Republic
of the
SUPREME
COURT
FIRST DIVISION
|
CONSTANCIO
F. MENDOZA and SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY OF BALATASAN, BULALACAO, ORIENTAL Petitioners, -
versus - MAYOR
ENRILO VILLAS and BRGY. KAGAWAD LIWANAG HERATO and MARLON DE CASTRO, Manager,
Pinamalayan Branch, Land Bank of the Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 187256 Present: NACHURA,*
PEREZ,
JJ. Promulgated: February
23, 2011 |
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R E S O L U T I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a Petition dated
April 7, 2009[1] filed by
Constancio F. Mendoza and Sangguniang
Barangay of Balatasan, Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro. In the Petition, it is prayed that the Court:
(1) set aside the Order dated February 2, 2009[2] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43 in Roxas, Oriental Mindoro and its
Order dated March 17, 2009[3]
denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the Order dated February 2,
2009; and (2) direct the RTC to continue with the proceedings in Special Civil
Action No. 08-10 entitled Constancio
Mendoza v. Mayor Enrilo Villas.
The factual antecedents of the case
are as follows:
In the 2007 barangay elections,
After the elections, the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) proclaimed
On February 28, 2008, Villas
administered the Oath of Office to Herato.[5] Then, Villas issued Memorandum No.
2008-03-010 dated March 3, 2008,[6]
directing all department heads of the Municipal Government to act only on
documents signed or authorized by Herato.
Meanwhile,
In a letter dated April 11, 2008,[7]
DILG Undersecretary Austere A. Panadero responded to
Nevertheless, the Bulalacao Municipal
Administrator, Edezer Aceron, by the authority of Villas, issued a letter dated
April 23, 2008[8] to
respondent Marlon de Castro, Manager, Pinamalayan Branch, Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP), requesting that transactions entered into by
In response, de Castro issued Villas
and
Thereafter, petitioners filed a
Petition dated May 5, 2008 for Mandamus with Damages and Prayer for the Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, docketed as Special Civil Action No. 08-10
pending with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43 in Roxas, Oriental Mindoro.
Petitioners prayed that the LBP be directed to release the funds of Barangay Balatasan to them in order to
render necessary, basic public services to the inhabitants of the barangay.
Thus, Villas and Herato filed an
Answer dated May 16, 2008 interposing the following affirmative defenses: (1) that the petition for mandamus was
defective, being directed against two or more different entities and requiring
to perform different acts; and (2) that Mendoza does not have any clear and
legal right for the writ of mandamus.
On the other hand, the LBP also filed
its Answer dated June 5, 2008, stating that its decision of withholding the barangay funds was a mere act of
prudence given the controversy surrounding the true Punong Barangay of Balatasan while manifesting that it will release
the funds to whom the Court directs it to.
Thereafter, Villas and Herato filed a
Motion to Dismiss dated November 7, 2008. In the Motion, a copy of the COMELEC
Resolution dated September 8, 2008 in COMELEC Case No. SPA-07-243-BRGY was
attached. This case originated from a disqualification case against
In an attempt to clarify the issues
on the matter,
Nevertheless, the RTC issued the
assailed order dated February 2, 2009 dismissing the petition on the strength
of the COMELEC Resolution dated September 8, 2008 disqualifying
From such orders the petitioners went
directly to this Court.
The instant petition is a direct
recourse to this Court from the assailed orders of the RTC. Notably,
petitioners did not cite the rule under the Rules of Court by which the
petition was filed. If the petition is to be treated as a petition filed under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the petition must be dismissed outright for
having been filed prematurely.
In Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA) v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[12] a
petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 was dismissed for having been filed
directly with the Court, violating the principle of hierarchy of courts, to
wit:
Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals
and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction,
such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of
court forum. In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog
v. Melicor, citing People v. Cuaresma,
this Court made the following pronouncements:
This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial
Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This
concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to
parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of
the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after
all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of
appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs. A
becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (“inferior”)
courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the
latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there
are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in
the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent
further over-crowding of the Court’s docket. (Emphasis supplied.)
Similarly, there are no special and
important reasons that petitioners cite to justify their direct recourse to
this Court under Rule 65.
On the other hand, direct recourse to
this Court has been allowed for petitions filed under Rule 45 when only
questions of law are raised, as in this case.
Thus, the Court ruled in Barcenas
v. Tomas:[13]
Section 1 of Rule 45 clearly states that the following
may be appealed to the Supreme Court through a petition for review by
certiorari: 1) judgments; 2) final orders; or 3) resolutions of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or similar courts,
whenever authorized by law. The appeal must involve only questions of law, not
of fact.
This Court has, time and time again, pointed out that
it is not a trier of facts; and that, save for a few exceptional instances, its
function is not to analyze or weigh all over again the factual findings of the
lower courts. There is a question of law when doubts or differences arise as to
what law pertains to a certain state of facts, and a question of fact when the
doubt pertains to the truth or falsity of alleged facts.
Under the principle of the hierarchy of courts,
decisions, final orders or resolutions of an MTC should be appealed to the RTC
exercising territorial jurisdiction over the former. On the other hand, RTC
judgments, final orders or resolutions are appealable to the CA through either
of the following: an ordinary appeal if the case was originally decided by the
RTC; or a petition for review under Rule 42, if the case was decided under the
RTC's appellate jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, a direct recourse to this Court can be
taken for a review of the decisions, final orders or resolutions of the RTC,
but only on questions of law. Under Section 5 of Article VIII of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court has the power to
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
x x x x
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of
law is involved.
This kind of direct appeal to this Court of RTC
judgments, final orders or resolutions is provided for in Section 2(c) of Rule
41, which reads:
SEC. 2. Modes of appeal.¾
x x x x
(c) Appeal by certiorari.¾In all cases where only questions of law are raised or
involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on
certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
Procedurally
then, petitioners could have appealed the RTC Decision affirming the MTC (1) to
this Court on questions of law only;
or (2) if there are factual questions involved, to the CA -- as they in fact
did. Unfortunately for petitioners, the CA properly dismissed their petition
for review because of serious procedural defects. This action foreclosed their
only available avenue for the review of the factual findings of the RTC.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the Court shall exercise
liberality and consider the instant petition as one filed under Rule 45. In Artistica
Ceramica, Inc. v. Ciudad Del Carmen Homeowner’s Association, Inc.,[14]
citing Republic v. Court of Appeals,[15]
the Court noted that it has the discretion to determine whether a petition was
filed under Rule 45 or 65 of the Rules of Court:
Admittedly, this Court, in accordance with the liberal
spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, has the
discretion to treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule
45, especially if filed within the reglementary period for filing a petition
for review.
Nevertheless, even providing that the
petition was not filed prematurely, it must still be dismissed for having
become moot and academic.
In Gunsi, Sr. v. Commissioners, The Commission on Elections,[16]
the Court defined a moot and academic case as follows:
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present
a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a rule, courts decline
jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
With the conduct of the 2010 barangay elections, a supervening event
has transpired that has rendered this case moot and academic and subject to
dismissal. This is because, as stated in
Fernandez v. Commission on Elections,[17] “whatever
judgment is reached, the same can no longer have any practical legal effect or,
in the nature of things, can no longer be enforced.”
WHEREFORE, the
Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA MARIANO C.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Additional member per Special Order No. 947 dated February 11, 2011.
[1] Rollo, p. 3-27.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] G.R. No. 183409, June 18, 2010, 621 SCRA 295, 309-310.
[13] G.R. No. 150321, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 593, 606-607.
[14] G.R. Nos. 167583-84, June 16, 2010, 621 SCRA 22, 34.
[15] G.R. No. 95533, November 20, 2000, 345 SCRA 63, 70.
[16] G.R. No. 168792, February 23, 2009, 580 SCRA 70, 76.
[17] G.R. No. 176296, June 30, 2008, 556 SCRA 765, 771.