FIRST
DIVISION
|
CEFERINA LOPEZ TAN Petitioner, -versus- SPOUSES APOLINAR P. ANTAZO and
GENOVEVA O. ANTAZO Respondents. |
G.R. No. 187208 Present: Chairperson VELASCO, JR., NACHURA,*
PEREZ, JJ. Promulgated: February 23, 2011 |
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D
E C I S I O N
PEREZ,
J.:
In
this petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Ceferina Lopez Tan seeks to
nullify the Resolution[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 105514 which dismissed her petition
for certiorari for being the wrong
mode of appeal.
The
factual antecedents follow.
Respondent
Spouses Apolinar and Genoveva Antazo are the registered owners of two parcels
of land, namely: (1) a 1,024-square meter lot identified as Lot No. 2190, Cad
609-D, Case-17, AP-04-004442, situated at Barangay
Pilapila, Binangonan, Rizal and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. M-11592; and (2) a 100-square meter portion of a 498-square meter lot
identified as
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as
follows:
A.
That
the defendant encroached on the property of the plaintiffs by 114 square
meters.
B.
The
defendant is hereby ordered to vacate the 114 square meters of the plaintiffs’
property illegally occupied by the defendant and to turn over its full
possession and ownership in favor of the plaintiffs. To remove the fence constructed on the
encroached area.
C.
The
plaintiffs are awarded attorney’s fees in the amount of 50,000 pesos.[2]
Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration but was later denied by the RTC on
Aggrieved, petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals on
On
Hence, the instant
recourse grounded on a sole assigned error – that the Court of Appeals has
decided a question of substance in a way not in accord with law or with
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court.[3]
Petitioner maintains
that she rightfully filed a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals on the ground of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court. While conceding
that certiorari is available only if
there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, petitioner avers that her case presents an exception to such general
rule because the decision rendered by the trial court is an example of an
oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
Petitioner justifies the mode of appeal she adopted before the Court of
Appeals in that under the Rules of Court, no appeal may be taken from an order
denying a motion for reconsideration, i.e.,
the
On the other hand,
respondents contend that the instant petition deserves outright dismissal for
being fatally defective due to failure to show competent evidence of the
identities of the affiants who signed the affidavit of service and the
verification and certification against forum shopping. Respondents also assert that certiorari is not the proper remedy to
assail the decision issued by the RTC.
Being improper, respondents argue that the filing of the certiorari petition before the Court of
Appeals did not toll the running of the appeal period. Consequently, the RTC judgment had already
lapsed into finality. Respondents also emphasize
that petitioner raises questions of facts which are beyond the purview of this
Court to resolve.
The pivotal issue in
this case is the correctness of a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals as a remedy against the Decision
and Resolution of the Regional Trial Court.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is a pleading limited to correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is to keep the inferior
court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from
committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. It may issue only when the
following requirements are alleged in and established by the petition: (1) that
the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) that such tribunal, board or officer
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) that there is
no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.[4]
Only the first
requisite is here present. Petitioner
correctly impleaded the trial court judge in her certiorari petition.
Regarding to the second
requisite, it is well-settled that a petition for certiorari against a court which has jurisdiction over a case will
prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is manifested. The burden is on the part of the petitioner to
prove not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent issuing the
impugned order. Mere abuse of discretion
is not enough; it must be grave. The
term grave abuse of discretion is defined as a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion
or hostility.[5]
The petitioner lists
the particulars of the alleged grave abuse of discretion, thus –
THE
RESPONDENT JUDGE OR TRIAL COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OF JURISDICTION AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED
ORDERS ANNEXES “A” AND “B.”
Under
this heading, the following are disputed as tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or without jurisdiction that
led to the questioned orders Annexes “A” and “B”, viz:
I.
THE
HONORABLE JUDGE/TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE
DEFENSES AND ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE PETITIONER;
II.
THE
HONORABLE JUDGE/TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE
IS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT SPOUSES ANTAZO’S PROPERTY WAS ENCROACHED BY THE
PETITIONER BY 114 SQUARE METERS;
III.
THE
HONORABLE JUDGE/TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE PETITIONER TO
VACATE AND TURNOVER THE FULL POSSESSION AND OWNERSHIP OF SAID 114 SQUARE METERS
TO RESPONDENTS SPOUSES ANTAZO DESPITE THE LATTER’S ABSENCE OF A CLEAR TITLE
THERETO;
IV.
THE
HONORABLE JUDGE/TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN NOT SUMMARILY DISMISSING
THE INSTANT COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF THE RULES ON NON-FORUM SHOPPING;
V.
THE
HONORABLE JUDGE/TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN AWARDING RESPONDENTS
SPOUSES ANTAZO WITH ATTORNEY’S FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF 50,000.00 PESOS IN THE
ABSENCE OF FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASES THEREFOR;
VI.
THE
HONORABLE JUDGE/TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN NOT AWARDING PETITIONER’S
COUNTER-CLAIMS DESPITE THE EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENTS TO SUPPORT THE SAME;
VII.
THE
HONORABLE
Item VII argues that the
trial court’s judgment is void for lack of factual and legal bases. This allegation is worthy only if it is read
to mean that the questioned judgment did not state the facts and the law on
which it is based, i.e., that it
violates Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that no
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
After perusing the
trial court’s decision, we find that the assailed decision substantially
complied with the constitutional mandate.
While the decision is admittedly brief, it however contains all factual
bases to support its conclusion. The
first two (2) paragraphs of the decision established the ownership of
respondents through certificates of title.
The fact of encroachment was proven by the relocation survey conducted
by the geodetic engineer, which the trial court found to be credible. The trial court held that these evidence are
more than sufficient to prove two matters—ownership by respondents and
encroachment by petitioner.
Petitioner herself
disproved the absence of the required statements. She questioned the trial court’s appreciation
of her arguments and defenses; the sufficiency of evidence to prove
encroachment; and the existence of a clear title to the alleged encroached
properties in Errors (I), (II), and (III).
Errors (IV), (V), and (VI) pertain to legal questions such as whether
there was violation of forum-shopping; whether the award of attorney’s fees is
proper; and the validity of the counterclaims.
A petition for the writ of certiorari
does not deal with errors of judgment. Nor does it include a mistake in the
appreciation of the contending parties' respective evidence or the evaluation
of their relative weight.[7]
Verily, the errors ascribed by petitioner are not proper subjects of a petition
for certiorari.
Anent the third
requisite, a writ of certiorari will
not issue where the remedy of appeal is available to the aggrieved party. The party aggrieved by a decision of the Court
of Appeals is proscribed from assailing the decision or final order of said
court via Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court because such recourse is proper only if the party has no plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the course of law.[8] Furthermore, certiorari cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy
of an ordinary appeal.[9]
In
this case, the remedy of appeal under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court was clearly
available to petitioner. She however
chose to file a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65. As the Court of Appeals
correctly surmised and pointed out, petitioner availed of the remedy of certiorari to salvage her lost appeal,
thus:
In the instant case, petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration of the decision dated
In her final attempt to
reinstate the case, petitioner invokes a liberal interpretation of the
procedural rules in the interest of substantial justice. We are not persuaded. Aside from citing cases wherein this Court
disregarded procedural infirmities to pave the way for substantial justice,
petitioner failed to specifically cite any justification how and why a normal application
of procedural rules would frustrate her quest for justice. Indeed,
petitioner has not been forthright in explaining why she chose the wrong mode of
appeal.
Based on the foregoing,
a denial of the petition is in order.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED.
SO
ORDERED.
|
|
JOSE
|
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of
the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
* Per Special Order No. 947, Associate Justice Antonio
Eduardo B. Nachura is hereby designated as additional member in place of
Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro who is on official leave.
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo with Presiding Justice
Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang, concurring. Rollo, pp.
46-48.
[2] Decision
of the Regional Trial Court. Rollo, p. 86.
[3] Petition
for Review on Certiorari filed with
the Supreme Court. Rollo, p. 16.
[4] Equitable-PCI Bank Inc. v. Apurillo,
G.R. No. 168746, 5 November 2009, 605 SCRA 30, 42-43 citing People v. Court of Appeals, 468 Phil. 1,
10 (2004); Salvacion v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 175006, 27 November 2008, 572 SCRA 163, 180-181.
[5] Office of the Ombudsman v. Magno, G.R.
No. 178923, 27 November 2008, 572 SCRA 272, 286-287 citing Microsoft Corporation v. Best Deal Computer Center Corporation, 438
Phil. 408, 414 (2002); Suliguin v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 166046, 23 March 2006, 485 SCRA 219, 233; Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
440 Phil. 1, 19-20 (2002); Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Goimco, Sr., 512 Phil. 729, 733-734 (2005) citing
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, 456 Phil. 755, 786 (2003); Duero
v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 12, 20 (2002) citing Cuison v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128540, 15 April 1998, 289
SCRA 159, 171.
[6] Petition
for Certiorari filed with the Court
of Appeals. Rollo, pp. 65-67.
[7] Romy’s Freight Service v. Castro, G.R.
No. 141637, 8 June 2006, 490 SCRA 160, 166 citing Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, supra note 5 at
787 citing further Cruz v. People,
363 Phil. 156 (1999).
[8] California Bus Lines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 145408, 20 August 2008, 562 SCRA 403, 413 citing Cathay Pacific Steel Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 164561, 30 August 2006, 500 SCRA 226, 236-237; Hanjin Engineering and Construction Co.,
Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165910, 10 April 2006, 487 SCRA 78,
96-97.
[9] Cua, Jr. v. Tan, G.R. No. 181455-56,
[10] Resolution
of the Court of Appeals dated