Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
DOLORITA C.
BEATINGO, Petitioner, - versus - LILIA BU GASIS, Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 179641
Present: CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: February 9,
2011 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a
Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals[1]
(CA) Resolutions dated June 27, 2007[2]
and August 13, 2007[3] in
CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 01624.
This petition stemmed from the
following facts:
Petitioner Dolorita Beatingo filed a
Complaint for Annulment and Cancellation
of
Petitioner alleged that, on May 19,
1998, she bought a piece of land, denominated as
On the other hand, respondent claimed
that she purchased the subject property from Flora without knowledge of the
prior sale of the same subject property to petitioner, which makes her an
innocent purchaser for value. Respondent denied having induced Flora to violate
her contract with petitioner as she never knew the existence of the alleged
first contract. Lastly, respondent declared that, upon payment of the purchase
price, she immediately occupied the subject property and enjoyed its produce.
On December 29, 2005, the RTC rendered
a decision,[6]
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,
on the basis of the testimonial and documentary evidence, the court finds that
preponderant evidence has been established by the defendant as against the
plaintiff, hence, JUDGMENT is therefore rendered in favor of the defendant.
Consequently,
the complaint is DISMISSED and the defendant is hereby declared to be the
lawful owner of the property in question. Further the plaintiff is hereby
ordered to pay the defendant P30,000.00 in attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses of P10,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
SO
ORDERED.[7]
The RTC considered the controversy as
one of double sale and, in resolving the issues raised by the parties, it
applied the rules laid down in Article 1544 of the Civil Code. As opposed to
petitioner’s admission that she did not pay the purchase price in full and that
she did not acquire possession of the subject property because of the presence
of tenants on it, the court gave more weight to respondent’s evidence showing
that she immediately acquired possession of the subject property and enjoyed
its produce upon full payment of the purchase price. Since the two sales – that
of petitioner and that of respondent – were not registered with the Registry of
Property, the RTC held that whoever was in possession had the better right. Hence, it decided in favor of respondent.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion
for New Trial and Reconsideration[8]
on the ground that she was in possession of the subject property actually and
constructively. The motion, however, was denied by the RTC in an Order[9]
dated April 5, 2006.
Undaunted,
petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via a Notice of Appeal. On December
20, 2006, the CA required petitioner to file an Appellant’s Brief within
forty-five (45) days from receipt of the notice.[10]
However,
due to pressures of work in equally important cases with other clients, counsel
for petitioner requested for an extension of ninety (90) days within which to
file the brief.[11]
In a
Resolution dated March 9, 2007, the CA granted the motion. The Resolution is
quoted below for easy reference:
As prayed for, the plaintiff-appellant is
hereby granted the maximum extension of ninety (90) days from 19 February 2007
or until 20 May 2007, within which to file an Appellant’s Brief.[12]
Instead of filing the Appellant’s Brief
within the extended period, petitioner twice moved for extension of time to
file the brief, covering an additional period of sixty (60) days for the same
reasons as those raised in the first motion for extension.[13]
In a Resolution[14]
dated June 27, 2007, the CA denied the motions for extension to file brief.
Thus, for failure to file the Appellant’s Brief, the appellate court dismissed
the appeal. In a Resolution[15]
dated August 13, 2007, the CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition on the
following grounds:
A.
THE
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT REVIEWING ON THE MERITS THE APPEAL OF
THE PETITIONER, CONSIDERING THAT, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
ILOILO IS SO HORENDOUSLY WRONG WHEN THE SAID COURT DECIDED IN FAVOR OF THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT, WHICH IF NOT REVIEWED, OR REVERSED, WILL CAUSE INJUSTICE TO
TRIUMPH AS AGAINST WHAT IS RIGHT AND LEGAL, SACRIFICING SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE IN
FAVOR OF TECHNICALITIES, CONSIDERING THAT:
a. Petitioner
was the first buyer of the property while the private respondent is only the
second buyer;
b. It is
petitioner who is in possession of the said property and that;
c. Private respondent was not able to have her
own deed of sale registered with the Register of Deeds;
B. THE
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION, IN FAVOR OF
SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE, BY ADMITTING THE APPELLANT’S BRIEF OF THE PETITIONER
TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THAT PETITIONER IN GOOD FAITH HAS FILED THE NEEDED
MOTIONS FOR EXTENSIONS (sic) TO FILE BRIEF, AND THE BRIEF WAS IN FACT FILED
WITHIN THE PERIOD OF THE REQUESTED EXTENSIONS.[16]
Petitioner insists that the appeal
should not have been dismissed because her failure to file the Appellant’s Brief
was not deliberate and intended for delay. She claims that prior to the
expiration of the 90-day extension within which to file the brief, she again
asked for two more extensions. She explains that the counsel could not prepare
the Appellant’s Brief because the law firm was swamped with numerous cases and
election related problems which needed his attention.
We find petitioner’s arguments bereft
of merit.
Section 7, Rule 44 of the Rules of
Court provides:
Sec.
7. Appellant’s Brief. – It shall be
the duty of the appellant to file with the court, within forty-five (45) days
from receipt of the notice of the clerk that all the evidence, oral and
documentary, are attached to the record, seven (7) copies of his legibly
typewritten, mimeographed or printed brief, with proof of service of two (2)
copies thereof upon the appellee.
In
a Resolution dated December 20, 2006, the CA required petitioner to file the Appellant’s
Brief. The notice was received by
petitioner on January 5, 2007. However,
instead of filing the required brief, petitioner requested for additional time
to prepare “due to pressures of work in equally important cases, plus court
appearances, preparation of memoranda, conference with other clients.” The CA
granted the request and specifically stated that the same was the maximum
extension. This notwithstanding, instead of complying with the court’s
directive, petitioner again filed two motions for extension, for a total period
of sixty (60) days. This time, the CA denied the motions and eventually
dismissed the appeal in accordance with Section 1(e),[17]
Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
Evidently, petitioner’s counsel was negligent in failing to
file the required brief not only within 45 days from receipt of the notice but
also within the extended period of ninety (90) days granted by the appellate
court. He, however, explains that he
could not comply with the court’s directive because he had to attend to other cases
that he considered more important and urgent than the instant case. Regrettably,
such excuse is unacceptable.[18]
An attorney is bound to protect his
client’s interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. Failure to file brief certainly constitutes
inexcusable negligence, more so if the delay results in the dismissal of the
appeal.[19]
Every member of the Bar should always
bear in mind that every case that a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention,
diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of its importance, whether he
accepts it for a fee or for free.[20]
Unfortunately, petitioner is bound by
the negligence of her counsel.
The failure to file the Appellant’s Brief, though not
jurisdictional, results in the abandonment of the appeal which may be the cause
for its dismissal. It is true that it is
not the ministerial duty of the CA to dismiss the appeal. The appellate court
has the discretion to do so, and such discretion must be a sound one, to be
exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in
mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.[21]
The question of whether or not to sustain the dismissal of
an appeal due to petitioner’s failure to file the Appellant’s Brief had been
raised before this Court in a number of cases. In some of these cases, we
relaxed the Rules and allowed the belated filing of the Appellant’s Brief. In
other cases, however, we applied the Rules strictly and considered the appeal
abandoned, which thus resulted in its eventual dismissal. In Government of the
(1) The general rule is for the Court
of Appeals to dismiss an appeal when no appellant’s brief is filed within the
reglementary period prescribed by the rules;
(2) The power conferred upon the
Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal is discretionary and directory and not
ministerial or mandatory;
(3) The failure of an appellant to
file his brief within the reglementary period does not have the effect of
causing the automatic dismissal of the appeal;
(4) In case of late filing, the
appellate court has the power to still allow the appeal; however, for the
proper exercise of the court’s leniency[,] it is imperative that:
(a)
the circumstances obtaining warrant the court’s liberality;
(b) that strong considerations of
equity justify an exception to the procedural rule in the interest of
substantial justice;
(c)
no material injury has been suffered by the appellee by the delay;
(d) there is no contention that the
appellee’s cause was prejudiced;
(e)
at least there is no motion to dismiss filed.
(5) In case of delay, the lapse must
be for a reasonable period; and
(6) Inadvertence of counsel cannot be
considered as an adequate excuse as to call for the appellate court’s
indulgence except:
(a)
where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the
client of due process of law;
(b) when application of the rule will
result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property; or
(c)
where the interests of justice so require.
In this case, we find no
reason to disturb the appellate court’s exercise of sound discretion in
dismissing the appeal. We must emphasize that the right to appeal is not a
natural right but a statutory privilege, and it may be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.[23]
The Court cannot say that the issues being raised by petitioner are of such
importance that would justify the appellate court to exempt her from the
general rule, and give due course to her appeal despite the late filing of her Appellant’s
Brief.[24]
Nevertheless, in our
desire to put an end to the present controversy, we have carefully perused the
records of this case and reached the conclusion that the decision dated December
29, 2005 of
the RTC is in perfect harmony with law and jurisprudence.[25]
The present controversy
is a clear case of double sale, where the seller sold one property to different
buyers, first to petitioner and later to respondent. In determining who has a
better right, the guidelines set forth in Article 1544 of the Civil Code apply.
Article 1544 states:
Art. 1544. If the same thing
should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred
to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it
should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property,
the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription,
the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in
possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest
title, provided there is good faith.
Admittedly, the two sales were not registered with the
Registry of Property. Since there was no inscription, the next question is who,
between petitioner and respondent, first took possession of the subject property
in good faith. As aptly held by the trial court, it was respondent who took
possession of the subject property and, therefore, has a better right.
Petitioner insists that, upon the execution of the public
instrument (the notarized deed of sale), she already acquired possession
thereof, and thus, considering that the execution thereof took place ahead of
the actual possession by respondent of the subject property, she has a better
right.
We do not agree.
Indeed, the execution of a public instrument shall be
equivalent to the delivery of the thing that is the object of the contract.
However, the Court has held that the execution of a public instrument gives
rise only to a prima facie
presumption of delivery. It is deemed negated by the failure of the vendee to
take actual possession of the land sold.[26]
In this case, though the sale was evidenced by a notarized
deed of sale, petitioner admitted that she refused to make full payment on the subject
property and take actual possession thereof because of the presence of tenants on
the subject property. Clearly, petitioner had not taken possession of the subject
property or exercised acts of dominion over it despite her assertion that she
was the lawful owner thereof.[27]
Respondent, on the other hand, showed that she purchased
the subject property without knowledge that it had been earlier sold by Flora
to petitioner. She had reason to believe that there was no defect in her title
since the owner’s duplicate copy of the OCT was delivered to her by the seller
upon full payment of the purchase price. She then took possession of the subject
property and exercised acts of ownership by collecting rentals from the tenants
who were occupying it.
Hence, the RTC is correct in declaring that respondent has
a better right to the subject property.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition is DENIED
for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals Resolutions dated June 27, 2007 and
August 13, 2007 in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 01624 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate
Justice |
JOSE CATRAL
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1]
[2] Penned
by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican, with Associate Justices Antonio L.
Villamor and Stephen C. Cruz, concurring; rollo,
pp. 125-126.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] Penned
by Judge Rene S. Hortillo; id. at 72-86.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Supra
note 2.
[15] Supra
note 3.
[16] Rollo, p. 21.
[17] Section
1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. –
An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on
that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
x
x x x
(e) Failure of the appellant to
serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or memorandum within
the time provided by these Rules.
[18] Jetri Construction Corporation v. Bank of
the Philippine
[19] Barbuco v. Atty. Beltran, 479 Phil. 692,
696 (2004).
[20]
[21] Government of the
[22] Supra,
at 241-242.
[23] Cariño v. Espinoza, G.R. No. 166036,
June 19, 2009, 590 SCRA 43, 48.
[24] Government of the
[25] See
Jetri Construction Corporation v. Bank of
the Philippine Islands, supra note 18, at 530.
[26] Ten Forty Realty and Development Corporation
v. Cruz, 457 Phil. 603, 615 (2003).
[27] See
San Lorenzo Development Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, 490 Phil. 7 (2005).