Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
|
JESUS TORRES, Petitioner, - versus - people of the Respondent. |
G.R. No. 175074 Present:
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson, PERALTA, ABAD, MENDOZA, and SERENO,* JJ.
Promulgated: August 31, 2011 |
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D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
This
is a petition for review on certiorari seeking
to reverse and set aside the Resolution[1]
dated
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
In
an Information[3] dated
That on or about the 27th day of April 1994,
or sometime subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Virac, Catanduanes,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, a public officer, being then the Principal of Viga Rural
Development High School, Viga, Catanduanes, and as such by reason of his office
and duties is responsible and accountable for public funds entrusted to and
received by him, to wit: PNB Checks (sic) Nos. C-983182-Q for P42,033.32;
C-983183-Q for P95,680.89; C-983184-Q for P58,940.33, all dated
April 26, 1994 in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED NINETY-SIX THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED FIFTY-FOUR PESOS and FIFTY-FOUR CENSTAVOS (P196,654.54),
Philippine Currency, representing salaries, salary differentials, additional
compensation allowance and Personal Emergency Relief Allowance from January to
March 1994 of the employees of the said school, taking advantage of his
position and committing the offense in relation to his office, encashed said
checks with the Philippine National Bank, Virac, Catanduanes Branch and once in
possession of the money, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and with grave abuse of confidence, misapply, misappropriate,
embezzle and convert to his personal use and benefit the aforementioned amount
of money, to the damage and prejudice of the Government.
Contrary to law.
Upon his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Consequently, trial on the merits ensued.
Evidence for the Prosecution
[Petitioner] Jesus Torres y Uchi was the principal of
Viga Rural Development High School (VRDHS).
On April 26, 1994, he directed Edmundo Lazado, the schools collection
and disbursing officer, to prepare the checks representing the teachers and
employees salaries, salary differentials, additional compensation allowance
(ACA) and personal emergency relief allowance (PERA) for the months of January
to March, 1994. Lazado prepared three
(3) checks in the total amount of P196,654.54, all dated April 26, 1994,
viz: PNB Check Nos. C-983182-Q for P42,033.32;
C-983183-Q for P95,680.89; C-983184-Q for P58,940.33 (Exhs. A,
B and C). The [petitioner] and
Amador Borre, Head Teacher III, signed the three (3) checks (TSN, Aug. 30,
2001, pp. 4-8).
Upon the instruction of the [petitioner], Lazado
endorsed the checks and handed them to the accused. It was the custom in the school for Lazado to
endorse the checks representing the teachers salaries and for the accused to
encash them at PNB, Virac Branch and deliver the cash to Lazado for distribution
to the teachers (Id., pp. 12-17).
The following day,
Evidence for the Defense
The [petitioner] admitted that he encashed the subject
checks at PNB, Virac Branch in the morning of
On
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Jesus Torres y
Uchi GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of malversation of public funds
as defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, and
hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
ranging from 12 years and 1 day of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, and to 18 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to
suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification; and to pay the fine
of P196,654.54 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.[7]
On September 8, 2005, petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal,[8] where it was indicated that he was seeking recourse and appealing the decision of the RTC before the Court of Appeals.
On
In its Comment[10] filed on June 29, 2006, the Office of the Solicitor General prayed that the appeal be dismissed outright, since transmittal to the proper court, in cases of erroneous modes of appeal, are proscribed.
On
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the provisions of Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules
and Section 4 of SC Circular No. 2-90, the instant appeal
hereby is DISMISSED OUTRIGHT for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[12]
but was denied in the Resolution[13]
dated
Hence, the petition raising the sole error:
Whether the honorable court
of appeals erred in dismissing the petitioners appeal outright instead of
certifying the case to the
Petitioner maintains that he inadvertently filed the notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals instead of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner implores that the Court exercise its sound discretion and prerogative to relax compliance to sound procedural rules and to decide the case on the merits, considering that from the beginning, he has been candid and straightforward about the fact that the case was wrongfully filed with the Court of Appeals instead of the Sandiganbayan.
The petition is without merit.
Paragraph 3, Section 4 (c) of
Republic Act No. 8249 (RA 8249),[15]
which defined the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, provides:
The Sandiganbayan
shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or orders of the regional trial courts whether in the exercise of
their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein
provided.[16]
Hence, upon his conviction, petitioners remedy should have been an appeal to the Sandiganbayan. There is nothing in said paragraph which can conceivably justify the filing of petitioners appeal before the Court of Appeals instead of the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, the Court of Appeals is bereft of any jurisdiction to review the judgment petitioner seeks to appeal.[17]
It must be emphasized, however, that
the designation of the wrong court does not necessarily affect the validity of
the notice of appeal. However, the designation of the proper court should
be made within the 15-day period to appeal. Once made within the said
period, the designation of the correct appellate court may be allowed even if
the records of the case are forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Otherwise,
Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court would apply,[18]
the relevant portion of which states:
Sec. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of
Appeals. x x x
An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals
shall not be transferred to the appropriate court, but shall be dismissed
outright.[19]
In
the case at bar, petitioner sought correction of the error in filing the appeal
way beyond the expiration of the period to appeal the decision. The RTC promulgated its Decision on
Besides, even if we look into the merits of his arguments, the case is doomed to fail. Contrary to petitioners argument, We find that he is an accountable officer within the contemplation of Article 217[20] of the Revised Penal Code, hence, is untenable.
An accountable public officer, within the purview of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, is one who has custody or control of public funds or property by reason of the duties of his office.[21] The nature of the duties of the public officer or employee, the fact that as part of his duties he received public money for which he is bound to account and failed to account for it, is the factor which determines whether or not malversation is committed by the accused public officer or employee. Hence, a school principal of a public high school, such as petitioner, may be held guilty of malversation if he or she is entrusted with public funds and misappropriates the same.
Petitioner also posits that he could not be convicted under the allegations in the Information without violating his constitutional right to be informed of the accusations against him. He maintains that the Information clearly charged him with intentional malversation and not malversation through negligence, which was the actual nature of malversation for which he was convicted by the trial court. This too lacks merit.
Malversation may be committed either through a positive act of misappropriation of public funds or property, or passively through negligence.[22] To sustain a charge of malversation, there must either be criminal intent or criminal negligence, and while the prevailing facts of a case may not show that deceit attended the commission of the offense, it will not preclude the reception of evidence to prove the existence of negligence because both are equally punishable under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.[23]
More in point, the felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it is committed through deceit or negligence, the law makes it punishable and prescribes a uniform penalty therefor. Even when the Information charges willful malversation, conviction for malversation through negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves the mode of commission of the offense.[24] Explicitly stated
x x x [E]ven on
the putative assumption that the evidence against petitioner yielded a case of
malversation by negligence, but the information was for intentional
malversation, under the circumstances of this case, his conviction under the
first mode of misappropriation would still be in order. Malversation is
committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa present
in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from mode
proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and conviction thereof is
proper. x x x[25]
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Designated as an additional member per Special Order No. 1028 dated June 21, 2011.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion, with Associate Justices Jose Catral Mendoza (now a member of this Court) and Sesinando E. Villon, concurring; rollo, pp. 41-42.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] Id. at 33.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] Entitled
An Act Further Defining The Jurisdiction Of The Sandiganbayan, Amending For
The Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, As Amended, Providing Funds Therefor,
And For Other Purposes. Approved on
[16] Emphasis
ours.
[17] Balaba v. People, G.R. No. 169519,
[18] Melencion
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 150684, June 12, 2008, 554 SCRA 345, 353; Moll v. Buban, 436 Phil. 627, 639 (2002). See also Balaba v. People, supra note 17, at 215.
[19] (Emphasis supplied.)
[20] Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or
property; Presumption of malversation. Any public officer who, by reason
of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall
appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through
abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public
funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the
misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods, if the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does
not exceed two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods,
if the amount involved is more than two hundred pesos, but does not exceed six
thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six
thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum
periods, if the amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos, but is less
than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty
shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua.
In all
cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of
perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds
malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure
of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with
which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima
facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal
use.
[21] Alejo v. People, G.R. No. 173360,
[22] See
People v. Ting Lan Uy, Jr., 511 Phil.
682, 691 (2005).
[23]
[24] Id.
at 691-692, citing Diaz v.
Sandiganbayan, 361 Phil. 789, 802-803 (1999).
[25] Cabello v. Sandiganbayan, 274
Phil. 369 (1991).