THIRD DIVISION
G.R.
No. 175074 (Jesus Torres v. People of the
Promulgated:
August 31, 2011
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SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
I concur in the result
that the petition is rejected and the September 6, 2006 and October 17, 2006
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) are upheld. While the ponencia
declined the supplication of petitioner that his appeal to the Sandiganbayan be
given due course, the ponencia
nevertheless impliedly granted the entreaty by delving on the merits of the
appealed conviction. I fully agree with
the ponencia that petitioner is
guilty of malversation as he is an accountable officer under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code. As a school
principal of a public high school, petitioner is liable for malversation if he
is entrusted with public funds and misappropriates them.
The ponencia is
correct in turning down the argument of petitioner that his erroneous appeal to
the CA should not be dismissed outright but referred to the proper court which
is the Sandiganbayan. This is in line
with Our ruling in Melencion v.
Sandiganbayan,[1] Moll v. Buban,[2]
and others that an appeal erroneously taken to the CA shall not be transferred
to the appropriate court (in this case, the Sandiganbayan) but shall be
dismissed outright pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
It is my opinion, however, that while the erroneous appeal
of petitioner can be dismissed as a matter of course, I find that the facts and
circumstances justify the relaxation and suspension of Our Rules of Court for
compelling reasons of equity and substantive justice. The records reveal that petitioner has no
financial resources to hire a de parte
lawyer and resorted to seeking legal representation from the Public Attorneys
Office (PAO) in Virac, Catanduanes. The
PAO lawyer assigned to his case bungled his job and filed a Notice of Appeal to
the CA when it should have been directed to the proper courtthe
Sandiganbayan. The PAO central, upon
being apprised of the error, lost no time in seeking the referral of the case
to the Sandiganbayan, but, unfortunately, the appeal period has lapsed. While it is the general rule that a party-litigant
is bound by the mistake or negligence of his counsel, in the case at bar, I
conclude that there was gross mistake or irresponsibility on the part of the
PAO lawyer.
In Aguilar v. Court
of Appeals,[3] the
Court granted relief to the hapless accused by reopening the case to give him
another chance to adduce evidence, thus:
[An accuseds] right to appeal should not be lost through technicalities. His liberty is at stake. x x x If he has to spend x x x long stretch in prison, his guilt must be established beyond reasonable doubt. He cannot lose his liberty because of the gross irresponsibility of his lawyer. Losing liberty by default of an insensitive lawyer should be frowned upon despite the fiction that a client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. The established jurisprudence holds:
x x x
The function of the rule that negligence or mistake of counsel in procedure is imputed to and binding upon the client, as any other procedural rules, is to serve as an instrument to advance the ends of justice. When in the circumstances of each case the rule deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.
x x x
The court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it.
x x x
If the incompetence, ignorance or inexperience of counsel is so great and the error committed as a result thereof is so serious that the client, who otherwise has a good case, is prejudiced and denied his day in court, the litigation may be reopened to give the client another chance to present his case. x x x
By analogy, it is my view that the Court should have
remanded the instant case to the Sandiganbayan and ordered petitioners appeal
to be given due course. The PAO lawyer,
who was assigned to the case of petitioner, is assumed to have handled hundreds
of cases for indigent litigants and should already be familiar with the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over final judgments,
resolutions or orders of the regional trial courts whether in the exercise of
their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein
provided pursuant to par. 3, Sec. 4(c) of Republic Act No. 8249. Apparently, he was not. Under the circumstances of the case, the Court
could have suspended the rules and accorded petitioner his right to appeal his
conviction to the Sandiganbayan.
Where ones liberty is at stake, it is fitting, but on a
case-to-case-basis, that a window for redress should be opened for the accused
especially in cases where the accused who is ordinarily unfamiliar with the
rules of procedure is prejudiced by the gross mistake or negligence of his
counsel. The deprivation of an accused
of liberty and/or property should certainly receive the liberal application of
the Rules of Court to attain justice and fairness.
I vote to dismiss the petition.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice