Republic of the
Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
AVELINA F.
SAGUN, Petitioner, - versus - SUNACE INTERNATIONAL
MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 179242
Present: CARPIO,
J., Chairperson, NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD,
and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: February 23,
2011 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a
Petition for Review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the Court
of Appeals (CA) Decision[1]
dated March 23, 2007 and Resolution[2]
dated August 16, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 89298.
The case arose from a complaint for
alleged violation of Article 32 and Article 34(a) and (b) of the Labor Code, as
amended, filed by petitioner Avelina F. Sagun against respondent Sunace
International Management Services, Inc. and the latter’s surety, Country
Bankers Insurance Corporation, before the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA). The case was docketed as POEA Case No. RV 00-03-0261.[3]
Petitioner claimed that sometime in
August 1998, she applied with respondent for the position of caretaker in P30,000.00 cash, P10,000.00 in the form of a promissory
note, and NT$60,000.00 through salary deduction, in violation of the
prohibition on excessive placement fees.
She also claimed that respondent promised to employ her as caretaker but,
at the job site, she worked as a
domestic helper and, at the same time, in a poultry farm.[4]
Respondent, however, denied
petitioner’s allegations and maintained that it only collected P20,840.00, the amount
authorized by the POEA and for which the corresponding official receipt was
issued. It also stressed that it did not furnish or publish any false notice or
information or document in relation to recruitment or employment as it was duly
received, passed upon, and approved by the POEA.[5]
On December 27, 2001, POEA
Administrator Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz dismissed[6]
the complaint for lack of merit. Specifically, the POEA Administrator found
that petitioner failed to establish facts showing a violation of Article 32,
since it was proven that the amount received by respondent as placement fee was
covered by an official receipt; or of Article 34(a) as it was not shown that respondent
charged excessive fees; and of Article 34(b) simply because respondent processed
petitioner’s papers as caretaker, the position she applied and was hired for.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration[7] with
the Office of the Secretary of Labor. The Secretary treated the motion as a
Petition for Review. On January 13, 2004, then Secretary of Labor Patricia A.
Sto. Tomas partially granted[8]
petitioner’s motion, the pertinent portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration, herein treated as a
petition for review, is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Order dated December 27, 2001 of
the POEA Administrator is partially MODIFIED, and SUNACE International
Management Services, Inc. is held liable for collection of excessive placement
fee in violation of Article 34 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended. The penalty
of suspension of its license for two (2) months, or in lieu thereof, the
penalty of fine in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) is
hereby imposed upon SUNACE. Further, SUNACE and its surety, Country Bankers
Insurance Corporation, are ordered to refund the petitioner the amounts of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) and NT$65,000.00, representing the excessive
placement fee exacted from her.
SO
ORDERED.[9]
On appeal by respondent, the Office of
the President (OP) affirmed[10]
the Order of the Secretary of Labor. In resolving the case for petitioner, the
OP emphasized the State’s policy on the full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized. It also held that it was impossible for
respondent to have extended a loan to petitioner since it was not in the
business of lending money. It likewise found it immaterial that no evidence was
presented to show the overcharging since the issuance of a receipt could not be
expected.
Respondent’s motion for reconsideration
was denied in an Order[11]
dated March 21, 2005, which prompted respondent to elevate the matter to the CA
via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
On March 23, 2007, the CA decided in
favor of respondent, disposing, as follows:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED and the decision
of the Office of the President dated 07 January 2005 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE for lack of sufficient evidence. The Order of the POEA
Administrator dismissing the complaint of respondent for violation of Article
34(a) and (b) of the Labor Code is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[12]
The appellate court
reversed the rulings of the Secretary of Labor and the OP mainly because their
conclusions were based not on evidence but on speculation, conjecture,
possibilities, and probabilities.
Hence, this petition filed by petitioner,
raising the sole issue of:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN GRANTING THE RESPONDENT’S PETITION FOR REVIEW REVERSING THE DECISION
AND ORDER [OF THE] OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT.[13]
The petition is without merit.
Respondent was originally
charged with violation of Article 32 and Article 34(a) and (b) of the Labor
Code, as amended. The pertinent provisions read:
ART. 32. Fees to be Paid by
Workers. - Any
person applying with a private fee charging employment agency for employment
assistance shall not be charged any fee until he has obtained employment
through its efforts or has actually commenced employment. Such fee shall be
always covered with the appropriate receipt clearly showing the amount paid.
The Secretary of Labor shall promulgate a schedule of allowable fees.
ART. 34. Prohibited Practices.
- It shall
be unlawful for any individual, entity, licensee, or holder of authority:
(a)
To charge or accept, directly or indirectly, any amount greater
than that specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the
Secretary of Labor; or to make a worker pay any amount greater than that
actually received by him as a loan or advance;
(b)
To furnish or publish any false notice or information or document
in relation to recruitment or employment.
The POEA, the Secretary of Labor, the OP, and the CA
already absolved respondent of liability under Articles 32 and 34(b). As no
appeal was interposed by petitioner when the Secretary of Labor freed
respondent of said liabilities, the only issue left for determination is
whether respondent is liable for collection of excess placement fee defined in
Article 34(a) of the Labor Code, as amended.
Although initially, the POEA dismissed petitioner’s
complaint for lack of merit, the Secretary of Labor and the OP reached a
different conclusion. On appeal to the CA, the appellate court, however,
reverted to the POEA conclusion. Following this turn of events, we are constrained
to look into the records of the case and weigh anew the evidence presented by
the parties.
We find and so hold that the POEA and the CA are correct in
dismissing the complaint for illegal exaction filed by petitioner against
respondent.
In proceedings before
administrative and quasi-judicial agencies, the quantum of evidence required to
establish a fact is substantial evidence, or that level of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[14]
In this case, are the
pieces of evidence presented by petitioner substantial to show that respondent
collected from her more than the allowable placement fee? We answer in the
negative.
To show the amount it
collected as placement fee from petitioner, respondent presented an
acknowledgment receipt showing that petitioner paid and respondent received P20,840.00. This
notwithstanding, petitioner claimed that she paid more than this amount. In
support of her allegation, she presented a photocopy of a promissory note she
executed, and testified on the purported deductions made by her foreign
employer. In the promissory note, petitioner promised to pay respondent the
amount of P10,000.00
that she borrowed for only two weeks.[15]
Petitioner also explained that her foreign employer deducted from her salary a
total amount of NT$60,000.00. She claimed that the P10,000.00 covered by the
promissory note was never obtained as a loan but as part of the placement fee
collected by respondent. Moreover, she alleged that the salary deductions made
by her foreign employer still formed part of the placement fee collected by
respondent.
We are
inclined to give more credence to respondent’s evidence, that is, the
acknowledgment receipt showing the amount paid by petitioner and received by respondent.
A receipt is
a written and signed acknowledgment that money or goods have been delivered.[16]
Although a receipt is not conclusive evidence, an exhaustive review of the
records of this case fails to disclose any other evidence sufficient and strong
enough to overturn the acknowledgment embodied in respondent’s receipt as to
the amount it actually received from petitioner. Having failed to adduce
sufficient rebuttal evidence, petitioner is bound by the contents of the
receipt issued by respondent. The subject receipt remains as the primary or
best evidence.[17]
The promissory note
presented by petitioner cannot be considered as adequate evidence to show the
excessive placement fee. It must be emphasized that a promissory note is a
solemn acknowledgment of a debt and a formal commitment to repay it on the date
and under the conditions agreed upon by the borrower and the lender. A person
who signs such an instrument is bound to honor it as a legitimate obligation
duly assumed by him through the signature he affixes thereto as a token of his
good faith.[18]
Moreover, as held by the CA, the fact that respondent is not a lending company
does not preclude it from extending a loan to petitioner for her personal use. As
for the deductions purportedly made by petitioner’s foreign employer, we
reiterate the findings of the CA that “there is no single piece of document or receipt showing that
deductions have in fact been made, nor is there any proof that these deductions
from the salary formed part of the subject placement fee.”[19]
At this point, we would like to emphasize the
well-settled rule that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies, like the POEA,
which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to
specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but at times even
finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence.[20]
While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and to the
protection of the working class, it should not be presumed that every dispute
will automatically be decided in favor of labor.[21]
To be sure, mere general allegations of payment of
excessive placement fees cannot be given merit as the charge of illegal
exaction is considered a grave offense which could cause the suspension or
cancellation of the agency’s license. They should be proven and substantiated by
clear, credible, and competent evidence.[22]
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition is DENIED
for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals Decision dated March 23, 2007 and Resolution
dated August 16, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 89298 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA Associate Justice |
ROBERTO
A. ABAD Associate Justice |
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section
13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo, with Associate Justices
Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a member of this Court) and Rosmari D. Carandang,
concurring; rollo, pp. 232-248.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] Embodied
in a Decision dated January 7, 2005; id. at 169-175.
[11]
[12] Supra
note 1, at 247-248.
[13] Rollo, p. 60.
[14] Philemploy Services and Resources, Inc. v.
Rodriguez, G.R. No. 152616, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 302, 314.
[15] Rollo, p. 108.
[16] Cham v. Paita-Moya, A.C. No. 7494, June
27, 2008, 556 SCRA 1, 8; Towne & City Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 478 Phil. 466, 475 (2004).
[17] Towne & City Development
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 475.
[18] Dela Peña v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
177828, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 396, 413.
[19] Rollo, p. 243.
[20] Philsa Int’l. Placement and Services Corp.
v. Sec. of Labor and Employment, 408 Phil. 270, 282 (2001).
[21] Ropali Trading Corporation v. NLRC, 357
Phil. 314, 320 (1998).
[22] Opinion
of the POEA Administrator in Alindao v.
Hon. Joson, 332 Phil. 239, 246 (1996).