Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
|
ABRAHAM MICLAT, JR. y CERBO, Petitioner, - versus - people of the
Respondent. |
G.R. No. 176077 Present:
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson, PERALTA, ABAD, SERENO,* JJ. Promulgated: August 31, 2011 |
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
This
is a petition for review on certiorari seeking
to reverse and set aside the Decision[1]
dated
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
In
an Information[2] dated
That on or about the 08th
day of November 2002, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without the
authority of law, did then and there willfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control [Methamphetamine] Hydrochloride (SHABu)
weighing 0.24 gram, knowing the same to be a dangerous drug under the
provisions of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis
supplied.)[3]
Upon arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Consequently, trial on the merits ensued.
To establish its case, the prosecution presented Police Inspector Jessie Abadilla Dela Rosa (P/Insp Dela Rosa), Forensic Chemical Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, NPD-CLO, Caloocan City Police Station and Police Officer 3 Rodrigo Antonio (PO3 Antonio) of the Caloocan Police Station Drug Enforcement Unit. The testimony of the police investigator, PO3 Fernando Moran (PO3 Moran), was dispensed with after petitioners counsel admitted the facts offered for stipulation by the prosecution.
On the other hand, the defense presented the petitioner as its sole witness. The testimonies of Abraham Miclat, Sr. and Ma. Concepcion Miclat, the father and sister, respectively, of the petitioner was dispensed with after the prosecution agreed that their testimonies were corroborative in nature.
Evidence for the Prosecution
First to testify for the prosecution was P/Insp.
Jessie Abadilla Dela Rosa, Forensic Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime
Laboratory, NPD-CLO, Caloocan City Police Station who, on the witness stand,
affirmed his own findings in Physical Science Report No. D-1222-02 (Exhs. D,
D-1, and D-2) that per qualitative examination conducted on the specimen
submitted, the white crystalline substance weighing 0.05 gram, 0.06 gram, 0.07
gram, and 0.06 gram then contained inside four (4) separate pieces of small
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets (Exhs. D-4 to D-7) gave positive
result to the test for Methylamphetamine (sic) Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
Also, thru the testimony of PO3 Rodrigo Antonio of the
Caloocan Police Station-Drug Enforcement Unit,
At about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of November 8,
2002, P/Insp. Jose Valencia of the Caloocan City Police Station-SDEU called
upon his subordinates after the (sic) receiving an INFOREP Memo from Camp Crame
relative to the illicit and down-right drug-trading activities being undertaken
along Palmera Spring II, Bagumbong, Caloocan City involving Abe Miclat, Wily
alias Bokbok and one Mic or Jojo (Exhs. E, E-1, and (sic) E-3, and
E-4). Immediately, P/Insp. Valencia formed a surveillance team headed by SPO4
Ernesto Palting and is composed of five (5) more operatives from the Drug
Enforcement Unit, namely: PO3 Pagsolingan, PO2 Modina, PO2 De Ocampo, and
herein witness PO3 Antonio. After a
short briefing at their station, the team boarded a rented passenger jeepney
and proceeded to the target area to verify the said informant and/or
memorandum.
When the group of SPO4 Palting arrived at Palmera Spring
II,
Evidence for the Defense
On the other hand, the [petitioner] has a different
version of the incident completely opposed to the theory of the prosecution. On the witness stand, he alleged that at about
On
WHEREFORE, from the facts
established, the Court finds the accused ABRAHAM
MICLAT Y CERBO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of possession
of a dangerous drugs (sic) defined and penalized under the provision of Section
11, sub-paragraph No. (3), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and hereby imposes
upon him an indeterminate penalty of six
(6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment, in view of
the absence of aggravating circumstances.
The Court likewise orders the accused to pay the amount of Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (Php300,000.00) as fine.
Let the 0.24 gram of shabu
subject matter of this case be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
Government and to be turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for
proper disposition.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis
supplied.)[7]
Aggrieved, petitioner sought recourse before the CA, which appeal was later docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 28846.
On
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the
accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied.)[9]
In affirming the RTC, the CA ratiocinated that contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the evidence presented by the prosecution were all admissible against him. Moreover, it was established that he was informed of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest. Hence, the CA opined that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt all of the elements necessary for the conviction of the petitioner for the offense of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
Hence, the petition raising the following errors:
1. whether or not a police
surveillance team sent to determine the veracity of a
2. whether or not peeping thRough
a curtain-covered window is within the meaning of plain view doctrine for a
warrantless seizure to be lawful.
3. whether or not the belief of
po3 antonio that the four (4) pieces of plaStic sachets allegedly being
arranged by petitioner contained shabu justified his entry into the house and
arrest petitioner without any warrant.
4. whether or not arranging four
(4) pieces of plaStic sachets constitute as a crime within the meaning of
section 5 (3), rule 113 of the rules of court.
5. whether or not petitioner was
properly appraised (SIC) of his constitutional rights to be informed of the
cause and nature of his arrest and right to be assisted by counsel during the
period of his arrest and continued detention.
6. whether or not the conviction
by the lower court of the petitioner, as affirmed by the honorable court of
appeals, on the basis of an illegal search and arrest, is correct.[10]
Simply stated, petitioner is assailing the legality of his arrest and the subsequent seizure of the arresting officer of the suspected sachets of dangerous drugs from him. Petitioner insists that he was just watching television with his father and sister when police operatives suddenly barged into their home and arrested him for illegal possession of shabu.
Petitioner also posits that being seen in the act of arranging several plastic sachets inside their house by one of the arresting officers who was peeping through a window is not sufficient reason for the police authorities to enter his house without a valid search warrant and/or warrant of arrest. Arguing that the act of arranging several plastic sachets by and in itself is not a crime per se, petitioner maintains that the entry of the police surveillance team into his house was illegal, and no amount of incriminating evidence will take the place of a validly issued search warrant. Moreover, peeping through a curtain-covered window cannot be contemplated as within the meaning of the plain view doctrine, rendering the warrantless arrest unlawful.
Petitioner also contends that the chain of custody of the alleged illegal drugs was highly questionable, considering that the plastic sachets were not marked at the place of the arrest and no acknowledgment receipt was issued for the said evidence.
Finally, petitioner claims that the arresting officer did not inform him of his constitutional rights at any time during or after his arrest and even during his detention. Hence, for this infraction, the arresting officer should be punished accordingly.
The petition is bereft of merit.
At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest.[11] An accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.[12]
In the present case, at the time of petitioners arraignment, there was no objection raised as to the irregularity of his arrest. Thereafter, he actively participated in the proceedings before the trial court. In effect, he is deemed to have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It will not even negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.[13]
True, the Bill of Rights
under the present Constitution provides in part:
SEC. 2. The right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
However, a settled exception to the
right guaranteed by the above-stated provision is that of an arrest made during the commission of a crime,
which does not require a previously issued warrant. Such warrantless
arrest is considered reasonable and valid under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest
without warrant; when lawful.
a peace office of a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in
his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;[14]
For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.[15]
In
the instant case, contrary to petitioners contention, he was caught in flagrante delicto and the police
authorities effectively made a valid warrantless arrest. The established facts reveal that on the date
of the arrest, agents of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU) of the
Caloocan City Police Station were conducting a surveillance operation in the
area of Palmera Spring II to verify the reported drug-related activities of
several individuals, which included the petitioner. During the operation, PO3 Antonio, through
petitioners window, saw petitioner arranging several plastic sachets
containing what appears to be shabu in
the living room of their home. The
plastic sachets and its suspicious contents were plainly exposed to the view of
PO3 Antonio, who was only about one and one-half meters from where petitioner
was seated. PO3 Antonio then inched his
way in the house by gently pushing the door.
Upon gaining entrance, the operative introduced himself as a police
officer. After which, petitioner
voluntarily handed over to PO3 Antonio the small plastic sachets. PO3 Antonio then placed petitioner under
arrest and, contrary to petitioners contention, PO3 Antonio informed him of
his constitutional rights.[16] PO3 Antonio then took the petitioner and the
four (4) pieces of plastic sachets to their headquarters and turned them over
to PO3 Moran. Thereafter, the evidence
were marked AMC 1-4, the initials of the name of the petitioner. The heat-sealed transparent sachets containing white
crystalline substance were submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for drug
examination, which later yielded positive results for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug under RA No. 9165.
Considering the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of the petitioner, petitioner was clearly arrested in flagrante delicto as he was then committing a crime, violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, within the view of the arresting officer.
As to the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it too falls within the established exceptions.
Verily,
no less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and consequent seizure must be
carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable, and
any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.[17]
The right against warrantless searches and seizure, however, is subject to
legal and judicial exceptions, namely:
1. Warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2.
Search of evidence in "plain view";
3.
Search of a moving vehicle;
4.
Consented warrantless search;
5.
Customs search;
6.
Stop and Frisk; and
7.
Exigent and emergency circumstances.[18]
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.[19]
It
is to be noted that petitioner was caught in the act of arranging the
heat-sealed plastic sachets in plain sight of PO3 Antonio and he voluntarily
surrendered them to him upon learning that he is a police officer. The seizure made by PO3 Antonio of the four plastic sachets from the
petitioner was not only incidental to a lawful arrest, but it also falls within
the purview of the plain view doctrine.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to
have that view are subject to seizure even without a search
warrant and may be introduced
in evidence. The plain
view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a)
the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification
for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the
officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or
otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully
make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful
intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.
(Emphasis supplied.)[20]
It is clear, therefore, that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. Since petitioners arrest is among the exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest and the evidence seized from the petitioner was the result of a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, which incidentally was in plain view of the arresting officer, the results of the ensuing search and seizure were admissible in evidence to prove petitioners guilt of the offense charged.
As to petitioners contention that the police failed to comply with the proper procedure in the transfer of custody of the seized evidence thereby casting serious doubt on its seizure, this too deserves scant consideration.
Section 21, paragraphs 1 and 2, Article II of RA No. 9165 provides:
Section 21. Custody and
Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall
take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team
having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon
confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be
submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative
examination;
x x x x.
Corolarilly, the implementing
provision of Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA No. 9165, provides:
(a) The apprehending team
having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, further, that
non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
and custody over said items.
x x x x.[21]
From the foregoing, it is clear that the failure of the law enforcers to comply strictly with the rule is not fatal. It does not render petitioners arrest illegal nor the evidence adduced against him inadmissible.[22] What is essential is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.[23]
Here,
the requirements of the law were substantially complied with and the integrity
of the drugs seized from the petitioner was preserved. More importantly, an unbroken chain of
custody of the prohibited drugs taken from the petitioner was sufficiently
established. The factual antecedents of
the case reveal that the petitioner voluntarily surrendered the plastic sachets
to PO3 Antonio when he was arrested.
Together with petitioner, the evidence seized from him were immediately
brought to the police station and upon arriving thereat, were turned over to PO3
Moran, the investigating officer. There
the evidence was marked. The turn-over
of the subject sachets and the person of the petitioner were then entered in
the official blotter. Thereafter, the
Chief of the SDEU, Police Senior Inspector Jose Ramirez
An unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs had, therefore, been established by the prosecution from the arresting officer, to the investigating officer, and finally to the forensic chemist. There is no doubt that the items seized from the petitioner at his residence were also the same items marked by the investigating officer, sent to the Crime Laboratory, and later on tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
For conviction of illegal possession of a prohibited drug to lie, the following elements must be established: (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug.[26] Based on the evidence submitted by the prosecution, the above elements were duly established in the present case. Mere possession of a regulated drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a satisfactory explanation of such possession the onus probandi is shifted to the accused, to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi.[27]
It is a settled rule that in cases involving violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner.[28] Although not constrained to blindly accept the findings of fact of trial courts, appellate courts can rest assured that such facts were gathered from witnesses who presented their statements live and in person in open court. In cases where conflicting sets of facts are presented, the trial courts are in the best position to recognize and distinguish spontaneous declaration from rehearsed spiel, straightforward assertion from a stuttering claim, definite statement from tentative disclosure, and to a certain degree, truth from untruth.[29]
In the present case, there is no compelling reason to reverse the findings of fact of the trial court. No evidence exist that shows any apparent inconsistencies in the narration of the prosecution witnesses of the events which transpired and led to the arrest of petitioner. After a careful evaluation of the records, We find no error was committed by the RTC and the CA to disregard their factual findings that petitioner committed the crime charged against him.
Against the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, petitioner merely denied the accusations against him and raised the defense of frame-up. The defense of denial and frame-up has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the defense of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence.[30]
As to the penalty, while We sustain the amount of fine, the indeterminate sentence imposed should, however, be modified.
Section 11, Article II, RA No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, provides:
Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a
fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten
million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who,
unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following
quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof:
x x x x.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the
foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be graduated as follows:
x x x x.
(3) Imprisonment
of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging
from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand
pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium,
morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or
marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu", or other dangerous drugs such as, but
not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those
similarly designed or newly-introduced drugs and their derivatives, without
having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond
therapeutic requirements; or less than three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.[31]
From
the foregoing, illegal possession of less than five (5) grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu is penalized with imprisonment of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) to Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00). The evidence adduced by the prosecution
established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner had in his possession 0.24
gram of shabu, or less
than five (5) grams of the dangerous drug, without any legal authority.
Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum period of the imposable penalty
shall not fall below the minimum period set by the law; the maximum period
shall not exceed the maximum period allowed under the law; hence, the
imposable penalty should be within the range of twelve (12) years and one
(1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE
CATRAL
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARIA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Designated additional member, per
Special Order No. 1028 dated
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga, with Associate Justices Vicente Q. Roxas and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 140-51.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] Supra note 1.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Rebellion
v. People, G.R. No. 175700,
[13] People
v.
[14] Emphasis supplied.
[15] People
v. Tudtud, 458 Phil. 752, 775 (2003).
[16] TSN,
(PO3 Rodrigo Antonio),
[17] 1987
Constitution, Article III, Sections 2 and 3 (2).
[18] People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529,
[19] People v. Nuevas, G.R. No.
170233,
[20] People v. Lagman, G.R. No. 168695, December
8, 2008, 573 SCRA 224, 236, citing People v. Doria, 361 Phil. 595,
633-634 (1999).
[21] Emphasis
supplied.
[22] People v. Pagkalinawan, G.R. No. 184805, March 3, 2010, 614 SCRA 202, 218, citing People v. Naquita, G.R. No. 180511, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 430, 448.
[23]
[24] Rollo, p. 37.
[25]
[26] People v. Teddy Batoon and Melchor Batoon, G.R. No. 184599, November 24, 2010.
[27] People v. Sembrano, G.R. No. 185848,
[28] People
v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 187070,
[29] People
v. Willie Midenilla, et al., G.R. No. 186470,
[30] People
v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 184804,
[31] Emphasis
supplied.