EN
BANC
G.R. No. 176951 -- League of Cities of the
G.R. No.
177499 -- League of Cities of the
G.R. No.
178056 -- League of Cities of the
Promulgated:
February 15, 2011
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CONCURRING
OPINION
ABAD, J.:
The Court has received flak on this case for supposed
“flip-flopping.” But its shifting views
are understandable because of the nearly even soundness of the opposing advocacies
of the two groups of cities over the validity of the sixteen cityhood laws.[1] It also does not help that the membership of
the Court has been altered by retirements and replacements at various stages
from when it first decided to annul the laws, to when it reconsidered and
upheld their validity, and to when it reverted to the original position and declared
the laws involved unconstitutional. This
to me is a healthy sign of democracy at work, the members being blind to the
need to conform.
In its Resolution
of August 24, 2010, the Court reversed its December 21, 2009 Decision
and denied the quest for cityhood of sixteen municipalities on the ground that
the laws creating them violated Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution[2]
and the equal protection clause.[3] By that resolution, the majority also held
that the Court erred in setting aside its November 18, 2008 decision since this
latter had attained finality after the Court’s denial of the second motion for
reconsideration of the respondent cities, albeit the 6-6 deadlock vote and the corresponding
entry of judgment.
The Issues Presented
The
motion for reconsideration of respondent cities presents the following issues:
1. Whether or not the sixteen cityhood laws violate Section 10,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution;
2. Whether or not such laws violate the equal protection clause;
and
3. Whether or not the Court could still modify its decision dated
November 18, 2008.
Discussions
One. In ruling that the sixteen cityhood laws
violated Section 10 of Article X, the majority in the Court held that the
creation of local government units must conform to the criterion prescribed in Section
450 of the Local Government Code.[4] Since those laws, which were passed after
the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) 9009,[5] covered
municipalities that did not comply with the amended income requirement set by the
Local Government Code, their conversion into cities were constitutionally
infirm. The majority held that R.A. 9009
did not provide exemptions from its application. Although the provisions in the sixteen
cityhood laws established exemptions from such requirement for the subject
municipalities, the same can not be considered without violating Section 10,
Article X, taking into account the legislature’s primary intent in passing R.A.
9009.[6]
I take
exception on how the majority of the Court selectively chose to focus on the sponsorship
speech of Senator Aquilino Pimentel to come up with a “primary intent” theory for
R.A. 9009. Surely, the intent of R.A.
9009 can not be based solely on that speech.
The Court should not ignore the legislative history of R.A. 9009,
including the pertinent exchanges during the interpellation of Senator Pimentel
and Senate President Franklin Drilon, thus:
THE PRESIDENT. The Chair
would like to ask for some clarificatory point. x x x
THE PRESIDENT. This is just on the point of the pending
bills in the Senate which propose the conversion of a number of municipalities
into cities and which qualify under the present standard.
We
would like to know the view of the sponsor:
Assuming that this bill becomes a law, will the Chamber apply the
standard as proposed in this bill to those bills which are pending for
consideration?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Mr. President, it might not be fair to make
this bill x x x [if] approved, retroact to the bills that are pending in the
Senate for conversion from municipalities to cities.
THE PRESIDENT. Will there be an appropriate language crafted
to reflect that view? Or does it not become a policy of the Chamber, assuming
that this bill becomes a law x x x that it will apply to those bills which are
already approved by the House under the old version of the [LGC] and are now
pending in the Senate? The Chair does not
know if we can craft a language which will limit the application to those which
are not yet in the Senate. Or is that a
policy that the Chamber will adopt?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Mr. President, personally, I do not think it is necessary to put that
provision because what we are saying here will form part of the interpretation
of this bill. Besides, if
there is no retroactivity clause, I do not think that the bill would have any
retroactive effect.
THE PRESIDENT. So
the understanding is that those bills which are already pending in the Chamber
will not be affected.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. These
will not be affected Mr. President.[7] (Emphasis supplied)
Two
things are clear from the above exchanges.
First, the legislature intended to exempt from the amended income
requirement of R.A. 9009 the municipalities that had pending cityhood bills
during the 11th Congress. As
a matter of fact, such legislative intent was carried over to the 12th
and the 13th Congress when the House of Representatives adopted
Joint Resolutions[8] that sought the exemption
of twenty-four municipalities, including the sixteen, from the application of R.A.
9009. The continuing intent of Congress
culminated in the inclusion of the exemption clause in the cityhood bills and
their subsequent passage.
Second, it is also clear from the above exchanges between
Senators Pimentel and Drilon that Congress did not anymore insert an exemption
clause from the income requirement of R.A. 9009 since such exchanges, when read
by the Court, would already reveal the lawmakers’ intent regarding such
matter.
Besides,
the exemption clause found in each of the cityhood laws serves as an affirmation
of Congress’ intent to exempt them from the increased income requirement of R.A.
9009. These new cities have not
altogether been exempted from the operation of the Local Government Code
covering income requirement. They have
been expressly made subject to the lower income requirement of the old
code. There remains, therefore,
substantial compliance with the provision of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution which provides that no city may be created “except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code.”
The
above interpretation accommodates the “primary” intention of Congress in
preventing the mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities
and the other intention of Congress to exempt the municipalities which have
pending cityhood bills before the enactment of R.A. 9009.
This is
not to say that the views of the majority in the Court are absolutely illogical
or wrong. They are admittedly
plausible. But, given the unstable
footing of such views as evidenced by its shifting positions on the issue, the
Court should have adopted an attitude of becoming humility, upholding the constitutionality
of the acts of a co-equal branch of government regarding a matter that properly
fell within its powers.
Two. The equal
protection clause of the Constitution seeks to protect persons from being deprived
of life, liberty, or property by the uneven application of statutes. In invoking this protection, it is incumbent
on petitioner League of Cities to show, not only that the exemption granted to
the sixteen cities amounted to arbitrary classification but, that the League or
their members have been deprived of life, liberty or property, by reason of the
exemption. The League of Cities has failed
to discharge this burden.
The
Court explained in Ichong v.
Hernandez[9] the limits of the equal protection clause,
thus:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists (sic) for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. (Emphasis supplied)
Far
from baselessly favoring the sixteen municipalities, Congress gave them exemptions
from the application of R.A. 9009 based on its sense of justice and fairness. Senator Alfredo Lim explained this in his
sponsorship speech on House Joint Resolution No. 1, thus:
x x x The imposition
of a much higher income requirement for the creation of a city virtually
delivered a lethal blow to the aspirations of the 24 municipalities to attain
economic growth and progress. To them, it was unfair; like any sport –
changing the rules in the middle of the game.
x x x x
I,
for one, share their view that fairness dictates that they should be given a
legal remedy by which they could be allowed to prove that they have all the
necessary qualifications for city status using the criteria set forth under the
Local Government Code prior to its amendment by R.A. 9009.
x x x x
In
essence, the Cityhood bills now under consideration will have the same effect
as that of House Joint Resolution No. 1 because each of the 12 bills seeks
exemption from the higher income requirement of R.A. 9009. The
proponents are invoking the exemption on the basis of justice and fairness.
x x x[10] (Emphasis supplied)
What makes the injustice quite
bitter is the fact that the sixteen cities did not merely have pending cityhood
bills during the 11th Congress.
They also met at that time the income criteria set under Section 450 of
the then Local Government Code. The
Court owes to these cities the considerations that justice and fair play
demands. It can not be denied that
substantial distinction sets them apart from the other cities.
Further, petitioner League of
Cities failed to show that the creation of the sixteen new cities discriminated
against other cities. As the respondent cities point out, the majority
of the present cities in our midst do not meet the P100 million minimum
income requirement of the Local Government Code.[11] It boggles the mind how these deficient
cities can complain of denial of equal protection of the law.
Besides, assuming an improper
classification in the case of the sixteen cities, petitioner League of Cities
can not invoke the equal protection clause since it has failed to show that it
will suffer deprivation of life, liberty, or property by reason of such
classification.
Actually, the existing cities
would not cease to exist nor would their liberties suffer by reason of the
enactment of the sixteen cityhood laws. That
their Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) will be diminished does not amount to
deprivation of property since the IRA is not their property until it has been automatically
released.[12] Mere expectancy in the receipt of IRA can not
be regarded as the “property” envisioned in the Bill of Rights.
Three. The
majority maintain that the Court did not properly set aside its original
decision dated November 18, 2008, which earlier invalidated the Cityhood laws
since, procedurally, the Court had previously declared such decision already
final.[13] But a question had been raised regarding the
propriety of such declaration of finality, given a pending question respecting
the consequence of a 6-6 vote on the constitutionality of the cityhood laws. At any rate, the Court has under
extraordinary circumstances[14]
reconsidered its ruling despite an entry of judgment. It will not allow the technical rules to
hinder it from rendering just and equitable relief.[15]
The issues presented in this
case do not only involve rights and obligations of some parties but the
constitutionality of the exercise by Congress of its power to make laws. There is no reason to uphold the November 18,
2008 decision since the petitioner League of Cities has failed to overcome the
strong presumption in favor of the cityhood laws’ constitutionality.
I vote to GRANT the
motion for reconsideration of the respondent cities, REVERSE AND SET ASIDE the
Resolution of the Court dated August 24, 2010, REINSTATE the Decision of
the Court dated December 21, 2009, and DISMISS the Consolidated petitions
of the League of Cities.
ROBERTO
A. ABAD
Associate Justice
[1] Republic Acts 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9394, 9398, 9393, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9436, 9435 and 9491.
[2] Section 10: No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
[3] Section 1, Article III: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Emphasis Supplied)
[4] Republic Act 7160, as amended.
[5] An Act Amending Section 450 of Republic Act No. 7160, Otherwise Known as The Local Government Code of 1991, by Increasing the Average Annual Income Requirement for a Municipality or Cluster of Barangay to be Converted into a Component City.
[6] To restrain “the mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities”. Sponsorship speech of Senator Aquilino Pimintel, October 5, 2000.
[7] See Justice Ruben T. Reyes’ Dissent promulgated on November 18, 2008; citing II Record, Senate, 13th Congress, pp. 167-168.
[8] Joint Resolution No. 29 entitled: “Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the coverage of Republic Act No. 9009” and Joint Resolution No. 1, readopting Joint Resolution No. 29.
[9] G.R. No. L-7995, 101 Phil. 1155 (1952), citing 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.
[10] Journal, Senate 13th Congress, 59th Session, 1238 -1240 cited in Justice Ruben T. Reyes’ Dissent promulgated on November 18, 2008.
[11] Motion for Reconsideration of respondent cities, p. 49.
[12]
Pimentel v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000.
[13] The Entry of Judgment of the Decision dated November 18, 2008 was made on May 21, 2009 as per Resolution of the Court dated June 2, 2009.
[14] See Manotok IV v. Heirs of Barque, G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605, December 18, 2008.
[15] Javier v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. L-68379-81, September 22, 1986.