G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499, and 178056: LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al.

 

 

Promulgated:

February 15, 2011

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DISSENTING OPINION

 

 

CARPIO, J.:

 

 

I dissent.

 

In their motion for reconsideration, respondents argue that: (1) the petitions on their face do not call for the exercise of judicial power considering that the share of local government units in the Internal Revenue Allotments does not constitute rights which are legally demandable and enforceable; (2) the 16 Cityhood Laws are not unconstitutional; and (3) there was no violation of the equal protection clause.

 

The crux of the controversy is whether the 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional.1

 

As I have consistently opined, which opinion is concurred in by the majority members of this Court in the reinstated Decision of 18 November 2008 and in the assailed Resolution of 24 August 2010, the 16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional.

 

First, the 16 Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. This provision reads:

 

No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)

 

 

The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code.2 The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.

 

RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement.

 

In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

 

Second, the 16 Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

 

The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following conditions:

 

1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;

2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;

3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.3

 

 

As I have previously stressed, there is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion − mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress − is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.

 

Moreover, the fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only.

 

Further, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date − the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11th Congress – as against all other municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009.

 

In addition, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded, the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

 

I repeat, Section 10, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that “no x x x city shall be created x x x except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code.” This provision can only be interpreted in one way, that is, all the criteria for the creation of cities must be embodied exclusively in the Local Government Code. In this case, the Cityhood Laws, which are unmistakably laws other than the Local Government Code, provided an exemption from the increased income requirement for the creation of cities under Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Clearly, the Cityhood Laws contravene the letter and intent of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

 

Accordingly, I vote to DENY the motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated 24 August 2010.

 

 

 

 

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

 

1In paragraph 93 of the motion for reconsideration, respondents state:

 

93. Thus, in this motion for reconsideration of the “Resolution” of August 24, 2010, what is in issue is the correctness of the ruling of the Majority on [the] merits of the case, particularly the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws.

2Republic Act No. 7160, as amended.

3De Guzman, Jr. v. COMELEC, 391 Phil. 70, 79 (2000); Tiu v. Court of Tax Appeals, 361 Phil. 229, 242 (1999).