Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE Appellee, - versus - Appellant. |
G.R.
No. 189580
Present: CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, BERSAMIN,* and ABAD, JJ. Promulgated: February
9, 2011 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
On appeal is the July 23, 2009
Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03020, which affirmed the
decision[2]
rendered by Branch 65 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulan, Sorsogon,
finding appellant Alvin del Rosario guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.
In
an Information[3] dated January
11, 2005, appellant was charged with murder, committed as follows:
That on December 20, 2004 at about 9:00
o’clock in the evening [in] Brgy. G. del Pilar, municipality of Bulan, province
of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, armed with a knife, with intent to kill and taking
advantage of night time, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and stab one EDWIN GELUA thereby inflicting upon him
mortal wounds on the stomach which caused his death, to the damage and
prejudice of his legal heirs.
CONTRARY
TO LAW.
When
arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty.
Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented four (4)
witnesses, namely: Angelita Gelua (Angelita), Edwin Gelua’s (Edwin’s) wife; Dr.
Andrew A. de Castro (Dr. De Castro), Edwin’s attending physician; Salvador
Gelua (
Angelita testified that, on December
20, 2004, at about 9:00 p.m., Edwin had a drinking spree with
Dr. De Castro found the cause of
death as “cardio-respiratory arrest, stab
wound, and hypovolemic shock.”[5] He explained that Edwin sustained a stab
wound “on the right upper quadrant with
laceration, the part of the intestine coming out,” and damaged the following abdominal organs, i.e., “perforated lesser curvature of [the]
stomach was thru and thru; perforated second part of [the] duodenum, thru and
thru; lacerated middle colic artery behind the stomach with extensive bleeding;
lacerated mesenteric vessels; and perforated ileum, thru and thru.”[6] Dr. De Castro opined that, based on the location
of the stab wound, the victim was in front of the assailant – face to face with
the latter when attacked. However, it
was also possible that the assailant was at the back of the victim by “hitting the anterior part from behind
holding the patient.”[7]
Ruel,
on the other hand, stated that Angelita informed him of the stabbing
incident. He went to the house of
appellant after the incident. Initially,
appellant denied that he stabbed Edwin; later, however, appellant admitted that
he was Edwin’s
assailant, and surrendered to him the
bladed
weapon which was allegedly used in
the stabbing. He then brought appellant
to the Bulan Police Station.[9]
For
his part, appellant invoked his constitutional right to remain silent. He
refused to present any witness in support of his denial, despite numerous
opportunities given him. He decided to
simply forego with the presentation of his evidence.
On
August 27, 2007, the RTC rendered a guilty verdict, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Alvin del Rosario having been found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by RA 7659, is hereby sentenced to suffer the single and
indivisible penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua (regardless of [the] presence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, Art. 63, R.P.C.) and to indemnify the heirs of deceased Edwin
Gelua in the amount of Php17,258.00 as actual and compensatory damages;
Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death and another Php50,000.00 as moral
damages; and to pay the costs.
The
period of preventive imprisonment already served by the accused shall be
credited in the service of his sentence pursuant to Article 29 of the same
Code.
SO
ORDERED.[10]
Appellant filed an appeal before the CA, assigning in his brief the
following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE
WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE AND UNRELIABLE ACCOUNT OF
PROSECUTION EYEWITNESSES ANGELITA AND
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF MURDER DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING IN
EVIDENCE THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S ALLEGED ADMISSION AND TURNING OVER OF THE
MURDER WEAPON WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.[11]
The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) also filed its brief,[12] asserting that appellant’s guilt was proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
On July
23, 2009, the CA rendered the now challenged Decision, affirming appellant’s
conviction:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed
decision of the RTC of Bulan, Sorsogon, Branch 65 dated August 27, 2007 is
hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Appellant is now before this Court,
submitting for resolution the same matters argued before the CA. Through his
Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Supplemental Brief,[14]
appellant stated that he would not file a Supplemental Brief and, in lieu
thereof, he would adopt the Appellant’s Brief he had filed before the appellate
court. The OSG likewise manifested that it was no longer filing a
Supplemental Brief.[15]
Appellant insists that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He asserts that
the pieces of evidence of the prosecution, specifically, the testimonies of
Angelita and
Indubitably, the issues raised by
appellant hinge on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
The age-old rule is that the task of assigning values to the testimonies
of witnesses and weighing their credibility is best left to the trial court
which forms first-hand impressions as witnesses testify before it. It is thus no surprise that findings and
conclusions of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses enjoy, as a rule, a
badge of respect, for trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor
of witnesses as they testify.[16] Further, factual findings of the trial court
as regards its assessment of the witnesses’ credibility are entitled to great
weight and respect by this Court, particularly when the CA affirms the said
findings, and will not be disturbed absent any showing that the trial court
overlooked certain facts and circumstances which could substantially affect the
outcome of the case.[17]
In this case, we find no reason to
depart from this rule. Appellant failed
to convince us that the RTC and the CA overlooked certain facts and
circumstances which, if considered, might affect the result of the case.
The witnesses for the People –
Angelita and
Angelita saw the stabbing of Edwin,
and was categorical and frank in her testimony. From her direct and
straightforward testimony, there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprit
(appellant), who suddenly emerged while Edwin was urinating and stabbed the
latter.[18]
The alleged improper motive on the part of Angelita and
As against the positive identification by Angelita and
It is a well-settled rule that positive
identification of the accused, where categorical and consistent and without any
showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter,
prevails over alibi and denial which if not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of
weight in law (People vs. Enriquez,
292 SCRA 656 [1998]). In this case, Emelita positively and categorically
identified accused-appellant as the person she saw outside the window of their
house immediately after she heard the gunshot. She also testified that
accused-appellant was toting a handgun at that time. Despite relentless
cross-examination, she never wavered in the material details of her testimony.
Emelita's testimony as to accused-appellant's
culpability is damning. It need not be emphasized that Emelita had no improper
motive to testify against accused-appellant, it being unnatural for one
interested in vindicating the crime to accuse somebody other than the real
culprit (People vs. Salvame, 270 SCRA
766 [1997]). Emelita's identification of accused-appellant, likewise, draws
strength from the rule that family members who have witnessed the killing of
their loved one usually strive to remember the faces of the assailants (People vs. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267
[1998]).
Appellant
also faults the RTC for admitting in evidence and for giving credence to the
testimony of Ruel. He insists that his
alleged admission that he was Edwin’s assailant cannot be considered as
evidence against him without violating his constitutional right to counsel.
The
argument is specious.
Records show that, when Ruel
testified on the alleged admission, appellant did not raise any objection. It is a rule of evidence that any objection
against the admission of any piece of evidence must be made at the proper time,
and that if not so made it will be understood to have been waived. The proper time to make a protest or
objection is when, from the question addressed to the witness, or from the
answer thereto, or from the presentation of the proof, the inadmissibility of
evidence is, or may be, inferred.[21] Therefore, the RTC cannot be faulted for
admitting the testimony of Ruel.
In any event, appellant’s conviction
was not based on his alleged admission or confession, but, primarily, on the
positive and credible testimonies of Angelita and
the circumstances surrounding
appellant’s alleged admission of the crime are inconsequential.
Appellant next argues that he should be made
liable for homicide only. He claims that treachery did not attend the killing
of Edwin.
That treachery or alevosia was
present is incontrovertible. The essence of this qualifying circumstance is the
sudden and unexpected attack by the assailant on an unsuspecting victim,
depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself. It is employed to ensure the commission of
the crime without the concomitant risk to the aggressor.[22]
Concededly, appellant’s attack,
coming from behind, on the unarmed Edwin, was sudden, unprovoked, unexpected,
and deliberate. Edwin was in no position and without any means to defend
himself. By all indications, Edwin was left with no opportunity to evade the
knife thrusts, to defend himself, or to retaliate. In sum, the finding of
treachery stands.
Under Article 248[23]
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, the penalty imposed for the crime
of murder is reclusion perpetua to
death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty
imposed on appellant is reclusion
perpetua, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2,[24]
of the RPC. The prison term imposed by
the trial court and affirmed by the CA for the death of Edwin is, therefore,
correct.
As to the damages awarded, when death occurs due to a crime, the
following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the
death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate
damages.[25]
In murder, the grant of civil
indemnity, which has been fixed by jurisprudence at P50,000.00, requires
no proof other than the fact of death as a result of the crime, and proof of an
accused’s responsibility therefor. Similarly, moral damages are awarded in view
of the violent death of the victim, and these do not require any allegation or
proof of the emotional sufferings of the heirs.[26] We, therefore, sustain the awards of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages to the heirs of Edwin.
As to actual damages, the official
receipts that Angelita presented showed expenses that amounted to P17,258.00.
However, we have held that when actual
damages proven by receipts amount to less than P25,000.00, the award of
temperate damages amounting to P25,000.00 is justified, in lieu of
actual damages for a lesser amount. This
is based on the sound reasoning that it would be anomalous and unfair to the
heirs of the victim who tried but succeeded only in proving actual damages of
less than P25,000.00. They would
be in a worse situation than another who might have presented no receipts at
all, but is entitled to P25,000.00 temperate damages.[27]
Thus, considering that expenses in the amount of P17,258.00 were proven
by Edwin's heirs, an award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages, in lieu
of this lesser amount of actual damages, is proper.
Likewise, we include an award of
exemplary damages in favor of the heirs of Edwin. An aggravating circumstance,
whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award
of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230[28]
of the Civil Code. The award of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages is,
therefore, proper under current jurisprudence.[29]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03020 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Alvin del Rosario is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER, and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant is also ordered to pay the heirs of
Edwin Gelua the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00
as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, and P30,000.00
as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A.
ABAD
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza per Raffle dated February 17, 2010.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon, with Associate Justices Jose Catral Mendoza (now a member of this Court) and Antonio L. Villamor, concurring; rollo, pp. 2-11.
[2] Records, pp. 145-155.
[3]
[4] TSN, June 21, 2005, pp. 3-5, 7.
[5] Records, p. 8.
[6]
[7] TSN, November 8, 2005, p. 7.
[8] TSN, January 17, 2006, pp. 1-3.
[9] TSN, February 14, 2006, pp. 1-3.
[10] Supra note 2, at 155.
[11] CA rollo, pp. 45, 51.
[12]
[13] Supra note 1, at 10.
[14] Rollo, pp. 26-28.
[15]
[16] People v. Lacaden, G.R. No. 187682, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 784, 794-795.
[17] People v. Molina, G.R. No. 184173, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 519, 535-536.
[18] TSN, June 21, 2005, pp. 3-5; TSN, September 6, 2005, 4-6.
[19] 355 Phil. 454, 473 (1998).
[20] 402 Phil. 446, 457-458 (2001).
[21] People v. Mariño, 215 Phil. 527, 532 (1984).
[22] People v. Glino, G.R. No. 173793, December 4, 2007, 539 SCRA 432, 456-457.
[23] Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, x x x.
[24] Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - x x x.
x x x x
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
[25] People v. Molina, supra note 17, at 542.
[26] People v. Hernando, G.R. No. 186493, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 741, 754.
[27] People v. Lacaden, supra note 16, at 804-805.
[28] Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
[29] See People v. Lacaden, supra note 16, at 805; People v.