Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
FIRST
DIVISION
|
ANUNCIACION VDA. DE OUANO, MARIO P. OUANO, LETICIA OUANO ARNAIZ, and
CIELO OUANO Petitioners, - versus - THE REPUBLIC OF THE Respondents. x-------------------------------------------x MACTAN- Petitioner, - versus - RICARDO L. INOCIAN, in his personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact
of OLYMPIA E. ESTEVES, EMILIA E. BACALLA, RESTITUTA E. MONTANA, and RAUL L.
INOCIAN; and ALETHA SUICO MAGAT, in her personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact
of PHILIP M. SUICO, DORIS S. DELA CRUZ, JAMES M. SUICO, EDWARD M. SUICO,
ROSELYN SUICO-LAWSIN, REX M. SUICO, KHARLA SUICO-GUTIERREZ, ALBERT
CHIONGBIAN, and JOHNNY CHAN, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 168770 Present: VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, PEREZ, JJ. G.R. No. 168812 Promulgated: February 9, 2011 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
VELASCO, JR., J.:
At
the center of these two (2) Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is
the issue of the right of the former owners of lots acquired for the expansion
of the
In the first
petition, docketed as G.R. No. 168770, petitioners
Anunciacion vda. de Ouano, Mario Ouano, Leticia Ouano Arnaiz and Cielo Ouano
Martinez (the Ouanos) seek to nullify the Decision[1]
dated September 3, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78027,
affirming the Order dated December 9, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 57 in
The second
petition, docketed as G.R. No. 168812, has the MCIAA seeking principally
to annul and set aside the Decision[2]
and Resolution[3]
dated January 14, 2005 and June 29, 2005, respectively, of the CA in CA-G.R. CV
No. 64356, sustaining the RTC, Branch 13 in Cebu City in its Decision of October
7, 1988 in Civil Case No. CEB-18370.
Per its
October 19, 2005 Resolution,
the Court ordered the consolidation of both cases.
Except for the names of the parties
and the specific lot designation involved, the relevant factual antecedents
which gave rise to these consolidated petitions are, for the most part, as set
forth in the Court’s Decision[4]
of October 15, 2003, as reiterated in a Resolution[5]
dated August 9, 2005, in G.R. No.
156273 entitled Heirs of Timoteo Moreno and Maria Rotea v. Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority (Heirs of Moreno), and in
other earlier related cases.[6]
In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), MCIAA’s
predecessor agency, pursued a program to expand the
On December 29, 1961, the then Court of First Instance (CFI)
of
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the expropriation of Lots Nos. 75, 76, 76, 89, 90, 91, 92, 105, 106, 107, 108, 104, 921-A, 88, 93, 913-B, 72, 77, 916, 777-A, 918, 919, 920, 764-A, 988, 744-A, 745-A, 746, 747, 762-A, 763-A, 951, 942, 720-A, x x x and 947, included in the Lahug Airport, Cebu City, justified in and in lawful exercise of the right of eminent domain.
x x x x
3. After the payment of the foregoing financial obligation to the landowners, directing the latter to deliver to the plaintiff the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title to their respective lots; and upon the presentation of the said titles to the Register of Deeds, ordering the latter to cancel the same and to issue, in lieu thereof, new Transfer Certificates of Title in the name of the plaintiff.[7]
In view of the adverted buy-back assurance made by the
government, the owners of the lots no longer appealed the decision of the trial
court.[8]
Following the finality of the judgment of condemnation, certificates of title
for the covered parcels of land were issued in the name of the Republic which,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6958,[9]
were subsequently transferred to MCIAA.
At the end of 1991, or soon after the
transfer of the aforesaid lots to MCIAA,
G.R. No. 168812 (MCIAA Petition)
On February 8, 1996, Ricardo L.
Inocian and four others (all children of Isabel Limbaga who originally owned
six [6] of the lots expropriated); and Aletha Suico Magat and seven others,
successors-in-interest of Santiago Suico, the original owner of two (2) of the
condemned lots (collectively, the Inocians), filed before the RTC in Cebu City
a complaint for reconveyance of real properties and damages against MCIAA. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No.
CEB-18370, was eventually raffled to Branch 13 of the court.
On September 29, 1997, one Albert
Chiongbian (Chiongbian), alleging to be the owner of Lot Nos. 761-A and 762-A
but which the Inocians were now claiming, moved and was later allowed to
intervene.
During the pre-trial, MCIAA admitted the
following facts:
1. That the properties, which are the subject matter of Civil Case No. CEB-18370, are also the properties involved in Civil Case R-1881;
2.
That the purpose of the expropriation was for the
expansion of the old
3.
That the old
4. That the price paid to the lot owners in the expropriation case is found in the decision of the court; and
5.
That some properties were reconveyed by the MCIAA
because the previous owners were able to secure express waivers or riders
wherein the government agreed to return the properties should the expansion of
the
During trial, the Inocians adduced evidence which included
the testimony of Ricardo Inocian (Inocian) and Asterio Uy (Uy). Uy, an employee of the CAA, testified that he
was a member of the team which negotiated for the acquisition of certain lots
in Lahug for the proposed expansion of the
Inocian testified that he and his mother, Isabel Lambaga,
attended a meeting called by the NAC team of negotiators sometime in 1947 or
1949 where he and the other landowners were given the assurance that they could
repurchase their lands at the same price in the event the
The MCIAA presented Michael Bacarizas (Bacarizas), who
started working for MCIAA as legal assistant in 1996. He testified that, in the course of doing
research work on the lots subject of Civil Case No. CEB-18370, he discovered
that the same lots were covered by the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881. He also found out that the said
decision did not expressly contain any condition on the matter of repurchase.
Ruling of the RTC
On October 7, 1998, the RTC rendered a Decision in Civil Case
No. CEB-18370, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered directing defendant Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) to reconvey (free from liens and encumbrances) to plaintiffs Ricardo Inocian, Olimpia E. Esteves, Emilia E. Bacalla, Restituta E. Montana and Raul Inocian Lots No. 744-A, 745-A, 746, 762-A, 747, 761-A and to plaintiffs Aletha Suico Magat, Philip M. Suico, Doris S. dela Cruz, James M. Suico, Edward M. Suico, Roselyn S. Lawsin, Rex M. Suico and Kharla Suico-Gutierrez Lots No. 942 and 947, after plaintiffs shall have paid MCIAA the sums indicated in the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881. Defendant MCIAA is likewise directed to pay the aforementioned plaintiffs the sum or P50,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees and P10,000.00 for litigation expenses.
Albert Chiongbian’s intervention should be, as it is hereby DENIED for utter lack of factual basis.
With costs against defendant MCIAA.[10]
Therefrom, MCIAA went to the CA on appeal, docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 64356.
Ruling of the CA
On January 14, 2005, the CA rendered judgment for the Inocians,
declaring them entitled to the
reconveyance of the questioned lots as the successors-in-interest of the late
Isabel Limbaga and Santiago Suico, as the case may be, who were the former
registered owners of the said lots. The decretal portion of the CA’s Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the appeal filed in this case and AFFFIRMING the decision rendered by the court a quo on October 7, 1998 in Civil Case No. CEB-18370.
SO ORDERED.
The CA, citing and reproducing excerpts from Heirs of Moreno,[11] virtually held that the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 was conditional, stating “that the expropriation of [plaintiff-appellees’] lots for the proposed expansion of the Lahug Airport was ordered by the CFI of Cebu under the impression that Lahug Airport would continue in operation.”[12] The condition, as may be deduced from the CFI’s decision, was that should MCIAA, or its precursor agency, discontinue altogether with the operation of Lahug Airport, then the owners of the lots expropriated may, if so minded, demand of MCIAA to make good its verbal assurance to allow the repurchase of the properties. To the CA, this assurance, a demandable agreement of repurchase by itself, has been adequately established.
On September 21, 2005, the MCIAA
filed with Us a petition for review of the CA’s Decision, docketed as G.R. No.
168812.
G.R. No. 168770 (Ouano Petition)
Soon after the MCIAA jettisoned the
Answering, the Republic and MCIAA averred that the Ouanos no
longer have enforceable rights whatsoever over the condemned Lot No. 763-A, the
decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 not having found any reversionary
condition.
Ruling of the RTC
By a Decision dated November 28, 2000, the RTC, Branch 57 in
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano, Mario P. Ouano, Leticia Ouano Arnaiz and Cielo Ouano Martinez and against the Republic of the Philippines and Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) to restore to plaintiffs, the possession and ownership of their land, Lot No. 763-A upon payment of the expropriation price to defendants; and
2.
Ordering the Register of Deeds to effect the transfer of the Certificate of
Title from defendant Republic of the Philippines on Lot 763-A, canceling TCT
No. 52004 in the name of defendant Republic of the Philippines and to issue a
new title on the same lot in the names of Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano, Mario P.
Ouano, Leticia Ouano Arnaiz and Cielo Ouano
No pronouncement as to costs.[13]
Acting on the motion of the
Republic and MCIAA for reconsideration, however, the RTC, Branch 57 in
Ruling of the CA
In time, the Ouanos interposed an
appeal to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 78027. Eventually, the appellate
court rendered a Decision[15]
dated September 3, 2004, denying the appeal, thus:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Order dated December 9, 2002, of the Regional Trial
Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 57,
SO ORDERED.
Explaining its case disposition,
the
CA stated that the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 did not state any
condition that Lot No. 763-A of the Ouanos––and all covered lots for that matter––would
be returned to them or that they could repurchase the same property if it were
to be used for purposes other than for the
The Ouanos filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA’s Decision, but was denied per the CA’s May 26, 2005 Resolution.[17] Hence, they filed this petition in G.R. No. 168770.
The Issues
G.R. No. 168812
GROUNDS
FOR ALLOWANCE OF THE PETITION
l.
THE
ASSAILED ISSUANCES ILLEGALLY STRIPPED THE REPUBLIC OF ITS ABSOLUTE AND
UNCONDITIONAL TITLE TO THE SUBJECT EXPROPRIATED PROPERTIES.
ll.
THE
IMPUNGED DISPOSITIONS INVALIDLY OVERTURNED THIS HONORABLE COURT’S FINAL RULINGS
IN FERY V. MUNICIPALITY OF CABANATUAN,
MCIAA V. COURT OF APPEALS AND REYES V. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY.
lll. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THIS HONORABLE
COURT’S RULING IN
G.R. No. 168770
Questions of
law presented in this Petition
Whether or not
the testimonial evidence of the petitioners proving the promises, assurances
and representations by the airport officials and lawyers are inadmissbale under
the Statute of Frauds.
Whether or not
under the ruling of this Honorable Court in the heirs of Moreno Case, and
pursuant to the principles enunciated therein, petitioners herein are entitiled
to recover their litigated property.
Reasons for
Allowances of this Petition
Respondents did
not object during trial to the admissibility of petitioners’ testimonial
evidence under the Statute of Frauds and have thus waived such objection and
are now barred from raising the same. In any event, the Statute of Frauds is
not applicable herein. Consequently, petitioners’ evidence is admissible and
should be duly given weight and credence, as initially held by the trial court
in its original Decision.[19]
While their respective actions against
MCIAA below ended differently, the Ouanos and the Inocians’ proffered arguments
presented before this Court run along parallel lines, both asserting
entitlement to recover the litigated property on the strength of the Court’s
ruling in Heirs of
I
WHETHER ABANDONMENT OF THE PUBLIC USE FOR WHICH THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES WERE EXPROPRIATED ENTITLES PETITIONERS OUANOS, ET AL. AND RESPONDENTS INOCIAN, ET AL. TO REACQUIRE THEM.
II
WHETHER PETITIONERS OUANOS, ET AL. AND RESPONDENTS INOCIAN, ET AL. ARE ENTITLED TO RECONVEYANCE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES SIMPLY ON THE BASIS OF AN ALLEGED VERBAL PROMISE OR ASSURANCE OF SOME NAC OFFICIALS THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES WILL BE RETUNRED IF THE AIRPORT PROJECT WOULD BE ABANDONED.
The Court’s Ruling
The Republic and MCIAA’s petition in
G.R. No. 168812 is bereft of merit, while the Ouano petition in G.R. No. 168770
is meritorious.
At the outset, three (3) fairly
established factual premises ought to be emphasized:
First, the MCIAA and/or its
predecessor agency had not actually used the lots subject of the final decree
of expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 for the purpose they were originally
taken by the government, i.e., for the expansion and development of
Second, the
Third, it has been preponderantly established by evidence
that the NAC, through its team of negotiators, had given assurance to the
affected landowners that they would be entitled to repurchase their respective
lots in the event they are no longer used for airport purposes.[21]
“No less than Asterio Uy,” the Court noted in Heirs of Moreno, “one of
the members of the CAA Mactan Legal Team, which interceded for the acquisition
of the lots for the Lahug Airport’s expansion, affirmed that persistent
assurances were given to the landowners to the effect that as soon as the Lahug
Airport is abandoned or transferred to Mactan, the lot owners would be able to
reacquire their properties.”[22] In Civil Case No. CEB-20743, Exhibit “G,” the
transcript of the deposition[23]
of Anunciacion vda. de Ouano covering the assurance made had been formally
offered in evidence and duly considered in the initial decision of the
This is a difficult case calling for a difficult but just solution. To begin with there exists an undeniable historical narrative that the predecessors of respondent MCIAA had suggested to the landowners of the properties covered by the Lahug Airport expansion scheme that they could repurchase their properties at the termination of the airport’s venue. Some acted on this assurance and sold their properties; other landowners held out and waited for the exercise of eminent domain to take its course until finally coming to terms with respondent’s predecessors that they would not appeal nor block further judgment of condemnation if the right of repurchase was extended to them. A handful failed to prove that they acted on such assurance when they parted with ownership of their land.[25] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
For perspective, Heirs of
In all then, the issues and supporting arguments presented by
both sets of petitioners in these consolidated cases have already previously
been passed upon, discussed at length, and practically peremptorily resolved in
Heirs of Moreno and the November 2008 Tudtud ruling. The Ouanos, as
petitioners in G.R. No. 168770, and the Inocians, as respondents in G.R. No.
168812, are similarly situated as the heirs of
Just like in Tudtud and earlier in Heirs
of Moreno, MCIAA would foist the theory that the judgment of condemnation
in Civil Case No. R-1881 was without qualification and was unconditional. It
would, in fact, draw attention to the fallo of the expropriation court’s
decision to prove that there is nothing in the decision indicating that the
government gave assurance or undertook to reconvey the covered lots in case the
Lahug airport expansion project is aborted. Elaborating on this angle, MCIAA
argues that the claim of the Ouanos and the Inocians regarding the alleged
verbal assurance of the NAC negotiating team that they can reacquire their
landholdings is barred by the Statute of Frauds.[28]
Under the
rule on the Statute of Frauds, as expressed in Article 1403 of the Civil Code,
a contract for the sale or acquisition of real property shall be unenforceable
unless the same or some note of the contract be in writing and subscribed by
the party charged. Subject to defined exceptions, evidence of the agreement
cannot be received without the writing, or secondary evidence of its contents.
MCIAA’s invocation of the Statute of Frauds is misplaced
primarily because the statute applies only to executory and not to completed,
executed, or partially consummated contracts.[29]
Carbonnel v. Poncio, et al., quoting Chief Justice Moran, explains the
rationale behind this rule, thusly:
x
x x “The reason is simple. In executory
contracts there is a wide field for fraud because unless they may be in writing
there is no palpable evidence of the intention of the contracting parties. The statute has been precisely been enacted
to prevent fraud.” x x x However, if a contract has been totally or partially
performed, the exclusion of parol evidence would promote fraud or bad faith,
for it would enable the defendant to keep the benefits already derived by him
from the transaction in litigation, and at the same time, evade the
obligations, responsibilities or liabilities assumed or contracted by him
thereby.[30] (Emphasis in the original.)
Analyzing the situation of the cases at bar, there can be no
serious objection to the proposition that the agreement package between the
government and the private lot owners was already partially performed by the
government through the acquisition of the lots for the expansion of the Lahug
airport. The parties, however, failed to accomplish the more important
condition in the CFI decision decreeing the expropriation of the lots litigated
upon: the expansion of the
At any rate, the objection on the admissibility of evidence
on the basis of the Statute of Frauds may be waived if not timely raised.
Records tend to support the conclusion that MCIAA did not, as the Ouanos and
the Inocians posit, object to the introduction of parol evidence to prove its
commitment to allow the former landowners to repurchase their respective
properties upon the occurrence of certain events.
In a bid to deny the lot owners the right to repurchase,
MCIAA, citing cases,[31]
points to the dispositive part of the decision in Civil Case R-1881 which, as
couched, granted the Republic absolute title to the parcels of land declared
expropriated. The MCIAA is correct about the unconditional tone of the
dispositive portion of the decision, but that actuality would not carry the day
for the agency. Addressing the matter of the otherwise absolute tenor of the
CFI’s disposition in Civil Case No. R-1881, the Court, in Heirs of Moreno,
after taking stock of the ensuing portion of the body of the CFI’s decision,
said:
As for
the public purpose of the expropriation proceeding, it cannot now be
doubted. Although
We went on to state as
follows:
While the trial court in Civil
Case No. R-1881 could have simply acknowledged the presence of public purpose
for the exercise of eminent domain regardless of the survival of the Lahug
Airport, the trial court in its Decision chose not to do so but instead
prefixed its finding of public purpose upon its understanding that ‘Lahug
Airport will continue to be in operation’. Verily, these meaningful
statements in the body of the Decision warrant the conclusion that the
expropriated properties would remain to be so until it was confirmed that
Not to be overlooked of course is what the Court said in its
Resolution disposing of MCIAA’s motion to reconsider the original ruling in Heirs
of
Moreover, we do not subscribe to
the [MCIAA’s] contention that since the possibility of the
The Court has, to be sure, taken
stock of Fery v. Municipality of Cabanatuan,[35]
a case MCIAA cites at every possible turn, where the Court made these
observations:
If, for example, land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then of course, when the purpose is terminated or abandoned, the former owner reacquires the property so expropriated. x x x If, upon the contrary, however the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of course, the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator x x x and in that case the non-user does not have the effect of defeating the title acquired by the expropriation proceedings x x x.
Fery
notwithstanding, MCIAA cannot really rightfully say that it has absolute title
to the lots decreed expropriated in Civil Case No. R-1881. The correct lesson of Fery is captured
by what the Court said in that case, thus: “the government acquires only such
rights in expropriated parcels of land as may be allowed by the character of
its title over the properties.” In light of our disposition in Heirs of
Moreno and Tudtud, the statement immediately adverted to means that
in the event the particular public use for which a parcel of land is
expropriated is abandoned, the owner shall not be entitled to recover or
repurchase it as a matter of right, unless such recovery or repurchase is
expressed in or irresistibly deducible
from the condemnation judgment. But as has been determined below, the
decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 enjoined MCIAA, as a condition of approving
expropriation, to allow recovery or repurchase upon abandonment of the Lahug
airport project. To borrow from our underlying decision in Heirs of Moreno,
“[n]o doubt, the return or repurchase of the condemned properties of
petitioners could readily be justified as the manifest legal effect of
consequence of the trial court’s underlying presumption that ‘Lahug
Airport will continue to be in operation’ when it granted the
complaint for eminent domain and the airport discontinued its activities.”[36]
Providing added support to the Ouanos
and the Inocians’ right to repurchase is what in Heirs of Moreno was
referred to as constructive trust, one that is akin to the implied trust
expressed
in Art. 1454 of the Civil Code,[37]
the purpose of which is to prevent unjust enrichment.[38] In the case at bench, the Ouanos and the
Inocians parted with their respective lots in favor of the MCIAA, the latter
obliging itself to use the realties for the expansion of Lahug Airport; failing
to keep its end of the bargain, MCIAA can be compelled by the former landowners
to reconvey the parcels of land to them, otherwise, they would be denied the
use of their properties upon a state of affairs that was not conceived nor
contemplated when the expropriation was authorized. In effect,
the government merely held the properties condemned in trust until the proposed
public use or purpose for which the lots were condemned was actually
consummated by the government. Since the
government failed to perform the obligation that is the basis of the transfer
of the property, then the lot owners Ouanos and Inocians can demand the
reconveyance of their old properties after the payment of the condemnation
price.
Constructive
trusts are fictions of equity that courts use as devices to remedy any
situation in which the holder of the legal title, MCIAA in this case, may not,
in good conscience, retain the beneficial interest. We add, however, as in Heirs
of Moreno, that the party
seeking the aid of equity––the landowners in this instance, in establishing the
trust––must himself do equity in a manner as the court may deem just and reasonable.
The Court, in the recent MCIAA v. Lozada, Sr., revisited and
abandoned the Fery ruling that the
former owner is not entitled to reversion of the property even if the public
purpose were not pursued and were abandoned, thus:
On this note, we take this
opportunity to revisit our ruling in Fery, which involved an
expropriation suit commenced upon parcels of land to be used as a site for a
public market. Instead of putting up a public market, respondent
Obviously, Fery was not decided pursuant to our now sacredly held constitutional right that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. It is well settled that the taking of private property by the Governments power of eminent domain is subject to two mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner. These requirements partake of the nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the property expropriated.
More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due process of law, and the judgment would violate the property owners right to justice, fairness, and equity.
In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of private property, consequent to the Governments exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain has become improper for lack of the required factual justification.[39] (Emphasis supplied.)
Clinging to Fery,
specifically the fee simple concept underpinning it, is no longer
compelling, considering the ensuing inequity such application entails. Too, the
Court resolved Fery not under the
cover of any of the Philippine Constitutions, each decreeing that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The twin
elements of just compensation and public purpose are, by themselves, direct
limitations to the exercise of eminent domain, arguing, in a way, against the
notion of fee simple title. The fee does not vest until payment of just
compensation.[40]
In esse, expropriation is forced
private property taking, the landowner being really without a ghost of a chance
to defeat the case of the expropriating agency. In other words, in expropriation, the
private owner is deprived of property against his will. Withal, the mandatory requirement of due
process ought to be strictly followed, such that the state must show, at the
minimum, a genuine need, an exacting public purpose to take private property,
the purpose to be specifically alleged or least reasonably deducible from the
complaint.
Public
use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired an expansive meaning to
include any use that is of “usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is
productive of general benefit [of the public].”[41] If the genuine public necessity—the very
reason or condition as it were—allowing, at the first instance, the
expropriation of a private land ceases or disappears, then there is no more
cogent point for the government’s retention of the expropriated land. The same
legal situation should hold if the government devotes the property to another
public use very much different from the original or deviates from the declared
purpose to benefit another private person. It has been said that the direct use
by the state of its power to oblige landowners to renounce their productive possession to another citizen, who
will use it predominantly for that citizen’s own private gain, is offensive to
our laws.[42]
A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, then it behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter so desires. The government cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any manner it pleases and, in the process, dishonor the judgment of expropriation. This is not in keeping with the idea of fair play,
The notion, therefore, that the government, via expropriation proceedings, acquires unrestricted
ownership over or a fee simple title to the covered land, is no longer tenable.
We suggested as much in Heirs of Moreno and in Tudtud and more recently in Lozada, Sr.
Expropriated lands should be differentiated from a piece of land, ownership of
which was absolutely transferred by way of an unconditional purchase and sale
contract freely entered by two parties, one without obligation to buy and the
other without the duty to sell. In that case, the fee simple concept really
comes into play. There is really no
occasion to apply the “fee simple concept” if the transfer is conditional. The taking of a private land in expropriation
proceedings is always conditioned on its continued devotion to its public
purpose. As a necessary corollary, once the purpose is terminated or
peremptorily abandoned, then the former owner, if he so desires, may seek its
reversion, subject of course to the return, at the very least, of the just
compensation received.
To be compelled to renounce dominion over a piece of land is, in itself,
an already bitter pill to swallow for the owner. But to be asked to sacrifice for the common
good and yield ownership to the government which reneges on its assurance that
the private property shall be for a public purpose may be too much. But it would be worse if the power of eminent
domain were deliberately used as a subterfuge to benefit another with influence
and power in the political process, including development firms. The mischief
thus depicted is not at all far-fetched with the continued application of Fery.
Even as the Court deliberates on these consolidated cases, there is an uncontroverted
allegation that the MCIAA is poised to sell, if it has not yet sold, the areas
in question to Cebu Property Ventures, Inc. This provides an added dimension to
abandon Fery.
Given the foregoing disquisitions, equity and justice demand
the reconveyance by MCIAA of the litigated lands in question to the Ouanos and
Inocians. In the same token, justice and fair play also dictate that the Ouanos
and Inocian return to MCIAA what they received as just compensation for the
expropriation of their respective properties plus legal interest to be computed
from default, which in this case should run from the time MCIAA complies with the
reconveyance obligation.[43] They must likewise pay MCIAA the necessary
expenses it might have incurred in sustaining their respective lots and the
monetary value of its services in managing the lots in question to the extent
that they, as private owners, were benefited thereby.
In accordance with Art. 1187 of the Civil Code on mutual
compensation, MCIAA may keep whatever income or fruits it may have obtained
from the parcels of land expropriated. In turn, the Ouanos and Inocians need
not require the accounting of interests earned by the amounts they received as
just compensation.[44]
Following Art. 1189 of the Civil Code providing that “[i]f the thing is improved by its nature, or by time, the improvement shall inure to the benefit of the creditor x x x,” the Ouanos and Inocians do not have to settle the appreciation of the values of their respective lots as part of the reconveyance process, since the value increase is merely the natural effect of nature and time.
Finally, We delete the award of PhP 50,000 and PhP 10,000, as
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, respectively, made in favor of the
Inocians by the Cebu City RTC in its judgment in Civil Case No. CEB-18370, as
later affirmed by the CA. As a matter of sound policy, no premium should be set
on the right to litigate where there is no doubt about the bona fides of the exercise of such right,[45]
as here, albeit the decision of MCIAA to resist the former landowners’ claim
eventually turned out to be untenable.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 168770 is GRANTED. Accordingly, the CA Decision dated
September 3, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78027 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority is ordered to reconvey subject
The petition of the Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority in G.R. No. 168812 is DENIED, and the CA’s Decision and Resolution dated
January 14, 2005 and June 29, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 64356
are AFFIRMED, except
insofar as they awarded attorney’s fees and litigation expenses that are hereby
DELETED. Accordingly, Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority is ordered to reconvey to respondents Ricardo
L. Inocian, Olympia E. Esteves, Emilia E. Bacalla, Restituta E. Montana, and Raul
L. Inocian the litigated Lot Nos. 744-A, 745-A, 746, 762-A, 747, and 761-A; and
to respondents Aletha Suico Magat, Philip M. Suico, Dolores S. dela Cruz, James
M. Suico, Edward M. Suico, Roselyn S. Lawsin, Rex M. Suico, and Kharla Suico-Gutierrez
the litigated Lot Nos. 942 and 947. The Register of Deeds of Cebu City is
ordered to effect the necessary cancellation of title and transfer it in the name
of respondents within a period of fifteen (15) days from finality of judgment.
The foregoing dispositions are subject to QUALIFICATIONS, to apply to these consolidated petitions, when appropriate, as
follows:
(1) Petitioners Ouano, et
al. in G.R. No. 168770 and respondents Ricardo L Inocian, et al. in G.R. No. 168812 are ordered to return to the MCIAA
the just compensation they or their predecessors-in-interest received for the
expropriation of their respective lots as stated in Civil Case No. R-1881, within
a period of sixty (60) days from finality of judgment;
(2) The MCIAA shall be entitled to RETAIN whatever fruits and income it may have obtained from the
subject expropriated lots without any obligation to refund the same to the lot
owners; and
(3) Petitioners Ouano, et
al. in G.R. No. 168770 and respondents Ricardo L. Inocian,
et al. in G.R. No. 168812 shall
RETAIN whatever interests the
amounts they received as just compensation may have earned in the meantime
without any obligation to refund the same to MCIAA.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO C.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
JOSE
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T
I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo (G.R. No.168770), pp. 45-56. Penned by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole and concurred in by Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Ramon M. Bato, Jr.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican and concurred in by Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Ramon M. Bato, Jr.
[3] Rollo (G.R. No.168812), pp. 77-78.
[4] Heirs of Timoteo Moreno and Maria Rotea v.
[5] Heirs of Timoteo Moreno and Maria Rotea v.
[6] Air Transportation Office v. Gopuco, Jr., G.R. No. 158563, June 30, 2005, 462 SCRA 544; MCIAA v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139495, November 27, 2000, 346 SCRA 126.
[7] Rollo (G.R. No.168812), pp. 31-32.
[8]
[9] An Act Creating [MCIAA], Transferring Existing Assets of the Mactan International Airport to the [MCIAA], Vesting the [MCIAA] with Powers to Administer and Operate the Mactan International Airport and the Lahug Airport.
[10] Rollo (G.R. No. 168812), pp. 95-96. Penned by Judge Meinrado P. Paredes.
[11] Supra note 4.
[12] Rollo (G.R. No. 168812), p. 70.
[13] Rollo (G.R. No. 168770), pp. 77-78. Penned by Judge Victorio U. Montecillo.
[14]
[15]
[16] G.R. No. 121506, October 30, 1996, 263 SCRA 736. This case should not be confused with MCIAA v. Court of Appeals, supra note 6, which involved the complaint by Virginia Chiongbian.
[17] Rollo (G.R. No. 168770), pp. 57-58.
[18] Rollo (G.R. No. 168812), p. 39.
[19] Rollo (G.R. No. 168770), p. 22.
[20] MCIAA v. Tudtud, G.R. No. 174012, November 14, 2008, 571 SCRA 165; Heirs of Moreno, supra note 4.
[21]
[22] Supra note 5, at 303.
[23] Rollo (G.R. No. 168770), pp. 180-194.
[24]
[25] Supra note 4, at 507-508.
[26] Supra note 20.
[27] Confederation of Sugar Producers Association, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), G.R. No. 169514, March 30, 2007, 519 SCRA 582, 618; citing Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed.).
[28] Civil Code, Art. 1403(2)(e), as a general proposition, places agreements for the sale of real property within the coverage of the Statute of Fraud, a postulate that declares unenforceable all contracts of realty unless made in writing. Contracts infringing the Statute of Frauds referred to in Art. 1403 of the Code are ratified by the failure to object to the presentation of oral evidence to prove the same, or by acceptance of benefits under them.
[29] Arrogante v. Deliarte, G.R. No. 152132, July 24, 2007, 528 SCRA 63, 74; Tudtud, supra note 20.
[30] 103 Phil. 655, 659 (1958); citing 3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court 178 (1957).
[31] Air Transportation Office v. Gopuco, Jr.,
supra note 6; Reyes v. National Housing
Authority, G.R. No. 147511, January 20, 2003, 395 SCRA 494; MCIAA v. Court of Appeals, supra note 6; Fery v.
[32] Heirs of
[33]
[34] Heirs
of
[35] Supra note 31.
[36] Supra note 4, at 512. Emphasis in the original.
[37] Art. 1454.––If an absolute conveyance of property is made in order to secure the performance of an obligation of the grantor towards the grantee, a trust by virtue of law is established. If the fulfillment of the obligation is offered by the grantor when it becomes due, he may demand the reconveyance of the property to him.
[38] 4
Paras, Civil Code of the
[39] G.R. No. 176625, February 25, 2010, 613 SCRA 618, 629-631.
[40] Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. Nos. 78742, 79310, 79744 & 79777, July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343, 389-390.
[42] Heirs of
[43] Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994, 234 SCRA 78, 95; and Civil Code, Art. 1169: “In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner what is incumbent upon him. From the moment one of the parties fulfills his obligation, delay by the other begins.”
[44] Civil Code, Art. 1187: “The effects of a conditional obligation to give, once the condition has been fulfilled, shall retroact to the day of the constitution of the obligation. Nevertheless, when the obligation imposes prestations upon parties, the fruits and interests during the pendency of the condition shall be deemed to have been mutually compensated.”
[45] Cordero v. F.S. Management & Development Corporation, G.R. No. 167213, October 31, 2006, 506 SCRA 451, 465.