SECOND DIVISION
|
FGU INSURANCE
CORPORATION (Now BPI/MS INSURANCE CORPORATION), Petitioner, - versus -
Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 161282 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated: February 23, 2011 |
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D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This
is a petition for mandamus praying that the July 1, 2003 and November 3, 2003
orders [1] of
the Regional Trial Court Branch 66, Makati City (RTC), which granted the
Motion To Set Case For Hearing filed by private respondent G.P. Sarmiento
Trucking Corporation (GPS), be set aside and, in lieu thereof, “a
decision be rendered ordering the lower court to issue the Writ of Execution in
Civil Case No. 94-3009 in consonance with the decision of this venerable court
dated
Records show that on
FGU
Insurance Corporation (FGU), the insurer of the damaged refrigerators,
paid CII, the insured, the value of the covered shipment in the sum of P204,450.00.
FGU, in turn, as subrogee of the insured’s rights and interests, sought
reimbursement of the amount it paid from GPS.
The
failure of the GPS to heed FGU’s claim
for reimbursement, led the latter to file a complaint for damages and breach of
contract of carriage against the former and its driver, Eroles, with the RTC. During the hearing of the case, FGU presented
evidence establishing its claim against GPS. For its part, GPS filed a motion to dismiss by
way of demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the RTC.
The RTC ruled, among others, that FGU failed
to adduce evidence that GPS was a common carrier and that its driver was
negligent, thus, GPS could not be made liable for the damages of the subject
cargoes. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the ruling of the
RTC. The case was then elevated to this Court. On
WHEREFORE, the order,
dated 30 April 1996, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, of Makati City,
and the decision, dated 10 June 1999, of the Court of Appeals, are AFFIRMED
only insofar as respondent Lambert M. Eroles is concerned, but said assailed
order of the trial court and decision of the appellate court are REVERSED as
regards G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation which, instead, is hereby ordered
to pay FGU Corporation the value of the damaged and lost cargoes in the amount
of P204,450.00. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
On
On
P204,450.00.
On
November 5, 2002, GPS filed its Opposition to Motion for Execution[7]
praying that FGU’s motion for execution be denied on the ground that the
latter’s claim was unlawful, illegal, against public policy and good morals, and constituted unjust
enrichment. GPS alleged that it discovered, upon verification from the insured,
that after the insured’s claim was compensated in full, the insured transferred
the ownership of the subject appliances to FGU.
In turn, FGU sold the same to third parties thereby receiving and
appropriating the consideration and proceeds of the sale. GPS believed that FGU
should not be allowed to “doubly recover” the losses it suffered.
Thereafter,
on
On
X x x.
The
defendant, however, contends that it has already turned over to the consignee
the 30 refrigerator units subject[s] of the case. It also appears from the
record that the Accounting/Administrative Manager of Concepcion Industries has
executed a certification to the effect that the assured company has
turned over the refrigerator units in question to plaintiff.
In view
of the foregoing and considering that plaintiff may not be allowed to recover
more than what it is entitled to, there is a need for the parties to clarify
the following issues to allow a fair and judicious resolution of plaintiff’s
motion for issuance of a writ of execution:
1) Was there
an actual turn-over of 30 refrigerators to the plaintiff?
2) In the
affirmative, what is the salvage value of the 30 refrigerators?
WHEREFORE,
the Court hereby orders both parties to present evidence in support of their
respective positions on these issues.
SO
ORDERED.[9] [Italicization
in the original]
Upon
denial of its motion for reconsideration, FGU filed this petition for mandamus
directly with this Court on the following
GROUNDS
THE
THE
In
advocacy of its position, FGU argues that the decision is already final and
executory and, accordingly, a writ of execution should issue. The lower court should not be allowed to hear
the matter of turnover of the refrigerators to FGU because it was not an issue
raised in the Answer of GPS. Neither was it argued by GPS in the CA and in this
Court. It was only brought out after the
decision became final and executory.
Indeed,
a writ of mandamus lies to compel a judge to issue a writ of execution when the
judgment had already become final and executory and the prevailing party is
entitled to the same as a matter of right.[10]
Fundamental is the rule that where the judgment of a
higher court has become final and executory and has been returned to the lower
court, the only function of the latter is the ministerial act of carrying out
the decision and issuing the writ of execution.[11]
In addition, a final and executory judgment can no longer be amended by adding
thereto a relief not originally included. In short, once a judgment becomes
final, the winning party is entitled to a writ of execution and the issuance
thereof becomes a court's ministerial duty.
The lower court cannot vary the mandate of the superior court or
reexamine it for any other purpose other than execution; much less may it
review the same upon any matter decided on appeal or error apparent; nor
intermeddle with it further than to settle so much as has been demanded.[12]
Under
the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a
decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may
no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the
court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which
violates this principle must immediately be struck down.
But like any other rule, it has exceptions,
namely: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc
entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the
finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.[13] The exception to the doctrine of immutability of judgment has
been applied in several cases in order to serve substantial justice. The early
case of City of Butuan vs. Ortiz[14]
is one where the Court held as follows:
Obviously a prevailing party in a civil
action is entitled to a writ of execution of the final judgment obtained by him
within five years from its entry (Section 443, Code of Civil Procedure). But it has been repeatedly held, and it is
now well-settled in this jurisdiction, that when after judgment has been
rendered and the latter has become final, facts and circumstances transpire
which render its execution impossible or unjust, the interested party may ask
the court to modify or alter the judgment to harmonize the same with justice
and the facts (Molina vs. De la Riva, 8 Phil. 569; Behn, Meyer & Co. vs.
McMicking, 11 Phil. 276; Warner, Barnes & Co. vs. Jaucian, 13 Phil. 4;
Espiritu vs. Crossfield and Guash, 14 Phil. 588; Flor Mata vs. Lichauco and
Salinas, 36 Phil. 809). In the instant
case the respondent Cleofas alleged that subsequent to the judgment obtained by
Sto. Domingo, they entered into an agreement which showed that he was no longer
indebted in the amount claimed of P995, but in a lesser amount. Sto. Domingo had no right to an execution for
the amount claimed by him.’ (De la Costa vs. Cleofas, 67 Phil. 686-693).
Shortly
after City of Butuan v. Ortiz, the case of Candelario v. Cañizares[15]
was promulgated, where it was written that:
After a judgment has become final, if
there is evidence of an event or circumstance which would affect or change the
rights of the parties thereto, the court should be allowed to admit evidence of
such new facts and circumstances, and thereafter suspend execution thereof and
grant relief as the new facts and circumstances warrant. We, therefore, find
that the ruling of the court declaring that the order for the payment of P40,000.00
is final and may not be reversed, is erroneous as above explained.
These
rulings were reiterated in the cases of Abellana vs. Dosdos,[16] The City of
In the case at bench, the Court
agrees with the RTC that there is indeed a need to
find out the whereabouts of the subject refrigerators. For this purpose, a
hearing is necessary to determine the issue of whether or not there was an
actual turnover of the subject refrigerators to FGU by the assured CII. If there was an actual turnover, it is very
important to find out whether FGU sold the subject refrigerators to third
parties and profited from such sale. These questions were brought about by the
contention of GPS in its Opposition to Motion for Execution[19]
that after the assured, CII, was fully compensated for its claim on the damaged
refrigerators, it delivered the possession of the subject refrigerators to FGU
as shown in the certification of the Accounting/Administrative Manager of CII.
Thereafter, the subject refrigerators were sold by FGU to third parties and FGU
received and appropriated the consideration and proceeds of the sale. GPS
claims that it verified the whereabouts of the subject refrigerators from the CII
because it wanted to repair and sell them to compensate FGU.
If, indeed, there was an actual delivery of the refrigerators and FGU
profited from the sale after the delivery, there would be an unjust enrichment
if the realized profit would not be deducted from the judgment amount. “The Court is not precluded from
rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to the doctrine
of immutability of final judgments would involve the sacrifice of justice for
technicality.”[20]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
ROBERTO A.
ABAD
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 34-35.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] Gatmaytan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
132856,
[11] Ruben Sia v. Erlinda Villanueva, G.R.
No. 152921,
[12] Tropical Homes v. Fortun, 251 Phil 83 (1989).
[13] Villa v. GSIS, G.R. No. 174642,
[14] 113
Phil 636 (1961).
[15] 114 Phil 672 (1962).
[16] 121 Phil 241 (1965).
[17] 160 Phil. 869 (1975).
[18] G.R.
No. 151215,
[19] Rollo, pp. 54-56.
[20] Heirs of Maura So et. al. v. Lucila
Jomoc Obliosca et. al., G.R. No. 147082,