Republic of the
Supreme Court
PEOPLE OF THE
|
G.R. No. 176350
Present: CARPIO,
J., Chairperson,
BRION, *BERSAMIN, PEREZ, and SERENO, JJ. Promulgated: August 10, 2011 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x
|
|
D E C I S I O N
|
|
|
|
|
|
BRION, J.: |
|
We resolve in this appeal the
challenge to the
BACKGROUND FACTS
The
prosecution charged the appellant with violation of Section 5, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165 before the RTC, under an Information that states:
That on or about the 1st day of September 2002, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver 0.06 gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug.[3] (emphases in the original)
The
appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.[4]
During the pre-trial, the prosecution and the defense stipulated on the
following:
PRE-TRIAL ORDER
x x x x
III. Evidence of the Prosecution:
A. Testimonial (witnesses) -
x x x x
B. Documentary
Exhibit A - Affidavit of Arrest
Exhibit B - Buy-bust Money
Exhibit C - Booking and Information Sheet
Exhibit D - Request for Laboratory Examination
Exhibit E - Physical Science Report
No. D-1331-02
C. Real Evidence x x x
Exhibit F - subject specimen
x x x x
VI. Stipulation of Facts (Including those admitted or undisputed): The accused with counsel and the Trial Prosecutor have agreed on the following:
Exhibits
C, D, & E admitted their existence
only but not as to the source
x x x x
This pre-trial order shall control the course of the trial in this case, unless modified by the Court to prevent manifest injustice. The trial prosecutor as well as the accused and counsel have signed this pre-trial order to attest to the correctness thereof and their conformity thereto which may accordingly be used in evidence in this case.[5] [emphases ours]
Thus, the defense admitted the existence of Exhibits C (Booking and
Information Sheet), D (Request for Laboratory Examination) and E (Physical
Science Report No. D-1331-02). The parties also agreed, during the pre-trial, to
dispense with the testimony of the forensic chemist, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Lourdeliza M. Gural.
The prosecution presented, as its
witnesses, Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1)
Jesus Tan and Police Officer 1 (PO1)
Timothy Mengote. The appellant and Reggie Morilla took the witness stand for
the defense.
The
evidence for the prosecution established that in the afternoon of
At
around
SPO2 Banzuela, SPO1 Tan, SPO1 Sangalang,
PO1 Mengote, PO3 Cachapero and the informant returned to
The
laboratory examination, conducted by P/Insp. Gural on the confiscated specimen,
yielded the following result:
PHYSICAL SCIENCE REPORT NO. D-1331-02
x x x x
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
A One (1) small brown staple wire-sealed evidence envelope with signature markings containing one (1) small heat sealed transparent plastic sachet with markings TM-1-010902 containing 0.06 gram of white crystalline substance and marked as A-1.
x x x x
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the tests for the presence of Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
CONCLUSION:
Specimen A-1 contains Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.[13]
In
his defense, the appellant submitted a different version of events. He testified
that at around
Reggies
testimony was summarized by the RTC as follows:
REGGIE
MORILLA, the caretaker of the store owned by the accuseds grandmother, testified
that he has been living with the family of the accused for three (3) years
already. The family of the accused is located at
The RTC, in its decision of P500,000.00
fine.[18]
The
records of this case were originally transmitted to this Court on appeal.
Pursuant to our ruling in People v. Efren
Mateo y Garcia,[19]
we endorsed the case and its records to the CA for appropriate action and
disposition.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision.[20] The
CA held that the appellant and his counsel entered into a stipulation of facts
whereby they agreed on the admissibility of the request for laboratory
examination of the submitted specimen and on the findings of P/Insp. Gural. Hence,
they cannot be allowed to question, on appeal, the identity and integrity of
the plastic sachet of shabu seized
from the appellant by members of the entrapment team. The CA added that the prosecution
witnesses positively identified the appellant as the person who handed the
plastic sachet of shabu to the
poseur-buyer.[21]
The
CA further held that the police officers are presumed to have performed their
duties in a regular manner, in the absence of any evidence of improper motive
on their part. It, likewise, disregarded the appellants defense of denial, as
it was unsupported by reliable corroborative evidence.[22]
In his brief, the appellant claims
that the trial court erred in convicting him of the crime charged despite the
prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He claims
that the integrity of the seized item had been compromised due to the failure
of the apprehending police to mark it.[23]
The
Office of the Solicitor General counters with the argument that the appellant
cannot now question the identity and integrity of the specimen confiscated from
him as he already entered into a stipulation regarding the admissibility
of the request for laboratory
examination and on the result of this examination. In addition, the appellant
failed to impute any ill motive on the part of the police officers to falsely
testify against him.[24]
THE COURTS RULING
We
resolve to ACQUIT the appellant, for
the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Constitution mandates that an
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond
reasonable doubt. The burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such
presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required. In
doing so, the prosecution must rest its case on its own merits and cannot merely
rely on the weakness of the defense. If the prosecution fails to meet the required
quantum of evidence, the defense does not
even need to present any evidence in its behalf; the presumption of innocence prevails
and the accused should be acquitted.[25]
Reasonable Doubt on the Corpus
Delicti
The elements necessary for the
prosecution of illegal sale of drugs under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 are: (1)
the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material in
the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court
of evidence of the corpus delicti,
i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has
actually been committed, as shown by presenting the object of the illegal
transaction.[26]
In prosecutions involving narcotics, the narcotic substance itself
constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense and proof of its existence
is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[27] To remove any doubt or uncertainty on the
identity and integrity of the seized drug, the evidence must definitely show
that the illegal drug presented in court is the very same illicit drug actually recovered from the
appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for drug pushing under R.A. No. 9165
fails.[28]
a.
The Chain
of Custody Rule and the Marking Requirement
Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No.
1, Series of 2002, which implements R.A. No. 9165, defines chain of custody as
the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in
the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction.
In Junie Malillin y Lopez v.
People,[29]
we explained the importance of establishing the chain of
custody of the confiscated drugs, in this wise:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibit's level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering - without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not - dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.[30]
Thus, crucial in proving chain of
custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items immediately after they are seized
from the accused. Marking means the placing by the apprehending officer or
the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the items seized.[31] Long
before Congress passed R.A. No. 9165, this Court has consistently held that
failure of the authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs casts
reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti.[32] Marking
after seizure is the starting point in
the custodial link; hence, it is vital that the seized contraband be
immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the
markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the
marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from
the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end
of the criminal proceedings, thus preventing switching, "planting," or
contamination of evidence.[33]
In the present case, the records do
not show that the apprehending team marked the seized items with their initials
immediately upon confiscation. In Sanchez,[34]
we explained that consistency with the chain of custody rule requires that the
marking of the seized items be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended
violator, and (2) immediately upon confiscation. We clarified in People v. Manuel Resurreccion[35] that
[m]arking upon immediate confiscation does not exclude the possibility that
marking can be at the police station or office of the apprehending team. In the
present case, the testimonies of the apprehending officers do not indicate that
they ever marked the seized items, either at the place of seizure or at the
police station. How the police could have omitted such a basic and vital
procedure in the initial handling of the seized drugs truly baffles us. Going
back to what we earlier discussed, succeeding handlers of the specimen will use
the markings as reference. If at the first instance or opportunity, the
apprehending team did not mark the seized item/s, then there is nothing to
identify it later on as it passes from one hand to another.
Curiously, the seized item already
bore the markings TM-1-010902 when it was examined by the forensic chemist. In
the absence, however, of specifics on how, when and where this marking was
done, and who witnessed the marking procedure, we cannot accept this marking as
compliance with the chain of custody requirement required by the law. In People v. Ranilo Dela Cruz y Lizing,[36]
the Court reversed the accuseds conviction for the failure of the police to
mark the plastic sachet in the presence of the accused or his representatives. People v. Zaida Kamad y Ambing,[37] likewise,
resulted in an acquittal for the failure of the prosecution to provide specific
details on how the seized shabu
was marked.
The second link in the chain of custody is the turnover of the
confiscated drug from PO1 Mengote to the police station. To recall, after PO1 Mengote
allegedly received the plastic sachet from the appellant, he made the
pre-arranged signal to his companions. The other members of the buy-bust team
approached the appellant, introduced themselves as police officers, and
arrested him. Thereafter, they brought him and the confiscated item to the
police station.
Notably, the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses failed to identify the person who took custody of the seized item at
the police station. Although the request for laboratory examination was signed
by P/Supt. Fegarido, the Chief of the District Drug Enforcement Group, we
cannot assume that he was the person who received the seized item from PO1
Mengote, in the absence of any testimony proving such fact.
For the succeeding links in the chain of custody, the evidence shows
that the confiscated item was forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory by one SPO2 Pepano, and then received
by a certain Relos. P/Insp. Gural examined the submitted specimen, and found
it positive for the presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride. As previously
discussed, there was a missing link in the custody of the confiscated item
after it left the possession of PO1 Mengote. The police did not only fail to mark
the specimen immediately upon seizure; it likewise failed to identify the
police officer to whose custody the confiscated item was given at the police
station. Thus, we cannot conclude with certainty that the item seized from the
appellant was the same as that presented for laboratory examination and, later
on, presented in court.
That the defense admitted the existence of the Booking and
Information Sheet (Exh. C), the Request for Laboratory Examination (Exh. D)
and Physical Science Report No. D-1331-02 (Exh. E) during the pre-trial did
not amount to an admission of the identity of the seized specimen. What the
admissions proved were merely the existence and authenticity of the request for
laboratory examination and the result of this examination, not the required
chain of custody from the time of seizure of evidence. Simply put, the
admission regarding the existence of Exhibits C, D and E has no bearing
on the question of whether the specimen submitted for chemical analysis was the
same as that seized from the appellant.[38] To
interpret the stipulations as an admission that the appellant was the source of
the specimen would be contrary to the pre-trial order (stating that Exhibits C,
D and E were admitted as to their existence only and not as to the source);
it would also bind the appellant to an unceremonious withdrawal of his plea of
not guilty.
In like manner, the stipulation during
the pre-trial regarding the non-presentation of the forensic chemist, P/Insp. Gural, merely covers the
handling of the specimen at the forensic laboratory and the result of the
examination, but not the manner
the specimen was handled before it came to the possession of the forensic
chemist and after it left his possession.[39]
b.
Non-compliance with the requirements of paragraph 1,
Section
21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165 and Section 21(a), Article II of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA No. 9165 give
us the procedures that the apprehending team should observe in the handling of
seized illegal drugs in order to preserve their identity and integrity as
evidence. As
indicated by their mandatory terms, strict compliance with the prescribed
procedure is essential and the prosecution must show compliance in every case.[40]
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165 reads:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
This
provision is further elaborated in Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR of R.A.
No. 9165, which reads:
(a)
The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory
and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]
The records of the present case are
bereft of evidence showing that the apprehending or buy-bust team followed the
outlined procedure of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR. PO1 Mengote
narrated the police operation as follows:
PROSECUTOR BERNABE SOLIS:
Q: So [were] you able to locate him afterwards?
PO1 TIMOTHY MENGOTE:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where was he at that time?
A: At that time, he was in front of a
sari-sari store or M. dela
Q: What was he doing at that time?
A: He was just sitting there at that time, sir.
x x x x
Q: What did you do next?
A: When we saw him, our asset introduced me to him as a shabu scorer sir.
x x x x
Q: So what was the reply of the accused?
A: He said, Magkano ba? and I answered, Halagang piso sir.
Q: What does Piso mean?
A: P100.00 worth, sir.
Q: After having conveyed your intention to
buy P100.00 worth of shabu, what did the accused do, if any?
A: When I had given him the buy bust money, he pulled x x x the shabu out of his right pocket pants, sir.
x x x x
Q: What did he do with the shabu which he pulled out of his right pocket?
A: He handed over the stuff to me, sir.
Q: And after this exchange of goods, what did you do if any?
A: I executed the pre-arranged signal by wiping my face with a face towel, sir.
x x x x
Q: And did your colleagues respond to the pre-arranged signal?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened after that?
A: I properly introduced myself to Jhon Jhon as a police officer, sir.
x x x x
Q: Upon the arrival of your back-up team, what happened next?
A: They likewise introduced themselves as police officers and we recovered the buy bust money which was taken from his right hand sir.
x x x x
Q: What happened next?
A: We apprised him of his rights, arrested him and brought him to our office sir.[41]
From these exchanges, clearly it
appears that the apprehending team did not photograph or conduct a physical
inventory of the item seized, whether at the place of seizure or at the police
station. The non-compliance by the apprehending team with the photograph and
physical inventory requirements under R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR was also
evident in the testimony of another member of the buy-bust teams, PO1 Tan, who
corroborated PO1 Mengotes testimony on material points. Notably, even the Joint Affidavit of Arrest[42]
of the members of the entrapment team made no mention of any inventory or
photograph.
Prior to the passage of R.A. No.
9165, the Court applied the procedure required by Dangerous Drugs Board
Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, amending Board Regulation No. 7, Series of
1974.[43] Section
1 of this Regulation requires the apprehending team, having initial custody and
control of the seized drugs, to immediately inventory
and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused and/or his representatives, who shall be required to
sign and be given copies of the inventory.
After the passage of R.A. No. 9165,
the Court did not waver in ensuring that the prescribed procedures in the
handling of the seized drugs were observed. In People v. Rosemarie R. Salonga,[44]
we acquitted the accused for the failure of the police to inventory and
photograph the confiscated items. We also reversed the accuseds conviction in Gutierrez,[45]
for the failure of the buy-bust team to inventory and photograph the
seized items without justifiable grounds. People
v. Cantalejo[46] also resulted in an acquittal because no
inventory or photograph was ever made by the police.
We reached the same conclusions in
the recent cases of People v. Erlinda Capuno
y Tison,[47] People v. Jay Lorena y Labag,[48] and
People v.
Lest the chain of custody rule be
misunderstood, we clarify that non-compliance with the prescribed procedural
requirements does not necessarily render the seizure and custody of the items
void and invalid; the seizure may still be held to be valid, provided that (a)
there is a justifiable ground for the non-compliance, and (b) the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are shown to
have been properly preserved. These conditions, however, were not met in the
present case as the prosecution did not even attempt to offer
any justification for the
failure of the police to follow the prescribed procedures in the handling of the seized items. As we
held in People v. Ronaldo De Guzman y
Danzil,[50] the failure to follow the
procedure mandated under R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR must be adequately explained. The justifiable ground for the non-compliance
must be proven as a fact. The Court cannot presume what these grounds are or
that they even exist.
No Presumption of Regularity in
the Performance of Official Duties
In
convicting the appellant of the crime charged, both the RTC and the CA relied
on the evidentiary presumption that official duties have been regularly
performed. However, this presumption is not conclusive and cannot, by itself,
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. The presumption of
regularity, it must be emphasized, obtains only when there is no deviation from
the regular performance of duty. Where the official act in question is
irregular on its face, no presumption of regularity can arise.[51] Our
declaration in People v. Samuel Obmiranis
y Oreta[52] is particularly
instructive:
It needs no elucidation that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty must be seen in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof. The presumption, in other words, obtains only where nothing in the records is suggestive of the fact that the law enforcers involved deviated from the standard conduct of official duty as provided for in the law. Otherwise, where the official act in question is irregular on its face, an adverse presumption arises as a matter of course. There is indeed merit in the contention that where no ill motives to make false charges was successfully attributed to the members of the buy-bust team, the presumption prevails that said police operatives had regularly performed their duty, but the theory is correct only where there is no showing that the conduct of police duty was irregular. People v. Dulay and People v. Ganenas in fact both suggest that the presumption of regularity is disputed where there is deviation from the regular performance of duty. Suffice it to say at this point that the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is merely just thata mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth.[53]
In
the present case, the procedural lapses by the apprehending team in the
handling of the seized items from their failure to mark it immediately upon
confiscation, to their failure to inventory and photograph it in the presence of
the accused, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the DOJ, and any elected public official, without offering any justifiable
ground effectively negated the presumption of regularity.
Conclusion
In fine, the totality of evidence
presented in the present case does not support the appellant's conviction for
violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, since
the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the
offense. The prosecutions failure to comply with Section 21, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of custody requirement of this Act compromised the identity of the item
seized, leading to the failure to adequately prove the corpus delicti of
the crime charged. In accordance with the constitutional mandate that the guilt
of the appellant must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, we hold for failure
to establish the required quantum of evidence that the presumption of
innocence must prevail and acquittal should follow as a matter of right.[54]
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the
Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished the Director, Bureau of Corrections,
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice Chairperson |
|
|
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
JOSE Associate Justice |
MARIA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Designated
additional member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 1053 dated
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo F. Sundiam, and concurred in by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a member of this Court) and Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao; rollo, pp. 4-14.
[2] Penned by Judge Cesar Z. Ylagan; CA rollo, pp. 13-21.
[3] Records, p. 1.
[4]
[5]
[6] TSN,
[7] TSN,
[8]
[9]
[10] TSN,
[11]
[12] Records, pp. 5-7.
[13]
[14] TSN,
[15]
[16]
[17] Records, pp. 124-125.
[18] Supra note 2.
[19] G.R. Nos. 147678-87,
[20] Supra note 1.
[21] Rollo, pp. 7-9.
[22]
[23] CA rollo, pp. 44-55.
[24]
[25] People
v. Cantalejo, G.R. No. 182790,
[26] See People
v. Pagaduan, G.R. No. 179029,
[27] People
v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 179213,
[28] Supra note 26.
[29] G.R. No. 172953,
[30]
[31] People
v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 175832,
[32] See People
v. Coreche, G.R. No. 182528,
[33]
[34] Supra note 31.
[35] G.R. No. 186380,
[36] G.R. No. 177222,
[37] G.R. No. 174198,
[38] Supra note 31.
[39] See People v. Almorfe, G.R. No. 181831, March 29, 2010, 617 SCRA 52, 60, citing People v. Sanchez, 569 SCRA 194 (2008); see also TSN, February 4, 2003, pp. 2-4.
[40] See People
v. Denoman, G.R. No. 171732,
[41] TSN,
[42] Records, pp. 5-6.
[43] See People
v. Magat, G.R. No. 179939,
[44] G.R. No. 186390,
[45] Supra note 27.
[46] Supra note 25.
[47] G.R. No.
185715,
[48] G.R. No. 184954,
[49] G.R. No. 191366,
[50] G.R. No. 186498,
[51] People v.
[52] G.R. No. 181492,
[53]
[54] People v. Cantalejo, supra note 25.