Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
|
JOSE MARCEL PANLILIO, ERLINDA
PANLILIO, NICOLE MORRIS and MARIO T. CRISTOBAL,
Petitioners, -versus- REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 51, CITY OF MANILA, represented
by HON. PRESIDING JUDGE ANTONIO M. ROSALES; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; and
the SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 173846 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, PERALTA, PEREZ,**
and MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated: February 2, 2011 |
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D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
Before
this Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the April 27, 2006
Decision[2]
and August 2, 2006 Resolution[3]
of the Court of the Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90947.
The
facts of the case are as follows:
On
On
Finding the petition, together
with its annexes, sufficient in form and substance and pursuant to Section 6,
Rule 4 of the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation, the Court hereby:
x x x x
2) Stays the
enforcement of all claims, whether for money or otherwise and whether such
enforcement is by court action or otherwise, against the debtor, its guarantors
and sureties not solidarily liable with the debtor.[6]
At
the time, however, of the filing of the petition for rehabilitation, there were
a number of criminal charges[7]
pending against petitioners in Branch 51 of the RTC of Manila. These criminal charges were initiated by
respondent Social Security System (SSS) and involved charges of violations of
Section 28 (h)[8] of
Republic Act 8282, or the Social Security Act of 1997 (SSS law), in relation to Article 315 (1) (b)[9]
of the Revised Penal Code, or Estafa. Consequently,
petitioners filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 51, a Manifestation and Motion
to Suspend Proceedings.[10]
Petitioners argued that the stay order issued by Branch 24 should also apply to
the criminal charges pending in Branch 51. Petitioners, thus, prayed that Branch 51
suspend its proceedings until the petition for rehabilitation was finally
resolved.
On
x x x x
Clearly then, the issue is, whether the stay order
issued by the RTC commercial court, Branch 24 includes the above-captioned
criminal cases.
The Court shares the view of the private
complainants and the SSS that the said stay order does not include the
prosecution of criminal offenses. Precisely, the law “criminalizes” the
non-remittance of SSS contributions by an employer to protect the employees
from unscrupulous employers. Clearly, in these cases, public interest requires
that the said criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the
protection of society.
From the foregoing, the
inescapable conclusion is that the stay order issued by RTC Branch 24 does not
include the above-captioned cases which are criminal in nature.[12]
Branch
51 denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners.
On
On
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED and is accordingly DISMISSED. No
costs.[14]
The
CA discussed that violation of the provisions of the SSS law was a criminal
liability and was, thus, personal to the offender. As such, the CA held that
the criminal proceedings against the petitioners should not be considered a
claim against the corporation and, consequently, not covered by the stay order
issued by Branch 24.
Petitioners
filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[15]
which was, however, denied by the CA in a Resolution dated
Hence,
herein petition, with petitioners raising a lone issue for this Court’s
resolution, to wit:
x x x WHETHER OR NOT THE STAY
ORDER ISSUED BY BRANCH 24, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, IN SEC CORP. CASE
NO. 04-111180 COVERS ALSO VIOLATION OF SSS LAW FOR NON-REMITTANCE OF PREMIUMS
AND VIOLATION OF [ARTICLE] [3] 515 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.[16]
The
petition is not meritorious.
To begin with, corporate rehabilitation connotes the restoration of the
debtor to a position of successful operation and solvency, if it is shown that
its continued operation is economically feasible and its creditors can recover
more, by way of the present value of payments projected in the rehabilitation
plan, if the corporation continues as a going concern than if it is immediately
liquidated.[17]
It contemplates a continuance of corporate life and activities in an effort to
restore and reinstate the corporation to its former position of successful
operation and solvency, the purpose being to enable the company to gain a new
lease on life and allow its creditors to be paid their claims out of its
earnings.[18]
A principal feature of corporate rehabilitation is the suspension of
claims against the distressed corporation. Section 6 (c) of Presidential Decree
No. 902-A, as amended, provides for suspension of claims against corporations
undergoing rehabilitation, to wit:
Section 6 (c). x x x
x x x Provided, finally, that upon appointment of a
management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board or body, pursuant to this
Decree, all actions for claims
against corporations, partnerships or associations under management or
receivership pending before any court, tribunal, board or body, shall be suspended accordingly.[19]
In
Stay Order. - If the court finds the petition to be
sufficient in form and substance, it shall, not later than five (5) days from
the filing of the petition, issue an Order x x x; (b) staying enforcement of all claims, whether for money or otherwise
and whether such enforcement is by court action or otherwise, against the
debtor, its guarantors and sureties not solidarily liable with the debtor; x x x[21]
In Finasia Investments and Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[22] the term
"claim" has been construed to refer to debts or demands of a
pecuniary nature, or the assertion to have money paid. The purpose for
suspending actions for claims against the corporation in a rehabilitation
proceeding is to enable the management committee or rehabilitation receiver to effectively
exercise its/his powers free from any judicial or extrajudicial interference
that might unduly hinder or prevent the rescue of the debtor company.[23]
The issue to be resolved then is: does the suspension of “all claims” as
an incident to a corporate rehabilitation also contemplate the suspension of
criminal charges filed against the corporate officers of the distressed
corporation?
This Court rules in the negative.
In Rosario v. Co[24]
(Rosario), a case of recent vintage, the issue resolved by this Court was
whether or not during the pendency of rehabilitation proceedings, criminal
charges for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 should be suspended, was disposed of as follows:
x x x the gravamen
of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making
and issuing a worthless check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment. It is designed to prevent damage to trade, commerce,
and banking caused by worthless checks. In Lozano v. Martinez, this Court
declared that it is not the nonpayment of an obligation which the law punishes.
The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The
thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making and
circulation of worthless checks. Because of its deleterious effects on the
public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the
act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.
The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to
deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate
him from society, to reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain
social order. Hence, the criminal prosecution is designed to promote the public
welfare by punishing offenders and deterring others.
Consequently, the filing of the case for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 is not a "claim" that can be enjoined within the
purview of P.D. No. 902-A. True, although conviction of the accused for the
alleged crime could result in the restitution, reparation or indemnification of
the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of
the felonious act of the accused, nevertheless, prosecution for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 is a criminal action.
A criminal action has a dual purpose, namely, the
punishment of the offender and indemnity to the offended party. The dominant
and primordial objective of the criminal action is the punishment of the
offender. The civil action is merely incidental to and consequent to the
conviction of the accused. The reason for this is that criminal actions are
primarily intended to vindicate an outrage against the sovereignty of the state
and to impose the appropriate penalty for the vindication of the disturbance to
the social order caused by the offender. On the other hand, the action between
the private complainant and the accused is intended solely to indemnify the
former.[25]
The
rehabilitation of SIHI and the settlement of claims against the corporation is
not a legal ground for the extinction of petitioners’ criminal liabilities.
There is no reason why criminal proceedings should be suspended during
corporate rehabilitation, more so, since the prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in
order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to
isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to
maintain social order.[26]
As correctly observed in
The
prosecution of the officers of the corporation has no bearing on the pending
rehabilitation of the corporation, especially since they are charged in their
individual capacities. Such being the case, the purpose of the law for the
issuance of the stay order is not compromised, since the appointed
rehabilitation receiver can still fully discharge his functions as mandated by
law. It bears to stress that the rehabilitation receiver is not charged to
defend the officers of the corporation. If there is anything that the
rehabilitation receiver might be remotely interested in is whether the court
also rules that petitioners are civilly liable. Such a scenario, however, is
not a reason to suspend the criminal proceedings, because as aptly discussed in
Rosario, should the court prosecuting
the officers of the corporation find that an award or indemnification is
warranted, such award would fall under the category of claims, the execution of
which would be subject to the stay order issued by the rehabilitation court.[28]
The penal sanctions as a consequence of violation of the SSS law, in relation
to the revised penal code can therefore be implemented if petitioners are found
guilty after trial. However, any civil indemnity awarded as a result of their
conviction would be subject to the stay order issued by the rehabilitation
court. Only to this extent can the order of suspension be considered obligatory
upon any court, tribunal, branch or body where there are pending actions for
claims against the distressed corporation.[29]
On
a final note, this Court would like to point out that Congress has recently
enacted Republic Act No. 10142, or the Financial Rehabilitation and Insolvency
Act of 2010.[30] Section 18 thereof explicitly provides that
criminal actions against the individual officer of a corporation are not
subject to the Stay or Suspension Order in rehabilitation proceedings, to wit:
The Stay or Suspension Order shall not apply:
x x x
x
(g) any criminal action against individual debtor
or owner, partner, director or officer of a debtor shall not be affected by any
proceeding commenced under this Act.
Withal, based on the foregoing
discussion, this Court rules that there
is no legal impediment for Branch 51 to proceed with the cases filed against
petitioners.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The April 27, 2006 Decision and
SO
ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO JOSE
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Chairperson
JOSE CATRAL
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Second Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Designated as an additional member in lieu of
Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, per raffle dated
** Designated as an
additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad, per raffle
dated July 12, 2010.
[1] Rollo, pp. 9- 23.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with
Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Japar B. Dimaampao, concurring, id. at 31-37.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Crim. Cases Nos. 00-184890, 00-183031 to 71, 03-213284
to 88, 03-206273, 03-207141, 03-214539, 03-214667, 03-215273, 03-215650,
03-215651, 03-216015 and 03-216187.
[8] (h) Any employer who, after deducting the
monthly contributions or loan amortizations from his employee’s compensation,
fails to remit the said deduction to the SSS within thirty (30) days from the
date they became due, shall be presumed to have misappropriated such
contributions or loan amortizations and shall suffer the penalties provided in
Article Three hundred fifteen of the Revised Penal Code.
[9] (b)
By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods,
or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be
totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such
money, goods, or other property.
[10] Rollo, pp.
114-120.
[11] Records, pp. 375-376.
[12]
[13] Rollo, pp.
150-168.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] Rule 2, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure
on Corporate Rehabilitation, effective
[18] Negros Navigation
Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 163156 and 166845, December 10,
2008, 573 SCRA 434, 450.
[19] Emphasis
supplied.
[20] A.M. No.
00-8-10-SC, [November 21, 2000]
[21] Emphasis
supplied.
[22] G.R. No. 107002,
[23] BF Homes,
Incorporated. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76879 and 77143,
[24] G.R. No. 133608,
[25]
[26] Ramiscal
v. Sandiganbayan, 487 Phil. 384, 405 (2004).
[27] Supra note 24, at 252.
[28]
[29]
[30] AN ACT PROVIDING
FOR THE REHABILITATION OR LIQUIDATION OF FINANCIALLY DISTRESSED ENTERPRISES AND
INDIVIDUALS.