Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
|
LAND BANK
OF THE Petitioner, - versus - HON. ERNESTO P. PAGAYATAN, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro; and JOSEFINA S. LUBRICA, in her capacity as Assignee of Federico
Suntay,
Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 177190 Present: NACHURA,* PEREZ,
JJ. Promulgated: February
23, 2011 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I
S I O N
VELASCO,
JR., J.:
The Case
This
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks to annul the August 17,
2006 Decision[1] and
March 27, 2007 Resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 93206, which affirmed the Order
dated March 4, 2005[3] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46 in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, in
Agrarian Case No. 1390 for the fixing of just compensation, entitled Land Bank of the Philippines v. Josefina S.
Lubrica, in her capacity as assignee of Federico Suntay, and Hon. Teodoro A.
Cidro, as Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro.
The RTC Order affirmed the Decision dated
March 21, 2003[4] of the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro in Case No.
DCN-0405-0022-02, entitled Josefina S.
Lubrica, in her capacity as Assignee of Federico Suntay v. Hon. Hernani A.
Braganza, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform,
and Land Bank of the
The Facts
On
October 21, 1972, the 3,682.0286-hectare Suntay Estate, consisting of
irrigated/unirrigated rice and corn lands covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-31(1326) located in the Barangays
of Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, Sta. Lucia, and San Nicolas in Sablayan, Occidental
Mindoro, was subjected to the operation of Presidential Decree No. 27, under
its Operation Land Transfer (OLT), with the farmer-beneficiaries declared as
owners of the property. However, a 300-hectare portion of the land was
subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) instead of the
OLT. Thus, Certificates of Landownership
Award were issued to the farmer-beneficiaries in possession of the land.[5]
Such application of the CARP to the 300-hectare land was later the subject of a
case before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board (DARAB), which
ruled that the subject land should have been the subject of OLT instead of
CARP. The landowner admitted before the PARAD that said case was pending with
this Court and docketed as G.R. No. 108920, entitled Federico Suntay v. Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile,
the owner of the land remained unpaid for the property. Thus, Josefina S.
Lubrica, in her capacity as assignee of the owner of the property, Federico
Suntay, filed a Petition for Summary Determination of Just Compensation with
the PARAD, docketed as Case No. DCN-0405-0022-2002. Thereafter, the PARAD
issued its Decision dated March 21, 2003, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1.
Fixing
the preliminary just compensation for 431.1407 hectare property at P166,150.00
per hectare or a total of P71,634,027.30.
2.
Directing
the Land Bank of the
3.
Directing
the DAR to immediately comply with all applicable requirements so that the
subject property may be formally distributed and turned over to the farmer
beneficiaries thereof, in accordance with the Decision of the DARAB Central in
DARAB Case No. 2846.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Petitioner Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 10, 2003 of the
above decision, but the PARAD denied the motion in an Order dated December 15,
2003.[7]
The LBP then filed a Petition dated
March 4, 2004 with the RTC docketed as Agrarian Case No. 1390, appealing the
PARAD Decision. In the Petition, the LBP
argued that because G.R. No. 108920 was pending with this Court in relation to
the 300-hectare land subject of the instant case, the Petition for Summary
Determination of Just Compensation filed before the PARAD was premature. The LBP argued further that the PARAD could
only make an award of up to PhP 5 million only. The PARAD, therefore, could not award an
amount of PhP 71,634,027.30. The LBP
also contended that it could not satisfy the demand for payment of Lubrica,
considering that the documents necessary for it to undertake a preliminary
valuation of the property were still with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
By way of answer, Lubrica filed a Motion
to Deposit the Preliminary Valuation under Section 16(e) of Republic Act No. (RA)
6657 and Ad Cautelam Answer dated June
18, 2004.[8] In the said motion, Lubrica claimed that since
the DAR already took possession of the disputed property, the LBP is duty-bound
to deposit the compensation determined by the PARAD in a bank accessible to the
landowner.
In an Order dated March 4, 2005, the
RTC resolved Lubrica’s motion, as follows:
The foregoing considered and as prayed for by
the respondent-movant The Land Compensation Department, Land Bank of the
Philipines, is hereby directed to deposit the preliminary compensation as
determined by the PARAD, in case and bonds in the total amount of Php
71,634,027.30, with the Land Bank of the Philippines, Manila, within seven (7)
days from receipt of this order, and to notify this Court of compliance within
such period.[9]
Thus, the LBP filed an Omnibus Motion
dated March 17, 2005 praying for the reconsideration of the above order, the
admission of an amended petition impleading the DAR, and the issuance of
summons to the new defendants. In the Omnibus Motion, the LBP contended:
In this AMENDED PETITION, Land Bank impleaded
the DAR as respondent because DAR is the lead agency of the government in the
implementation of the agrarian reform. It is the one which is responsible in
identifying the lands to be covered by agrarian reform program,
placing/identifying the farmer beneficiaries, parcellary mapping of the land,
and determining the land value covered by PD 27/EO 228. The documents DAR
prepares is placed in a folder called “claim folder” which it forwards to Land
Bank for processing and payment.
21. At present there is no claim folder
prepared and submitted by DAR to Land Bank, and therefore Land Bank has no
claim folder to process and no basis to pay the landowner.[10]
In an Order dated December 8, 2005,[11]
the RTC denied the Omnibus Motion finding no reversible error in its Order
dated March 4, 2005 and denying the motion to amend the petition for being
unnecessary towards land valuation.
Thus, the LBP appealed the RTC Orders
dated March 4, 2005 and December 8, 2005 to the CA through a Petition for
Certiorari dated February 13, 2006. The LBP
argued that without the claim folder from the DAR, it could not preliminarily
determine the valuation of the covered lands and process the compensation
claims. Moreover, it said that the amount to be deposited under Sec. 16 of RA 6657,
or the Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, is
the offered purchase price of DAR for the land contained in the notice of
acquisition and not the price determined in an administrative proceeding before
the PARAD.
Afterwards, on August 17, 2006, the CA issued
the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE, and subsequently DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[12]
The LBP moved for reconsideration of
the CA Decision, but the CA did not reconsider it, as stated in its Resolution
dated March 27, 2007.
Hence, the LBP filed this petition.
The Issue
What is the proper amount to be deposited
under Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6657? Is it the PARAD/DARAB determined
valuation or the preliminary valuation as determined by the DAR/LBP?[13]
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
Private respondent Lubrica argues
that, under the doctrines of res judicata
and stare decisis, the instant case
must be dismissed in light of the decision of this Court in Lubrica v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[14]
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Amended Decision
dated October 27, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77530 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated May 26, 2004 of the Court of Appeals
affirming (a) the March 31, 2003 Order
of the Special Agrarian Court ordering the respondent Land Bank of the
Philippines to deposit the just compensation provisionally determined by the
PARAD; (b) the May 26, 2003 Resolution denying respondent’s Motion for
Reconsideration; and (c) the May 27, 2003 Order directing Teresita V. Tengco,
respondent’s Land Compensation Department Manager to comply with the March 31,
2003 Order, is REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, Branch 46, acting as
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied.)
The principles of res judicata and stare decisis do not apply to the case at bar.
In Lanuza v. Court of Appeals,[15]
the Court discussed the principle of res
judicata, to wit:
Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing
judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. The
doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment, on the merits rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the
parties and their privies and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions
involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. The elements of res
judicata are (a) identity of parties or at least such as representing the same
interest in both actions; (b) identity
of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and (c) the identity in the two (2) particulars is such that any
judgment which may be rendered in the other action will, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In Lubrica, the issue was as follows:
Petitioners insist that the determination of
just compensation should be based on the value of the expropriated properties
at the time of payment. Respondent LBP, on the other hand, claims that the
value of the realties should be computed as of October 21, 1972 when P.D. No.
27 took effect.[16]
While the Court directed that the
valuation made by the PARAD be the amount to be deposited in favor of the
landowner, it was done only because the PARAD’s valuation was based on the time
the payment was made.
The issue before Us is whether the
RTC acted properly in ordering the deposit or payment to the landowner of the preliminary
valuation of the land made by the PARAD. This is considering that Sec. 16(e) of
RA 6657 clearly requires the initial valuation
made by the DAR and LBP be deposited or paid to the landowner before taking
possession of the latter’s property, not the preliminary valuation made by the
PARAD.
Evidently, the second element of res judicata is not present. The relief
prayed for in Lubrica is that the
amount for deposit in favor of the landowner be determined on the basis of the time
of payment and not of the time of taking. But here, the prayer of the LBP is
for the deposit of the valuation of the LBP and DAR and not that of the PARAD. These
are two distinct and separate issues. Res judicata, therefore, cannot apply.
We cannot apply the principle of stare decisis to the instant case, too.
The Court explained the principle in Ting
v. Velez-Ting:[17]
The principle of stare decisis enjoins
adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its
final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has
been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument. Basically, it is a bar to any
attempt to relitigate the same issues, necessary for two simple reasons:
economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in
Article 8 of the Civil Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
To reiterate, Lubrica and the instant case have different issues. Hence, stare decisis is also inapplicable here.
The LBP posits that under Sec. 16(e)
of RA 6657, and as espoused in Land Bank
of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[18]
it is the purchase price offered by the DAR in its notice of acquisition of the
land that must be deposited in an accessible bank in the name of the landowner
before taking possession of the land, not the valuation of the PARAD.
The Court agrees with the LBP. The RTC erred when it ruled:
Under Section 16 (e) the payment of the
provisional compensation determined by the PARAD in the summary administrative
proceedings under Section 16 (d) should precede the taking of the land. In the
present case, the taking of the property even preceded the mere determination
of a provisional compensation by more than 30 years.[19]
Sec. 16 of RA 6657 contains the
procedure for the acquisition of private lands, viz:
SEC. 16. Procedure
for Acquisition of Private Lands.¾For purposes of acquisition of private lands,
the following procedures shall be followed:
(a) After having identified the land, the
landowners and the beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its notice to acquire the
land to the owners thereof, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post
the same in a conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of
the place where the property is located. Said
notice shall contain the offer of the DAR to pay a corresponding value in
accordance with the valuation set forth in Sections 17, 18, and other pertinent
provisions hereof.
(b) Within thirty (30) days from the date of
receipt of written notice by personal delivery or registered mail, the
landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his
acceptance or rejection of the offer.
(c) If the landowner accepts the offer of the
DAR, the LBP shall pay the landowner the purchase price of the land within
thirty (30) days after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of
the Government and surrenders the Certificate of Title and other muniments of
title.
(d) In case of rejection or failure to reply,
the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the
compensation of the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other
interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land,
within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice. After the expiration
of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty
(30) days after it is submitted for decision.
(e)
Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or in case of
rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an
accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds
in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the
land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The
DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the
qualified beneficiaries.
(f)
Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of
proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Conspicuously, there is no mention of
the PARAD in the foregoing Sec. 16(e) when it speaks of “the deposit with an
accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds
in accordance with this Act.” Moreover, it is only after the DAR has made its
final determination of the initial valuation of the land that the landowner may
resort to the judicial determination of the just compensation for the land.
Clearly, therefore, it is the initial valuation made by the DAR and LBP that is
contained in the letter-offer to the landowner under Sec. 16(a), said valuation
of which must be deposited and released to the landowner prior to taking
possession of the property.
This too was the Court’s
interpretation of the above provision in Land
Bank of the
It was thus erroneous for the CA to conclude
that the provisional compensation required to be deposited as provided in
Section 16 (e) is the sum determined by the DARAB/PARAD/RARAD in a summary
administrative proceeding merely because the word “deposit” appeared for the
first time in the sub-paragraph immediately succeeding that sub-paragraph where
the administrative proceeding is mentioned (sub-paragraph d). On the contrary,
sub-paragraph (e) should be related to sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c)
considering that the taking of possession by the State of the private
agricultural land placed under the CARP is the next step after the DAR/LBP has
complied with notice requirements which include the offer of just compensation
based on the initial valuation by LBP. To construe sub-paragraph (e) as the
appellate court did would hamper the land redistribution process because the
government still has to wait for the termination of the summary administrative
proceeding before it can take possession of the lands. Contrary to the CA’s
view, the deposit of provisional compensation is made even before the summary
administrative proceeding commences, or at least simultaneously with it, once
the landowner rejects the initial valuation (“offer”) by the LBP. Such deposit
results from his rejection of the DAR offer (based on the LBP’s initial
valuation). Both the conduct of summary administrative proceeding and deposit
of provisional compensation follow as a consequence of the landowner’s
rejection under both the compulsory acquisition and VOS. This explains why the
words “rejection or failure to reply” and “rejection or no response from the
landowner” are found in sub-paragraphs (d) and (e). Such “rejection”/“no
response from the landowner” could not possibly refer to the award of just
compensation in the summary administrative proceeding considering that the
succeeding sub-paragraph (f) states that the landowner who disagrees with the
same is granted the right to petition in court for final determination of just
compensation. As it is, the CA’s interpretation would have loosely interchanged
the terms “rejected the offer” and “disagrees with the decision”, which is far
from what the entire provision plainly conveys.
x x x x
Under the law, the LBP is charged with the
initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land
reform and the compensation to be paid for their taking. Once an expropriation
proceeding or the acquisition of private agricultural lands is commenced by the
DAR, the indispensable role of LBP begins. EO No. 405, issued on June 14, 1990,
provides that the DAR is required to make use of the determination of the land
valuation and compensation by the LBP as the latter is primarily responsible
for the determination of the land valuation and compensation. In fact, the LBP
can disagree with the decision of the DAR in the determination of just
compensation, and bring the matter to the RTC designated as [
The
amount of “offer” which the DAR gives to the landowner as compensation for his
land, as mentioned in Section 16 (b) and (c), is based on the initial valuation
by the LBP. This then is the amount which may be accepted or rejected by the
landowner under the procedure established in Section 16. Perforce, such initial
valuation by the LBP also becomes the basis of the deposit of provisional
compensation pending final determination of just compensation, in accordance
with sub-paragraph (e). (Emphasis
supplied.)
It is clear from Sec. 16 of RA 6657
that it is the initial valuation made by the DAR and the LBP that must be
released to the landowner in order for DAR to take possession of the property.
Otherwise stated, Sec. 16 of RA 6657 does not authorize the release of the
PARAD’s determination of just compensation for the land which has not yet
become final and executory.
Moreover, it bears pointing out that,
pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 1996, entitled Revised Rules and Procedures Governing the
Acquisition of Agricultural Lands subject of Voluntary Offer to Sell and
Compulsory Acquisition pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657, the DAR Municipal
Office (DARMO) first prepares a claim folder (CF) containing the necessary
documents for the valuation of the land. The DARMO then forwards this claim
folder to the DAR Provincial Office (DARPO) which, in turn, has the following
duties: “Receives claim folder and forwards to the DAR-LBP Pre-Processing Unit
(PPU) for review/evaluation of documents. Gathers lacking documents, if any.”[21] The
DAR-LBP PPU then forwards the CF to the LBP-Land Valuation and Landowner’s
Compensation Office (LVLCO) which “receives and evaluates the CF for
completeness, consistency and document sufficiency. Gathers additional
valuation documents.”[22]
Thereafter, the LBP-LVLCO “determines land valuation based on valuation inputs”
and “prepares and sends Memo of Valuation, Claim Folder Profile and Valuation
Summary (MOV-CFPVS)” to the DARPO.[23]
The DARPO then “sends Notice of Valuation and Acquisition to LO [landowner] by
personal delivery with proof of service or by registered mail with return card,
attaching copy of MOV-CFPVS and inviting LO’s attention to the submission of
documents required for payment of claim.”[24]
Notably, DAR failed to prepare the
claim folder which is necessary for the LBP to make a valuation of the land to
be expropriated. The proper remedy would
have been to ask the DAR and LBP to determine such initial valuation and to
have the amount deposited to his account, in accordance with Sec. 16 of RA
6657. Nevertheless, it was erroneous for private respondent to have filed a
Petition for Determination of Just Compensation with PARAD when the remedy that
she was seeking was for the deposit of the initial valuation that the DAR and
LBP should have made.
Contrary to the CA’s ruling, the
RTC’s failure to distinguish between the initial valuation that is contemplated
in Sec. 16 of RA 6657 and the just compensation subject of judicial
determination is a gross and patent error that can be considered as grave abuse
of discretion. Gross abuse of discretion is defined, as follows:
A special civil action for certiorari, under Rule 65, is an
independent action based on the specific grounds therein provided and will lie
only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. A petition for certiorari
will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to exist. “Grave
abuse of discretion,” under Rule 65, has a specific meaning. It is the
arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal
hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that
amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by
law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of
discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross.[25] x x x (Emphasis
supplied.)
It should also be pointed out that in
the related Land Bank of the Philippines
v. Pagayatan,[26]
the Court had found the presiding judge of the RTC, Branch 16 in San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, herein respondent Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan, guilty of Gross
Ignorance of the Law or Procedure and Gross Misconduct for holding Teresita V.
Tengco, Acting Chief of the Land Compensation Department of the LBP, and
Leticia Lourdes A. Camara, Chief of the Land Compensation Department of the
LBP, guilty of indirect contempt for allegedly disobeying the very same Order
dated March 4, 2005 of the RTC. In that
case, Court ruled:
The partiality of respondent was highlighted
when, out of his selective invocation of judicial courtesy, he refused to
resolve Leticia and Teresita’s February 14, 2007 Urgent Manifestation of
Compliance and Motion and other pending incidents in view of the pendency
before the appellate court of the LBP’s Omnibus Motion praying for, among other
things, the quashal of the warrant of arrest, whereas he had earlier found
Leticia and Teresita guilty of contempt despite the pendency before the
appellate court of LBP’s motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 93206.
Evidently,
the RTC had already acted with partiality in deciding the case and with grave
abuse of discretion.
Moreover,
in order to give life and breath to Sec. 16 of RA 6657, as well as DAR
Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 1996, the Court is constrained to direct
the DAR and the LBP to make the initial valuation of the subject land as of the
time of its taking and to deposit the valuation in the name of the landowner or
his estate, in accordance with RA 6657 and the pertinent decisions of this Court
on the matter.
The
length of time that has elapsed that the landowner has not received any
compensation for the land cannot justify the release of the PARAD valuation to
the landowner. Sec. 16 of RA 6657 only
allows the release of the initial valuation of the DAR and the LBP to the landowner
prior to the determination by the courts of the final just compensation due.
Besides, it must be stressed that it was only sometime in 2003 that the
assignee of the landowner filed a petition for determination of just
compensation with the PARAD. Clearly, the
landowner slept on his right to demand payment of the initial valuation of the
land. Nevertheless, such lapse of time demands that the DAR and the LBP act
with dispatch in determining such initial valuation and to deposit it in favor
of the landowner at the soonest possible time.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED. The CA’s August 17, 2006 Decision and March
27, 2007 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 93206 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The DAR and the LBP are hereby given three
(3) months from receipt of notice that this Decision has become final and
executory, within which to determine the initial valuation of the subject lot
and to deposit its initial value to the account of private respondent Lubrica.
The PARAD Decision dated March 21,
2003 in Case No. DCN-0405-0022-02 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
RTC Order dated March 4, 2005 in Agrarian Case No. 1390 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA MARIANO C.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Additional member per Special Order No. 947 dated February 11, 2011.
[1] Rollo, pp. 73-80. Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Magdangal M. de Leon.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] G.R. No. 170220, November 20, 2006, 507 SCRA 415, 425-426.
[15] G.R. No. 131394, March 28, 2005, 454 SCRA 54, 61-62.
[16] Supra note 14, at 421.
[17] G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009, 582 SCRA 694, 704.
[18] G.R. No. 118712, October 6, 1995, 249 SCRA 149.
[19] Rollo, p. 178.
[20] G.R. No. 161834, August 11, 2010.
[21] Rollo, p. 288.
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25] Beluso v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180711, June 22, 2010, 621 SCRA 450, 456.
[26] A.M. No. RTJ-07-2089, September 8, 2009, 598 SCRA 592, 605.