one-year period. Undoubtedly, while the committee
exercises a degree of discretion in deciding upon and coming up with the
report, as when it determines whether the impeachment complaint/s is/are
sufficient in form and substance,[43]
this discretion is exercised by a mere subset of the entire House, however, and
is but preliminary. Although of persuasive value, the
recommendations of the committee, which is composed of approximately fifty-five
(55) members,[44] are not binding on the
entire House in plenary, which counts two hundred eighty-three (283) members.[45]
The power to initiate all cases of
impeachment is an extraordinary exercise of the sovereign people through its
elected representatives to immediately remove those found to have committed
impeachable offenses.[46]
Therefore, the power to initiate impeachment proceedings is a power that is
reposed upon the House of Representatives as a whole body, in representation of
the sovereign, and this power cannot be taken over by a mere Committee.
Irrespective of the Committee’s findings, the impeachment proceeding will rise or fall or continue up to the impeachment case in the Senate on the basis of the one-third vote of the House. Hence, the one-year period is a limitation on the discretionary power of the entire House to initiate impeachment proceedings, and not on the committee’s deliberations or recommendations with respect to the impeachment complaint/s.
In summary, the following principles support the position that the time bar should be counted from the House of Representative’s plenary action on the report of the Committee on Justice:
1.
The time bar on impeachment proceedings
cannot be counted from the filing of
the complaint; otherwise the absurdity of individuals racing to file the
first complaint would ensue, regardless of the complaint’s propriety or
substance.
2.
The time bar must equally apply, whether
the impeachment complaint is successful
or not.
3.
The time bar, which is a limitation on the
House’s exclusive power to initiate impeachment, must be counted from a discretionary act, not from a mechanical or
ministerial act, especially not from acts that trivialize the impeachment
process.
4.
The time bar can only be reckoned from
the plenary action of the House on the report of the committee (regardless of
the outcome), since such action is done by the constitutional body in which the
power is vested, and not by a mere subset that makes a preliminary finding that
has only persuasive value.
Judicial review serves an affirmative
function vital to a government of limited powers – the function of maintaining
a satisfactorily high public feeling that the government has obeyed the law of
its own Constitution and stands ready to obey it as it may be declared by a
tribunal of independence.[47]
In this instance, in exercising the power
of judicial review over the exclusive and sole power of the House to initiate
impeachment cases, the Court must remember that it is also performing a
legitimating function – validating how the House exercises its power in the
light of constitutional limitations. The Court in the present constitutional
dilemma is tasked with doing what has been described as a “balancing act,”[48]
in determining the appropriate operation of the one-year time bar on the
initiation of subsequent impeachment proceedings vis-à-vis the need to allow
Congress to exercise its constitutional prerogatives in the matter of
impeachment proceedings.
On the one hand, the undisputed raison d’être of the time bar is to
prevent the continuous and undue harassment of impeachable officers, such as
petitioner Gutierrez, in a way that prevents them from performing their
offices’ functions effectively. On the other hand, the protection afforded to
petitioner and other impeachable officers against harassment is not a blanket
mechanical safety device that would defeat altogether any complaint of
wrongdoing, of which she and other impeachable officers may be accused.
Therefore, the power to initiate impeachment proceedings should not be so
effortlessly and expeditiously achieved by disgruntled politicians to pressure
impeachable officers to submission and undermine the latter’s institutional
independence. But neither should the power of impeachment be too unreasonably
restrictive or filled with technical loopholes as to defeat legitimate and
substantiated claims of gross wrongdoing.
I submit that a balance of these two
interests is better achieved if the time bar for the initiation of impeachment
proceedings commences from the voting of the House on the committee report.
Briefly, a subsequent impeachment proceeding against the same officer cannot be
initiated until and unless one year lapses from the time the House in plenary
votes either to approve or to disapprove the recommendations of the committee
on impeachment complaint/s.
What the Court is deciding herein is
merely the scope of the constitutional limits on the power to initiate
impeachment proceedings, and how the delineation of that scope would affect the
second Impeachment Complaint filed by private respondent Reyes. This Court does
not arrogate unto itself the power to determine the innocence or guilt of
petitioner Gutierrez with respect to the allegations contained in the
impeachment complaints of private respondents. Congress, the political branch
of government, was entrusted with the power of impeachment, specifically,
“because the objectives and the questions to be resolved are political.”[49]
In the Constitution, the impeachment power is an extraordinary political tool
to oust a public officer. It must, therefore, be exercised by those whose
functions are most directly and immediately responsive to the broad spectrum of
the Filipino people, rather than by the Courts.
In expounding on the rationale for
excluding the power of impeachment from the courts, Alexander Hamilton
succinctly wrote:
… The awful discretion, which a court of
impeachments must necessarily have, to doom to honor or to infamy the most
confidential and the most distinguished characters of the community, forbids
the commitment of the trust to a small number of persons.
These considerations seem alone
sufficient to authorise a conclusion, that the Supreme Court would have been an
improper substitute for the Senate, as a court of impeachments. … [50]
On a final note, the issuance of the
Status Quo Ante Order in this case was most unfortunate. It was issued over the
objections of Justices Antonio Carpio, Conchita Carpio Morales, and myself. I
believed then, as I believe now, that the Court, in issuing the said order, was
overly intrusive with respect to a power that does not belong to it by
restraining without hearing a co-equal branch of Government. This belief was
made more acute by the fact that the order was voted upon in the morning of 14 September
2010, without the benefit of a genuinely informed debate, since several members
of the Court, myself included, had not yet then received a copy of the
Petition. No one should henceforth presume to tell the House of Representatives
that any form of restraining order is still in effect and thereby seek to
extend the effectivity of the Status Quo Ante Order. This is the legal import
of the majority Decision.
Premises considered, I vote to DISMISS the Petition in its entirety,
and, consequently, the Status Quo Ante Order is immediately lifted.
Associate Justice
[1]
The Debates in the Federal
Convention of 1787 which Framed the Constitution of the United States of
America, Reported by James Madison (International Edition), Gaillard
Hunt and James Brown N. Scott (ed.) 1970 reprint, at 290.
[2] Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 3 (4).
[3] Id, Sec. 3 (1).
[4] Id, Sec. 3 (2). The verified
complaint is filed with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives. (15th Congress Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings, Rule II, Section 3)
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 3 (3).
[10] Id. Sec. 3 (4).
[11] Private respondents Risa
Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo D. Lim, Felipe Pestaño
and Evelyn Pestaño (private respondents
Baraquel) argue that the one-year time-bar rule under the Constitution
is inapplicable to the first Impeachment Complaint that they filed against
petitioner Gutierrez. (Private respondent Baraquel’s Memorandum dated 27
October 2010, at 5-6)
[12] Petitioner Gutierrez’s
Memorandum dated 21 October 2010, at 27-40.
[13] Public respondent’s Memorandum
dated 26 October 2010, at 61-85. See also
public respondent’ Reply Memorandum dated 15 November 2010, at 21-34.
[14] Private respondents Reyes’s
Memorandum dated 26 October 2010, at 26-44.
[15] Respondent-intervenor Belmonte’s
Memorandum for the Intervenor Ex
Abundanti Cautela dated 27 October 2010, at 19-25.
[16] G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262-63,
160277, 160292, 160295, 160310, 160318, 160342-43, 160360, 160365, 160370,
160376, 160392, 160397, 160403, 160405, 10 November 2003, 415 SCRA 44.
[17]
[18] “The filing of an impeachment
complaint constitutes the only true and actual initiation of impeachment
proceedings. This operative and immutable fact cannot be downplayed or
trivialized as being the mere solitary act which ‘begins the initiation
process.’ That the filing of the complaint admittedly ‘begins the process of
initiation’ only underscores the plain and inescapable fact that it is the very
start, the very inception, the very origin of an impeachment proceeding.”
(Petitioner Gutierrez’s Consolidated Reply dated 15 October 2010, at 15)
[19] “Having concluded that the
initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the
impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at
least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the
Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment
complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.”
(Francisco, supra note 15, at 169)
[20] Carpio Morales, Dissenting
Opinion, De Castro v. Judicial and
Bar Council, G.R. No. 191002,
191032, 191057, 191149, 191342, 191420 & A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, 20 April 2010.
[21] Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, G.R. No. 180643, 04
September 2008, 549 SCRA 77.
[22]Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 2.
[23] Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 12.
[24] Id, Sec. 8.
[25] Labovitz, John R., Presidential
Impeachment, 20 (1978).
[26] The grounds for impeachment are
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. (Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 2)
[27] Although some of the grounds for
impeachment are specifically defined under penal laws (treason, bribery, graft
and corruption), those laws and their concomitant jurisprudence are mere guides
for the members of Congress and are not exactly bound to these definitions,
given the discretionary power vested in them.
[28] The Constitution provides a
specific time conditions for several acts in the impeachment process, namely:
(a) inclusion of the impeachment complaint in the Order of Business (ten
session days); (b) referral to the Committee (three session days); (c) report
of the Committee (sixty session days); and (d) calendar of the Committee report
to the plenary (ten session days).
[29] Arroyo v. De Venecia, G.R No. 127255, 14 August 1997, 277 SCRA 268
citing U.S. v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 144
U.S. at 5.36 L.Ed. at 324-25.
[30]
[31] TSN, 05 October 2010, at
119-120.
[32]
“aa.
Justice, 55 Members. All
matters directly and principally relating to the administration of justice, the
Judiciary, the practice of law and integration of the Bar, legal aid,
penitentiaries and reform schools, adult probation, impeachment proceedings, registration of land titles, immigration,
deporation, naturalization, and the definition of crimes and other offenses
punishable by law and their penalties.” (House Rules of Procedure, Rule IX The
Committees, Sec. 27 [aa])
[33] “A purely ministerial act or
duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in
a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without
regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety
of the act done.” (Callejo, Concurring Opinion, Lambino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153 & 174299, 25 October 2006,
505 SCRA 160, citing Codilla, Sr. v. De
Venecia, G.R. No. 150605, 10 December 2002, 393 SCRA 639)
[34] TSN, 05 October 2010, at
142-143.
[35] 1 C.J.S. Actions § 1(h)(1)(a),
at 955.
[36] 34 Words and Phrases 142 (1957), citing Beers v. Haughton, 34
[37] G. R. No. L-45410, 67 Phil.
661(1939).
[38] Macondray & Co., Inc., v. Bernabe, 67 Phil. 661 (1939), citing 50 C.J., 441; cf. Philippine
Law Dictionary, 748 (Federico B. Moreno ed., 3rd ed. 1988).
[39] TSN, 12 October 2010, at 88-90.
[40] “Rep. Datumanong raised again
the issue of having two impeachment complaint referred to the Committee.
According to him, the journal of the House on August 11 reflects the
successive, and not simultaneous, referral to the two complaints to the
Committee. This position was later reiterated by Re. Rufus Rodriguez, who
stated that it is a physical impossibility to refer two complaints to the
Committee at exactly the same time. Rep. Neptali Gonzales II answered Rep.
Datumanong’s query, and maintained that in the same journal, both complaints
were referred to the Committee on Justice at exactly the same time, which shows
the intention of the House to refer the complaints simultaneously and not
successively. Rep. Gonzales also stated that there is nothing in the
Constitution or the Rules on Impeachment that prevents the Committee from
consolidating the two complaints against an impeachable officer.” (Minutes of
the Meeting of the Committee on Justice, 07 September 2010 at 5; cf. petitioner Gutierrez’s Compliance
and Manifestation dated 30 September 2010)
[41] TSN, 12 October 2010, at
133-135.
[42] “102. The moment when an
impeachment is ‘initiated’ therefore is a process that starts from the filing
up until the recommendation of the House Committee on Justice to the House of
Representatives. It is still a process and a continuum, but it is a process
that allows democratically elected forums to weigh in.” (Respondent-intervenor
Belmonte’s Memorandum dated 27 October 2010, at 22)
[43] “Section 4.
Determination of Sufficiency in Form and Substance. - Upon due referral,
the Committee on Justice shall determine whether the complaint is sufficient in
from and substance. If the committee finds that the complaint is insufficient
in form, it shall return the same to the Secretary General within three (3)
session days with a written explanation of the insufficiency. The Secretary
General shall return the same to the complaint(s) together with the committee's
written explanation within three (3) session days from receipt of the committee
resolution finding the complaint insufficient in form.”
“Should the committee find the complaint sufficient in
form, it shall then determine if the complaint is sufficient in substance. The
requirement of substance is met if there is a recital of facts constituting the
offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee. If the
committee finds that the complaint is not sufficient in substance, it shall
dismiss the complaint and shall submit its report as provided hereunder.”
(House Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, Sec. 4)
[44] House Rules of Procedure, Rule
IX (The Committees), Sec. 27 (aa).
[45]
<http://www.congress.gov.ph/members/> (Last accessed on 24 January 2011)
[46] “On a more fundamental level,
the impeachment power is, in fact, an exercise of sovereignty. It is a choice
by the representatives of the people to immediately remove those unfit for
public service. Impeachment involves conviction and removal of government
officers of the highest level and, hence, is an extreme measure. So, it is but
appropriate that it is the Congress – the direct representatives of the people
– which should wield the power of impeachment. Therefore, the power to
‘initiate’ impeachment proceedings may not be exercised by a lone congressman
or by a citizen by the sheer act of filing an impeachment complaint.” (Tamano, Adel A., Handbook on Impeachment under the 1987
Constitution [1st Ed., 2004], at 21)
[47] Charles
L. Black, Jr., The People and the Court: Judicial Review in a
Democracy, 86 (1960).
[48] “… So, that is why I am saying
now that we should not only consider the rights of the accused we should also
consider the rights of the State. We should try to do a balancing act such that
we will come out with a favorable decision which is fair to both parties.”
(Justice Carpio Morales, TSN, 05 October 2010, at 335)
[49] John R. Labovitz, Presidential Impeachment 251 (1978).
[50] Federalist No. 65, at 439-45 (07 March 1788).