Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
|
heirs of rodolfo
crisostomo (euprocinia, royce and irish crisostomo), Petitioners, - versus
- Rudex international
development corporation, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 176129
Present:
CORONA, C.J., Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated: August 24, 2011 |
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D
E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]
seeks to reverse and set aside the October 6, 2006[2]
and January 5, 2007[3] Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 95920, which dismissed outright the petitioners Petition for Review
dated September 13, 2006 for being filed one day beyond the 15-day extended
period granted by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners
Euprocinia, Royce, and Irish, are the wife and children, respectively, of the
late complainant, Rodolfo Crisostomo, who died during the pendency of the case. [4]
The respondent,
Rudex International Development Corporation, is a domestic corporation engaged
in the real estate business.[5]
On December 17,
2001, the Crisostomo spouses were offered a house and lot at Patricia South
Villa, a subdivision developed by the respondent in Anabu II-F, Imus,
Cavite. After seeing the model house on
Block 8, Lot 3, the Crisostomos decided to buy the property priced at ₱833,000.00 on installment basis. On the same day, they paid ₱10,000.00 as down payment and signed a Reservation
Agreement. On December 21, 2001, the
couple paid an additional ₱50,000.00, executed a promissory note, and issued 36
postdated checks to cover the monthly amortizations on the property. The Crisostomos were then given a Key
Acceptance, Walk Through, and Final Turnover Certificate.[6]
On February 10,
2002, the Crisostomo family moved in to their new house; however, they started
to notice several construction defects on the house and inadequate facilities
in the subdivision. Thus, on March 22,
2002, the late Rodolfo asked his wife Euprocinia to discontinue paying their monthly
amortizations and to ask for a rescission of the contract. On May 17, 2002, Rodolfo personally delivered
a letter of complaint to the respondent, wherein he rescinded their Contract to Sell, demanded the refund
of all the payments he had made, and reiterated that he would no longer pay the
monthly amortizations.[7]
On May 27, 2002,
Rodolfo filed a Complaint[8]
for violation of Presidential Decree Nos. 1344 and 957, and Board Resolution
No. 579 of 1995, before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
In view of
respondents failure to answer the Complaint, it was declared in default on
November 26, 2003.[9]
The HLURB
conducted an ocular inspection in Patricia South Villa on March 12, 2003 and
found Rodolfos allegations to be supported by its findings. The HLURB held that under Section 20 of
Presidential Decree No. 957, its findings justified the right of Rodolfo to
demand rescission of his contract with the respondent. Thus, on July 7, 2003, the HLURB issued its Judgment by Default,[10]
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment
is hereby rendered declaring the rescission of the contract to sell as valid
and ordering the respondent to refund the total payments in the amount of
P71,650.00 with interest at 12% per annum from the filing of the complaint
until full payment.
After
full payment, complainant is directed to peacefully surrender the subject
property in favor of the respondent.
Further,
respondent is directed to pay complainant P5,000.00 as attorneys fees
and to pay this Board P10,000.00 by way of administrative fine for
violation of Section 20 in relation to Section 38 of P.D. 957.[11]
On August 26, 2003, the respondent asked the HLURB to
review[12]
its July 7, 2003 Decision. It alleged
that Rodolfos allegations were concocted to get out of their contract because
he could no longer pay his monthly amortizations on the property. On August
17, 2004, the HLURB rendered a Decision[13]
on respondents Petition for Review, to wit:
Wherefore,
the decision of the office below is hereby modified to read as follows:
Wherefore
premises considered, judgment is hereby rescinding the reservation agreement of
parties and subject to legal compensation or offsetting, ordering respondent to
refund the total payments in the amount of P71,650.00 with interest at
legal interest from the time of the filing of the complaint; ordering
complainant to turn over possession of the unit to the respondent and ordering
complainant to pay respondent reasonable compensation for the use of the unit in
the amount of P4,000.00 per month until possession of the unit is turned
over to the respondent.
Further,
respondent is directed to pay complainant P5,000.00 as attorneys fees
and to pay this board P10,000.00 by way of administrative fine for
violation of section 20 in relation to section 38 of P.D. 957.[14]
This was
appealed[15]
by the petitioners, who substituted Rodolfo upon his death, to the Office of the President. On November 18, 2005, the Office of the
President decided[16] in their favor, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision
of the HLURB Board of Commissioners dated August 23, 2004 is hereby reversed
and set aside. Judgment is hereby
rendered:
a.
Declaring
the contract of sale entered into between the parties as rescinded;
b.
Appellants
are hereby ordered to turn over possession of the property to the Appellee;
c.
Appellee
is hereby ordered of refund to the appellants the latters total payment in the
amount of P71,650.00 with interest at 12% per annum from June 10, 2002
(time of the filing of the complaint);
d.
Appellee
is likewise ordered to pay appellants P25,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00
as exemplary damages;
e.
Appellee
is ordered to pay appellants P5,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
f.
Appellee
is ordered to pay administrative fine in the amount of P10,000.00.[17]
The respondent asked for a
reconsideration[18] of this
decision and on May 9, 2006, the Office of the President granted respondents
motion and reinstated the August 17,
2004 decision of the HLURB.[19]
The Office of the President, in
resolving the issue of whether it properly deleted the previous award of
rentals by the HLURB, held that P.D. [No.] 957 does not authorize oppression
of perceived unscrupulous subdivision developers, each time a home buyer cries
foul or alleges any infirmity on the former.[20] Agreeing with the respondent that the
deletion of the award of rentals would result in unduly enriching the
petitioners, the Office of the President held:
By
staying at the questioned premises for free and without compensation, to the
prejudice of [respondent], it is clear that [petitioners] unduly enriched
themselves at the expense of another.
Rental
payments are legally supported by virtue of the doctrine of unjust
enrichment. Eventhough the same is not
prayed for by herein appellee, it could still be recognized and awarded by our
Office considering that said issue, or award thereof, is inextricably linked to
the issues involved as well as the facts proven in the case, and it is necessary
for a just and equitable determination of the case.[21]
The petitioners sought for a
reconsideration[22] of this
Order,[23]
but this was denied by the Office of the President on August 2, 2006.
On September 15, 2006, the
petitioners filed their Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals. However, this was dismissed outright in a
Resolution[24] for
being filed out of time, the deadline being September 14, 2006. The Court of Appeals said that the
petitioners were already granted a 15-day extension and yet no justification or
reason was given to explain why they still filed beyond the extended period. The Court of Appeals held:
We have no more jurisdiction to
entertain the Petition much less to alter the judgment which has become final
and executory. We only have the power to
dismiss the appeal in the absence of exceptional circumstances to warrant such
delay.[25]
The
petitioners sought reconsideration of this dismissal but the Court of Appeals
found their motion to be bereft of merit.[26]
The
petitioners are now before us, seeking not only that we give their petition due
consideration, but also that we declare the HLURB August 17, 2004 Decision as
null and void. They submit the following
issues for our resolution:
5.1.
AN APPEAL IS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF OUR
JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND THE COURTS SHOULD PROCEED WITH CAUTION, SO AS NOT TO
DEPRIVE THE PETITIONERS OF THE RIGHT TO APPEAL, PARTICULARLY, IF THE APPEAL IS
MERITORIOUS.
5.2.
THE HLURB APPEAL BOARD HAS NO
JURISDICTION MODIFYING THE JUDGMENT OF HLURB PROPER GRANTING RELIEF WHICH WAS
NOT PRAYED FOR ALLEGED IN THE PLEADINGS, AND NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED.
5.3.
THE
HLURB APPEAL BOARD HAS NO JURISDICTION WHEN IT MODIFIED THE JUDGMENT BY
DEFAULT OF HLURB PROPER, AND THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, LIKEWISE HAS ACTED,
IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT AFFIRMED EN
TOTO THE DECISION OF THE HLURB APPEAL BOARD.[27]
Discussion
We shall limit our discussion to the
core issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the
petition for review filed by petitioners before it, on the ground that the
petition was filed late.
The petitioners are claiming that
their one-day delay in filing their petition before the Court of Appeals
constitutes excusable negligence in the absence of an intent to delay the
administration of justice. The
petitioners explained that their petition was ready as early as September 13,
2006, with only the annexes to be attached.
Their counsel assigned her secretary to arrange and attach these annexes
but without their counsels knowledge, the secretary did this in a vacant room
outside their office. The following day,
the secretary, a single mother of two small children, failed to report for work
because she had to take her kids to a doctor as they had been sick since she found
them home, abandoned by their nanny, the night before. It was only late in the afternoon that the
secretary remembered that she forgot to leave instructions about the petition
in their office.[28]
The petitioners are asking that
this Court exercise its equity jurisdiction since their delay was neither
intended nor prejudicial to respondent.[29]
Ruling
of this Court
We
grant the petition.
This
Court has explained that the purpose in limiting the period of appeal is to
forestall or avoid an unreasonable delay in the administration of justice and
to put an end to controversies. Where no
element of intent to delay the administration of justice could be attributed to
petitioners, a one-day delay does not justify their petitions dismissal.[30]
In Department of
Justice Secretary Raul M. Gonzales v. Pennisi,[31]
this Court elucidated on the rules on reglementary periods, to wit:
The general rule is that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is, not only mandatory, but jurisdictional, and failure to conform to the rules will render the judgment sought to be reviewed final and unappealable. By way of exception, unintended lapses are disregarded so as to give due course to appeals filed beyond the reglementary period on the basis of strong and compelling reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof. The purpose behind the limitation of the period of appeal is to avoid an unreasonable delay in the administration of justice and to put an end to controversies.[32]
In Samala v. Court of Appeals,[33] we
said:
The rules
of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application especially
on technical matters, which tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, must be avoided. Even the
Revised Rules of Court envision this liberality. Technicality, when it deserts its proper
office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy,
deserves scant consideration from the courts.[34]
In
this case, the last day for filing the petition for review was on September 13,
2006. The petitioners entrusted the
drafting of their petition with their counsel, who in turn entrusted the
attaching of the required annexes to the petition with her secretary. The secretary resigned from her job sometime
later to avoid giving her employer problems for unexpected absences in the
future.[35] Aside from this, the petitioners also
submitted an Affidavit[36]
from the secretary, who narrated her ordeal that day and why she was not able
to inform her employer of the whereabouts of the petition. A certification from the doctor of one of the
secretarys children was also submitted to prove that the secretary indeed
brought her children to the doctor on September 14, 2006, the deadline for
filing the petition for review with the Court of Appeals.
In
light of the foregoing, we are inclined to give the same consideration in this
case pursuant to the rules on justice, equity, and fair play.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED. The October 6, 2006 and January 5, 2007
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 95920 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. CA-G.R. SP No.
95920 is ordered REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for
further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
LUCAS P. BERSAMINAssociate Justice
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MARIANO C. Associate Justice
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MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
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[1] 1997
Rules of Court, Rule 45.
[2] Rollo, pp. 45-46; penned by Associate
Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and
Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring.
[3] Id.
at 39-42.
[4] Id. at 10.
[5] Id.
at 222.
[6] Id.
at 22.
[7] Id.
at 23-25.
[8] Id. at 53-62.
[9] Id.
at 65-66.
[10] Id.
at 93-97.
[11] Id.
at 97.
[12] Id.
at 98-112.
[13] Id. at 185-188.
[14] Id.
at 187.
[15] Id.
at 191-220.
[16] Id.
at 260-273.
[17] Id.
at 272-273.
[18] Id.
at 274-282.
[19] Id.
at 290-293.
[20] Id.
at 291.
[21] Id.
at 292.
[22] Id.
at 294-309.
[23] Id.
at 317.
[24] Id.
at 45-46.
[25] Id.
[26] Id.
at 40.
[27] Id.
at 26.
[28] Id.
at 26-27.
[29] Id.
at 27.
[30] Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
v. Angara, 511 Phil. 486, 498 (2005).
[31] G.R.
No. 169958, March 5, 2010, 614 SCRA 292.
[32] Id.
at 301.
[33] 416 Phil. 1 (2001).
[34] Id.
at 8.
[35] Rollo, p. 51, Resignation Letter.
[36] Id.
at 48-49.