SECOND
DIVISION
|
FILOMENA L. VILLANUEVA, Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 188630 Present: CARPIO J.,
Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: February
23, 2011 |
x
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by petitioner Filomena L. Villanueva (petitioner) seeking
to reverse and set aside the (1)
November 13, 2008 Resolution[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) which
dismissed her petition for review for lack of jurisdiction; and (2) its June 25, 2009 Resolution[2]
denying her motion for reconsideration.
The Facts:
Petitioner was the Assistant Regional
Director of the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) of Region II, a
position lower than Salary Grade 27.
Records show that on various dates in
1998, the petitioner and her husband Armando Villanueva (Armando) obtained
several loans from the Cagayan Agri-Based Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (CABMPCI). Armando defaulted in the
payment of his own loan. Because of this, CABMPCI, represented by its General
Manager, Petra Martinez (Martinez), filed a civil case for collection of sum of money against Armando before
the Regional Trial Court of Sanchez Mira, Cagayan (RTC), docketed as
Civil Case No. 2607-S. To support its claim, CABMPCI presented a certification,
received and signed by petitioner, attesting that she and Armando promised to
settle their obligation on or before
During the pendency of the civil case
before the RTC,
On October 16, 2001, in Civil Case
No. 2607-S, the trial court declared Armando in default and rendered a decision
ordering him to pay the total amount of P1,107,210.90, plus fine and
interest at the rate of 3% per month and the cost of collection. Armando filed
a petition for prohibition before the CA alleging that he should not be made to
pay said loan as the same had long been fully paid as shown by 1] Official Receipt
No. 141084 in the name of petitioner evidencing payment of the amount of P764,865.25,
and 2] the Certification issued by Martinez. When directed to file its comment,
CABMPCI failed to comply. Its non-compliance was deemed to have been a waiver
to refute the claim of payment contained in the petition.[5] Thus,
on
On
In
the end, the Ombudsman rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of Grave
Misconduct and imposed the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of benefits and
disqualification for re-employment in the government service.
Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration but the Ombudsman denied it.
Aggrieved,
the petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA. The CA found merit in
the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed decision of the Ombudsman. The CA ruled that the Ombudsman erred in
applying R.A. No. 6713, without recognizing the fact of membership and its
privileges. It further stated that
Aside
from those cases, a criminal case was
also filed against the petitioner for violation of Section 2(d) of R.A. No. 6713
before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Claveria, Cagayan (MCTC), docketed as
Criminal Case No. 3111-CL.
On
March 24, 2006, the MCTC promulgated its decision in Criminal Case No. 3111-CL
convicting the petitioner and imposing the penalty of five (5) years of imprisonment
and disqualification to hold office (Section 11, R.A. No. 6713).
Petitioner
appealed the MCTC Decision to the Regional Trial Court of Sanchez Mira, Cagayan
(RTC). The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3082. On
Aggrieved,
petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA.
The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) then filed a Manifestation and
Motion contending that the Sandiganbayan had exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over the petition.
Petitioner,
in her Comment, argued that the issue of jurisdiction could not be raised for
the first time before the CA in view of the failure of the Provincial
Prosecutor to bring out the same when she appealed the MCTC Decision to the
RTC. She claimed to have availed of the remedy provided under Rule 122 of the
Rules of Court in good faith. Finally, she contended that the essence of true
justice would be served if the case would be decided on the merits.
The
CA, however, agreed with the OSG. In its
(1) At
the time petitioner committed the crime charged, she was holding a position
lower than salary grade “27.” The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional
trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of
their appellate jurisdiction. (CA cited
Moll v. Buban, G.R. No. 136974, August 27, 2002);
(2) The
OSG had timely raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction considering that the
law does not contemplate the remedy of appeal from the decision of the MTCC [sic]
directly to the Sandiganbayan; and
(3) Petitioner’s
good faith and the merits of her case cannot in any way vest CA with
jurisdiction.
After
the CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on
On
The Court
resolves to NOTE petitioner’s Compliance and Explanation dated 22 September
2009 with Resolution dated 12 August 2009, apologizing to this Court for the
clerical error on the date mentioned in paragraph 2 of the affidavit of service
of the motion for extension of time to file petition for review on certiorari
which was typed as 21 July 2009 instead of 23 July 2009, and submitting
documents relative thereto.
Acting on the
petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolutions dated 13 November
2008 and 25 June 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31240, the
Court further resolves to DENY the petition for failure to
sufficiently show that the appellate court committed any reversible error in
the challenged resolutions as to warrant the exercise by this Court of its
discretionary appellate jurisdiction.
Moreover,
pursuant to Rule 45 and other related provision of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court, only
petitions which comply strictly with the requirements specified therein shall
be entertained. Herein petitioner failed
to state the material date of filing of the motion for reconsideration of the
assailed resolution in violation of Section 4[b] and 5, Rule 45 in relation to
Section 5[d], Rule 56.
The
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Court on
On
On
The OSG then filed a Manifestation and
Motion[15]
stating, among others, that it is the Sandiganbayan which has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over petitioner’s case, thus, it is the Office of the
Special Prosecutor (OSP) that has the
duty and responsibility to represent the People in cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and in all cases elevated from the
Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court. The OSG prayed that: (1) the
Manifestation be noted; (2) it be excused from further
participating in this case; (3) petitioner be ordered to furnish
the OSP with a copy of the petition together with its annexes; and (4) the
OSP be given a fresh period within which to file its comment.
On August 25, 2010, the Court resolved
to: (1) note the OSG’s Manifestation and Motion and grant its
prayer to be excused from further participating in the present case; (2) direct
the Division Clerk of Court to furnish the OSP with a copy of the petition and
its annexes; and (3) require the OSP to file a comment on the
petition within ten (10) days from receipt of copy of the petition and its
annexes.[16]
Eventually,
the OSP filed its Comment.[17]
Primarily, it pointed out that the dismissal of petitioner’s appeal by the CA
was proper as it was indeed the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the
case; that the negligence of counsel binds the client; and that the right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege
and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by law. As the petitioner failed to perfect her
appeal in accordance with law, the RTC resolution affirming the MCTC Decision
was rendered final and executory.
The Court’s Ruling
There
is no quibble that petitioner, through her former counsel, had taken a wrong
procedure. After the RTC rendered an adverse decision, she should have sought
relief from the Sandiganbayan in conformity with R.A. No. 8249.[18] Under
R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional
trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of
their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. Thus:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019,
as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying
the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
x x x x x x x
x x
In cases where none
of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade '27' or
higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and
PNP officer mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be
vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal
trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to
their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional
trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of
their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. (Emphases supplied)[19]
Pursuant thereto, the Sandiganbayan
promulgated its own internal rules.
Section 2, Rule XI, Part III of the Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan reads:
SEC.
2. Petition for Review. – Appeal to the Sandiganbayan from a decision of
the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be
by a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
This was strictly applied by the
Court in the cases of Melencion v. Sandiganbayan[20]
and Estarija v. People,[21]
where it ruled that the CA committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the petitions erroneously filed before it.
Thus, in this case, the CA was
correct in dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Section 2 of Rule 50
of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court provides, among others, that “an appeal
erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate
court but shall be dismissed outright.” This has been the consistent holding of
the Court.
The
peculiar circumstances of the case, however, constrain the Court to reconsider
its position and give the petitioner a chance to bring her case to the
Sandiganbayan. The Court notes that the CA eventually decided the
administrative case filed against petitioner in her favor.[22]
This administrative case (where only substantial evidence is required)
is so intertwined with this criminal case (where evidence beyond reasonable doubt is
required). The CA pointed out that
Records
also bear out that the earlier civil case
against Armando, the petitioner’s husband, was also finally resolved in his
favor since the obligation had already been settled.[24]
This civil case is also intertwined with the administrative and criminal cases
filed against petitioner.
Thus, it appears
that the filing of the criminal case against petitioner was merely an
afterthought considering that the civil case against her husband and the
administrative case against her were resolved in the couple’s favor.
In light of what has been shown, the
Court is inclined to suspend the rules to give the petitioner a chance to seek
relief from the Sandiganbayan. The Court likewise makes exception to the
general rule that the mistakes and negligence of counsel bind the client. Doubtless,
the filing of the appeal before the CA by the petitioner’s former counsel was
not simple negligence. It constituted gross negligence.
It bears stressing at this point, that
the rule which states that the mistakes of counsel bind the client may not be strictly
followed where observance of it would result in outright deprivation of the
client’s liberty or property, or where the interests of justice so require. In
rendering justice, procedural infirmities take a backseat against substantive
rights of litigants. Corollarily, if the
strict application of the rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote
justice, this Court is not without power to exercise its judicial discretion in
relaxing the rules of procedure.[25]
The Court takes note of settled jurisprudence which holds that:
The
function of the rule that negligence or mistake of counsel in procedure is
imputed to and binding upon the client, as any other procedural rule, is to
serve as an instrument to advance the ends of justice. When in the
circumstances of each case the rule desert[s] its proper office as an aid to
justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be
relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a manifest miscarriage of
justice.
x
x x x x x x x x
The
court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule
whenever the purposes of justice require it.[26]
The Court also takes note that the petitioner has no
participatory negligence. The resulting
dismissal by the CA was utterly attributable to the gross negligence of her
counsel. For said reason, the Court is
not averse to suspending its own rules in the pursuit of justice. “Where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives
the client of due process of law, or when its application will result in
outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property or where the interests
of justice so require, relief is accorded to the client who suffered by reason
of the lawyer’s gross or palpable mistake or negligence.”[27]
“Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or
property which would warrant the suspension of the rules of the most mandatory
character and an examination and review by the appellate court of the lower
court's findings of fact, the other elements that are to be considered are the
following: (1) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (2) the
merits of the case, (3) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) a lack of
any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, (5) the
other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.”[28] All these factors are attendant in this case. In the case of Tiangco v. Land
Bank of the Philippines,[29]
it was written:
Dismissal of appeals on
purely technical grounds is not encouraged. The rules of procedure ought not to
be applied in a very rigid and technical sense, for they have been adopted to
help secure, not override, substantial justice. Judicial action must be guided
by the principle that a party-litigant should be given the fullest opportunity
to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose
life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities. When a rigid application of
the rules tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this
Court is empowered to suspend their operation.
Petitioner’s
liberty here is at stake. The MCTC convicted her and imposed upon her the
penalty of five (5) years imprisonment and the disqualification to hold office.
This MCTC decision was affirmed by the RTC.[30]
If she has to suffer in prison, her guilt must be established beyond reasonable
doubt, availing all the remedies provided for under the law to protect her
right. It is highly unjust for her to lose her liberty only because of the
gross negligence of her former counsel.
With
the dismissal of the administrative case against the petitioner, it is in the
interest of substantial justice that the criminal case against her should be reviewed
on the merits by the proper tribunal following the appropriate procedures under
the rules. Our legal culture requires the presentation of proof beyond reasonable
doubt before any person may be convicted of any crime and deprived of his life,
liberty or even property, not merely substantial evidence. It is not enough that the evidence establishes
a strong suspicion or a probability of guilt. The primary consideration is
whether the guilt of an accused has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. It has
been consistently held that:
In a criminal case, the accused is
entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond doubt. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility
of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or
that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. On the
whole, the meager evidence for the prosecution casts serious doubts as to the
guilt of accused. It does not pass the test of moral certainty and is
insufficient to rebut the constitutional presumption of innocence.[31]
At this juncture, the Court takes
opportunity to state that it is not countenancing the inexcusable negligence
committed by petitioner’s former counsel, Atty. Santos M. Baculi, in handling
petitioner’s case. He is, accordingly, warned to be more careful and meticulous
in the discharge of his duties to his clients.
It
need not be overemphasized that the trust and confidence necessarily reposed by
clients in their counsel requires from the latter a high standard and
appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the
public. Every lawyer should, therefore, serve his client in a meticulous,
careful and competent manner. He is bound to protect the client’s interests and
to do all steps necessary therefor as his client reasonably expects him to discharge
his obligations diligently.[32]
WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 31240 dated
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ROBERTO A.
ABAD
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of
the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 32-35. Penned by Associate Justice
Magdangal M. de Leon with Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga and
Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia, concurring.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Before
the effectivity of the new Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (
[15] Rollo, pp. 119-127.
[16]
[17]
[18] “An Act Further Defining the
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for the Purpose Presidential Decree
No. 1606, as Amended, Providing Funds Thereof, and for other Purposes.”
[19] See the case of Moll v. Hon.
Buban, 436 Phil. 627, 635-636 (2002).
[20] G.R. No. 150684,
[21] G.R.
No. 173990,
[22] Rollo, pp. 38-46.
[23]
[24]
[25] See the case of Rutaquio v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 143786, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 312, 320.
[26] Aguilar v. CA, 320 Phil. 456, 462 (1995).
[27] People v. Almendras, 449 Phil. 587, 609 (2003).
[28] Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 452 Phil 665, 674 (2003); and Ginete v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 36, 54 (1998).
[29]
G.R. No. 153998,
[30] Rollo, pp. 49-50.
[31] People v. Bansil, 364 Phil. 22, 34 (1999).
[32] Villaflores v. Limos, A.C. No. 7504,