G.R. No. 153690 - DAVID LU, Petitioner,
versus PATERNO LU YM, SR., et al., Respondents; G.R. No. 157381 - PATERNO LU
YM, SR., et al., Petitioners, versus DAVID LU, Respondent; and G.R. No. 170889
- JOHN LU YM, et al., Petitioners, versus THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS OF
CEBU CITY (Former Twentieth Division), et al., Respondents.
Promulgated:
February
15, 2011
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NACHURA, J.:
For resolution are the following
motions filed by David Lu against respondents Paterno Lu Ym, Sr., Paterno Lu
Ym, Jr., Victor Lu Ym, John Lu Ym, Kelly Lu Ym, and Ludo and LuYm Development
Corporation (LLDC): 1) Second Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Refer
Resolution to the Court En Banc;[1] 2)
Amended Second Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Refer Resolution to the
Court En Banc;[2] 3) Motion for Leave to File Motion for
Clarification, Amended Second Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Refer
Resolution to the Court En Banc;[3] 4)
Motion for Clarification;[4]
and 5) Supplement to the Second Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to
Dismiss.[5]
Also before this Court are six
motions filed by respondents John Lu Ym and LLDC, namely: 1) Motion for Leave
to File and Admit Motion for the Issuance of an Entry of Judgment;[6] 2)
Motion for the Issuance of an Entry of Judgment;[7] 3)
Motion for Leave to File and Admit Supplement to Motion for the Issuance of an
Entry of Judgment;[8] 4)
Supplement to Motion for the Issuance of an Entry of Judgment;[9] 5)
Motion for Leave to File and Admit Attached Manifestation;[10]
and 6) Manifestation.[11]
The relevant factual and procedural
antecedents that gave rise to the parties’ respective motions are as follows:
On August 26, 2008, this Court denied
the petitions in G.R. Nos. 153690 and 157381 for being moot and academic;
dismissed the petition of John Lu Ym and LLDC in G.R. No. 170889; and
consequently lifted the status quo order dated January 23, 2006. The Court
further directed the Court of Appeals (CA) to proceed with CA-G.R. CV No. 81163
and to resolve the same with dispatch.[12]
On more thorough reflection, in a
Resolution[13] dated
August 4, 2009, we granted John Lu Ym and LLDC’s motion for reconsideration,
and set aside our August 26, 2008 Decision. Consequently, we dismissed the
complaint in SRC Case No. 021-CEB then on appeal with the CA in CA-G.R. CV No.
81163. Moreover, we denied all interlocutory matters challenged in the
consolidated petitions for being moot and academic.[14]
Aggrieved, David Lu filed a Motion
for Reconsideration and Motion to Refer Resolution to the Court En Banc.[15] In a Resolution[16]
dated September 23, 2009, we denied the motion with finality for lack of merit.
Undaunted, David Lu successively
filed the above-mentioned motions now submitted for resolution. In a Resolution dated October 20, 2010, the
Court’s Second Division voted to submit the pending incidents to the Court En Banc, and the latter accepted the
referral.
In support of his motions, David Lu
advances the following arguments:
23.1. First, by changing the determinative test as to when an action is or is not capable of pecuniary interest, the August 4 Resolution will effectively result in practically all actions being capable of pecuniary interest. By deviating from the well-established rule that it is only when the principal remedy is for recovery of property that an action becomes capable of pecuniary interest; and by holding that the Complaint is capable of pecuniary estimation simply because [a] it involves property the value of which was described by Respondent Lu; [b] Respondent Lu alleged that he has suffered damage or injury from which his cause of action arose, the Resolution purports to make practically all cases capable of pecuniary estimation because [a] all actions would necessarily involve an allegation of damage or injury because that allegation is an indispensable element of a cause of action; and [b] numerous cases involve property with specific values even if actual recovery of that property is not sought.
23.2. Second, the August 4 Resolution, by concluding that Lu Ym [f]ather and sons is not estopped from assailing the trial court’s jurisdiction despite them having raised that issue for the first time on appeal and only after an adverse decision has been rendered, will effectively allow unscrupulous litigants to “gamble on the results of litigation” and to wait until the proceedings are at an advanced stage and for an adverse decision to be rendered before assailing the trial court’s jurisdiction. The August 4 Resolution thus effectively condones the wastage of the limited time and resources of the courts and of the other litigants as well.
23.3. Third, the August 4 Resolution, by making a finding of bad faith from the innocuous act of annotating notices of lis pendens, effectively puts the public at risk of being held to have acted in bad faith for acts done innocently but perhaps erroneously. This effect becomes even worse when doubtful or disputed questions of law involved – since the effect of the August 4 Resolution is that mere error in judgment amounts to bad faith.[17]
Looking
into the merits of David Lu’s arguments, his motions are doomed to fail.
David
Lu insists that our August 4, 2009 Resolution abandoned, reversed, and modified
well-established legal principles on the determinative test as to whether an
action is one capable of pecuniary estimation or not, and on findings of good
faith and bad faith, and the principle of estoppel. He further claims that, in
so doing, the Court violated the principle of stare decisis.
I
disagree.
Stare decisis simply means that, for the
sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those
that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties
may be different. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event
have been put forward by parties similarly situated as in a previous case
litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.[18]
David Lu faults the Court in not
applying our pronouncement in Lapitan v.
Scandia Inc., et al.[19]
and subsequent cases in the determination of whether an action is one incapable
of pecuniary estimation. He further questions the non-application of
established jurisprudence on the principle of estoppel in failing to raise the
issue of non-payment of docket fees at the first opportunity. Finally, he
assails the non-application of the presumption of good faith and the burden to
prove bad faith.
Suffice
it to state that the cited cases are not on all fours with the present case.
The principle of stare decisis has no
application to the factual setting of the instant case.[20]
The totality of the circumstances prevailing in this case had been considered
in our August 4, 2009 Resolution and, unquestionably, we did not abandon or
depart from the doctrines laid down in the cases cited by David Lu. We only
applied the law and pertinent jurisprudence in accordance with the facts of
this case. To be sure, the issues have been thoroughly discussed in the above
Resolution which I now reiterate.
The
criteria in determining the nature of the action are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the reliefs sought.
The complaint and amended complaint
readily show that the primary and ultimate intention of the plaintiffs therein
was the return of the subject shares of stock to LLDC. Thus, the 600,000 shares were indeed the subject
matter of the litigation. The shares of
stock have an estimated value, which was declared by the plaintiffs themselves
in their complaint to be P1,087,055,105.
As this was the stated value of the property in litigation, the docket
fees should have been computed based on this amount.
Moreover, David Lu prayed for the liquidation and
distribution of the assets of the corporation so that he might receive his
share therein. Among the assets of the
corporation are real properties. Hence,
the case was, in actuality, a real action which had for its objective the
recovery of real property. That the case involved a real action was
acknowledged by David Lu when he moved for the annotation of notices of lis pendens on the properties owned by
LLDC. In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the
estimated value thereof, shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the
basis in computing the docket fees.
When David Lu sought the annotation of notices
of lis pendens on the titles of LLDC,
he acknowledged that the complaint affected a title or a right to the
possession of the LLDC real properties. In other words, he affirmed that though
the complaint was a declaration for the nullity of the issuance of share issue,
the action was indeed one which affected the real properties of the
corporation. This being so, he must have
been fully aware that the docket fees would be based on the value of the
realties involved. The silence or inaction
to point this out to the Clerk of Court, who computed the docket fees, becomes
highly suspect. Therefore, the
non-payment of the correct docket fees was not only the result of the erroneous
computation of the fees by the Clerk of Court; rather, it was the consequence
of David Lu’s non-declaration of the true nature of the action. This may be characterized as an act of bad
faith, indicating an attempt to defraud the government by avoiding the payment
of the correct docket fees.
Indeed, in a number of cases, this
Court refrained from dismissing the complaint/petition despite the insufficient
payment of the required fees.[21]
However, in those cases, there was no intention to defraud the government. Considering that there was bad faith on the
part of David Lu and a clear intent to avoid payment of the correct docket
fees, the strict rule set forth in Manchester
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals[22] is
applicable warranting the dismissal of the complaint.
Anent
the issue of estoppel, respondents are not estopped from challenging the
jurisdiction of the trial court. They raised
the insufficiency of the docket fees before the trial court rendered judgment
and continuously maintained their position even on appeal to the CA. Although the manner of challenge was
erroneous, they should not be deemed to have waived their right to assail the
jurisdiction of the trial court.
Estoppel,
being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be applied rarely – only from
necessity and only in extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with great care
and the equity must be strong in its favor.
When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel may be the most effective
weapon for the accomplishment of injustice.[23]
Clearly,
the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction and the complaint before it should be
dismissed. Consequently, the decision rendered therein is null and void. With
the foregoing disquisition, there is no need to further discuss the other
issues raised by David Lu. As prayed for by respondents, an entry of judgment
must be issued.
One
final note. As can be gleaned from the
discussion above, there is no abandonment, modification, or reversal of
well-established doctrines. I maintain that there is no extraordinarily
persuasive reason to refer the case to the Court En Banc. To be sure, the Court En
Banc is not an appellate court to which decisions or resolutions of a
Division may be appealed.[24]
Premises considered, I vote to DENY David Lu’s motions.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
[1] Rollo (G.R. No. 157381), pp. 1421-1451.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] Motion
for Leave to File and Admit Attached Manifestation dated May 24, 2010, pp. 1-4;
id.
[11] Manifestation
dated May 24, 2010, pp. 1-6; id.
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] Grand Placement and General Services
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142358, January 31, 2006, 481
SCRA 189, 203-204.
[19] 133
Phil. 526 (1968).
[20] Chavez v. National Housing Authority,
G.R. No. 164527, August 15, 2007, 530 SCRA 235, 290.
[21] Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC-13) v. Alonzo-Legasto, G.R. No. 169108, April 18, 2006, 487 SCRA 339; Yambao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140894, November 27, 2000, 346 SCRA 141; Ayala Land, Inc. v. Carpo, G.R. No. 140162, November 22, 2000, 345 SCRA 579.
[22] 233 Phil. 579 (1987).
[23] Figueroa v. People,
G.R. No. 147406,
[24] United Planters Sugar Milling Co., Inc
(UPSUMCO) v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, Philippine National Bank (PNB) and
Asset Privatization Trust (APT), as Trustee of the Republic of the