Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
JUDITH
YU, G.R. No.
170979
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO MORALES, J.,
Chairperson,
BRION,
BERSAMIN,
- versus - VILLARAMA,
JR., and
SERENO,
JJ.
Promulgated:
HON.
ROSA SAMSON-TATAD,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, February 9, 2011
PEOPLE
OF THE
Respondents.
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D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
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We resolve the petition for prohibition filed by petitioner Judith Yu to enjoin
respondent Judge Rosa Samson-Tatad of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 105,
The Factual Antecedents
The facts
of the case, gathered from the parties’ pleadings, are briefly summarized
below.
Based on
the complaint of Spouses Sergio and Cristina Casaclang, an information for
estafa against the petitioner was filed with the RTC.
In a P3,800,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment, and the payment of
an indemnity to the Spouses Casaclang in the same amount as the fine.[2]
Fourteen
(14) days later, or on
In an
On November
16, 2005, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging that
pursuant to our ruling in Neypes v. Court
of Appeals,[5]
she had a “fresh period” of 15 days from November 3, 2005, the receipt of the denial
of her motion for new trial, or up to November 18, 2005, within which to file a
notice of appeal.[6]
On
On
On
On
On
The Petition
The petitioner
argues that the RTC lost jurisdiction to act on the prosecution’s motions when she
filed her notice of appeal within the 15-day reglementary period provided by
the Rules of Court, applying the “fresh period rule” enunciated in Neypes.
The Case for the Respondents
The
respondent People of the
In view of
the OSG’s manifestation, we required the Spouses Casaclang to comment on the
petition.[12]
In their
comment, the Spouses Casaclang aver that the petitioner cannot seek refuge in Neypes to extend the “fresh period rule”
to criminal cases because Neypes involved a civil case, and the
pronouncement of “standardization of the appeal periods in the Rules” referred
to the interpretation of the appeal periods in civil cases, i.e., Rules 40, 41, 42 and 45, of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure among others; nowhere in Neypes was the period to appeal in criminal cases, Section 6 of Rule
122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, mentioned.[13]
Issue
The core
issue boils down to whether the “fresh period rule” enunciated in Neypes applies to appeals in criminal
cases.
The Court’s Ruling
We find merit in the petition.
The right
to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right — it is a
statutory privilege and of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if
granted or as provided by statutes. It may be exercised only in the manner
prescribed by the provisions of the law.[14] The
period to appeal is specifically governed by Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP
129),[15]
as amended, Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and
Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Section 39
of BP 129, as amended, provides:
SEC. 39. Appeals.
– The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or
decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted
from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision
appealed from: Provided, however, That
in habeas corpus cases, the period
for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment
appealed from.
Section 3, Rule 41 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3. Period
of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record
on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record
on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be
interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion
for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall
be allowed.
Section 6, Rule
122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
SEC. 6. When
appeal to be taken. — An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This
period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for
new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the
motion has been served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the
balance of the period begins to run.
In Neypes, the Court modified the rule in
civil cases on the counting of the 15-day period within which to appeal. The
Court categorically set a fresh period of 15 days from a denial of a motion
for reconsideration within which to appeal, thus:
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural
rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even
establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the
speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the
Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions
of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their
appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in
the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the
Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to
file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of
the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule"
shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts
to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional
Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The
new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from
receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.[16]
The Court
also reiterated its ruling that it is the denial of the motion for
reconsideration that constituted the final order which finally disposed of the
issues involved in the case.
The raison d’être for the “fresh period
rule” is to standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules and do away
with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus,
the 15-day period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration; litigants today need not concern
themselves with counting the balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the
15-day period is now counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for
new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution.
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in
civil cases, the Court’s pronouncement of a “fresh period” to appeal should equally
apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:
First, BP 129, as amended, the
substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes no distinction
between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section
39 of BP 129 categorically states that “[t]he
period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or
decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted
from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision
appealed from.” Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the
law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also ought not to recognize any
distinction.[17]
Second, the provisions of Section 3 of
Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly
the same. There is no substantial difference between the two provisions insofar
as legal results are concerned – the appeal period stops running upon the
filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and starts to run again
upon receipt of the order denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration.
It was this situation that Neypes
addressed in civil cases. No reason exists why this situation in criminal cases
cannot be similarly addressed.
Third, while the Court did not consider
in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in
criminal cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court
of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governing
appeals by certiorari to this Court,
both of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section 3
of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:
SEC. 3. How
appeal taken. — x x x x
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in
cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.
x x x x
Except as provided in the last paragraph of
section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by
petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.
Clearly, if
the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC exercised its appellate
jurisdiction) and to this Court in civil and criminal cases are the same, no cogent
reason exists why the periods to appeal from the RTC (in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction) to the CA in civil and criminal cases under Section 3 of
Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure should be treated differently.
Were we to strictly
interpret the “fresh period rule” in Neypes
and make it applicable only to the period to appeal in civil cases, we shall
effectively foster and encourage an absurd situation where a litigant in a civil
case will have a better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case – a
situation that gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates
against the accused-appellants. It suggests a double standard of treatment when we favor a situation where
property interests are at stake, as against a situation where liberty stands to
be prejudiced. We must emphatically reject this double and unequal standard for
being contrary to reason. Over time, courts have recognized with almost
pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason is not allowed in law – Quod est inconveniens, aut contra rationem
non permissum est in lege.[18]
Thus, we
agree with the OSG’s view that if a delay in the filing of an appeal may be
excused on grounds of substantial justice in civil actions, with more reason should
the same treatment be accorded to the accused in seeking the review on appeal
of a criminal case where no less than the liberty of the accused is at stake.
The concern and the protection we must extend to matters of liberty cannot be
overstated.
In light of
these legal realities, we hold that the petitioner seasonably filed her notice
of appeal on
WHEREFORE, the
petition for prohibition is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Judge Rosa
Samson-Tatad is DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from further
exercising jurisdiction over the
prosecution’s motions to dismiss appeal and for execution of the
decision. The respondent Judge is also DIRECTED to give due course to the petitioner’s
appeal in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105698, and to elevate the records of the case
to the Court of Appeals for review of the appealed decision on the merits.
No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
LUCAS
P. BERSAMIN MARTIN
S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARIA
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1] Pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; rollo, pp. 3-23.
[2] Penned by Pairing Judge Thelma A. Ponferrada; id. at 24-40.
[3]
[4]
[5] G.R.
No. 141524,
[6] Rollo, pp. 58-60.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] Supra note 1.
[11]
[12] Per the Court’s
[13]
[14] Phillips Seafood (Philippines) Corporation v. Board of Investments, G.R. No. 175787, February 4, 2009, 578 SCRA 69, 76; de La Cruz v. Ramiscal, G.R. No. 137882, February 4, 2005, 450 SCRA 449, 457.
[15] Otherwise Known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.”
[16] Supra note 5 at 643-645.
[17] BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec.
Sec. Zamora, G.R. No.
138570, October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 449, 484;
Pilar v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 115245, July 11, 1995, 245 SCRA
759, 763; Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 101976, January 29, 1993, 218 SCRA
203, 214-215.
[18] Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the Commissioner of Customs v. Unimex Micro-Electronics GMBH, G.R. Nos.
166309-10, March 9, 2007, 518 SCRA 19, 33; Republic
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108926,