Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
|
PETER
BEJARASCO, JR., Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 159781 Present: CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson, BRION, BERSAMIN, VILLARAMA, JR., and SERENO,
JJ. Promulgated: February
2, 2011 |
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D E C I S I O N
BERSAMIN, J.:
This case concerns the dire
consequences of a litigant’s failure to periodically follow up with his counsel
on the developments of his appeal.
The petitioner was convicted on
On
Thereafter, on
On
In its resolution dated
Aggrieved, the petitioner is now before
the Court to plead his cause. He submits that Atty. Besario’s reckless
abandonment of his case effectively deprived him of his day in court and of his
right to due process; and that said former counsel’s actuation constituted reckless
and gross negligence that should not be binding against him.
The petition is denied due course.
That
Atty. Besario was negligent in handling the petitioner’s case was clear.
Indeed, his abject failure to file the petition for review in the CA despite
his two motions for extension for that purpose warranted no other conclusion but
that he was negligent.
Nonetheless, we find no justification
to reverse the CA’s disposition of the appeal. The petitioner was bound by
Atty. Besario’s negligence.
The general rule is that a client is bound by
the counsel’s acts, including even mistakes in the realm of procedural
technique.[2]
The rationale for the rule is that a counsel, once retained, holds the implied
authority to do all acts necessary or, at least, incidental to the prosecution
and management of the suit in behalf of his client, such that any act or
omission by counsel within the scope of the authority is regarded, in the eyes
of the law, as the act or omission of the client himself.[3] A
recognized exception to the rule is when the reckless or gross negligence of the
counsel deprives the client of due process of law. For the exception to apply, however,
the gross negligence should not be accompanied by the client’s own negligence or
malice, considering that the client has the duty to be vigilant in respect of his
interests by keeping himself up-to-date on the status of the case. Failing in this duty, the client should suffer
whatever adverse judgment is rendered against him.
Truly,
a litigant bears the responsibility to monitor the status of his case, for no
prudent party leaves the fate of his case entirely in the hands of his lawyer. It
is the client’s duty to be in contact with his lawyer from time to time in
order to be informed of the progress and developments of his case;[4] hence,
to merely rely on the bare reassurances of his lawyer that everything is being taken
care of is not enough.
Here, the petitioner took nearly 16
months from the issuance of the entry of judgment by the CA, and almost 22
months from when the RTC affirmed the convictions before he actually filed his petition
for review in the CA. He ought to have been sooner alerted about his dire
situation by the fact that an unreasonably long time had lapsed since the RTC had
handed down its dismissal of his appeal without Atty. Besario having updated
him on the developments, including showing to him a copy of the expected petition
for review. Also, he could have himself verified at the CA whether or not the
petition for review had been filed, especially upon realizing that Atty.
Besario had started making himself scarce to him. In short, the petitioner’s
failure to know or to find out the real status of his appeal rendered him undeserving
of any sympathy from the Court vis-à-vis
the negligence of his former counsel.
The
right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, but is merely
a statutory privilege that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the
law.[5] The right is unavoidably forfeited by the litigant
who does not comply with the manner thus prescribed. So it is with the
petitioner.
WHEREFORE,
the Court affirms the resolution promulgated on
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARIA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, p. 46.
[2] Producers Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126620, April 17, 2002, 381 SCRA 185, 192.
[3] People v. Bitanga, G.R. No.
159222,
[4] Delos Santos v. Elizalde, G.R. Nos. 141810 & 141812, February 2, 2007, 514 SCRA 14, 31, citing Bernardo v. Court of Appeals (Special Sixth Division), G.R. No. 106153, July 14 1997, 275 SCRA 413.
[5] Estate of Felomina G. Macadangdang v. Gaviola, G.R. No.
156809 , March 4, 2009, 580 SCRA 565, 573.