A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC − IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES OF PLAGIARISM, ETC., AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO.
Promulgated:
February 8,
2011
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DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
I dissent on two grounds. First, this
Court has no jurisdiction to decide in an administrative case whether a
sitting Justice of this Court has committed misconduct in office as this power
belongs exclusively to Congress. Second, in writing judicial decisions a
judge must comply with the Law on Copyright1 as the judge has no power to exempt himself from the
mandatory requirements of the law.
I.
Disciplining
Authority of Impeachable Officers
Under the Constitution, the sole
disciplining authority of all impeachable officers, including Justices of this
Court, is Congress. Section 3(1), Article XI of the Constitution provides that,
“The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate
all cases of impeachment.” Likewise, Section 3(6) of the same Article provides
that, “The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide cases of
impeachment.” These provisions constitute Congress as the exclusive
authority to discipline all impeachable officers for any impeachable
offense, including “betrayal of public trust,” a “catchall phrase”2 to cover any misconduct involving breach of public
trust by an impeachable officer.
While impeachment is often described as a
political process, it also functions as the equivalent of
administrative disciplinary proceedings against impeachable officers. Impeachable
officers are not subject to administrative disciplinary proceedings either by
the Executive or Judicial branch, in the same manner that non-impeachable
officers are subject. Thus, impeachment by Congress takes the place of
administrative disciplinary proceedings against impeachable officers as
there is no other authority that can administratively discipline impeachable
officers.3
Removal from office and disqualification to hold public office,4
which is the penalty for an impeachable offense,5 is also the most severe penalty that can be imposed
in administrative disciplinary proceedings.
Impeachment is not a criminal proceeding
because conviction in an impeachment complaint is not a bar to criminal
prosecution for the same act.6 An impeachable offense, like betrayal of public
trust, may not even constitute a criminal act. Like in an administrative proceeding,
proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required for conviction in impeachment. If
an impeachable officer is charged of a crime, as distinguished from an
administrative charge, the proper court has jurisdiction to try such
impeachable officer because the proceeding is criminal, not administrative.
However, neither the conviction nor acquittal of such impeachable officer in
the criminal case constitutes a bar to his subsequent impeachment by Congress.
There is no double jeopardy because impeachment is not a criminal proceeding.7
Only Congress, as the exclusive
disciplining authority of all impeachable officers, can decide in a
non-criminal, non-civil proceeding8 whether
a sitting Justice of this Court has committed plagiarism. Plagiarism is a
betrayal of public trust because, as the majority puts it, to plagiarize is
“‘to steal and pass off as one’s own’ the ideas of another.”9 However, in writing judicial decisions
a judge is liable for plagiarism only if the copying violates the moral rights
of the author under the Law on Copyright.
This Court may conduct an investigation of an
administrative complaint against a sitting Justice to determine if there is
basis in recommending to the House of Representatives the
initiation of an impeachment complaint against the sitting Justice. This Court
may also conduct an investigation of an administrative complaint against a
sitting Justice to determine if the complaint constitutes contempt of this
Court. However, this Court has no power to decide on the guilt or innocence
of a sitting Justice in the administrative complaint because such act is a
usurpation of the exclusive disciplinary power of Congress over impeachable
officers under the Constitution. Any decision by this Court in an
administrative case clearing a sitting Justice of an impeachable offense is
void for want of jurisdiction and for violation of an express provision of the
Constitution.
Such a
decision will put this Court on a collision course with Congress if
subsequently an impeachment complaint for plagiarism is filed with Congress
against the sitting Justice. Incidentally, an impeachment complaint has already
been filed in the House of Representatives involving the same complaint subject
of this administrative case. If the House of Representatives decides to take
cognizance of the complaint and initiates an impeachment based on the same
administrative complaint that this Court had already dismissed as baseless,
then this Court would have created a constitutional crisis that could only
weaken the public’s faith in the primacy of the Constitution.
The
Supreme Court cannot assume jurisdiction over an administrative
complaint against a sitting Justice of this Court by invoking Section 6,
Article VIII of the Constitution. This provision states that the “Supreme Court
shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel
thereof.” This provision refers to the administrative supervision that the
Department of Justice used to exercise over the courts and their personnel, as
shown by the folowing exchange during the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission:
MR.
GUINGONA: xxx.
The
second question has reference to Section 9, about the administrative
supervision over all courts to be retained in the Supreme Court. I was
wondering if the Committee had taken into consideration the proposed resolution
for the transfer of the administrative supervision from the Supreme Court to
the Ministry of Justice. But as far as I know, none of the proponents had been
invited to explain or defend the proposed resolution.
Also,
I wonder if the Committee also took into consideration the fact that the UP Law
Constitution Project in its Volume I, entitled: Annotated Provision had, in
fact, made this an alternative proposal, the transfer of administrative
supervision from the Supreme Court to the Ministry of Justice.
Thank
you.
MR.
CONCEPCION: May I refer the question to Commissioner Regalado?
THE
PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sarmiento): Commissioner Regalado is recognized.
MR.
REGALADO: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
We
did invite Minister Neptali Gonzales, who was the proponent for the transfer of
supervision of the lower courts to the Ministry of Justice. I even personally
called up and sent a letter or a short note inviting him, but the good Minister
unfortunately was enmeshed in a lot of official commitments. We wanted to hear
him because the Solicitor General of his office, Sedfrey Ordoñez, appeared
before us, and asked for the maintenance of the present arrangement wherein the
supervision over lower courts is with the Supreme Court. But aside from that,
although there were no resource persons, we did further studies on the
feasibility of transferring the supervision over the lower courts to the
Ministry of Justice. All those things were taken into consideration motu
proprio.10
For sure,
the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over judges is
expressly govened by another provision, that is, Section 11, Article VIII of
the Constitution. Section 11 provides:
Section 11. xxx The Supreme Court
en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts,
or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually
took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly,
the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over judges is found in Section
11 of Article VIII. However, this disciplinary authority is expressly limited
to lower court judges, and does not incude Supreme Court Justices, precisely
because the Constitution expressly vests exclusively on Congress the power to
discipline Supreme Court Justices. By excluding Supreme Court Justices, Section
11 withholds from the Supreme Court en banc the power to
discipline its own members.
The Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 of the United States, which gives
judicial councils composed of federal judges the power to discipline
federal judges short of removal from office, does not apply to Justices
of the United States Supreme Court who are subject to discipline only by the
United States Congress. Morever, a similar law cannot be enacted in the
Philippines bacause all lower court judges are subject to discipline by the
Supreme Court en banc under Section 11, Article VIII of the
Constitution. Thus, reference to the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of
1980 is inappropriate in this jurisdiction.
I submit that this Court recall the Resolution of 12 October 2010 subject of the present motion for reconsideration for lack of jurisdiction to decide the administrative complaint against Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo.
II. The Judge Must Follow the Law on
Copyright
a. Copying from Works of the Government
In writing judicial decisions, a judge should
make the proper attribution in copying passages from any judicial decision,
statute, regulation, or other Works of the Government. The Manual of
Judicial Writing adopted11 by this Court provides how such attribution should be
made.
However, the failure to make such attribution
does not violate the Law on Copyright.12 The law expressly provides that Works of the
Government are not subject to copyright.13 This means that there is neither a legal right by
anyone to demand attribution, nor any legal obligation from anyone to make an
attribution, when Works of the Government are copied. The failure to make the
proper attribution of a Work of the Government is not actionable but is merely
a case of sloppy writing. Clearly, there is no legal obligation, by a
judge or by any person, to make an attribution when copying Works of the
Government.
However, misquoting or twisting, with or
without attribution, any judicial decision, statute, regulation or other Works
of the Government in judicial writing, if done to mislead the parties or the
public, is actionable. Under Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a
judge “should perform official duties honestly.”14 Rule 3.0115 and Rule 3.0216 of the Code provide that a judge must be faithful to
the law, maintain professional competence, and strive diligently to ascertain
the facts and the applicable law.
The foregoing applies to any non-copyrightable work, and any work in the public domain, whether local or foreign.
b. Copying from Pleadings of Parties
In writing judicial decisions, the judge may copy passages from the pleadings of the parties with proper attribution to the author of the pleading. However, the failure to make the proper attribution is not actionable.
Pleadings are submitted to the court
precisely so that the pleas, or the arguments written on the
pleadings, are accepted by the judge. There is an implied offer by the pleader
that the judge may make any use of the pleadings in resolving the case. If
the judge accepts the pleader’s arguments, he may copy such arguments to
expedite the resolution of the case. In writing his decision, the judge does
not claim as his own the arguments he adopts from the pleadings of the parties.
Besides, the legal arguments in the pleadings are in most cases merely
reiterations of judicial precedents, which are Works of the Government.
However, misquoting or twisting, with or
without attribution, any passage from the pleadings of the parties, if done
to mislead the parties or the public, is actionable. Under Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge “should perform official duties honestly.”
Rule 3.01 and Rule 3.02 of the Code provide that a judge must be faithful to
the law, maintain professional competence, and strive diligently to ascertain
the facts and the applicable law.
c. Copying from Textbooks, Journals and other Non-Government Works
In writing judicial decisions, the judge may copy passages from textbooks, journals and other non-government works with proper attribution. However, whether the failure to make the proper attribution is actionable or not depends on the nature of the passages copied.
If the work copied without proper attribution is copyrighted, the failure to make such attribution violates Section 193 of the Intellectual Property Code, which provides:
Section 193. Scope of Moral Rights. The author of a work
shall, independently of the economic rights in Section 177 or the grant of an
assignment or license with respect to such right, have the right:
193.1. To require that the authorship of
the works be attributed to him, in particular, the right that his name, as
far as practicable, be indicated in a prominent way on the copies, and in
connection with the public use of his work;
x x x x
193.3 To object to any distortion,
mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to
his work which would be prejudicial to his honor or
reputation;
x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 184(k) of the Intellectual Property
Code expressly allows, as a limitation on the copyright or economic rights of
the author, “any use made of a work for the purpose of any judicial
proceedings x x x.”17 Section 184(k) clearly authorizes a judge to copy
copyrighted works for “any use” in judicial proceedings, which means the
judge, in writing his decision, can copy passages beyond the quantitative
limitations of “fair-use” under Section 184(b). This is the significance
of Section 184(k), allowing the judge to copy lengthy passages of copyrighted
work even beyond what is required by fair-use. Section 184(k) is silent on the
obligation of the judge to make the proper attribution, unlike Section 184(b)
on fair-use by the public which expressly requires a proper attribution.
However, Section 193 nevertheless requires
anyone, including a judge writing a judicial decision, to make the proper
attribution to show respect for the moral rights of the author. Thus, while the
author has no right to demand economic compensation from the judge or the
government for the unlimited and public use of his work in a judicial decision,
the law requires that “the authorship of the works be attributed to him x x
x in connection with the public use of his work.” In short, the judge is
legally obligated to make the proper attribution because Section 193 protects
the moral rights of the author.
The moral rights under Section 193 of the
Intellectual Property Code arise only if the work of an author is copyrighted.
If the work is not copyrighted, then there are no moral rights to the work. If
the passages in a textbook, journal article, or other non-work of the
government are merely quotations from Works of the Government, like sentences
or paragraphs taken from judicial decisions, then such passages if copied by a
judge do not require attribution because such passages, by themselves,
are Works of the Government. The same is true for works in the public domain.
However, the arrangement or presentation of
passages copied from Works of the Government may be subject to copyright,18 and a judge copying such arrangement or presentation,
together with the passages, may have to make the proper attribution. If the
passages are those of the author himself, and not copied from Works of the
Government or from works in the public domain, then clearly there is a legal
obligation on the part of the judge to make the proper attribution. Failure by
the judge to make such attribution violates not only Section 193 of the
Intellectual Property Code, but also Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
The moral rights of an author are independent
of the author’s economic rights to his work in the sense that even if the
author assigns his work, the moral rights to the work remain with him, being
inalienable.19 Any
violation of an author’s moral rights entitles him to the same remedies as a
violation of the economic rights to the work,20 whether such economic rights are still with him or
have been assigned to another party. Thus, while called “moral rights,” these
rights are legally enforceable.
Two essential elements of an author’s moral
rights are the right to attribution and the right to integrity. The right to
attribution or paternity21 is the right of the author to be recognized as the
originator or father of his work, a right expressly recognized in Section 193.1
of the Intellectual Property Code. The right to integrity is the right of the
author to prevent any distortion or misrepresentation of his work, a right expressly
recognized in Section 193.3 of the Code. The Legislature incorporated the moral
rights of an author in the Intellectual Property Code in compliance with the
treaty obligations of the Philippines under the Berne Convention, which
requires treaty states to enact legislation protecting the moral rights of
authors.22
The rationale behind moral rights is explained in a local intellectual property textbook, citing American jurisprudence:
The term moral rights has its origins in the civil
law and is a translation of the French le droit moral, which is meant to
capture those rights of a spiritual, non-economic and personal nature. The
rights spring from a belief that an artist in the process of creation injects
his spirit into the work and that the artist’s personality, as well as the
integrity of the work, should therefore be protected and preserved. Because
they are personal to the artist, moral rights exist independently of an
artist’s copyright in his or her work. While the rubric of moral rights
encompasses many varieties of rights, two are protected in nearly every
jurisdiction recognizing their existence: attribution and integrity. The
right of attribution generally consists of the right of an artist to be recognized
by name as the author of his work or to publish anonymously or pseudonymously,
the right to prevent the author’s work from being attributed to someone else,
and to prevent the use of the author’s name on works created by others,
including distorted editions of the author’s original work. The right of
integrity allows the author to prevent any deforming or mutilating changes to
his work, even after title of the work has been transferred. In some
jurisdictions, the integrity right also protects artwork from destruction.
Whether or not a work of art is protected from destruction represents a
fundamentally different perception of the purpose of moral rights. If integrity
is meant to stress the public interest in preserving a nation’s culture,
destruction is prohibited; if the right is meant to emphasize the author’s
personality, destruction is seen as less harmful than the continued display of
deformed or mutilated work that misrepresents the artist and destruction may
proceed.23 (Emphasis supplied)
When a judge respects the right to attribution and integrity of an author, then the judge observes intellectual honesty in writing his decisions. Writing decisions is the most important official duty of a judge, more so of appellate court judges. Conversely, if a judge fails to respect an author’s right to attribution and integrity, then the judge fails to observe intellectual honesty in the performance of his official duties, a violation of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
The duty of a judge to respect the moral
rights of an author is certainly not burdensome on the performance of his
official duties. All the reference materials that a judge needs in writing
judicial decisions are either Works of the Government or works in the public
domain. A judge must base his decision on the facts and the law,24 and the facts and the law are all in the public
domain. There is no need for a
judge to refer to copyrighted works. When a judge ventures to refer to
copyrighted works by copying passages from such works, he immediately knows he
is treading on protected works, and should readily respect the rights of the
authors of those works. The judge, whose most
important function is to write judicial decisions, must be the first to respect
the rights of writers whose lives and passions are dedicated to writing for the
education of humankind.
Besides, Section 184(k) of the Intellectual
Property Code already generously allows the judge unlimited copying of
copyrighted works in writing his judicial decisions. The Code, however, does
not exempt the judge from recognizing the moral rights of the author. The basic
rule of human relations, as embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code, requires
that the judge should give to the author of the copyrighted work what is due
him. Thus, Article 19 states: “Every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.”
d. Difference from the Academe
Academic writing, such as writing
dissertations or articles in academic journals, is governed by standards
different from judicial decision writing. The failure to make the proper
attribution for passages copied from Works of the Government is not actionable
against a judge when writing a judicial decision. However, the same failure by
a student or a faculty member may be deemed plagiarism in the academe, meriting
a severe administrative penalty. Nevertheless, the Judiciary and the
academe should have the same rule when it comes to copyrighted works. In
every case, there is a legal duty to make the proper attribution when copying
passages from copyrighted works because the law expressly requires such
attribution without exception.
The academe requires that passages copied
from Works of the Government, works in the public domain, and non-copyrighted
works should be properly attributed in the same way as copyrighted works. The
rationale is to separate the original work of the writer from the works of
other authors in order to determine the original contribution of the writer to
the development of a particular art or science. This rationale does not apply
to the Judiciary, where adherence to jurisprudential precedence is the rule.
However, if a judge writes an article for a law journal, he is bound by the
same rules governing academic writing.25
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to RECALL the Resolution of 12 October
2010 subject of the present motion for reconsideration as this Court’s
jurisdiction extends only to a determination whether the administrative
complaint against Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo constitutes contempt of this
Court.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
2Volume II, Records of the Constitutional
Commission, p. 272. The following exchange took place during the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. REGALADO: Thank you, Madam President.
xxx
First, this is with respect to Section 2, on the
grounds for impeachment, and I quote:
. . . culpable violation of
the Constitution, treason, bribery, other high crimes, graft and corruption or
betrayal of public trust.
Just for the record, what would the Committee envision
as a betrayal of the public trust which is not otherwise covered by the other
terms antecedent thereto?
MR. ROMULO: I think, if I may
speak for the Committee and subject to further comments of Commissioner de los
Reyes, the concept is that this is a catchall phrase. Really, it refers to his
oath of office, in the end that the idea of a public trust is connected with
the oath of office of the officer, and if he violates that oath of office, then
he has betrayed that trust.
MR. REGALADO: Thank you.
MR. MONSOD: Madam President, may I ask Commissioner de
los Reyes to perhaps add to those remarks.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner de los Reyes is
recognized.
MR. DE LOS REYES: The reason I proposed this amendment
is that during the Regular Batasang Pambansa when there was a move to impeach
then President Marcos, there were arguments to the effect that there is no
ground for impeachment because there is no proof that President Marcos
committed criminal acts which are punishable, or considered penal offenses.
And so the term "betrayal of public trust," as explained by
Commissioner Romulo, is a catchall phrase to include all acts which are not
punishable by statutes as penal offenses but, nonetheless, render the officer
unfit to continue in office. It includes betrayal of public interest,
inexcusable negligence of duty, tyrannical abuse of power, breach of official
duty by malfeasance or misfeasance cronyism, favoritism, etc. to the prejudice
of public interest and which tend to bring the office into disrepute. That
is the purpose, Madam President. Thank you.
MR. ROMULO: If I may add another example, because
Commissioner Regalado asked a very good question. This concept would include, I
think, obstruction of justice since in his oath he swears to do justice to
every man; so if he does anything that obstructs justice, it could be construed
as a betrayal of the public trust. Thank you. (Emphasis supplied)
3 The 1993 Report of the National Commission
on Judicial Discipline & Removal of the United States (http://judicial-discipline-reform.org/judicial_complaints/1993_Report_Removal.pdf, pp. 17-18)
concluded that impeachment is the exclusive mode of removing federal judges
from office, thus:
Nevertheless, the Commission concludes that Congress
may not provide for removal as a criminal penalty. If removal may lawfully
follow on conviction for a federal judge, then it may do so for the Vice
President of the United States or perhaps even the President. But if the
constitutional grant of a term of office to the Vice President and President
prevails against any provision for removal in the criminal law, the same should
be true of the tenure the Constitution grants to judges. The Constitution quite
explicitly separates impeachment and removal from the ordinary criminal
process. The Commission does not believe that Congress's power to punish crimes
is an exception to judicial life tenure, or alternatively a way in which good
behavior may be inquired into, in the way that the impeachment process clearly
is.
x x x
x
The Commission concludes that a statute providing for
the removal from office of judges who serve on good behavior under Article III by
means other than impeachment and conviction would be unconstitutional.
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
4Section 3(7), Article XI of the Constitution provides: “Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.”
5 There are those who, with good reason, believe
that removal from office is the maximum penalty in impeachment and thus there
can be lesser penalties like censure. See Joseph
Isenbergh, Impeachment and Presidential Immunity from Judicial Process,
18 Yale Law & Policy Review 53 (1999).
6 See note 4.
7Professor Laurence H. Tribe writes: ”The independence of the process of impeachment and
criminal prosecution is highlighted by the case of Judge Alcee Hastings, who
was acquitted of bribery by a federal jury in 1983, but was subsequently
impeached by the House and convicted by the Senate for the same offense – and
for testifying falsely about it under oath at his federal criminal trial.
Similarly, Judge Walter Nixon was impeached by the House and convicted by the
Senate in 1989 for falsely testifying under oath before a federal grand jury
investigating Judge Nixon’s improper discussions with a state prosecutor in a
case involving a business acquaintance’s son, despite an earlier acquittal in a
federal prosecution for bribery arising out of those very events. And, although
this precise sequence is not addressed by Article I, Section 3, clause 7, it
should also be possible for an official to be acquitted by the Senate in an
impeachment trial but subsequently convicted of the same underlying acts in a
federal court. The Senate’s acquittal, after all, could well represent a determination
merely that the charged offenses were not impeachable, or that the nation would
be harmed more than protected by pronouncing the official guilty.” American Constitutional Law, Volume 1 (3rd
edition), pp. 159-160.
8An author whose moral rights under the Law on
Copyright are infringed by a judge in his judicial decision may file a civil
case in court against such judge. See discussion on The Judge Must Follow
the Law on Copyright, infra.
10 Volume I, Records of the
Constitutional Commission, pp. 456-457.
11
Approved by the En Banc on 15 November 2005.
12 Part IV
of RA No. 8293, otherwise known as the “Intellectual Property Code of the
Philippines.”
13Section
176 of RA No. 8293 provides: “Works of the Government. No copyright
shall subsist in any work of the Government of the Philippines. xxx.”
14Canon 3 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct provides: “A judge should perform official duties honestly,
and with impartiality and diligence.”
15Rule 3.01 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct provides: “A judge shall be faithful to the law and
maintain professional competence.”
16Rule 3.02 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct provides: “In every case, a judge shall endeavour
diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law, unswayed by partisan
interests, public opinion or fear of criticism.”
17Section 184 (k) of
RA No. 8293 provides: “Limitations on Copyright. 184.1. Notwithstanding
the provisions of Chapter V [on copyright and economic rights], the following
acts shall not constitute infringement of copyright:
(a) x x x x
x x x x
(k) Any use made of a work for the purpose of any judicial proceedings or for the giving of professional advice by a legal practitioner.”
18 Section173.1 (b), Intellectual
Property Code.
19Section 198.1 of
the Intellectual Property Code provides that the “[moral] rights of an author x
x x shall not be assignable or subject to license.”
20 Section 119, Intellectual
Property Code.
21 Roger E. Schechter and John R. Thomas, Intellectual
Property (2003), p. 19.
22 Vicente B. Amador, Copyright under the
Intellectual Property Code (1998), p. 570.
23Id. p. 569, citing John
Carter, John Swing and John Veronis v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc. and Associates,
U.S. Court of Appeals for 2nd Circuit, 1 December 1995.
24 Article 8 of the Civil Code
provides: “Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.”
25 In the Matter
of Hon. Thomas E. Brennan, Jr., Judge, 55th District, Mason,
Michigan, 433 Mich. 1204, 447 N.W.2d 712 (6 November 1989) . In this case,
Judge Brennan, Jr. submitted an article to a law review for publication. The
article failed to acknowledge several passages copied from law journal articles
of two other authors. The Michigan Judicial Tenure Commission recommended to
the Supreme Court of Michigan that Judge Brennan, Jr. be publicly censured for
misconduct. Interestingly, Judge Brennan, Jr. (a state judge) admitted his
misconduct and made the following manifestation:
Respondent Thomas E. Brennan, Jr., of the 55th
District Court, Ingham County, Michigan, acknowledges notice and receipt of the
Judicial Tenure Commission's Decision and Recommendation for Order of
Discipline dated September 12, 1989, and stipulates to the Judicial Tenure
Commission's findings as recited in paragraphs one (1) through six (6) thereof;
Respondent further affirmatively acknowledges the
impropriety of his conduct as set forth in the Decision and Recommendation for
Order of Discipline, and pursuant to MCR 9.221(C), consents to the Commission's
recommendation that he be publicly censured.
Respondent further concurs in the request of the
Judicial Tenure Commission that an order embodying the foregoing disciplinary
action be entered immediately by the Michigan Supreme Court. (Emphasis
supplied)