G.R. No. 153690 (DAVID LU, Petitioner v. PATERNO LU YM, SR., ET AL.,
Respondents); G.R. No. 157381 (PATERNO LU YM, SR. ET AL., Petitioners v. DAVID
LU, Respondent); G.R. No. 170889 (JOHN LU YM, ET AL., Petitioners v. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., Respondents).
Promulgated:
February 15, 2011
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
PERALTA, J.:
It
is axiomatic that this Court’s decision form part of the law of the land to
which the entire citizenry adheres. It
is, therefore, righteous that this Court had reconsidered and reassessed its
pronouncements in the Resolution dated
At the outset, a brief narration of the factual and procedural antecedents that transpired and lead to the filing of these cases is in order.
The
consolidated cases emanated from the complaint filed by David Lu, et al. (David, et al.) against Paterno Lu Ym, Sr. and sons (Lu Ym father and sons)
and Ludo and Lu Ym Development Corporation (LLDC) for “Declaration of Nullity
of Share Issue, Receivership and Dissolution” way back in
On
Meanwhile, several matters which stemmed from
the complaint were brought before this Court via three petitions.
Eventually, on
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions in G.R. Nos.
153690 and 157381 are DENIED for
being moot and academic; while the petition in G.R. No. 170889 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Consequently, the Status Quo Order dated
The Court of Appeals is DIRECTED to proceed with CA-G.R. CV No. 81163 and to resolve the same
with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
In G.R. No 153690, with David, et al. assailing the appellate court’s resolutions dismissing their complaint for its incomplete signatory in the certificate of non-forum shopping and, consequently, annulling the placing of the subject corporation under receivership pendente lite, the Court found the same to be moot with the admission by the trial court of David, et al.’s Amended Complaint filed by them, pursuant to the trial court’s order to conform to the requirements of the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies. Since the amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it amends, the original complaint was deemed withdrawn from the records. The Court noted that both parties admitted the mootness of the issue and that the trial court already rendered a decision on the merits in said case. It added that the Amended Complaint stands, since Lu Ym father and sons availed of an improper mode (via an Urgent Motion filed with this Court) to assail the admission of the Amended Complaint.[1]
In G.R. No. 157381, with Lu Ym father and sons challenging the appellate court’s resolution restraining the trial court from proceeding with their motion to lift the receivership order which was filed during the pendency of G.R. No. 153690, the Court resolved that the propriety of such injunction was mooted by the amendment of the complaint and by the trial court’s decision on the merits. The motion having been filed ancillary to the main action, which main action was already decided on the merits by the trial court, there is thus nothing more to enjoin.[2]
G.R. No. 170889 involves the denial of Lu Ym father and sons’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction by the appellate court that is handling CA-G.R. CV No. 81163. In dismissing the petition, the Court found no merit on their claim of lack of jurisdiction for David, et al.’s non-payment of the correct docket fees.[3] The Court systematically belied the arguments raised by Lu Ym father and sons as follows:
In the instant case,
however, we cannot grant the dismissal prayed for because of the following
reasons: First, the case instituted before the RTC is one incapable of
pecuniary estimation. Hence, the correct
docket fees were paid. Second, John and LLDC are estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court because of their active
participation in the proceedings below, and because the issue of payment of
insufficient docket fees had been belatedly raised before the Court of Appeals,
i.e., only in their motion for
reconsideration. Lastly, assuming that the docket fees paid were truly inadequate,
the mistake was committed by the Clerk of Court who assessed the same and not
imputable to David; and as to the deficiency, if any, the same may instead be
considered a lien on the judgment that may thereafter be rendered.[4]
On August 4, 2009, however, despite the firm and sound rationale enunciated and methodically pronounced in the decision, this Court issued a Resolution completely vacating and departing from the logic and reasoning of the earlier decision.
David
Lu then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Refer Resolution to
the Court En Banc. On
While a second motion for reconsideration is, as a general rule, a prohibited pleading, it is within the sound discretion of the Court to admit the same, provided it is filed with prior leave whenever substantive justice may be better served thereby.[5] Verily, the propriety of entertaining a second motion for reconsideration is not foreign in this jurisdiction, it would not be the first time that this Court would consider and actually grant the motion. In the case of Valeroso v. Court of Appeals,[6] We elucidated that:
This is not the first time that this Court
is suspending its own rules or excepting a particular case from the operation
of the rules. In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, despite the denial of De Guzman’s motion for reconsideration, we
still entertained his Omnibus Motion, which was actually a second motion for
reconsideration. Eventually, we reconsidered our earlier decision and
remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan for reception and appreciation of
petitioner’s evidence. In that case, we said that if we would not
compassionately bend backwards and flex technicalities, petitioner would surely
experience the disgrace and misery of incarceration for a crime which he might
not have committed after all. Also in Astorga v. People, on a second motion for reconsideration, we set aside our earlier
decision, re-examined the records of the case, then finally acquitted Benito
Astorga of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of reasonable
doubt. And in Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante, by virtue of the January 13, 2004 En Banc
Resolution, the Court authorized the Special First Division to suspend the
Rules, so as to allow it to consider and resolve respondent’s second motion for
reconsideration after the motion was heard on oral arguments. After a
re-examination of the merits of the case, we granted the second motion for
reconsideration and set aside our earlier decision.
Clearly, suspension of the rules of
procedure, to pave the way for the re-examination of the findings of fact and
conclusions of law earlier made, is not without basis.
We would like to stress that rules of
procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. They are conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the courts
in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of
technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice,
courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the
norm that, on the balance, technicalities take a backseat to substantive
rights, and not the other way around. Thus, if the application of the
Rules would tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it would always
be within our power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from its
operation.[7]
Besides, the first motion for reconsideration filed by David, et al. should not have been denied outright by a mere minute resolution.
It
should be pointed out that in the Resolution dated
However, when David, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution, the motion was not given much consideration and was merely brushed aside through a mere minute resolution. Considering that there was a standing dissent, David, et al.’s motion should not have been denied outright. When a dissenting opinion was registered against the majority opinion in a decision and, later on, a motion for reconsideration was filed by the aggrieved party, the Court should resolve the motion via a signed resolution.
Hence,
on this premise, it was recommended[8]
that the Motion to Refer Resolution to the Court En Banc be granted.
Consequently, in accordance with the Rules, the Second Division granted
the motion and the cases were subsequently referred to the Court En Banc, which the latter accepted in
the Resolution dated
Anent, the substantive aspect, as aptly argued by David, et al., this Court’s pronouncements in the August 4, 2009 Resolution abandoned, reversed, and departed from well-settled jurisprudence, which warrant a second hard look by this Court.
First, the subject matter of the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
In a long line of decisions,[10] this Court has laid down the rule in order for an action to be considered one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The test in determining whether the subject matter of an action is incapable of pecuniary estimation is by ascertaining the nature of the principal action or the remedy sought. This Court has consistently held that for an action to be considered one capable of pecuniary estimation the action must have, as the principal remedy sought, the recovery of property or a sum of money. Otherwise, if the principal remedy sought is not the recovery of property or a sum of money, the action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation.
As
early as in the case of Lapitan v.
Scandia, Inc., et al.,[11]
this Court has laid down the guide in determining whether the subject matter of
an action is capable or incapable of pecuniary estimation. Said this Court:
x x x [I]n determining
whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining
the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the courts of first instance [now Regional Trial Courts]
would depend on the amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a
sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence
of, the principal relief sought like in suits to have the defendant perform
his part of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or
for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of
the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable
exclusively by courts of first instance [now Regional Trial Courts]. x x x.[12]
In the case at bar, David Lu does not claim to be the owner of the subject shares of stocks and, as such, entitled to be its transferees. What is primarily being sought is the nullification of the issuance of the said shares of stocks and the dissolution of LLDC. Clearly, these remedies do not have for their principal purpose the recovery of property or a sum of money. However, in the eventuality that property, real or personal, will be distributed to the stockholders as a result of the annulment and dissolution, it would only be a consequence of the main action.
Moreover, the mere mention of the value of the subject shares of stocks does not make the present action one capable of pecuniary estimation; it is merely a narrative to highlight the inequitable price at which the stocks were transferred. Such narrative description of the value of the subject stocks should not be equated as making the action one that is capable of pecuniary estimation and used as the basis for fixing the docket fees.
To conclude otherwise would certainly create an absurdity where the mere mention of property or a sum of money in an action would result in the action being classified as one that is capable of pecuniary estimation. In such case, all actions can be considered capable of pecuniary estimation, since every case involves the recovery or vindication of something to which the plaintiff or complainant can affix his own valuation.
To maintain this line of reasoning would certainly have far reaching effects on established jurisprudential precepts.
Moreover, not even the erroneous annotation of a notice of lis pendens could belie the conclusion that the action is one not capable of pecuniary estimation. In the present action, as in most cases, it just so happens that real properties are involved. However, it does not necessarily follow that when a party in an action erroneously causes the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on real properties he changes the nature of an action from one incapable of pecuniary estimation to one capable of pecuniary estimation. In the case at bar, this does not make the action a real action for what is still being sought is the nullification of the issuance of the shares of stocks and the dissolution of LLDC, which is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Second, Lu Ym father and sons are already estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court.
As properly observed in the earlier decision, Lu Ym father and sons belatedly raised the issue of insufficient payment of docket fees. In fact, the first time Lu Ym father and sons raised this matter was in their motion for reconsideration before the CA. Up to that stage of the action, Lu Ym father and sons actively participated in the proceedings before the CA and the trial court, never questioning the correct amount of docket fees paid by David, et al.
Moreover, it cannot be said that Lu Ym father and sons’ inquiry with the Clerk of Court on the amount of docket fees paid by David, et al. and their subsequent inquiry with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), as to the correctness of the amount paid by David, et al., was the proper procedure to question the jurisdiction of the trial court. If Lu Ym father and sons really believed that the correct amount of docket fees was not paid, nothing was stopping them to question it before the trial court. Instead, Lu Ym father and sons speculated on the fortunes of litigation, which is clearly against the policy of the Court, and merely waited for a favorable judgment from the trial court. Verily, if a party invokes the jurisdiction of a court, he cannot thereafter challenge the court’s jurisdiction in the same case.[13] Moreover, to question the jurisdiction of the trial court over the case due to the alleged non-payment of the correct amount of docket fees should be disallowed, having been raised for the first time on appeal.[14] Much more when it was raised only in a motion for reconsideration as in the case at bar.
In the case of National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[15] this Court held that:
The court acquires jurisdiction over the action if the
filing of the initiatory pleading is accompanied by the payment of the
requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid at the time of the filing of the
pleading, as of the time of full payment of the fees within such reasonable
time as the court may grant, unless, of course, prescription has set in the
meantime.
It does not follow, however, that the trial court
should have dismissed the complaint for failure of private respondent to pay
the correct amount of docket fees. Although the payment of the proper docket
fees is a jurisdictional requirement, the trial court may allow the plaintiff
in an action to pay the same within a reasonable time before the expiration of
the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. If the plaintiff fails to comply within this requirement, the defendant
should timely raise the issue of jurisdiction or else he would be considered in
estoppel. In the latter case, the balance between the appropriate docket
fees and the amount actually paid by the plaintiff will be considered a lien or
any award he may obtain in his favor.[16]
Thus, Lu Ym father and sons are now estopped from raising this issue. Indeed, while the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of an action, nevertheless, the party raising such question may be estopped if he has actively taken part in the very proceedings which he questions and he only objects to the court’s jurisdiction because the judgment or the order subsequently rendered is adverse to him.
Third, bad faith is not present in the case at bar, since there was no intention on the part of David, et al. to defraud the government.
David, et al. paid the docket fees for an action incapable of pecuniary estimation, as computed by the Clerk of Court. If there was, therefore, any error in the payment of the correct amount of docket fees the mistake could be imputed upon the Clerk of Court and not David, et al. As aptly observed in the earlier decision:
It may be recalled that despite the payment of
insufficient fees, this Court refrained from dismissing the complaint/petition
in Intercontinental Broadcasting
Corporation (IBC-13) v. Alonzo-Legasto, Yambao
v. Court of Appeals and Ayala Land,
Inc. v. Carpo. In those cases, the
inadequate payment was caused by the erroneous assessment made by the Clerk of
Court. In Intercontinental, we declared that the payment of the docket fees,
as assessed, negates any imputation of bad faith to the respondent or any
intent of the latter to defraud the government.
Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the
respondent, and there was no intention to defraud the government, the
In the instant case, David paid the docket fees as
assessed by the Clerk of Court. Even if
the amount was insufficient, as claimed by John and LLDC, fraud and bad faith
cannot be attributed to David to warrant the dismissal of his complaint. Consistent with the principle of liberality
in the interpretation of the Rules, in the interest of substantial justice,
this Court had repeatedly refrained from dismissing the case on that ground
alone. Instead, it considered the
deficiency in the payment of the docket fees as a lien on the judgment which
must be remitted to the Clerk of Court of the court a quo upon the execution of the judgment.
To be sure, this Court in Ayala Land, Inc. v. Spouses Carpo,[17] citing Segovia v. Barrios,[18] held that:
x x x As early as 1946, in the case of Segovia v. Barrios, we ruled that where
an appellant in good faith paid less than the correct amount for the docket fee
because that was the amount he was required to pay by the clerk of court, and
he promptly paid the balance, it is error to dismiss his appeal because –
every citizen has the right to assume and trust that a
public officer charged by law with certain duties knows his duties and performs
them in accordance with law. To penalize
such citizen for relying upon said officer in all good faith is repugnant to
justice.
Despite
the passage of time, the ruling in
I, therefore, concur with the majority opinion.
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
[1] Dissenting Opinion of Madame Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, p. 2.
[2]
[3]
[4] Lu v. Lu Ym, Sr., G.R. Nos. 153690, 157381, and 170889, August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 254, 274.
[5] Valeroso v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164815,
[6] G.R. No. 164815,
[7]
[8] Reflections of Justice Diosdado M. Peralta dated
[9] The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC), Rule 12, Sec. 1.
[10] See Iniego v. Purganan, G.R. No. 166876, March 4, 2006, 485 SCRA 394, 400-401; Spouses Huguete v. Spouses Embudo, 453 Phil. 170, 176-177 (2003); Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 62, 66 (2002); Barangay San Roque, Talisay, Cebu v. Heirs of Pastor, 389 Phil. 466, 471 (2000); Russell v. Vestil, 364 Phil. 392, 400 (1999); De Leon v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil. 535, 541 (1998); Raymundo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97805, September 5, 1992, 213 SCRA 457, 460-461; Amorganda v. Court of Appeals, 248 Phil. 442, 453 (1988); Singson v. Isabela Sawmill, 177 Phil. 575, 588 (1979); Lapitan v. Scandia, Inc., et al., 133 Phil. 526 (1968).
[11] Lapitan v. Scandia, Inc., et al., supra.
[12]
[13] Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, 495 Phil. 422, 434 (2005)
[14] Idolor v. Court of Appeals, 490 Phil. 808, 816 (2005)
[15] 362
Phil. 150 (1999).
[16]
[17] 399 Phil. 327, 334 (2000).
[18] 75 Phil 764 (1946).