SECOND DIVISION
|
NATIONWIDE SECURITY AND ALLIED SERVICES, INC., Petitioner, - versus - RONALD P. VALDERAMA, Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 186614
Present: CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: February
23, 2011 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Petitioner Nationwide Security and
Allied Services, Inc. (petitioner) appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court the December 9, 2008
Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 104966, and the February 24, 2009 Resolution[2]
denying its reconsideration.
Respondent Ronald Valderama
(Valderama) was hired by petitioner as security guard on April 18, 2002. He was assigned at the Philippine Heart
Center (PHC),
Petitioner presented a different
version. It alleged that respondent was
not constructively or illegally dismissed, but had voluntarily resigned. Its version of the facts was summarized by the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in this wise:
[Petitioner] x x x averred that [respondent]
has committed serious violations of the security rules in the workplace. On January 31, 2004, he was charged with
conduct unbecoming for which he was required to explain. Months after, he and four (4) other
co-security guards failed to attend a mandatory seminar. For this, he was suspended for seven (7)
days. On June 5, 2004, [respondent]
displayed his discourteous and rude attitude upon his superior. He said to him
in a high pitch of (sic) voice, “ano ba
sir, personalan ba ito, sabihin mo lang kung ano gusto mo.” On June 8, 2004, [petitioner] required him to
explain why no disciplinary action should be meted against him.
Again, on January 22, 2005, seven security
guards, including [respondent], were made to explain their failure to report
for duty without informing the office despite the instruction during their
formation day which was held a day before. On January 31, 2006, Roy Datiles,
Detachment Commander, reported that [respondent] confronted and challenged him
in a high pitch and on top of his voice rudely showing discourtesy and
rudeness. Being his superior, Datiles
recommended the relief of [respondent] in the detachment effective January 31,
2006. By order of the Operations
Manager, he was relieved from his post at the Philippine Heart Center. He was directed to report to the office. On February 10, 2006, he got his cash bond
and firearm deposit. Despite his voluntary
resignation, [petitioner] sent him a letter through registered mail to report for
the office and give information on whether or not he was still interested for report
for duty or not. [Respondent] did not bother to reply. Neither did he report to the office.[3]
After due proceedings, the Labor
Arbiter (LA) rendered a decision, viz.:
This office is of the view that [respondent]
was constructively dismissed.
[Petitioner’s] defense that [respondent] voluntarily resigned on February
10, 2006 is unsubstantiated (Annex “G”). What appears on record is the
pro-forma resignation dated 04 October 2004 (Annex “D”) long before this
complaint was filed. It is a basic rule
in evidence that the burden of proof is on the part of the party who makes the
allegation. [Petitioner] failed to discharge the burden.
The
general rule is that the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is
inconsistent with resignation. The
Supreme Court in Shie Jie Corp. vs. National Federation of Labor, G.R. No.
153148, July 15, 2005, held:
“By vigorously pursuing the litigation of his
action against petitioner, private respondent clearly manifested that he has no
intention of relinquishing his employment which is, wholly incompatible [with]
petitioner[’]s assertion, that he voluntarily resigned.”
In Great Southern Maritime Services Corp. vs.
Acuña, G.R. No. 140189, Feb. 28, 2005, it was ruled that the execution of the
alleged “resignation letters cum release and quitclaim” to support the
employer’s claim that respondents voluntarily resigned is unavailing as the
filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with resignation.
Further it is significant to note that
[respondent] was even required by [petitioner] to undergo a “Re-Training
Course” conducted from February 20, 2006 to March 1, 2006 (Annex “F”). It is not only absurd but unbelievable that
[respondent] who according to [petitioner] voluntarily resigned on February 10,
2006 and yet participated in the said “Re-Training Course” after his alleged resignation.
In this case, [respondent] was not posted
since he was relieved from his post on January 30, 2006 until the filing of the
instant complaint on August 2, 2006 or for a period of more than six (6)
months. In
This office is in accord with [respondent’s]
argument that the letter sent to the latter to report for work is an absurdity
considering [petitioner’s] claim that [respondent] voluntarily resigned. x x x.[4]
The LA disposed thus:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, judgment
is hereby rendered declaring [respondent] to have been constructively
dismissed. [Petitioner is] ordered to
reinstate [respondent] to his former position without loss of seniority rights
and other benefits. Further,
[petitioner] Nationwide Security & Allied Services, Inc. is ordered to pay
[respondent] the following monetary awards[:]
1. Backwages
(see computation) 148,
125.00
2. Prop.
13th Month Pay
1/06
- 1/30/06 = 97 mo.
P450
x 30 x 1/12 x .97
1,091.25
TOTAL
AWARD 149,216.25
x x x
x
SO ORDERED.[5]
On
appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision.
It declared that respondent was neither constructively terminated nor
did he voluntarily resign. As such,
respondent remained an employee of petitioner.
The NLRC thus ordered respondent to immediately report to petitioner and
assume his duty. It also deleted the
award of backwages and the order of reinstatement by the LA for lack of basis.[6]
The
NLRC decreed that:
WHEREFORE,
the foregoing considered, the instant appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED deleting the
award of backwages and order of reinstatement.
[Respondent] is directed to report immediately and [petitioner is]
ordered to accept him. [Petitioner is]
also ordered to pay his 13th month pay in the amount of P1,091.25
as ordered in the Decision.
SO
ORDERED.[7]
Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the NLRC denied it on June 11, 2008.
Respondent went to the CA via certiorari. On December 9, 2008, the CA rendered a Decision[8]
setting aside the resolutions of the NLRC and reinstating that of the LA. In gist, the CA sustained respondent’s claim of
constructive dismissal. It pointed out that
respondent remained on floating status for more than six (6) months, and petitioner
offered no credible explanation why it failed to provide a new assignment to respondent
after he was relieved from PHC. It likewise
rejected petitioner’s claim that respondent voluntarily resigned, holding that
no convincing evidence was offered to prove it. The CA found it odd that respondent attended the
re-training course conducted by petitioner from February 20, 2006 to March 1,
2006, if respondent indeed resigned on February 10, 2006. The CA, therefore, ruled against the legality
of respondent’s dismissal and sustained the LA’s award of backwages and order
of reinstatement in favor of respondent.
The CA decreed, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is
GRANTED. The Resolutions dated 27 March
2008 and 11 June 2008 of the National Labor Relations Commission (Third
Division) in NLRC NCR CASE NO. 00-08-06365-06; NLRC CA NO. 051626-07 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision
dated 29 November 2006 of Labor Arbiter Enrique L. Flores, Jr. is hereby
REINSTATED. Costs against [petitioner].
SO
ORDERED.[9]
Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration, but the CA denied it on February 24, 2009.[10]
Hence, this appeal by
petitioner faulting the CA for sustaining respondent’s claim of constructive
dismissal.
The appeal lacks merit.
In cases involving security guards, a
relief and transfer order in itself does not sever employment relationship
between a security guard and his agency. An employee has the right to security
of tenure, but this does not give him a vested right to his position as would
deprive the company of its prerogative to change his assignment or transfer him
where his service, as security guard, will be most beneficial to the client.
Temporary “off-detail” or the period of time security guards are made to wait
until they are transferred or assigned to a new post or client does not constitute
constructive dismissal, so long as such status does not continue beyond six months.[11]
The onus of proving that there is no post available to which the security
guard can be assigned rests on the employer, viz.:
When a security guard is placed on a
"floating status," he does not receive any salary or financial
benefit provided by law. Due to the grim economic consequences to the employee,
the employer should bear the burden of proving that there are no posts
available to which the employee temporarily out of work can be assigned.[12]
Respondent claims that he was
relieved from PHC on January 30, 2006; thereafter, he was not given a new assignment. Petitioner, on the other hand, asserts that
respondent refused to report to petitioner for his reassignment. Otherwise
stated, petitioner claims that respondent abandoned his job.
The jurisprudential rule on abandonment
is constant. It is a matter of intention
and cannot lightly be presumed from certain equivocal acts. To constitute
abandonment, two elements must concur: (1) the failure to report for work or absence
without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intent, manifested through
overt acts, to sever the employer-employee relationship.[13]
In this case, petitioner failed to establish clear evidence of respondent’s intention to abandon his
employment. Except for petitioner’s bare
assertion that respondent did not report to the office for reassignment, no
proof was offered to prove that respondent intended to sever the
employer-employee relationship.
Besides, the fact that respondent filed the
instant complaint negates any intention on his part to forsake his work. It is
a settled doctrine that the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is
inconsistent with the charge of abandonment,
for an employee who takes steps to protest his dismissal cannot by logic be
said to have abandoned his work.[14]
Similarly, we cannot
accept petitioner’s
argument that respondent voluntarily resigned.
Resignation is the voluntary act of
an employee who is in a situation where one believes that personal reasons
cannot be sacrificed in favor of the
exigency of the service, and one has
no other choice but to dissociate oneself from employment. It is a formal
pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, with the intention of relinquishing
the office accompanied by the act of relinquishment. As the intent to
relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the
employee before and after the alleged resignation must be
considered in determining whether, he or she, in fact, intended to sever his or
her employment.[15]
In Mobile Protective & Detective Agency v. Ompad[16] and
Mora v. Avesco Marketing Corporation,[17]
we ruled that should the employer interpose the defense of
resignation, it is incumbent upon the employer to prove that
the employee voluntarily resigned. On
this point, petitioner failed to discharge the burden.
Petitioner was also firm in asserting
that respondent voluntarily resigned. Oddly,
it failed to present the alleged resignation letter of respondent. We also note that, in its March 24, 2006
letter,[18]
petitioner required respondent to report at its office for reassignment. It strains credulity that petitioner would
require respondent to report for reassignment if the latter already tendered
his resignation effective February 10, 2006.
Petitioner capitalizes on the
withdrawal of the cash and firearm bonds by respondent. It contends that the withdrawal of bonds
sufficiently proved respondent’s intention to terminate his employment contract
with petitioner. In support of its
argument, petitioner cited Roberta Gaa v.
Nationwide Security and Allied Services, Inc. and Romeo Nolasco,[19] which
declared that cash bond and firearm bond
are never withdrawable for as long as the security guard intends to remain an
employee of the security agency.
Petitioner’s reliance on Gaa is misplaced. We note that the
declaration that cash bond and firearm
bond are never withdrawable for as long as the security guard intends to remain
an employee of the security agency was made by the NLRC.[20] Although this Court affirmed the NLRC in a
Minute Resolution dated September 26, 2007,[21]
still, the said NLRC ruling cannot be considered a binding precedent that can
be invoked by petitioner in its favor.
As explained by this Court in Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc.
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue:[22]
It is true that, although contained in a
minute resolution, our dismissal of the petition was a disposition of the
merits of the case. When we dismissed the petition, we effectively affirmed the
CA ruling being questioned. As a result, our ruling in that case has already
become final. When a minute resolution
denies or dismisses a petition for failure to comply with formal and substantive
requirements, the challenged decision, together with its findings of fact and
legal conclusions, are deemed sustained. But what is its effect on other cases?
With respect to the same subject matter and
the same issues concerning the same parties, it constitutes res judicata.
However, if other parties or another subject matter (even with the same parties
and issues) is involved, the minute resolution is not binding precedent. Thus,
in CIR v. Baier-Nickel, the Court noted that a previous case, CIR v.
Baier-Nickel involving the same
parties and the same issues, was previously disposed of by the Court
thru a minute resolution dated February 17, 2003 sustaining the ruling of the
CA. Nonetheless, the Court ruled that the
previous case "ha(d) no bearing" on the latter case because
the two cases involved different subject matters as they were concerned
with the taxable income of different taxable years.
Besides, there are substantial, not simply
formal, distinctions between a minute resolution and a decision. The
constitutional requirement under the first paragraph of Section 14, Article
VIII of the Constitution that the facts and the law on which the judgment is
based must be expressed clearly and distinctly applies only to decisions, not
to minute resolutions. A minute resolution is signed only by the clerk of court
by authority of the justices, unlike a decision. It does not require the
certification of the Chief Justice. Moreover, unlike decisions, minute
resolutions are not published in the Philippine Reports. Finally, the proviso of Section 4(3) of Article VIII
speaks of a decision. Indeed, as a rule, this Court lays down doctrines or
principles of law which constitute binding precedent in a decision duly signed
by the members of the Court and certified by the Chief Justice.
Accordingly, since petitioner was not a party
in G.R. No. 148680 and since petitioner's liability for DST on its health care
agreement was not the subject matter of G.R. No. 148680, petitioner cannot
successfully invoke the minute resolution in that case (which is not even
binding precedent) in its favor.
Furthermore, the filing of the
complaint belies petitioner’s claim that respondent voluntarily resigned. As held by this Court in Valdez v. NLRC:[23]
It would have been illogical for herein
petitioner to resign and then file a complaint for illegal dismissal.
Resignation is inconsistent with the filing of the said complaint.
Indubitably, respondent
remained on “floating status” for more than six months. He was relieved on January 30, 2006, and was
not given a new assignment at the time he filed the complaint on August 2,
2006. Jurisprudence is trite with pronouncements that
the temporary inactivity or “floating status” of security guards should
continue only for six months. Otherwise,
the security agency concerned could be liable for constructive dismissal.[24] The failure of petitioner to give respondent
a work assignment beyond the reasonable six-month period makes it liable for
constructive dismissal. The CA was
correct in sustaining respondent’s claim.
If
there is a surplus of security guards caused by lack of clients or projects,
the security agency may resort to retrenchment upon compliance with the
requirements set forth in the Labor Code.
In this way, the security agency will not to be held liable for
constructive dismissal and be burdened with the payment of backwages.
Under Article 279[25]
of the Labor Code, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges; to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances; and to other
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation
was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.[26] Therefore, the CA committed no reversible
error in sustaining the LA’s award of backwages and ordering respondent’s
reinstatement.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
104966 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
JOSE CATRAL
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, with Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña III and Sesinando E. Villon, concurring; rollo, pp. 46-63.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] Supra note 1.
[9]
[10] Supra note 2.
[11] Megaforce Security and Allied Services, Inc. v. Lactao, G.R. No. 160940, July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 110, 116-117.
[12] Pido v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 169812, February 23, 2007, 516 SCRA 609, 616-617.
[13] CRC Agricultural Trading v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 177664, December 23, 2009, 609 SCRA 138, 148.
[14] Samarca v. Arc-Men Industries, Inc., 459 Phil. 506, 515 (2003).
[15] BMG Records (Phils.), Inc. v. Aparecio, G.R. No. 153290, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 300, 313-314.
[16] 497 Phil. 621 (2005).
[17] G.R. No. 177414, November 14, 2008, 571 SCRA 226.
[18] Rollo, p. 221.
[19] NLRC NCR 00-08-09249-04 (CA No. 046155-05); rollo, pp. 142-153.
[20]
[21] G.R. No. 179206, September 26, 2007.
[22] G.R. No. 167330, September 18, 2009, 600 SCRA 413, 446-447.
[23] 349 Phil. 760, 767 (1998).
[24] Soliman Security Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 433 Phil. 902, 910 (2002); Valdez v. NLRC, supra, at 765-766; Superstar Security Agency, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 81493, April 3, 1990, 184 SCRA 74, 77.
[25] ART. 279. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
[26] Megaforce Security and Allied Services, Inc. v. Lactao, supra note 11, at 118-119.