Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
MARK Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 184274
Present: CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, VELASCO, JR.,* NACHURA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: February
23, 2011 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a
Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the Court
of Appeals (CA) Decision[1]
dated June 18, 2008 and Resolution[2]
dated August 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 30603. The assailed Decision affirmed
with modification the September 27, 2006 decision[3]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 202, Las Piñas City, finding
petitioner Mark C. Soledad guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of
Section 9(e), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8484, or the Access Devices Regulations
Act of 1998; while the assailed Resolution denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
The facts of the case, as narrated by
the CA, are as follows:
Sometime
in June 2004, private complainant Henry C. Yu received a call on his mobile
phone from a certain “Tess” or “Juliet Villar” (later identified as Rochelle Bagaporo), a credit card agent, who
offered a Citifinancing loan assistance at a low interest rate. Enticed by the
offer, private complainant invited Rochelle Bagaporo to go to his office in
During
the first week of August 2004, private complainant received his Globe
handyphone statement of account wherein he was charged for two (2) mobile phone
numbers which were not his. Upon verification with the phone company, private
complainant learned that he had additional five (5) mobile numbers in his name,
and the application for said cellular phone lines bore the picture of
[petitioner] and his forged signature. Private complainant also checked with
credit card companies and learned that his Citibank Credit Card database
information was altered and he had a credit card application with Metrobank
Card Corporation (Metrobank).
Thereafter,
private complainant and Metrobank’s junior assistant manager Jefferson
Devilleres lodged a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
which conducted an entrapment operation.
During
the entrapment operation, NBI’s Special Investigator (SI) Salvador Arteche
[Arteche], together with some other NBI operatives, arrived in Las Piñas around
5:00 P.M. [Arteche] posed as the delivery boy of the Metrobank credit card.
Upon reaching the address written on the delivery receipt, [Arteche] asked for
Henry Yu. [Petitioner] responded that he was Henry Yu and presented to
[Arteche] two (2) identification cards which bore the name and signature of
private complainant, while the picture showed the face of [petitioner].
[Petitioner] signed the delivery receipt. Thereupon, [Arteche] introduced
himself as an NBI operative and apprehended [petitioner]. [Arteche] recovered
from [petitioner] the two (2) identification cards he presented to [Arteche]
earlier.[4]
Petitioner was thus charged with
Violation of Section 9(e), R.A. No. 8484 for “possessing a counterfeit access
device or access device fraudulently applied for.” The accusatory portion of the Information
reads:
That
on or about the 13th day of August 2004, or prior thereto, in the
City of Las Piñas, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with certain Rochelle
Bagaporo a.k.a. Juliet Villar/Tess and a certain Ronald Gobenciong a.k.a. Carlo
and all of them mutually helping and aiding each other, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud complainant HENRY YU by applying a credit
card, an access device defined under R.A. 8484, from METROBANK CARD
CORPORATION, using the name of complainant Henry C. Yu and his personal
documents fraudulently obtained from him, and which credit card in the name of
Henry Yu was successfully issued and delivered to said accused using a
fictitious identity and addresses of Henry Yu, to the damage and prejudice of
the real Henry Yu.
CONTRARY
TO LAW.[5]
Upon
arraignment, petitioner pleaded “not guilty.” Trial on the merits ensued. After the presentation of the evidence for the
prosecution, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence, alleging that he was not
in physical and legal possession of the credit card presented and marked in
evidence by the prosecution. In an Order
dated May 2, 2006, the RTC denied the Demurrer to Evidence as it preferred to
rule on the merits of the case.[6]
On
September 27, 2006, the RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty as
charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
In
the light of the foregoing, the
Court finds accused Mark P10,000.00) for the offense committed.
SO ORDERED.[7]
On appeal, the CA affirmed
petitioner’s conviction, but modified the penalty imposed by the RTC by
deleting the terms prision correccional and
prision mayor.
Hence, this petition raising the
following issues:
(1) Whether or not the Information is valid;
(2) Whether or not the Information charges an
offense, or the offense petitioner was
found guilty of;
(3)
Whether
or not petitioner was sufficiently informed of the nature of the accusations
against him;
(4)
Whether
or not petitioner was legally in “possession” of the credit card subject of the
case.[8]
The petition is without
merit.
Petitioner was charged
with Violation of R.A. No. 8484, specifically Section 9(e), which reads as
follows:
Section 9. Prohibited Acts. – The following acts shall constitute access
device fraud and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x x
(e) possessing one or more counterfeit access
devices or access devices fraudulently applied for.
Petitioner assails the
validity of the Information and claims that he was not informed of the
accusation against him. He explains that though he was charged with “possession
of an access device fraudulently applied for,” the act of “possession,” which
is the gravamen of the offense, was not alleged in the Information.
We do not agree.
Section 6, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down the guidelines in determining the sufficiency
of a complaint or information. It states:
SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or
information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation
of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date
of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.
In the Information filed before the RTC, it was clearly
stated that the accused is petitioner “Mark Soledad y Cristobal a.k.a. Henry Yu/Arthur.” It was also specified in the preamble of the
Information that he was being charged with Violation of R.A. No. 8484, Section
9(e) for possessing a counterfeit access device or access device fraudulently
applied for. In the accusatory portion thereof, the acts constituting the
offense were clearly narrated in that “[petitioner], together with other
persons[,] willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defrauded private complainant by applying [for] a credit card, an
access device defined under R.A. [No.] 8484, from Metrobank Card Corporation,
using the name of complainant Henry C. Yu and his personal documents
fraudulently obtained from him, and which credit card in the name of Henry Yu
was successfully issued, and delivered to said accused using a fictitious
identity and addresses of Henry Yu, to the damage and prejudice of the real
Henry Yu.” Moreover, it was identified that the offended party was private
complainant Henry Yu and the crime was committed on or about the 13th
day of August 2004 in the City of
The Court’s discussion in People v. Villanueva[9] on
the relationship between the preamble and the accusatory portion of the
Information is noteworthy, and we quote:
The preamble or opening paragraph should not
be treated as a mere aggroupment of descriptive words and phrases. It is as
much an essential part [of] the Information as the accusatory paragraph itself.
The preamble in fact complements the accusatory paragraph which draws its
strength from the preamble. It lays down the predicate for the charge in
general terms; while the accusatory portion only provides the necessary
details. The preamble and the accusatory paragraph, together, form a complete
whole that gives sense and meaning to the indictment. x x x.
x x x x
Moreover, the opening paragraph bears the
operative word “accuses,” which sets in motion the constitutional process of
notification, and formally makes the person being charged with the commission
of the offense an accused. Verily, without the opening paragraph, the
accusatory portion would be nothing but a useless and miserably incomplete
narration of facts, and the entire Information would be a functionally sterile
charge sheet; thus making it impossible for the state to prove its case.
The Information sheet must be considered, not
by sections or parts, but as one whole document serving one purpose, i.e., to
inform the accused why the full panoply of state authority is being marshaled
against him. Our task is not to determine whether allegations in an indictment
could have been more artfully and exactly written, but solely to ensure that
the constitutional requirement of notice has been fulfilled x x x.[10]
Besides, even if the word “possession” was not repeated in
the accusatory portion of the Information, the acts constituting it were
clearly described in the statement “[that the] credit card in the name of Henry Yu was successfully
issued, and delivered to said accused using a fictitious identity and addresses
of Henry Yu, to the damage and prejudice of the real Henry Yu.” Without a doubt, petitioner was given the
necessary data as to why he was being prosecuted.
Now on the sufficiency of evidence leading to his
conviction.
Petitioner avers that he
was never in possession of the subject credit card because he was arrested
immediately after signing the acknowledgement receipt. Thus, he did not yet
know the contents of the envelope delivered and had no control over the subject
credit card.[11]
Again, we find no value
in petitioner’s argument.
The trial court convicted
petitioner of possession of the credit card fraudulently applied for, penalized
by R.A. No. 8484. The law, however, does not define the word “possession.”
Thus, we use the term as defined in Article 523 of the Civil Code, that is,
“possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right.” The acquisition of possession involves two
elements: the corpus or the material
holding of the thing, and the animus possidendi or the intent to possess it.[12]
Animus
possidendi is a state of mind, the presence or determination of which is
largely dependent on attendant events in each case. It may be inferred from the prior or
contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances.[13]
In this case, prior to
the commission of the crime, petitioner fraudulently obtained from private
complainant various documents showing the latter’s identity. He, thereafter, obtained cellular phones using
private complainant’s identity. Undaunted, he fraudulently applied for a credit
card under the name and personal circumstances of private complainant. Upon the
delivery of the credit card applied for, the “messenger” (an NBI agent)
required two valid identification cards. Petitioner thus showed two
identification cards with his picture on them, but bearing the name and forged
signature of private complainant. As evidence of the receipt of the envelope
delivered, petitioner signed the acknowledgment receipt shown by the messenger,
indicating therein that the content of the envelope was the Metrobank credit
card.
Petitioner materially
held the envelope containing the credit card with the intent to possess. Contrary to petitioner’s contention that the
credit card never came into his possession because it was only delivered to
him, the above narration shows that he, in fact, did an active part in acquiring
possession by presenting the identification cards purportedly showing his
identity as Henry Yu. Certainly, he had the intention to possess the same. Had
he not actively participated, the envelope would not have been given to him. Moreover, his signature on the acknowledgment
receipt indicates that there was delivery and that possession was transferred
to him as the recipient. Undoubtedly, petitioner knew that the envelope
contained the Metrobank credit card, as clearly indicated in the acknowledgment
receipt, coupled with the fact that he applied for it using the identity of
private complainant.
Lastly, we find no reason
to alter the penalty imposed by the RTC as modified by the CA. Section 10 of
R.A. No. 8484 prescribes the penalty of imprisonment for not less than six (6)
years and not more than ten (10) years, and a fine of P10,000.00 or
twice the value of the access device obtained, whichever is greater. Thus, the
CA aptly affirmed the imposition of the indeterminate penalty of six years to
not more than ten years imprisonment, and a fine of P10,000.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
June 18, 2008 and Resolution dated August 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 30603 are
AFFIRMED.
SO
ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate
Justice |
JOSE CATRAL
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
*
Additional member in lieu of
Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro per Special Order No. 949
dated February 11, 2011.
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta, with Associate Justices Edgardo
P. Cruz and Ricardo R. Rosario, concurring; rollo,
pp. 52-68.
[2]
[3] Penned
by Judge Elizabeth Yu Guray; id. at 33-47.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] 459
Phil. 856 (2003).
[10]
[11] Rollo, pp. 17-26.
[12] Arturo
M. Tolentino, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
[13] People v. Esparas, 354 Phil. 342,
354-355 (1998); People v. Lian, 325
Phil 881, 889 (1996).