Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
|
DIOSDADO S. MANUNGAS, Petitioner, -
versus - MARGARITA Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 193161 Present: VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson, PERALTA, ABAD, SERENO,* JJ. Promulgated: August
22, 2011 |
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D E C I
S I O N
VELASCO,
JR., J.:
The
Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 seeks the reversal of the April 30, 2009 Decision[1] and
July 21, 2010 Resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 74531-MIN, entitled Margarita Avila Loreto and Florencia Avila
Parreo v. Hon. Erasto D. Salcedo, Acting Presiding Judge, RTC (Branch 2), Tagum
City, and Diosdado Salinas (Manungas).
The CA Decision set aside as null and void the Order dated November 4, 2002[3] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2 in Tagum City, Davao del Norte, in
Special Proceedings No. 708 entitled In
the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased Engracia N. Vda de Manungas,
Diosdado Manungas, petitioner, wherein the RTC reversed its appointment of respondent
Florencia Avila Parreo (Parreo) as the special administrator of the estate of
Engracia Manungas and appointed petitioner Diosdado Salinas Manungas (Diosdado)
in her stead.
The Facts
Engracia
Manungas was the wife of Florentino Manungas. They had no children. Instead,
they adopted Samuel David Avila (
Thereafter, Engracia Manungas filed a
Motion for Partition of Estate on March 31, 1980 in the intestate estate
proceedings of Florentino Manungas, of which she was the administratrix. There,
she stated that there are no other legal and compulsory heirs of Florentino
Manungas except for herself,
On October 25, 1995, the RTC, Branch
4 in
Engracia Manungas, through Parreo,
then instituted Civil Case No. 5196-96 against the spouses Diosdado Salinas Manungas
and Milagros Pacifico for illegal detainer and damages with the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) in
Thereafter, on August 7, 1998, Diosdado
instituted a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over the
Estate of Engracia Manungas (Estate of Manungas) in his favor before the RTC,
Branch 2 in
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
Florencia A. Parreo is hereby appointed as Special Administrator of the
property of the late Engracia N. Vda. de Manungas. The Special Administrator is
hereby directed to post a bond in the amount of P200,000.00 pursuant to Sec. 4
of Rule 81.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Diosdado
filed a Motion for Reconsideration with a
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction.[12] In
his motion, Diosdado argued that Parreos appointment as special administrator
of the Estate of Manungas was by virtue of her being the judicial guardian of
the latter but which relation ceased upon Engracia Manungas death, concluding
that her appointment as special administrator was without basis. He added that Parreo
was not fit to become a special administrator having already been fined by the
court for failing to render a timely accounting of Engracia Manungas property
as her judicial guardian. Diosdado also reasoned that Parreo is a mere niece,
a collateral relative, of Engracia Manungas, while he is the illegitimate son
of Florentino Manungas.
On
November 4, 2002, the RTC issued an Order reversing itself and ordering the
revocation of its earlier appointment of Parreo as the administrator of the
Estate of Manungas while appointing Diosdado as the Special Administrator.[13]
Parreo
and Loreto appealed the ruling of the RTC to the CA. The CA issued its assailed
April 30, 2009 Decision finding that the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in revoking its earlier appointment of Parreo as the administrator
of the Estate of Manungas and appointing Diosdado instead. The CA further
reinstated Parreo as the special administrator of the estate. The dispositive
portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is GRANTED. The Order dated
November 4, 2002 setting aside the appointment of Florencia Parreo as special
administrator of the estate of the late Engracia Vda. de Manungas, and denying
the property bond posted by Florencia Parreo [is] hereby declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE as having been issued by Public Respondent Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum City, Davao del Norte with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Diosdado
assailed the CA Decision in a Motion for Reconsideration dated May 15, 2009[15]
which the CA denied in the July 21, 2010 Resolution.
Hence,
We have this petition.
The Issues
Diosdado
raises the following issues:
The
Court a Quo utterly disregarded the jurisprudence that certiorari cannot be a
substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available.[16]
The
Court a Quo in denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration grossly violated
the rule that once a decision or order is final and executory, it becomes
immutable and unalterable.[17]
The
Court a Quo committed a grave error when it ruled to annul the appointment of
petitioner, Diosdado Manungas as judicial administrator and reinstating the
appointment of Florencia Parreo as special administrator.[18]
The Court a Quo gravely erred in [giving] due
course to oppositors petition that is flawed.[19]
The Courts Ruling
The petition must be denied.
The RTC Order dated November 4, 2002 is an
interlocutory order
The first two issues raised by Diosdado
revolve around the issue of whether the RTC Order dated November 4, 2002 is an
interlocutory order.
Diosdado alleges that, following the
ruling of this Court that Certiorari cannot be the substitute for a lost appeal,
Parreo should have appealed the RTC Order dated November 4, 2002 to the CA
through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. Diosdado contends that the Order dated November 4, 2002 became final and
executory, Parreo having failed to file the petition within the reglementary
period; thus, the Order cannot be the subject of review even by this Court. However,
Diosdados position assumes that the RTC Order dated November 4, 2002 is a
final order instead of an interlocutory order.
In Philippine Business Bank v. Chua,[20]
the Court stated what an interlocutory order is:
Conversely,
an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Courts
task of adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their rights and
liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things
remain to be done by the Court, is interlocutory, e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss
under Rule 16 of the Rules x x x. Unlike a final judgment or order, which is
appealable, as above pointed out, an interlocutory order may not be questioned
on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from
the final judgment rendered in the case.
The Court has considered an
appointment of a special administrator as an interlocutory or preliminary order
to the main case for the grant of letters of administration in a testate or intestate
proceeding. In Ocampo v. Ocampo,[21] the
Court succinctly held, The appointment or removal of special administrators,
being discretionary, is thus interlocutory and may be assailed through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
With
such categorical ruling of the Court, the Order dated November 4, 2002 is
clearly an interlocutory order. As such, the order cannot be the subject of an
appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as argued by petitioner. The proper
remedy is the filing of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. Thus, Section
1(c) of Rule 41 states:
Section 1. Subject of appeal.
An appeal may be taken from a judgment or
final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter
therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
x x x x
(c) An interlocutory order;
x x x x
In all the above instances where the judgment
or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65.
Verily,
respondents made use of the proper mode of review by filing a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. Respondents filed the petition well
within the prescribed period under this rule.
There was no necessity
to file a motion for reconsideration
As
properly noted by petitioner, the general rule is that a motion for
reconsideration is required before a decision may be appealed through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Under the rule, there must be no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, such as a
motion for reconsideration, to justify the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Thus, petitioner argues that respondents failure to move for the reconsideration
of the Order dated November 4, 2002 is fatal to an appeal from it. Such general rule, however, admits of
exceptions as explained in Delos Reyes v.
Flores:[22]
We
have held in a litany of cases that the extraordinary remedies of certiorari
and mandamus are available only when there is no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, such as a motion for
reconsideration. The writ of certiorari does not lie where another adequate
remedy is available for the correction of the error. x x x However, there are several exceptions where a petition for certiorari
will lie without the prior filing of a motion for reconsideration, to wit:
x x x x
i. where
the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The
instant case is clearly an exception to the general rule. An examination of the
issues raised by respondents in appealing the Order dated November 4, 2002,
reveals that the issues are only questions of law. Ergo, there is no need for a
motion for reconsideration.
In
addition, the Court has even allowed the filing of a petition for certiorari
despite the existence of an appeal or other appropriate remedy in several
instances, including when the court a quo
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order.[23]
Thus,
while respondent failed to move for the reconsideration of the November 4, 2002
Order of the RTC, a petition for certiorari may still prosper, as in this case.
The RTC acted with
grave abuse of discretion
The
lower court stated in its November 4, 2002 Order that:
After carefully scrutinizing the arguments
and grounds raised by both petitioner and oppositors, this Court finds merit in
the contention of petitioner. In the case of Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 324, the Supreme Court
ruled:
The presence of illegitimate children
precludes succession by collateral relatives to his estate;
Diosdado Manungas, being the illegitimate son
of Florentino Manungas inherits the latters property by operation of law;
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the order
appointing Florencia Parreo as special administrator of the estate of the late
Engracia Vda. de Manungas is ordered set aside.
Such
reasoning is a non sequitur.
The
fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of Florentino Manungas does not
mean that he is entitled or even qualified to become the special administrator
of the Estate of Manungas.
Jurisprudence
teaches us that the appointment of a special administrator lies within the
discretion of the court. In Heirs of
Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel,[24]
it was stated that:
It is well settled that the statutory
provisions as to the prior or preferred right of certain persons to the
appointment of administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory
provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or administrator under
section 653 of Act No. 190, now Section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the
selection or removal of special administrator. x x x As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special administrator
and the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has
discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which
must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity.
(Emphasis supplied; citation omitted.)
This principle was reiterated in the Ocampo case, where the Court ruled that:
While the RTC considered that respondents
were the nearest of kin to their deceased parents in their appointment as joint
special administrators, this is not a mandatory requirement for the
appointment. It has long been settled that the selection or removal of special
administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal
of regular administrators. The probate court may appoint or remove special
administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules at its
discretion, such that the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness
or unfitness and the application of the order of preference under Section 6 of
Rule 78, as would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not
obtain. As long as the discretion is
exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity, justice, and
legal principles, interference by higher courts is unwarranted.[25]
(Emphasis supplied.)
While the trial court has the
discretion to appoint anyone as a special administrator of the estate, such
discretion must be exercised with reason, guided by the directives of equity,
justice and legal principles. It may, therefore, not be remiss to reiterate
that the role of a special administrator is to preserve the estate until a
regular administrator is appointed. As stated in Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the Rules:
Section 2. Powers and duties of special adminsitrator. Such special
administrator shall take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights,
credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve
the same for the executors or administrator afterwards appointed, and for
that purpose may commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only
such perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A special
administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless so ordered
by the court.
Given this duty on the part of the
special administrator, it would, therefore, be prudent and reasonable to
appoint someone interested in preserving the estate for its eventual
distribution to the heirs. Such choice would ensure that such person would not
expose the estate to losses that would effectively diminish his or her share. While
the court may use its discretion and depart from such reasoning, still, there
is no logical reason to appoint a person who is a debtor of the estate and
otherwise a stranger to the deceased. To do so would be tantamount to grave
abuse of discretion.
Hence, the CA ruled that the trial
court erred in issuing the November 4, 2002 Order, acting with grave abuse of
discretion in appointing Diosdado as the special administrator of Engracia
Manungas estate:
In any case, the trial court erred in
revoking the appointment of Florencia Avila Parreo as Special Administrator on
the ground that it found merit in Diosdados contention that he is the
illegitimate child of the late Florentino Manangus. The evidence on record shows that Diosdado is not related to the late
Engracia and so he is not interested in preserving the latters estate. On
the other hand, Florencia, who is a former Judicial guardian of Engracia when
she was still alive and who is also the niece of the latter, is interested in
protecting and preserving the estate of her late aunt Engracia, as by doing so
she would reap the benefit of a wise administration of the decedents estate. Hence, the Order of the lower court
revoking the appointment of Florencia Avila Parreo as special administrator
constitutes not only a reversible error, but also a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the instant case, the lower
court exercised its power in a despotic, arbitrary or capricious manner, as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[26]
(Emphasis supplied.)
To reiterate, the subject of the
intestate proceedings is the estate of Engracia Manungas. It must be remembered
that the estate of Florentino Manungas was already the subject of intestate
proceedings that have long been terminated with the proceeds distributed to the
heirs with the issuance of a Decree of Final Distribution.[27]
With the termination of the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino
Manungas, Diosdado, as an illegitimate heir of Florentino Manungas, is still not
an heir of Engracia Manungas and is not entitled to receive any part of the Estate
of Manungas. In fact, Diosdado is a debtor of the estate and would have no
interest in preserving its value. There is no reason to appoint him as its
special administrator. The trial court
acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado as special administrator
of the Estate of Manungas. The CA correctly set aside the November 4, 2002
Order of the RTC.
Consequently,
with the setting aside of the November 4, 2002 Order of the trial court,
reversing its May 15, 2002 Order and appointing Diosdado as the special
administrator of Engracia Manungas estate, the May 15, 2002 Order is
necessarily reinstated and Parreos appointment as special administrator is revived.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The CAs April 30, 2009 Decision
and July 21, 2010 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 74531-MIN declaring as null and
void the November 4, 2002 Order of the RTC in Special Proceedings No. 708 are AFFIRMED. Consequently, the Order dated May 15, 2002 of the
RTC is hereby REINSTATED and
Florencia Avila Parreo is REINSTATED
as the special administrator of the estate of Engracia Manungas.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE CATRAL
Associate
Justice
Associate Justice
MARIA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I
O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Additional member per Special Order No. 1028 dated June 21, 2011.
[1] Rollo, pp. 22-36. Penned by Associate Justice Ruben C. Ayson and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Michael P. Elbinias.
[2]
[3] CA rollo, pp. 113-114. Penned by Judge Erasto D. Salcedo.
[4] Rollo, p. 23.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] G.R.
No. 178899, November 15, 2010.
[21] G.R.
No. 187879, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 559, 571.
[22] G.R. No. 168726, March 5, 2010, 614 SCRA 270, 277-278.
[23] Republic v. Coalbrine International Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 161838, April 7, 2010, 617 SCRA 491, 502.
[24] G.R.
No. 162934, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 747, 759-760.
[25] Supra note 21.
[26] Rollo, p. 35.
[27]