G.R. No. 182555: LENIDO LUMANOG and AUGUSTO SANTOS, petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

G.R. No. 185123: CESAR FORTUNA, petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

G.R. No. 187745: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, v. SPO2 CESAR FORTUNA y ABUDO, RAMESES DE JESUS y CALMA, LENIDO LUMANOG y LUISTRO, JOEL DE JESUS y VALDEZ and AUGUSTO SANTOS y GALANG, accused, RAMESES DE JESUS y CALMA and JOEL DE JESUS y VALDEZ, accused-appellants.

Promulgated:

February 8, 2011

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DISSENTING OPINION

CARPIO, J.:

I reiterate my dissent.

The prosecution in this case gravely failed to discharge its burden of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the prosecution unsuccessfully established the identity of the perpetrators of the crime beyond reasonable doubt. Lamentably, the majority believes otherwise. The majority relies on the highly questionable identification made by the lone eyewitness, Freddie Alejo (Alejo), in convicting the five accused for the murder of Philippine Constabulary Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla (Abadilla). The majority dismally failed to exercise caution in relying on Alejo’s identification, contrary to what the Court emphasized in People v. Rodrigo,¹ thus:

The greatest care should be taken in considering the identification of the accused especially, when this identification is made by a sole witness and the judgment in the case totally depends on the reliability of the identification. This level of care and circumspection applies with greater vigor when, as in the present case, the issue goes beyond pure credibility into constitutional dimensions arising from the due process rights of the accused. (Emphasis supplied)

As I earlier pointed out, danger signals abound in Alejo’s in-court identification, rendering such identification seriously doubtful. These warnings include (1) a serious discrepancy exists between the identifying witness’ original description and the actual description of the accused; (2) there was a limited opportunity on the part of the witness to see the accused before the commission of the crime; (3) a considerable time elapsed between the witness’ view of the criminal and his identification of the accused; and (4) several persons committed the crime.

According to Alejo, not one, not two, but six men perpetrated the crime. He saw these six male adults, all complete strangers, for the very first time in a matter of seconds. It is quite unbelievable that Alejo, whose life was threatened by at least one of the suspects, focused his attention on all six suspects, looked at them at the same time, and memorized their faces and features in a very fleeting and extremely stressful moment. In fact, in his sworn statement given before the police investigators, Alejo was able to describe only two suspects. He failed to give any description of the other killers. This highlights Alejo’s weak recollection of the crime and its perpetrators even if he is a security guard who is expected to be extra perceptive and vigilant.

If Alejo indeed perfectly memorized the physical appearance of the killers, which the majority believes, nothing stopped him from describing the rest of the suspects when asked by the police investigators “Ano ba ang itsura ng mga suspect?” Alejo could have readily described the other suspects, which description would have strengthened his subsequent in-court identification of the accused, if indeed they were the suspects Alejo saw murdering Abadilla. However, to repeat, Alejo was able to describe only two suspects, whose remarkable features bore no resemblance with the accused’s.

Notwithstanding, during the trial, Alejo easily identified the six accused as Abadilla’s murderers. It must be emphasized that prior to his in-court identification, Alejo had surely seen the faces of the accused in newspapers and television, facilitating his identification of the accused during the trial. As I have previously stressed, Alejo would not have been able to identify the accused in court without the pictures of the accused that were taken by the media. The media exposure of the accused casts serious doubts on the integrity of Alejo’s testimony on the identification of the murderers.

Further, Alejo’s in-court identification of the accused Joel de Jesus proceeded from and was influenced by impermissible suggestions in the earlier photographic identification. As a consequence, Alejo’s testimony based on such fatally defective identification cannot be considered as proof beyond reasonable doubt of the identity of the perpetrators, warranting Joel’s acquittal.

As regards Lumanog, Fortuna, Santos and Rameses, it was Joel, through a coerced confession, who supplied the police investigators with the identities of his supposed cohorts and their whereabouts. The police did not possess any description or prior identification of these accused. To repeat, Joel provided the police, through a coerced confession, with the identities of his supposed co-conspirators and where they could be found.

The inadmissibility of Joel’s extrajudicial confession renders its contents, specifically the identity of the supposed killers, unreliable and inadmissible as well. Hence, Alejo’s in-court identification of the accused must not be given any weight for to do so is to admit and give probative value to the coerced confession of Joel.

At this juncture, I reemphasize the serious violations committed by the police authorities of accused’s constitutional rights. The highly suggestive photographic identification of Joel made by Alejo violated Joel’s due process rights under Sections 1 and 14(1), Article III of the Constitution. Meanwhile, the failure of the police to provide Joel with the assistance of counsel during the police line-up, regarded as a part of custodial investigation, violated Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. Moreover, torturing Joel to admit his participation in the crime and to provide the identities of his supposed co-conspirators violated his right under Section 12(2), Article III of the Constitution. Also, the police arrested the accused without warrant contrary to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.

The police’s blatant infringement of the accused’s constitutional rights and the seriously flawed identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime generate sufficient reason to doubt the accused’s guilt for the crime charged. Contrary to the majority’s view, the prosecution miserably failed to establish the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The accused are therefore entitled to an acquittal.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the motions for reconsideration.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

1 G.R. No. 176159, 11 September 2008, 564 SCRA 584, 597.